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Preface 
FEW MEN played a more prominent role in the political life of 
the United States from 1807 to 1825 than William Harris Craw- 
ford (1772-1834), and few of such major importance in any period 
of American history have been accorded so little attention by 
historians. Senator from Georgia for more than six years, staunch 
defender of the Bank of the United States, minister to France, 
secretary of war, secretary of the treasury for the fourth longest 
period in history, instigator and implementer of important re- 
forms, leading contender for the presidency until his illness in 
the fall of 1823, and active in the educational, political, and 
judicial life of his state until his death in 1834, Crawford has 
been all but forgotten by later generations. 
Writers of different periods have attributed this neglect to 
various factors, but the simple explanation is the absence of a 
single large collection of Crawford's personal papers. He often 
did not make a copy of outgoing correspondence and was careless 
about preserving the letters he received. Much of the material 
that survived was gathered by Crawford's son-in-law, George M. 
Dudley, who intended to write a memoir, but this material was 
lost when Dudley's house burned shortly after the Civil War. 
Over the years bits of Crawfordiana have found their way into 
depositories scattered throughout the country, and the examina- 
tion of hundreds of collections has uncovered information that 
permits an evaluation not clouded by political jealousy and op- 
position. 
There are still many gaps and unanswered questions. The  
materials on his pre-Senate years are quite skimpy, and informa- 
tion on his private life is not sufficient to limn the portrait one 
would wish. Politicians-and others-often revealed their motives 
and true feelings in correspondence with their wives and families, 
but not a single letter between Crawford and any member of his 
large family is known to exist. In other instances, key letters 
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are known by reference only. Even so, the new material does 
show Crawford to have been something more than a master of 
intrigue driven by ambition and something less than the paragon 
portrayed by his partisans. 
In monographs, biographies, general histories, and specialized 
series much of the information on Crawford is incorrect or dis- 
torted by a bias in favor of one or more of his political opponents. 
A considerable number of errors have resulted from relying too 
heavily on the memoirs of John Quincy Adams; others have 
stemmed from the unwillingness of authors to mine the less 
productive and more pedestrian bodies of material. I t  is not the 
purpose of this study to correct each of these inaccuracies-or even 
to indicate them. On a few occasions reference will be made to 
some especially gross misinterpretation or distortion of the ev- 
idence. 
In gathering material for this biography I have probably been 
helped by more people than have most authors. More than one 
hundred and fifty individuals, from directors to manuscript clerks, 
in some seventy-five repositories throughout the country have 
extended kindnesses and assistance that are beyond repayment. 
To  all of them I express my sincere gratitude. 
My thanks are extended to the staffs of the following repos- 
itories who have graciously granted permission to use and quote 
from collections in their custody: Boston Public Library; Hough- 
ton Library, Harvard University; Massachusetts Historical Society; 
New-York Historical Society; Research Libraries, The  New York 
Public Library, Astor, Lenox and Tilden Foundations; University 
of Rochester Library; Historical Society of Pennsylvania; Chicago 
Historical Society; Newberry Library; University of Chicago 
Library; J. K. Lilly Library, Indiana University; and Henry E. 
Huntington Library and Art Museum. The  location of the 
materials will be indicated on first citation. 
Special acknowledgments must be made to the late David M. 
Potter for allowing me to use the Ulrich B. Phillips Papers (then 
in his possession and now at Yale University), to John A. Munroe 
of the University of Delaware for extending courtesies in con- 
nection with the use of the James A. Bayard and the Louis 
McLane Papers, to William H.  Masterson of the University of 
Tennessee at Chattanooga for sharing some of his notes, and to 
Miss Fanny Golding (Columbus, Mississippi) and Mrs. E. E. 
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(Patty) Gross (Hattiesburg, Mississippi) for permission to use the 
papers in  their possession and for personal kindnesses. Financial 
aid from the Graduate School of Indiana University and  the John 
Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation was most welcome and 
greatly appreciated. 
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1 
The Early Georgia Years 
SOON AFTER the inauguration of John Quincy Adams in March 
1825, an uncommonly large man, emaciated and enfeebled from 
long illness, left Washington, D.C., for a 600-mile carriage trip 
to the South. He had traveled the same route many times in the 
preceding eighteen years, sometimes as senator, others as minister 
to France, and still others as secretary of war or of the treasury. 
This time the defeated presidential candidate was making his last 
journey from the capital to his beloved "Woodlawn," a few miles 
from Lexington, Georgia. He had seriously thought of retiring 
from national office ten years earlier; now the time had come, and 
the expectation of a more leisurely life buoyed his spirit during 
the arduous ride. William Harris Cratvford had served his country 
with distinction; during seven of his remaining nine years he 
would play a significant role in the political and judicial life of 
his state. 
Crawford, the sixth of eleven children, was born to Joel and 
Fanny Harris Crawford on February 24, 1772, in Amherst County, 
Virginia. He had three older and three younger brothers and 
two older and two younger sisters. The  family was not new to 
Virginia. Joel's great-grandfather John, Earl of Crawford, was 
born in Scotland in 1600, emigrated to Virginia in 1643, and was 
killed while fighting in Bacon's Rebellion in 1676. As a family, 
the Crawfords have been described as clannish, large of stature, 
physically powerful, given to a considerable amount of inter- 
marriage, and not without some distincti0n.l 
Financial reverses of an unknown nature induced Joel Crawford 
in 1779 to move his family to the Edgefield District of South 
Carolina, where he located on Stevens Creek about thirty miles 
above Augusta, Georgia. The  military operations of the Revolu- 
tion had placed Augusta in British hands earlier in 1779, and 
apparently in about a year the Crawford family crossed the Broad 
River into the Chester District. Joel was among those "rebels" 
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put in the Camden jail while the Tory-Patriot conflict raged in 
the area, but in the late summer of 1780 he was released through 
the efforts of some of his loyalist neighbors. Within the next two 
years he returned to the Edgefield District and then in 1783 moved 
to Kiokee Creek, near the present site of Appling, Georgia. 
Already a number of Virginia families lived in  the area, and 
more were soon to come. 
Young Crawford had received a little schooling in the Edgefield 
District, and judging from accounts of his father's zeal for educa- 
tion, it can be assumed that his children attended such schools 
as existed in the Chester District. I t  is known that they attended 
a nearby school in Georgia. Joel Crawford apparently hoped to 
send William Harris to the University of Edinburgh, which he 
believed offered the finest education a~ai lab le .~  These hopes were 
unrealized, however, and Crawford returned to the old field 
school. In 1788 resources were insufficient to finance his education 
at the academy in Augusta, and he became the teacher of the 
school he had so recently attended. That same year his father 
died and for the next few years Crawford continued to teach 
and to help on the farm. 
Crawford maintained his interest in formal education. In 1794 
-at the age of twenty-two-he enrolled as a pupil at Moses 
Waddel's Carmel Academy, near Appling. Waddel, a graduate of 
Hampden-Sydney College and a Presbyterian minister who was 
to become one of the great schoolmasters of the antebellum South, 
operated basically a college preparatory school. Latin, Greek, 
mathematics, and English grammar and literature were stressed; 
oral reading, declamation, and natural and moral philosophy 
1 Crawford's birthplace is now in Nelson County. For accounts of the Crawford 
family see Laurus Crciwfordiana, Memorials of that Branch of the Crawford Family 
(New York, 1883); Lucinda Stephens, comp., Crawford Genealogy (Macon, Ga., 
1936). 
2 J. E. D. Shipp, Giant Days, or T h e  Li fe  and Times of William H. Crawford 
(Americus, Ga., 1909), 25-26: [George W. Dudley], "William H. Crawford," James 
Herring and James Barton Longacre, T h e  National Portrait Gallery of Distinguished 
Americans (Philadelphia, 1840), 4:l. According to Shipp, the plans for young 
Crawford to accompany a Scottish merchant of Augusta on a buying trip to Scot- 
land-where arrangements would be made for his schooling-were canceled just 
before departure when the merchant attempted to cut his own throat. Benjamin F. 
Perry, Biographical Sketches of Eminent American Statesmen with Speeches, Ad- 
dresses and Letters (Philadelphia, 1887), 272, says the death of Joel and the loss of 
his property rendered attendance at  Edinburgh impractical. T h e  Crawford site on 
Kiokee Creek was in  Richmond County, but  i n  1790 i t  became a part of Columbia 
County. 
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received considerable attention; history, natural sciences, and the 
newer, more "practical" subjects were relegated to the bottom 
of the curriculum. Crawford's two-year attendance coincided with 
the life of this school. No doubt his previous experience, aptitude, 
and relative maturity prompted his appointment as usher (assis- 
tant or underteacher) during the second year. For this service 
in a student body that included Thomas W. Cobb (a strong 
supporter of Crawford in later years) and the headmaster's 
brother-in-law, John C. Calhoun, Crawford's tuition was remitted 
by one third. 
Waddel was never an easy taskmaster, and his recognition of 
the abilities of Crawford-only two years his junior-seems to 
confirm the reports that the transplanted Virginian learned his 
Latin and Greek quickly. He was especially fond, then and later, 
of Virgil, Horace, Thucydides, Cicero, and H ~ m e r , ~  and his later 
references to the history of the Greeks show that he did not 
confine his attention exclusively to literature. He loved books 
and enjoyed extolling their virtues to others; and his interest in 
and promotion of the writings of some of his friends and ac- 
quaintances bespeak an interest in contemporary literature as well. 
Many of Waddel's students at Carmel and at his more famous 
school at Willington, South Carolina (opened in 1804), later 
enrolled at various colleges in the Northeast, but Crawford was 
not so fortunate. He had already taught for several years, and 
his additional experience at Carmel-plus his admiration for the 
work of Waddel and the lack of any other marketable skill- 
probably induced him in July 1796 to accept a $300-a-year 
position as first English teacher at Richmond Academy in Augusta. 
The rector of the academy, chosen the previous year, was Charles 
Tait, and a warm friendship and lifelong political association 
developed between the two men. The  school had financial 
difficulties. Its two old buildings along the river were decaying 
and too far from the center of the city to compete with the newer 
and more conveniently located schools. There were evidences 
of irregular management by one of the clerks, as well as problems 
resulting from fluctuating tobacco prices and paper money. Tait 
resigned at the end of 1797, and for the next year Crawford 
served as rector and first English teacher at a salary of $500-$300 
3 Shipp, Crawford, 29: Dudley, "Crawford," 2: Joseph H. Cohh, Leisure Labors; 
or, Miscellanies Historical, Literary, and Political (New York, 1858), 135-36. 
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less than that of his predecessor. On January 1, 1799, Crawford 
received his last payment of $125 as a sch~olteacher.~ 
The  two and a half years at Augusta were significant ones for 
Crawford. His friendship with Tait promoted the political 
fortunes of both men. Five years after leaving Augusta the 
ex-schoolmaster married one of his former pupils. Susanna 
Gerardin, daughter of Louis Gerardin, a Savannah River Valley 
planter of French Huguenot descent, became Crawford's wife 
in 1804, the mother of his three daughters and five sons, and the 
mistress of a lively, happy household for their thirty years 
t ~ g e t h e r . ~  
An event of 1798, of only routine interest in Augusta at the 
time, was to plague Crawford during the presidential campaign 
of 1824. On July 2, 1798, the "young men of Augusta" addressed 
a letter-to which Crawford subscribed his name-to President 
John Adams assuring him of their "unalterable attachment to 
our country and its government." The  communication pointed 
out the shift in their attitudes as the French government had 
changed from one of worthy revolutionary aims to one of cor- 
ruption, and concluded: 
Altho' we are attached to the blessings of peace and deprecate 
the horrors of war, yet we are sensible, that self-preservation now 
points out a firm and energetic conduct of government; we view 
with the highest degree of approbation, those measures which 
have been pursued by the executive, for the preservation of our 
national honor. 
As we enjoy the supreme felicity of being citizens, OF perhaps, 
the only genuine and well balanced republic, now existing in the 
world, we feel a just contempt for a nation, who can brand us 
with the imputation of being a divided people, and who presum- 
ing on our division, have left us the only lawful alternative, dis- 
graceful peace, or war. 
4 Charles Guy Cordle, "An Ante-Bellum Academy, The  Academy of Richmond 
County, 1783-1863" (M.A. thesis, University of Georgia, 1935), 17-21, citing Minutes 
of the Trustees of Richmond Academy of appropriate dates. The  academy closed in 
1800 but reopened in 1802. 
5 There is much confusion regarding the spelling of "Gerardin," the spelling I 
accept. In  a beautifully written letter to "Dear Grandpa" on June 2, 1821, the 
oldest Crawford daughter, Caroline, addressed the communication to "Mr. L. 
Gerardin." It is rather unlikely that her parents would have permitted the letter 
to be sent with an incorrect spelling. This letter and several other Crawford items 
are in the possession of Crawford's great-great-granddaughter, Miss Fanny Golding 
of Columbus, Mississippi. 
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With the most unlimited confidence, in the firmness, justice and 
wisdom of your administration, we pledge ourselves to you and 
our fellow citizens, that we will be ready at the call of our country 
to defend what is dearer to us than our lives-her liberty and law. 
Adams in his reply of July 20 indicated he differed with his 
fellow citizens in general about the French Revolution, that he 
considered American support of it to be an "error of public 
opinion," and that the expression of confidence from Augusta was 
"more precious, as it was une~pected."~ 
In the 1820s Crawford's opponents charged him with having 
approved the oppressive measures of the Adams administration. 
They overlooked, or ignored, the facts that although the citizens 
of Augusta may have known of the passage of the Naturalization 
Act (June 18), they could not have had any knowledge of the 
Alien Act (June 25),  and that the Alien Enemies and Sedition 
acts were passed after the letter was sent. 
Crawford had decided, or been persuaded, that greater oppor- 
tunities lay open to him in another field. During his last year 
at Richmond Academy he had studied law, and in the spring of 
1799 he moved to Lexington, Oglethorpe County, and began 
practice. Other than the Augusta letter the only indication of 
Crawford's participation in public affairs prior to 1799 is his 
alleged opposition to the Yazoo land sales. Although Georgia 
laws permitted the head of a family to acquire 1,000 acres of 
land for "office and surveyor fees," by the 1790s the Indian title 
to desirable land had been extinguished only along the coast and 
in most of the area between the Savannah and Ogeechee rivers. 
The  influx of population into Georgia was great during this 
period, with much land speculation, and Georgia had substantial 
claims to nearly all the present states of Alabama and Mississippi. 
The  character of much of the unsettled land was little known, 
but the lands of the Yazoo River area were considered desirable. 
The Yazoo land companies, consisting of speculators from Georgia 
and many other states, had failed to meet the requirements of a 
grant by the Georgia legislature in 1789, but through bribery of 
6 The Augusta communication and Adams' reply are in the Augusta Chronicle 
and Gazette of the State, Aug. 11, 1798. Similar letters of support for Adams' 
French policy and Adams' replies are in the same paper, July 7, Aug. 18, Dec. 8, 
1798. John Clark, soon to be Crawford's bitter and lifelong enemy, was signatory 
to one of these. 
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the legislators and other means they succeeded in 1795 in obtain- 
ing a grant of more than 30,000,000 acres for $500,000, or one 
and two thirds cents per acre. 
The  public outcry was heard even before the legislative grant 
had been signed, and Crawford is said to have been the moving 
spirit behind a petition from the citizens of Columbia County 
urging Governor George Mathetvs to withhold his signature. The  
petition failed; the governor signed the biL7 James Jackson, 
Revolutionary hero and United States senator, so opposed the 
sale that he resigned from the Senate to work for repeal of the 
act, which was forthcoming in the next session of the legislature. 
There is no direct evidence of Crawford's role, but later political 
friendships-with Jackson among others-and personal animos- 
ities lend credence to accounts of his opposition to the grant. 
Although national concern with the Yazoo land frauds seems 
to have ended with the Fletcher v.  Pecli decision in 1810 and 
congressional compensation for "injured" purchasers in 18 14, the 
controversy had a more lasting influence on political parties in 
Georgia. The  Federalists, never very strong, were weakened by 
the popular belief that they were deeply involved in the frauds, 
and by 1800 they were no longer an effective political force. In 
the Republican party, Jackson's actions helped to bring about a 
split that lasted almost three decades; factional alignments within 
the Republican party depended largely on social and economic 
factors and on personalities. 
At the time of the Yazoo sale the Federalists were headed by 
Elijah Clark of Revolutionary reputation, by his sons John and 
Elijah, Jr., and by Mathews. The  Clarks were from North Car- 
olina, and it seems that a vast number of migrants from that state 
settled in Wilkes County and adhered to the faction soon to be 
dominated by John Clark. Clark had participated with his father 
in numerous Indian fights, was rough and ready in politics and 
personal habits, rather overbearing in disposition, and settled 
differences preferably by violent means. For many years he was 
the leader of the Republican group of speculators, small farmers, 
and transplanted North Carolinians. 
7 Shipp, Crawford, 33: Ulrich B.  Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, American 
Historical Association Annual Report, 1901 (Washington, D.C., 1902), 2:31, cites 
no references. I have been unable to substantiate the references on this point in 
several secondary accounts or to locate any primary materials linking Crawford 
with this incident. 
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English-born James Jackson of Savannah was the leader in the 
coastal area, but he sought the friendship and support of promis- 
ing young men from all over the state. More able than Clark, 
Jackson was almost equally given to violence and could not 
maintain civil social relations with political opponents. His 
closest political liaisons in this period were with the Virginians 
who had settled in large numbers in the Savannah River area, 
especially in Elbert County. Among these Virginians were Craw- 
ford, Tait, the Gilmers, the Barnetts, and William W. Bibb. 
There was a traditional and persistent rivalry between the North 
Carolinians and Virginians, and often the causes (other than 
personal) for factional differences in Georgia were difficult to 
define.8 
As Georgia expanded westward from the coastal-Savannah 
River strip and grew from 82,000 in 1790 to more than a quarter 
million in 1810, the Jackson mantle fell to George M. Troup of 
Savannah and Crawford of Lexington. Clark became undisputed 
head of the other group and a bitter personal rival of Crawford. 
Both factions were Republican, but the Crawford-Troup align- 
ment continued to draw its strength from the Virginians, the 
larger landowners, the older settled areas, and the regions with 
the highest proportion of slaves. 
In the clannish, turbulent, violent Savannah-Ogeechee River 
frontier Crawford had grown to maturity, taken advantage of the 
best educational training that conditions and finances permitted, 
taught school, attracted the attention of several of the current 
and future leaders, and launched his legal-political career. Most 
of the lawyers at that time rode the court circuit; this mobility 
offered excellent opportunities for a man with political ambitions. 
In Georgia the political advantages of this practice were even 
greater than in some of the other states, since the circuit courts 
were the highest in the state until 1845. 
Crawford fitted well into this world. This ruggedly handsome 
"giant of a manw-six feet three and well over two hundred 
pounds-had regular features, "clear blue, mild, though radiant" 
eyes, and a fair and ruddy complexion. He  was very active 
physically but somewhat awkward in movement, possessed little 
vanity and not many of the social graces, had a fine, logical mind 
8 For an account of the development of these factions see Phillips, Georgia and 
State Rights, 94-102. 
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and a good command of the English language, but his oratorical 
skills were not proportionate to his powerful voice. Believing so 
thoroughly in getting to the heart of the matter quickly and 
possessing a greater desire to convince than to please, Crawfo;d 
was sometimes considered blunt. 
At twenty-seven Crawford's character was doubtless well formed. 
His sincerity and accessibility, his excellent memory, his prompt 
and careful mastery of his cases, a professional zeal that made his 
clients' causes his own, his wit, and the forceful presentation of 
his cogent arguments to judge or jury in thirty minutes or less 
helped to make him an immediate success at the bar. Nor should 
one overlook Crawford's mental and physical courage, his un- 
polished but genuine amiability, and hearty sense of humor-he 
loved to tell anecdotes, told them well, and was a "capital" 
laugher-as qualities that would attract legal business and win 
friends. 
The  first fruits of Crawford's rapidly developing connections 
in Georgia politics ripened at the end of 1799. In December the 
legislature authorized the Georgia secretary of state, Horatio 
Marbury, and two commissioners to prepare a one-volume digest 
of the Georgia laws.s George Watkins and Crawford were chosen 
as the commissioners. Crawford's choice can probably be at- 
tributed to his friendship with James Jackson (now governor), 
the mutual attachment and admiration that had developed 
between Crawford and Peter Early of Greene County (the lead- 
ing upcountry lawyer and later governor, 1813-1815), and his 
association with Watkins who had served as chairman of the 
meeting of the "young men of Augusta" in July 1798. The  three 
appointees wrote Jackson on December 9, 1800, asking for a part 
of the money in advance to help meet expenses.1° Watkins' 
participation was short-lived, but Marbury and Crawford pre- 
9 No official action had followed an earlier law authorizing a digest, but Robert 
and George Watkins undertook the work on their own. In 1799 Governor James 
Jackson disapproved an appropriation for publication of their volume because it 
contained the Yazoo Act. The contention that the rescinding act was also included 
had no effect, and before the matter was concluded Jackson and Robert Watkins 
had fought three duels. Shipp, Crawford, 35-39; Dudley, "Crawford," 6-7. For a 
brief account of Jackson see Thomas U. P. Charlton, The Life of Major General 
James Jackson, Part I (Augusta, Ga., 1809). The Watkins Digest was published by 
R. Aiken of Philadelphia in 1800. 
lOThe three to James Jackson, William H. Crawford Papers (Yale University 
Library). 
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sented the results of their work to the governor on March 2, 
1801. The  digest was printed the following year.ll 
Although this digest did not differ greatly from the unofficial 
one by George and Robert Watkins, the work of preparation 
kept Crawford for some time in the capital city of Louisville, 
permitted him to become better acquainted with the details of 
the laws of the state, and facilitated contacts that seem not to 
have injured his law practice or hampered his political career.12 
In 1802 Early, elected to Congress, turned his law practice over 
to Crawford, who thus became perhaps the most active lawyer 
in the Western Circuit.13 His rise in the profession, his associa- 
tions, and his refusal to serve as counsel for land speculators made 
him persona non  grata to the Clark faction, which wished to 
undermine or destroy him. In 1802, a lesser light of the Clark 
group was the unfortunate instrumentality of an attempt to ruin 
Craw ford. 
Peter Lawrence Van Alen went from New York to Georgia 
in the mid-1790s and took up residence in Elbert County. He 
allied himself with the Clark faction and in 1800 became solicitor 
general of the Western Circuit. Opportunities for land specula- 
tion were numerous in rapidly growing Georgia, and apparently 
Clark, Van Alen, and their associates were interested in acquiring 
large quantities of land by almost any methods. Crawford not 
only refused to become their attorney in land suits but was 
vigorous in opposition to their schemes. They seem to have 
determined to involve him in an affair of honor, apparently 
11 Horatio Marbury and William H. Crawford, Digest of the Laws of the State 
of Georgia . . . (Savannah, Ga., 1802). T h e  errata pages seem to have been prepared 
by J. Meriwether, Edwin Mounger, and George R. Clayton. 
12 While in Louisville, Crawford worked and relaxed at the home of his cousin 
William Barnett. Barnett's father, Nathaniel, had married Crawford's aunt; his 
brother Joel married Crawford's older sister Ann. William and Joel were for some 
time in the Georgia legislature, and William defeated John Forsyth for Congress in 
1812. Joel became a wealthy planter in Mississippi. Shipp, Crawford, 42-43. While 
at Barnett's, Crawford became acquainted with the Gilmers who lived immediately 
opposite. Crawford's promise to young George R. Gilmer, future governor of 
Georgia, was later acknowledged but modified by the suggestion that Gilmer read 
law with a Mr. Upson. Crawford felt that his duties in Washington prevented his 
giving adequate attention to Gilmer's legal training. George R. Gilmer, Sketches 
of some of the First Settlers of Upper Georgia, of the Cherokee, and the Author, 
rev. ed. (Americus, Ga., 1926), 98. The  first edition of Gilmer, with the same title, 
was published in New York in 1855. 
13 See Oglethorpe County Inferior Court Minutes, 1794-1811, and minutes of 
other courts (microfilm, Georgia Department of Archives and History). 
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hoping he would refuse to duel and thereby be politically ruined 
or that he would accept and be killed, since he was not noted 
for proficiency with pistols. As in many such affairs, the details 
of the route to the dueling stakes are tortuous. Finally, however, 
Van Alen challenged Crawford. 
Crawford accepted and appeared at the chosen site, Fort 
Charlotte-twelve miles below Petersburg on the Carolina side- 
with borrowed pistols. I t  is said he did not even try them out 
until the morning of the encounter and that they snapped twice 
while he was testing them. On the first shot neither party was 
hit; on the second round Van Alen was mortally wounded, but 
Crawford was uninjured. Instead of ruining Crawford, the 
episode seems to have increased his prestige-and to have increased 
Clark's dislike for him.l4 
In the summer of 1803, Thomas Peter resigned as judge of 
the superior court of the Western Judicial District and John 
Griffin, who was married to a sister of Clark's wife, was appointed 
to the post until the legislature could make its selection. That 
winter both Clark and Crawford were members of the legislature, 
the latter for the first time. Clark and his partisans supported 
Griffin for the appointment, but Charles Tait, favorite of the 
Crawford group, was chosen to the judgeship.15 Not for some 
years had the Clarkites suffered so signal a defeat in filling an 
important office, and from this incident a duel between Crawford 
and Clark was to develop. The  grand juries of the courts of 
Clark, Greene, Hancock, Jackson, Franklin, and Lincoln counties 
had recommended that Griffin be chosen. Crawford charged that 
Clark had recently practiced before all but one of those courts 
14 Details may be found in Shipp, Crawford, 44-49; Gilmer, Sketches, 98-99. Most 
writers have used Van Allen instead of Van Alen. Nearly all of the letters in the P. 
L. Van Alen folder. GDAH, are signed P. Alen and the return address is usually 
Peter L. Van Alen. In the Oglethorpe County Inferior Court Minutes, 1794-1811, 
Peter L. V. Alen was listed as practicing attorney in the June 1800 term; in the 
January 1801 term he was listed as P. Alen. Contrary to the statements of several 
authors, Van Alen was not a kinsman of Martin Van Buren; it does appear that 
Van Alen's brother David married a cousin of Van Buren. 
15A letter from James Jackson to John Milledge, Sept. 1, 1801, is not at all 
clear in its meaning. It is clear that Jackson was engaged in political maneuvering 
and that he had mentioned Crawford as a candidate for the "C[ircuit?] Judgeship" 
to "have some [one] from the Westward." Barnett, he noted, and the "whole back 
country" were "wroth" over the other person recommended. But "Crawford will 
satisfy them all-Early and a few Yazoo lawyers excepted-and we must take some 
of those friendly Young Men by the hand." Charlton, Jackson, 182-85, esp. 184. 
Shipp, Crawford, 41, citing Charlton, 184, has a somewhat different "translation." 
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and that he had influenced the actions of the grand juries. He 
did not say that Clark had bribed, or attempted to bribe, the 
members of the juries, but he pointed out in his letters that 
influence took many forms. Newspaper letters and personal 
correspondence of the two simply worsened the matter, and they 
agreed to meet on the Carolina side in December 1804. An 
appeal to Governor John Milledge by "several disinterested 
gentlemen" resulted in the naming of a court of honor, which 
reported on December 12. The  court thought the basis of the 
dispute of insufficient consequence to have produced the an- 
imosity, unhesitatingly declared both gentlemen "brave and in- 
trepid," and urged them to settle their quarrel. Clark and 
Crawford acceded to the decision, but the former seems not to 
have been happy about it. 
The  matter, however, was not settled. In February 1806 Robert 
Clary accused Clark of being involved in a land transaction in 
which payment was made with counterfeit money. Clark charged 
conspiratorial activity against him; he was convinced that Craw- 
ford and Tait (before whom Clary's deposition was made) were 
determined to destroy him-or perhaps he was still determined to 
destroy Crawford-and on December 2, 1806, after an unsuccess- 
ful attempt to impeach Tait,lB he sent Crawford a challenge, 
which was accepted on the same day. Two weeks later the parties 
met at the "High Shoals of the Appalachee" in the Indian 
Territory. On the first fire Clark was unharmed; Crawford's 
left wrist was badly damaged. Clark wished to continue but 
George Moore, Crawford's second, would not allow further ex- 
change. Clark's subsequent challenge, on July 22, 1807, was 
declined by Crawford who considered that by the previous meet- 
ing the "contest was brought to a final issue and the difference 
adjusted as far as an interview of that kind is intended or cal- 
culated for adjustment. . . ."I7 
leManuscript Journal, House of Representatives, June 11, Nov. 10, 29, 1806 
(GDAH). Clary, accused of Negro stealing, was a prisoner in custody of losiah 
Glass. The  deposition was taken after court hours. T h e  report disapproving Clark's 
charges for impeachment of Tait  was carried, 53 to 3. 
17 Accounts may be found in John Clark, Considerations of the Purity of the 
Principles of William H. Crawford . . . (Augusta, Ga., 1819), 13-105: Shipp, Craw- 
ford, 50-75. Neither is completely accurate, but it is not considered worthwhile to 
correct the numerous errors. I t  seems that Clark may have written the 1807 
challenge letter about the time he caught Tait  on Jefferson Street in Milledgeville 
and gave him thirty or forty lashes with his riding whip. For that assault Clark 
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Crawford's two duels in four years, Jackson's several encounters, 
and many others reflect the standards of politics and society in 
Georgia at that time. The  man who would not defend his "sacred 
- 
honor" with his life could not command the respect and esteem 
of his fellows. Crawford could live with this: he was Dart and 
I 
parcel of the frontier and was known from his early years as 
self-reliant, forthright, and outspoken, though affable and good- 
natured. He did not run from difficulty, but it does not appear 
that he intentionally offended others. He would have been rash 
deliberately to provoke a duel with Clark, whose long-established 
reputation indicated physical violence as a favorite method of 
resolving controversies. It  is said that Clark mellowed in old 
age and grew friendly with all but Crawford. Crawford's dislike 
for Clark probably was less intense than Clark's for Crawford, but 
there are indications that Crawford would not have been averse 
to some other person's engaging Clark in mortal combat. After 
1806, however, Crawford renounced physical violence as a means 
of settling differences between himself and others, and in 1811, 
as John kandolph9s second, he appears to have played an im- 
portant role in persuading Randolph and John W. Eppes that a 
duel between them was not required.18 
Crawford continued as representative from Oglethorpe County 
in the Georgia assembly through the 1806 session; his committee 
memberships were numerous, and apparently his work was satis- 
factory and his political friendships and contacts effective, for 
he was chosen by his colleagues for the United States Senate. 
Crawford's efforts to establish free schools and to authorize a 
lottery to raise $3,000 for books for the state college at Athens 
reflect his lifelong concern for improving education. He sought 
to improve the judicial system and the electoral process and to 
provide funds for bridges and making the rivers more easily 
was fined $2,000 and placed on security for good conduct for five years. Shortly 
thereafter Governor Jared Irwin remitted the fine in all its parts. Cobb, Leisure 
Labors, 139, says that Crawford, "naturally awkward, nervous, and every way un- 
qualified for a genuine duellist . . . took his position at the peg with the same 
carelessness as he was wont to swagger to his seat at the bar of a county court, 
exposing his left arm in a maner to catch the ball of even the rawest duellist." 
Dudley, "Crawford," 5, says Crawford looked upon his duels with "deep and 
poignant regret." 
18 Randolph to James M. Garnett, April 28, 1811 (including copy of Crawford to 
Randolph, March 28, 1811), Correspondence of John Randolph and James M. 
Garnett, compiled by W. C. Bruce (Virginia State Library, Richmond); Irving Brant, 
James Madison, 6 vols. (Indianapolis, Ind., 1941-1961), 5:263. 
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navigable. He was also successful in advocating that importation 
of slaves into Georgia, both from other states and from abroad, 
be prohibited.la 
The legislature met at the new capital, Milledgeville, for the 
first time on November 2, 1807, and five days later the two 
branches proceeded by separate ballot to elect a successor to the 
late Abraham Baldwin. From the ballots "it appeared that 
William Harris Crawford Esq. was elected Senator to the Congress 
of the United States."20 Crawford's long opposition to the Clark 
faction, duels with two of that group, flourishing law practice 
and wide acquaintance in the state, creditable though not out- 
standing service in the house, personal popularity and recognized 
ability, support by key figures of the anti-Clarkites, intimate 
knowledge of Georgia politics, and the setback administered to 
Clark in his attempt to impeach Tait help to explain Crawford's 
rise from beginning lawyer in 1799 to United States senator in 
eight years. He was to remain in national service for eighteen 
years, and not until 1827 did he again hold state office. 
Crawford had a strong attachment to Georgia and to his 
farm-plantation; during nearly two decades of national service 
he visited Georgia in the summer whenever possible. Year by 
year the desire to lead the life of a country gentleman appeared 
to strengthen, though he did not permanently return to Wood- 
lawn until the spring of 1825. 
It  seems that Crawford had just acquired the initial tract of 
Woodlawn at the time of his marriage in 1804. These 260 acres, 
located approximately three miles from Lexington, were listed 
on the tax books of 1805 as "second class" or second quality.21 
He was taxed for only two slaves in 1806 instead of the four of 
1805, but he had increased his landholdings to 300 acres. Craw- 
ford had by then acquired a two-wheeled carriage, a bequest of 
Francis Meson. The  taxable acreage dropped back to 260 in 1807 
and remained steady until 1811 when an additional 736 acres, 
second class, was listed from Jackson County. He had owned and 
19 Manuscript Journal, esp. Nov. 15, 25, Dec. 1, 2, 1805; Nov. 19, 24, 1804: Nov. 
12, Dec. 2, 1805; Nov. 15, 19, 1806. 
20 Ibid., NOV. 7, 1807. 
21 It is probable that the William H. Crafford listed in John C. Evans' district 
in 1799 was Crawford. He was taxed for one Negro, but no land. All information 
on Crawford's property is taken from "Tax Digest-Oglethorpe County" (microfilm, 
GDAH). Land in Georgia at the time was classed as first, second, or third quality. 
and "Pine Land." 
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apparently disposed of a lot in Athens but held two lots in Jeffer- 
son. A four-wheeled carriage was added to the tax list in 1809, 
and by 18 1 1 the slaves had increased to sixteen. 
The  year 18 1 1 seems to have been a turning point in Crawford's 
finances, for then he, George Phillips, and Robert Allison filed 
their final report with the Court of Ordinary in Lexington on 
the administration of the will of Francis Meson. Meson, a 
merchant of Lexington, had made his will on August 30, 1806, 
and died eight days later. He stipulated that $8,000 be used to 
establish an academy, bequeathed to Crawford a carriage and 
two carriage horses, and gave equal parts of the remainder of 
his estate (after the satisfaction of some express money bequests) 
to the three executors. Oglethorpe County had no academy but 
did have academy commissioners in 1806; Crawford and Phillips 
were two of the five. Action on the academy was rapid, and 
Crawford was on the first board of trustees. The  portion of the 
estate divided among the three executors was "no less than 
$30,000."22 It  is probably safe to assume that Crawford had 
been Meson's attorney, that the relationship of the two men had 
been cordial, and that Crawford used some of the bequest from 
Meson for the purchase of land, for Woodlawn increased from 
300 acres in 181 1 to 800 in 1812 and to 1,100 the following year. 
Between 1804 and 181 3 Crawford's landholdings had grown 
from farmer to planter proportions, but his slaveholdings would 
not justify designating him a planter until the 1820s. He was 
one of the largest landholders in Oglethorpe County, a reasonably 
fertile area of the Georgia Piedmont. Little is known of his 
agricultural production beyond the facts that he did raise cotton, 
corn, and hogs and had rather extensive orchards. He trusted 
only himself and his older children to tend the fruit trees, which 
suffered from neglect during his stay in France. Crawford also 
experimented with different fertilizing and nitrogen-fixing agents, 
but his major innovative efforts were devoted to the introduction 
of new seeds, grasses, vines, and fruits. He often asked friends to 
experiment by sharing the imports with them. Thomas Jefferson, 
James Madison, John Randolph, Nathaniel Macon, and Henry 
22 E. Merton Coulter, "Francis Meson, An Early Georgia Merchant and Philan- 
thropist," Georgia Historical Quarterly 42 (March 1958):26-43; "Meson Academy, 
Lexington, Georgia," ibid. (June 1958):125-62. Coulter says that the words on the 
marble slab on Meson's grave were probably chosen by Crawford and that it has 
been generally assumed that Crawford wrote Meson's will. 
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Clay were among those who tested seeds and plants that Crawford 
hoped would prove profitably adaptable to the climate and soil 
of the southern United States. 
The house at Woodlawn was said to boast no "artificial em- 
bellishments of taste"; rather it portrayed the "simplicity and 
unostentatious habits of its illustrious owner." Between the house 
and the main road was a "magnificent forest of oaks" through 
which wound an avenue just wide enough for vehicles to pass. 
T o  the rear of the house was the extensive plantation clearing, 
dotted with apple and peach orchards. A spring only a few yards 
from the house was the source of a clear little brook that mean- 
dered through the open area. The  garden contained an abundance 
of flowering shrubs, choice fruit trees, and numerous flowerbeds. 
On the front lawn, under a large oak, the entire family frequently 
gathered on summer evenings.23 There was no affectation in 
Crawford's manner or dress-and Mrs. Crawford was said to be 
as unaffected as he-but he was charitable, seldom asked the price 
of anything, and considered nothing expensive if it contributed 
to the comfort of himself or his family. 
There was little or nothing in the Crawford household to 
support the image of the stern authoritarian family of the early 
nineteenth century; Woodlawn was often referred to as "Liberty 
Hall." Crawford had a great respect for human dignity, sought 
the development of individuals as free spirits, and was unflagging 
in his zeal to promote the education of his children. Every child, 
from the oldest to the youngest, was free to express his or her 
opinion on the topic of the moment; if an opinion or assertion 
was combated, it was in such a way as to demonstrate how 
a more correct judgment might be reached. Each person was 
encouraged to be himself, and the actions of each were open to 
praise or adverse criticism by the others. The  father was subject 
to the same treatment as all the others and is said to have admitted 
his errors or argued his defense in the "same kind spirit and 
good temper" as everyone else. Free speech, equal rights, and 
equal suffrage-the trinity of democracy-began at home. Mis- 
fortunes and joys were borne or shared in common. Indoor 
amusements included chess, drafts, and other games of calcula- 
tion and judgment as well as games that called for "rapid thought, 
quick perception, and ready answers." Outdoors, games of cour- 
23 Cobb, Leisure Labors, 233-34. 
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age and agility were played. Though robbed of much of his 
physical power by his illness, Crawford often participated in these 
activities throughout his life. 
Crawford's espousal of the techniques and the freedom of the 
Pestalozzian school was in perfect keeping with his general phi- 
losophy of rearing children, and he and William W. Bibb (doctor, 
senator, and Crawford partisan) established and sustained a 
Pestalozzian school in Georgia for several years. But much of the 
education of the Crawford children took place in the capital 
city. They were sent to the best schools and Crawford personally 
examined the children daily to satisfy himself about their progress 
and the methods of instruction. He would often have them read 
with him. The  Bible was the chief classbook for these sessions, 
and Job and the Psalms were Crawford's favorite books. All 
during his cabinet service-except for the period of his severe 
illness-he held these extrainstructional meetings, and after his 
return to Georgia he continued the practice with his younger 
children. Though Crawford frequently read the Bible, he thought 
formal sectarian religion often hypocritical; he never made a 
profession of religion but believed in Christianity and was a 
life member of the American Bible Society.24 
When Crawford left Woodlawn in 1807 it was a farm of only 
three hundred acres, and this man who had risen so rapidly was 
thirty-five, the father of Caroline and John, and in his manners 
showed few traces of his frontier background. His intimate and 
detailed knowledge of Georgia political activities dimmed with 
the years away from home, but his zest for the game quickly 
revived when he returned to his beloved estate in 1825. 
24 Ibid., 234; Dudley, "Crawford," 2-5, 7; Gilmer, Sketches, 129. 
In the Senate: 
Defender of the Bank 
WHEN CKAWFORD became a senator in late 1807, both the United 
States and the Republican party were divided. Beset by persisting 
commercial and diplomatic difficulties which periodically reached 
crisis proportions in the succeeding five years, Congress reflected 
acute sectional differences, interparty struggle, and intraparty 
strife. The war among the European powers-especially between 
England and France-had permitted the American shipping 
interests to engage in a lucrative wartime, or mushroom, com- 
merce with the colonies of those countries, but the normal 
commerce of the United States-particularly in cotton and other 
heavy products-had suffered a great decline because it was less 
rewarding to the shippers. The  shipping areas of the country 
took a jaundiced view of any attempt to curtail or interdict the 
wartime commerce, while the areas producing the heavy goods 
were ardent in the defense of neutral rights as a protector of the 
normal commerce which was essential to their economic well- 
being. Generally, the Federalists supported the shipping interests 
and the Republicans the producing, but there were significant 
exceptions. 
Resolution of the problems facing the nation was made more 
difficult by the growing factionalism in the party in power, the 
Jeffersonian Republicans. The  President's recall of James Monroe 
af ter his abortive effort to negotiate a satisfactory commercial 
agreement with England placed Monroe temporarily in opposi- 
tion to the administration, though not in alliance with the 
eccentric John Randolph and his followers, who since the im- 
peachment trial of Associate Justice Samuel Chase had tended to 
go their own way. Republican ranks were further rent by the 
activities of Aaron Burr, whose trial for treason had recently 
closed at Richmond. Also, the Republicans had come to differ 
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among themselves about the proper role and function of the 
national government almost as sharply as they had differed with 
the Federalists a few years before. 
Crawford's public experience had been confined to the state 
level, and there is no evidence that he had really grappled with 
national issues or had reached any firm conclusions about the 
role of the central government. As a freshman senator-arriving 
six weeks after the session began-he spoke infrequently, but his 
attack on the statements of William Branch Giles, senator from 
Virginia and long a national figure and Republican factionalist, 
indicated an unwillingness to be bound by any party considera- 
tions. Generally, during the 1807- 1808 session Crawford seemed 
to be acquainting himself with some of the problems and fulfilling 
a number of committee assignments creditab1y.l 
Soon after the adjournment of Congress Crawford returned to 
Georgia in company with congressmen William W. Bibb, George 
M. Troup, and Thomas W. Cobb, all of whom were to play 
important roles in his political career. They traveled with John 
Randolph and were guests at his plantation, "Bizarre." They 
must have discussed James Monroe's chances for gaining the 
presidency that year because Randolph thought they would reach 
Georgia with a "greater zeal for the election of Colonel M[onroe] 
than possessed them" when they left Washington. Three weeks 
later Randolph wrote that Bibb, Cobb, Crawford, and Joseph 
Bryan (a Georgia senator at the time) were zealous in the cause 
of the election of Monroe. Monroe's candidacy brought a tempo- 
rary break in a long friendship with Madison, and Bryan's support 
of Monroe hurt the state senator "greatly." Other Georgia sup- 
porters of Monroe, Bryan said, had been "destroyed" politically 
by their opposition to the successful M a d i s ~ n . ~  
One can only guess how zealous Crawford was in Monroe's 
cause, but whatever his role it apparently had no adverse effects 
on his career. Perhaps a letter of March 23, 25, and 26 to a "friend 
in Hancock County" was intended to persuade some of his fellow 
Georgians to support Monroe rather than Madison. Crawford 
1 T h e  Debates and Proceedings of the Congress of the United States . . . (Wash- 
ington, D.C., 1852). 10th Cong., 1st sess., 1:47, 55, 64, 79, 86, 98-99, 106, 131, 177, 
313-17, 375, 381-82. Hereafter cited as Annals. 
2 John Randolph to James M. Garnett, May 8, 27, 1808, Randolph-Garnett; Joseph 
Bryan to Randolph, Jan. 31, Feb. 3, 1808, Jan. 4, 1810, Joseph Bryan Papers 
(Virginia State Library). 
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said some favorable things about Monroe's communication of 
- 
the previous month on his activities in England, thought a full 
view of the negotiations would justify Monroe's and William 
Pinkney's signing of the treaty with England, and believed that 
the former minister had acted the part of an "honest upright 
Rep~blican."~ A certain independence-or even recalcitrance- 
on the part of Monroe may have attracted Crawford, but there 
is no evidence to indicate a close friendship between these two 
until after Monroe began his service as secretary of state in 1811. 
In the fall of 1808, Crawford staked his claim to recognition 
and leadership by his discussion of the embargo, but he was 
little involved in strictly domestic matters either in that session 
of Congress or the special session of the following summer. In 
1809 he was keenly interested in the gubernatorial contest in 
Georgia; he made two trips to the state, visited several counties, 
and corresponded and conferred with the successful candidate, 
David B. Mitchell. Crawford must have been pleased late in 1809 
when his friend of many years, Charles Tait, was chosen as his 
colleague in the Senate.4 
Crawford's claim for national stature was strengthened in early 
1810 by his speech against the frigate bill during which he 
sharply criticized President Madison's message to Congress,5 but 
it was in February 1811 that he definitely established that stature 
-and gained a position of preeminence in the Senate-by his 
able and vigorous advocacy of the renewal of the charter of the 
First Bank of the United  state^.^ Henry Clay, later ardent 
supporter of the bank, was the most vocal opponent of renewal. 
The establishment of the bank in 1791 had been part of the 
ideology and power struggle between Alexander Hamilton and 
Thomas Jefferson, but the Jeffersonian Republicans had come 
to recognize the beneficial effects of the institution and had 
actually strengthened and expanded it. The bank played a vital 
3 Georgia Argus, April 12, 1808 (Tuesday morning extra). The original letter 
has not been located. 
4 Crawford to General [David B. Mitchell], May 1, 1809, Miscellaneous, MSS C 
(New-York Historical Society); Crawford to Mitchell, Oct. 15, 1809, Miscellaneous 
Collection (Historical Society of Pennsylvania); Annals, l l th  Cong., 2d sess., 519. 
5 For Crawford's routine activities and committee assignments see Annals, l l th  
Cong., 2d sess., 473, 479, 483, 484, 511-12, 525, 530, 550, 577, 587, 634, 664, 671-72, 
674. See chapter 3 for a discussion of the frigate bill. 
6Action on the renewal bill had been postponed during the preceding session. 
Ibid., 598, 625, 661, 669. 
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role as fiscal agent of the government and acted as a stabilizing 
influence on the economy and a restraining force on state banks 
whose notes often were not backed by specie. Some Republican 
opponents of the bank, particularly from the South, believed the 
bank an unconstitutional manifestation of federal power danger- 
ous to democratic institutions, while others professed to fear the 
evil influence which British stockholders might exercise. Still 
others (such as Samuel and Robert Smith of Maryland, Michael 
Leib of Pennsylvania, and Giles) appeared more concerned about 
the influence of Albert Gallatin, secretary of the treasury and long 
a supporter of the bank. 
During 1810 the state banks waged a campaign to arouse public 
opinion against the bank. The  campaign was most successful 
in the larger states, and several legislatures, including those of 
Virginia, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania, had instructed their 
senators and requested their representatives to vote against re- 
charter. In the smaller states the efforts of the state banks met 
with indifferent success, and many thought the imminence of 
war made the time inauspicious for disrupting the fiscal system 
of the government. 
On December 10, 1810, a petition from the directors of the 
bank seeking renewal of the charter was referred to a five-man 
committee, with Crawford as chairman. Secretary of Treasury 
Gallatin, who in 1809 had recommended renewal of the charter, 
told the committee that continuation of the bank would greatly 
facilitate the collection of revenue and promote the public wel- 
fare; he cautioned that serious shock to commercial, banking, 
and national credit could come from ceasing the operations of 
an institution which circulated $13 million and to which the 
merchants owed $14 million in addition to the $10 million or 
$12 million they owed the United States for duties. On February 
5, 181 1, Crawford presented a bill to extend the life of the bank 
to March 4, 1831.7 He made no remarks in favor of the bill, 
nor did he explain the committee's recommendations, though 
Gallatin's letter was submitted with the bill. 
The  showdown began in the committee of the whole on 
February 11, when Joseph Anderson of Tennessee (who, with 
7 Annals, 11th Cong., 3d sess., 21, 22-25 passim, 122: Crawford to Gallatin, Jan. 
29, 1811: Gallatin to Crawford, Jan. 30, 1811, ibid., 122-23, 123-25. On February 1 
Crawford's credentials, showing he had been elected for the six-year term beginning 
in March. were presented to the Senate. Ibid., 114. 
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Crawford, had also been on the bank committee of the previous 
session) moved to strike the establishing clause of the renewal 
bill. He said every citizen had made up  his mind on the issue- 
as had perhaps every member of the Senate-so he would not 
discuss the matter. Crawford, as closemouthed in presenting the 
bill as Anderson in his proposal for defeat of the measure, was 
astonished by the Tennessean's approach to the renewal issue: 
the good effects of the bank had for twenty years been universally 
experienced, and no reason was assigned for not continuing the 
bank other than public opinion. Admittedly, the public will 
should play a great role in a democracy, but Crawford questioned 
the magnanimity and fairness of Anderson's procedure. He hoped 
someone would give reasons for opposition to the bank's re- 
~ h a r t e r . ~  Samuel Smith, powerful in business as well as political 
circles, saw nothing novel in Anderson's action, thought Craw- 
ford knew the state legislatures had taken up  the issue, and 
maintained the burden of proof rested with the introducer of a 
measure. Crawford had expected to delay his defense of the 
measure, but the fear of a vote being taken without debate 
impelled him to explain the reasoning of the committees-or 
perhaps his reasons for supporting the bill. 
As chief spokesman for the renewal of the bank charter, Craw- 
ford ran counter to the majority of the Republican party and to 
public opinion in general, and his use of the doctrine of implied 
powers to "prove" the constitutionality of the bank places him 
outside the fold of Old Republicanism. His reliance on the 
necessary and proper clause was less offensive to Old Republicans, 
but his contention that this clause, together with the express 
authority to collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, "fairly 
invests Congress with the power to create a bank" did not prove 
persuasive. Congressional authorization of a lighthouse, he said, 
was no more a law to regulate commerce than establishing a 
bank was a law to collect taxes, imposts, and duties. Yet the 
erection of a lighthouse tends to facilitate and promote the 
security and prosperity of commerce just as the creation of a bank 
tends to facilitate and insure the collection, safekeeping, and 
transmission of the revenue.1° 
8 Ibid., 132-33. 
Q Ibid., 133-34; Macon to Joseph Nicholson, Feb. 11, 1811, Joseph Nicholson Papers 
(Manuscript Division, Library of Congress). 
10 Annals, 11th Cong., 3d sess., 134-40. 
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Crawford would not say that the government absolutely de- 
pended upon the existence of a bank; he did insist that the bank 
enabled the government to manage more advantageously its fiscal 
concerns. The present imperative must not be subordinated to 
tradition and precedent: "We are, when acting to-day, not to 
inquire what means were necessary and proper twenty years ago, 
not what were necessary and proper at the organization of the 
Government, but our inquiry must be, what means are necessary 
and proper this day. The  Constitution, in relation to the means 
by which its powers are to be executed, is one eternal now. The  
state of things now, the precise point of time we are called upon 
to act, must determine our choice in the selection of means to 
execute the delegated powers."ll 
In denouncing the larger states that sought destruction of 
the bank, Crawford charged their actions were motivated by the 
desire to dominate and by avarice: they hoped to compel the 
United States to use their banks as places of deposit and thus 
increase their dividends. He reminded his colleagues of the 
equality of the states and questioned whether the already excess- 
ive influence of the great states should be increased at the expense 
of the country as a whole.12 Still focusing his remarks primarily 
on the large states, he sharply criticized the newspapers, which 
had "teemed with the most scurrilous abuse against any member 
of Congress who has dared to utter a syllable" in favor of re- 
charter of the bank. Should the senators "tamely act under the 
lash of this tyranny of the press? . . . Instead of reasoning to 
prove the unconstitutionality of the law, they charge members 
of Congress with being bribed and corrupted. And this is what 
they call liberty of the press. T o  tyranny, under whatever form 
it may be exercised, I declare open and interminable war. T o  
me it is perfectly indifferent whether the tyrant is an irrespon- 
sible editor or a despotic monarch."13 
He denied the charge that the bank had been established by 
11 Ibid., 141-42. 
1 2  Ibid., 143-44. Henry Adams, History of the United States of America . . ., 
9 vols. (New York, 1909-1911), 5:335 (hereafter cited as Adams, History), says that 
when Crawford "flung so freely" his charge of avarice and ambition about the 
Senate he had Samuel Smith "directly in his eye." In 1824 Smith strongly supported 
Crawford's presidential candidacy. 
13 Annals, 11th Cong., 3d sess., 145. Crawford stressed that the first bank had 
not been created in the "hard unconstitutional times which produced the Sedition 
Law." Ibid., 144. 
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the opponents of the present party of administration, noted that 
under Jefferson the Congress had not only supported the bank 
but had even extended it into the Louisiana Territory, and re- 
minded his colleagues that the current session of Congress had 
incorporated additional banks for the District of Columbia. The  
entire banking system, he contended, was "too long and too 
deeply rooted, to be frowned out of existence by Congress."14 
And the objection to the bank because of the large number of 
British stockholders he thought of little consequence; the United 
States could at any moment seize such investments and thus be 
able to exert more influence on the conduct of investors than 
investors could possibly exert upon affairs of the United States. 
Crawford asked those senators who might be bothered by sup- 
porting an institution strongly favored by their political op- 
ponents to sacrifice their pride at the "shrine of public good."15 
During the next nine days Crawford occasionally addressed 
himself to a point of clarification when some other senator made 
reference to his remarks, and on February 20, the last day of 
debate on the bill, he again made a major speech. He disagreed 
with Samuel Smith that the bank in its origin had been a party 
question; the vote would show many distinguished Republicans 
for and many distinguished Federalists against the original 
charter. The point was pursued into the area of "correct ap- 
portionment," which if it had existed would have brought a 
heavier vote for the bank, not against, as the opponents of 
renewal asserted. Crawford returned to the matter of state 
influence, noting that the central government could do no more 
than withdraw deposits from state banks, but the very life of the 
Bank of the United States depended on the will of Congress. 
Further, he said, the disposition of state banks to control the 
operation of the central government would "increase with every 
increase of the means of annoyance, which the folly and improv- 
idence of Congress may throw into their hands."1° 
Crawford discussed at some length credit and revenue bonds, 
the discounting of bonds that had an additional endorser and 
were on deposit in the bank at Philadelphia, the bank's respon- 
sibility for the collection of such bonds, and the resulting increase 
14 Ibid., 146. 
16 Ibid., 147-50. 
10 Ibid., 331-34. 
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of credit and collection of large sums without any possibility of 
loss by the government. Credit, he said, was the true basis of 
commerce and the bank the "most powerful engine in the col- 
lection of revenue which human ingenuity can devise." Yet, the 
opponents of the bank had contended that it had nothing to do 
with the collection of the revenue.lT 
In his earlier speech Crawford had expressed uncertainty as 
to the constitutionality of state banks, but on February 20 he 
picked up the argument of Henry Clay and other antibank 
senators regarding state taxation and turned it in a rather novel 
direction: 
It has been said . . . that the right of the States to tax bank 
stock is inconsistent with the right of Congress to create a bank. 
That the right of taxation destroys the right to create, because 
the States, by immoderate taxation, could drive the bank out of 
their limits. All arguments drawn from the abuse of a right 
ought to be received with great caution; but, if it is entitled to 
any weight in this case, it equally proves the unconstitutionality 
of the State banks, because the right of Congress to lay and collect 
taxes is subject to but two restrictions: that they shall be uniform, 
and that direct taxation shall be according to population.18 
He ridiculed the fears of some of the senators by saying that the 
Constitution had given the government unlimited power over 
taxes, unlimited power to raise armies and navies, unlimited 
power to make war and peace, but some of his colleagues were 
alarmed at the incidental power to create a bank to aid in the 
management of its fiscal operations.lg 
The recharter of the bank was not a partisan question, and 
Crawford would not be troubled by party conformity; he would 
advance with a "firm, undeviating step, unappalled by the howling 
of party rage, more terrific than the yell of the aboriginal sav- 
age."" Not only had a number of the Republicans voted for 
the bank in 1791, but the Republicans, he again noted, had 
extended it into the territories. Furthermore, they had taken 
action in 1807 (as had the Federalists in 1798) against counter- 
feiting, and these precedents should have some weight. If the 
17 Ibid., 334-35. 
18 Ibid., 342. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., 331,338. 
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Republicans had thought the bank unconstitutional, it was their 
duty to have amended the Constitution, either by expressly giving 
or taking away that power. T o  decide that the bank was uncon- 
stitutional was to disturb what had been settled for twenty years. 
Ten years later others might decide that it was constitutional and 
recharter it for twenty years. The  bank would then have been 
constitutional for twenty years, unconstitutional for ten years, 
and constitutional for twenty years. "Are we to go on in this 
unsettled, miserable, halting manner? God forbid!" If he pre- 
ferred political standing in his state to the public welfare, Craw- 
ford said he would rejoice in the success of Anderson's motion, 
but since he believed the public welfare infinitely more important 
than any "fleeting popularity which an individual like myself can 
expect to enjoy," he would sincerely regret success of the motion. 
He concluded by saying that support for and success of the bank 
might uphold the tottering credit of the commercial class until 
the storm had passed; failure to recharter might draw down to 
"undistinguished ruin thousands of your unfortunate and un- 
offending fellow-citizens."21 
Maybe Anderson was right when he said on February 11 that 
perhaps every member of the Senate had made up his mind on 
the bank, and on that day Nathaniel Macon-then a representative 
and later senator from North Carolina-had correctly predicted a 
tie vote in the Senate. Nine of its members from the free states 
voted for renewal and nine against; eight from the slave states 
were for recharter and eight against. The  vote of Vice President 
George Clinton killed the measure.22 
Although Madison remained aloof and a number of admin- 
istration men had opposed recharter, the bank seems to have 
gone down-as Gallatin recounted years later-because of the 
personal opposition of the Clintons, the Smiths, Leib, and Giles 
to the President and to Gallatin. Soon after the defeat of the bank 
bill, Gallatin-weary of factional quarrels and perhaps resentful 
of Madison's failure to give active support to the measure-sub- 
mitted his resignation. Crawford and other Gallatin friends called 
on the President to remonstrate against the secretary's leaving 
office. Madison declined to accept Gallatin's resignation; instead 
21 Ibid., 344-46. 
22 Macon to Joseph Nicholson, Feb. 11, 1811, Nicholson. In the House the bill 
for recharter had earlier been indefinitely postponed by a 65-to-64 vote. 
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he dismissed Secretary of State Robert Smith, who for some time 
had given less than full support to the President's policies.23 
The  odds against Crawford's winning the fight for the bank 
were too great, but his efforts won the admiration of many and 
raised him to preeminence in the Senate. His distinguished speech 
of February 11, partially if not wholly extemporaneous, clearly 
signaled his ideas of constitutional powers and his conviction that 
individual, sectional, and party interests must not be allowed to 
threaten national measures and goals. I t  displayed his inde- 
pendence of spirit and action, his frankness and fearlessness, his 
ability of clear and logical exposition, and his composure in the 
heat of debate. Further, he had ridiculed party rigidity, declared 
war on special interests and tyranny, and appealed for action in 
the name of the public welfare. 
Among Crawford's contemporaries, Gallatin was especially at- 
tracted to Crawford's qualities, and the recharter fight probably 
was the beginning of a close friendship between the two men. 
Several years later, after indicating to a lifelong friend how various 
men had failed to meet his standards in a search for a successor 
to Jefferson, Gallatin said: "One man at last appeared who filled 
my expectations . . . Crawford, who united to a powerful mind a 
most correct judgment and an inflexible integrity-which last 
quality, not sufficiently tempered by indulgence and civility, has 
prevented his acquiring general p~pu la r i t y . "~~  
Much later, historian Henry Adams, while noting that Craw- 
ford was a "crude Georgian, with abilities not yet tried in admin- 
istration," indicates that the defense of the bank made Crawford 
the representative of the Madison administration in the Senate 
and the favorite of the "Jeffersonian triumvirate" for succession 
to the presidency. At another place Adams says that Crawford's 
speech of February 11 was "remarkable for the severity of its 
truths," but the Georgian showed the "faults of a strong nature- 
he was overbearing, high-tempered, and his ambition did not 
spurn what his enemies called intrigue; but he possessed the 
courage of Henry Clay, with more than Clay's intelligence, though 
far less than his charm. Crawford was never weak, rarely rhetor- 
23 Gallatin to Nicholas Biddle, Aug. 14, 1830 (confidential), Albert Gallatin Papers 
(NYH): Adams, History, 5:434-35; Brant, Madison, 5:278; Crawford to Joseph Nichol- 
son, March 1, 181 1 ,  Nicholson. 
24 Gallatin to John Badollet, July 29, 1824, Gallatin. 
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ical; and if he was ever emotional he reserved his emotion for 
other places than the Senate." Crawford, under Gallatin's teach- 
ing, bade fair-in Adams' opinion-to make himself what the 
South desperately needed, a statesman who understood its inter- 
ests. He, however, was far in advance of his people, who were 
more correctly represented by Giles of Virginia.25 
Whatever might be one's definition of civility and crudeness, 
or agreement or disagreement with these estimates, it seems clear 
that by the spring of 1811 Crawford had achieved an enviable 
position among the Republicans. It  is not clear that Crawford 
was the representative of the Madison administration; he was the 
most effective opponent of antiadministration forces in the Senate, 
but he, too, was on several occasions sharply critical of, and even 
opposed to, the administration. Nor is it certain that Crawford 
was "favored" for succession to the presidency; if this were true, 
the "favor" was short-lived. The breach between Madison and 
Monroe was healed just at this time, and Monroe became secretary 
of state in April 181 1. Monroe was soon the favorite, and a close 
friendship developed between the new secretary and Crawford. 
Certainly, Crawford had become a major force in national politics 
by early 181 1. 
In the fall of 18 1 1 Crawford was reappointed to most of the 
important committees on which he had previously served. Illness 
kept him from the Senate from December 20, 1811, to January 
28, 1812, and limited his activity for almost another month. His 
committee work seems to have taken a sharp upturn during the 
first three weeks of March, but he was soon removed from the 
active participant's role. On March 23 the Senate adjourned 
because of the indisposition of the Vice President; the following 
day Crawford was elected president pro tempore on the first 
ballot. I t  is highly probable that Crawford's subordination of 
partisan politics to issues and the impartiality of his criticism 
were significant factors in his being chosen as the first "permanent" 
presiding officer (other than the Vice Presidents) of the Senate, 
though it is also possible that his opposition wished to neutralize 
his i n f l u e n ~ e . ~ ~  
25 Henry Adams, The Life of Albert Gallatin (Philadelphia, 1880), 428, 433 
(hereafter cited as Adams, Gallatin); Adams, History, 5:332-33. 
26 Annolr, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 177 passim; ibid., 2d sess., passim: Nathaniel 
Macon to [Bartlett Yancey], Jan. 2, 1812, Personal Miscellany, AC2548 (MDLC). 
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Steps were taken to grant Crawford the same compensation, 
during his period of service, as was allowed the speakers of the 
House. In  May 1812 Crawford was one of seventeen senators 
attending the caucus which renominated Madison for the pres- 
idency and chose John Langdon of New Hampshire as his running 
mate. The  latter declined the nomination, and on June 6 Craw- 
ford read his letter to another meeting, which then chose Elbridge 
Gerry.27 
Clinton had died within a month of his indisposition, and 
Crawford was reelected president pro tempore at the next session. 
He seems not to have used his position to make partisan appoint- 
ments or confer personal favors, but the use of his influence as 
presiding officer-and perhaps now as leader of the administra- 
tion forces-may be inferred from the voting on a few o~cas ions .~~  
By this time the United States had been several months at war, 
and Crawford had played a major role in the congressional events 
leading to the country's involvement in that conflict. 
27 Niles' Weekly Register 2 (May 23, 1812):192-93; (June 27, 1812):276; National 
Zntelligencer, June 9, 11, 1812. Gerry died before the end of 1814. 
28 For example, see the action on the bill for the regulation of seamen. Annals, 
12th Cong., 2d sess., 107-8, 111. 
In the Senate: 
Embargo or War 
WHEN CRAWFORD took his seat in the Senate on December 9, 
1807, the United States was sharply divided over response to the 
violations by France and Great Britain of her neutral rights and 
national honor. Napoleon's Berlin decree of 1806 and Milan 
decree of 1807 declared the British Isles blockaded and subjected 
merchant ships bound to or from England to seizure and con- 
fiscation by French warships and privateers; British orders in 
council authorized the same treatment for vessels of any nation 
at war with Britain or vessels trading with any port under 
Napoleon's domination. That same year, 1807, the commercial 
provisions of the Jay Treaty expired. William Pinkney, bearing 
with him the yet inoperative Non-Importation Act of 1806, had 
been sent to England to help Minister James Monroe negotiate 
a new agreement. The  failure of these negotiations left American 
commerce completely at the mercy of both belligerents. Board- 
ings, searches, seizures, condemnations, confiscations of vessels 
and cargoes, and impressment of seamen were carried out by 
both France and England. But what many thought the ultimate 
outrage had occurred in June 1807 when a contingent from the 
British Leopard boarded and seized four crewmen from the 
frigate Chesapeake, a national ship and thus an extension of 
national territory. War sentiment ran high, but President 
Thomas Jefferson's determination to avoid war helped to keep 
an uneasy peace for five years more. 
Jefferson's substitute for armed conflict was economic warfare, 
an embargo on all American shipping. Crawford, as a freshman 
senator, had little time to improve his understanding of the issues 
involved in this controversy, for nine days after he arrived in 
the capital a vote on the embargo act was called for. He requested 
additional time to study the measure; his motion for temporary 
postponement was defeated 16 to 12, and on that same day 
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Crawford was among the minority of six opposed to passage. 
The  majority counted twenty-two v0tes.l I t  probably would have 
been more appropriate for Crawford to abstain, but this was a 
tactic he rarely adopted; he was inclined to vote against measures 
he had not studied. Before the end of the session, however, he 
opposed a move to repeal the embargo. 
Though Crawford said little on foreign affairs during his first 
session in Congress, a letter of March 1808 to his friend in 
Hancock County, Georgia, foreshadowed his later conviction that 
war was the only honorable alternative to the embargo. The  
choices open to the United States were not happy ones: if she 
stayed out of the conflict and Napoleon should destroy England, 
he might destroy the United States also; if she acceded to the 
British, she would have to give up  all national rights. Continua- 
tion of the embargo would mean inconvenience, privation, and 
the sacrifice of personal gain to the public good, but these he 
considered minor compared to the devastation and death of war.2 
By late 1808 Crawford was a staunch defender of the embargo. 
Much discussion had followed the introduction on November 11 
by James Hillhouse of Connecticut of a bill for repeal, and on 
November 23 Crawford spoke at length against this measure. He 
again emphasized the importance of public opinion in a republic, 
noted that the people had suffered privation because of the 
embargo, and expressed awareness of some discontent, but he 
stressed that in his area of the country the embargo was viewed 
as the only alternative to war, was applauded, and cheerfully 
submitted to. And no region was more immediately affected than 
the South because of the loss of the cotton market, a loss con- 
sidered temporary since England must always buy raw materials 
from those who buy her  manufacture^.^ 
He believed the embargo had vitally affected the British and 
ridiculed the argument that unemployment of 50,000 British 
"mechanics" had simply strengthened the British army and navy; 
the only conclusion to which this argument could lead was that 
the destruction of British manufactures would make Britain 
more powerful. Certainly, the United States should not continue 
this act of self-denial unless there was a probability of its pro- 
1 Annals, 10th Cong., 1st sess., 51. Later, when Crawford was accused of Federalist 
leanings because of this vote, John Quincy Adams came to his defense. 
2 Georgia Argus, April 12, 1808 (Tuesday morning extra). 
3 Annals, 10th Cong., 2d sess., 63-65. 
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ducing some adverse effect on those who made it necessary. 
Continuance would hurt the southern states, which must have 
foreign markets, more than the commercial states of the North, 
since the commercial states were also the manufacturing states. 
If the influence of the embargo were to be counteracted by the 
Spanish revolt against the French and the recent British victories 
in the Peninsular War, Crawford would abandon it-"but its 
substitute should be war, and no ordinary war." 
Nor should the embargo be continued if it could not be 
enforced, but the ease with which this law was said to be evaded 
simply proved to Crawford that the morals of the evaders could 
not have been very sound when the measure was passed. And the 
sentiment that the United States had no just cause of conflict 
against Great Britain and that "all our complaints are a mere 
pretext for war"-expressed in petitions introduced in the House 
of Representatives and in resolutions of one of the state legis- 
latures-made him "blush for the disgrace they reflect on my 
country . . . blush that any man belonging to the great American 
family should be so debased, so degraded, so lost to every generous 
and national feeling, as to make a declaration of this kind. It  is 
debasing to the national character." Complaints are not pretext: 
it is the undeniable right of an independent nation to trade with 
the whole world, except in absolutely blockaded ports or in 
contraband of war, and no nation has previously attempted to 
control another in such trade. Nor could he see the difference 
between a tacit acquiescence in the British orders in council and 
paying tribute, for if the embargo was raised Britain would 
require the shipment of produce to England and the payment 
of an arbitrary sum before it could be shipped elsewhere. I t  
mattered little to Crawford whether the United States suffered 
more from England or France; he was long convinced that both 
intended to do all the evil they could, and a difference in the 
amount of injury resulted only from an "inability in the least 
mischievous to do more."4 
Repeal of the embargo would result in war or the abandonment 
of neutral rights. The idea of arming merchant vessels to create 
a force to oppose the British navy he thought impossible and 
absurd. T o  permit vessels to go to sea in the face of orders in 
council, blockading decrees, and proclamations would expose the 
4 Ibid., 66, 67-69, 70-71. 
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country to new insults and aggressions. It  was useless to talk of 
the magnanimity of nations. 
Usually even tempered in discussion, Crawford seemed angered 
by the argument of Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts and of 
Hillhouse that perseverance in a measure opposed to the interest 
of a people may lead to insurrection and revolution: 
If the nation be satisfied that any course is proper, it would be 
base and degrading to be driven from it by the murmurs of a 
minority. We are cautioned to beware how we execute a measure 
with which the feelings of a people are at war. I should be the 
last to persist in a measure which injuriously affects the interests 
of the United States, but no man feels more imperiously the duty 
of persevering in a course which is right, notwithstanding the con- 
trary opinions of a few; and though I may regret and respect the 
feelings of those few, I will persist in the course I believe to be 
right, at the expense even of the Government i t~e l f .~  
The  repeal motion was defeated by a 25-to-6 vote on December 2. 
On the last day of 1808 Crawford expressed even more firmly, 
in a letter, his conviction that war was the only real alternative 
to the embargo, for repeal without the adoption of stronger 
measures to him meant abandonment of the independence of 
the nation. However, the growing Federalist control in the New 
England states and the rising voices of discord led him to believe 
that measures of war-or measures that would lead to war-would 
be as unpopular as the embargo. Perhaps more so. In  the event 
of war, the intensity of the feelings of the "Yankee Federalists" 
might drive them into union with Canada, Nova Scotia, and 
New Brunswick. If the war spirit developed among the people 
as it was mounting in Congress, only a change of course by 
Britain and France could prevent conflict. Crawford had little 
hope for such a change, but he opposed a special session for the 
following May-the decision for war could be made on March 
1 as well as on May 
By February 1809 Crawford was greatly disturbed by the turn 
of events. The House seemed determined to replace the embargo 
and had refused to allow the issue of letters of marque and 
5 Ibid., 73. 
6 Crawford to Thomas Carr, Dec. 31, 1808, Henry Jackson Papers (University of 
Georgia Library, Athens). 
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reprisal, which would have permitted the arming of merchant 
vessels. Since such letters were the "lowest stage of war," he could 
only conclude the House had decided to submit, after insisting 
throughout most of the session that the nation would resist. 
Opposed to all substitutes that had been offered for the embargo, 
Crawford wished to see an end to the humiliation of the nation 
by either war or peace. His distaste for the dissident Yankee had 
indeed become intense: "If we can get out of this scrape, I for 
one, will suffer them [the British] to impress every Yankee in the 
nation if found upon the high seas, & to interpolate new principles 
into the law of nations as often as they please. The  Yankees have 
brought the nation into the scrape, & have in Congress en masse 
deserted it in the hour of trial. . . . We have gone too far to 
recede, and are so frightened with dissention at home that we 
dare not ad~ance ."~  
The embargo issue, in one form or another, was almost con- 
stantly before that session of Congress. Crawford voted for 
amendments for its more effective enforcement, but on February 
4 Giles moved to repeal the embargo on March 4-except in its 
application to England, France, and their dependencies. Although 
Crawford was on the committee for the bill, there is no evidence 
that he spoke further on the measure. He did vote with a 
majority (14 to 11) against striking the provision permitting the 
issue of letters of marque and reprisal, but this section was later 
struck by the House and in the Senate concurrence Crawford did 
not vote. On the final passage of the bill Crawford and eleven 
others voted in the minority while twenty-one cast votes for the 
Non-Intercourse Act, which became law on March 1, 1809.8 The 
law repealed the embargo and provided that the United States 
would restore commercial relations with the first power (England 
or France) to lift its offensive trade restrictions-or, as Crawford 
had said, the measure put up the "warlike services of the nation 
at auction, not to the highest, but first bidder." 
The experiment with total economic coercion had ended, and, 
as Crawford had predicted, great numbers of American ships 
were soon seized by both England and France. Apparently feeling 
that the new act represented submission, Crawford, as well as 
7 Crawford to Carr, Feb. 20, 1809, ibid. 
8 Annals, 10th Cong., 2d sess., 230, 241-56, 298, 310-11, 318-19, 345, 353-83, 409, 
413,415, 436, 1830. 
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fellow senator John Milledge and four other senators, cast his 
vote on March 1 against the appropriation bills for the Treasury, 
War, and Navy departments, and the support of the military 
establishment. The  following day he voted with the majority 
against imposing additional d ~ t i e s . ~  
The  British plenipotentiary, David Erskine, moved quickly, and 
in April 1809 negotiated an agreement settling the Chesapeake 
affair and providing for repeal of the orders in council. James 
Madison, only a month in the presidency and doubtless hoping 
to add to his prestige by resolution of some of the commercial- 
diplomatic difficulties he had long unsuccessfully grappled with 
as secretary of state, did not wait for British ratification of the 
agreement. He reopened trade with Britain. The  "conciliatory" 
mood of the President was reflected in the special session of 
Congress (which began in May) by the postponement of a bill 
which would have excluded the armed vessels of other nations 
from the ports of the United States. The  five-man committee, 
including Crawford, recommended the delay because it believed 
the British moves were made in good faith and that agreements 
could be reached that would "guard our flag from insult, our 
jurisdiction from aggression, our citizens from violation, and our 
mercantile property from spoliation." The  committee expecta- 
tions were not realized, and at the next session Crawford was one 
of twenty-six passing the bill.lo 
The  British government repudiated the Erskine agreement, 
maintaining that their envoy had exceeded his powers. Madison's 
precipitate action raised questions about his judgment, and his 
prestige suffered severely; he did not recover the lost ground by 
his ambiguous message to Congress on January 3, 1810. The  
hand of the opposition forces was strengthened, and Macon Bill 
No. 1, permitting the importation of French and British goods 
in American ships only, was defeated. 
Crawford, again in this 1809-1810 session a member of the 
committee on intercourse with Great Britain, thought by late 
January 1810 that Macon Bill No. 2 would be passed. He 
suspected easterners of trying to delay passage so they might 
buy southern cotton at the existing low prices, but he believed 
their estimates of profits from this activity too sanguine. Crawford 
9 Ibid., 452,454. 
10 Ibid., 11th Cong., 1st sess., 26, 39-40, 42, 45; ibid., 2d sess., 582. 
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was one of the Senate managers who went into conference with 
House counterparts on May 1, 1810-the day of passage of this 
Macon bill and the day of adjournment.ll 
Macon Bill No. 2, which pleased neither Macon nor the 
President, repealed the Non-Intercourse Act and provided that 
if either England or France withdrew her trade restrictions and 
the other did not follow suit, the United States would reestablish 
nonintercourse with the noncomplying nation. Later in the year 
Madison foolishly accepted the Cadore letter-saying the Berlin 
and Milan (though not the Rambouillet) decrees were revoked- 
to the American minister in France as official action. Noninter- 
course against Britain was revived, and Napoleon, having ac- 
complished his purpose of getting cargoes within reach, revived 
spoliation of American commerce. Madison's political opponents 
had additional ammunition, the loyalty of Secretary of State 
Robert Smith became an open question, the criticism of Gallatin 
(the staunchest supporter of the administration) increased, but it 
was not until the spring of 18 11 that Madison could bring himself 
to dismiss Smith and appoint Monroe in his place.12 
Crawford, too, had become critical of Madison's leadership and 
the ambiguity of the President's position. It  is, however, difficult 
to define precisely Crawford's position during 1810 and 18 1 1 : 
he had favored war if the embargo was repealed; war did not 
come, and he seems to have earnestly desired an honorable peace 
but opposed "warlike" proposals as totally inadequate to meet the 
situation. His major speech of the 1809-1810 session was made 
in opposition to the bill authorizing the fitting out, officering, 
and manning of frigates belonging to the United States. More 
than two weeks before his remarks in the Senate he had expressed 
in a letter his displeasure with the President's stance. Madison's 
cautiously worded message, he said, had pleased almost every man 
in Congress because every man interpreted it as he pleased: 
One says it is a war message-another, it is for peace. One says 
it was intended to support Mr. Macon's bill-another, it was sent 
to knock that bill in the head. And all of these declare that they 
11 Ibid., 2d sess., 550, 554, 578, 583, 585, 664, 673, 674, 678-79: Crawford to Thomas 
Carr, Jan. 29, 1810, Henry Jackson. See also Macon to Joseph H. Nicholson, March 
26, 1812, Nicholson. 
l2For brief accounts of the divisions in the government, see Adams, History, 
5:180ff.: Dice Robins Anderson, William Branch Giles . . . (Menasha, Wis., 1914), 
146-70. 
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are right if they understand the English language-& if they are 
not right they will give up Madison for ever. Poor man I believe 
they would give him up if he had not the distribution of the 
loaves & fishes, but as long as he holds this magic wand, so long 
will he be the object of their adulation.13 
Giles, who so often opposed the President, was the leading 
spokesman for the frigate bill, which, he said, stemmed from the 
President's recommendation of a system of preparatory measures 
to "meet any exigencies that may await the country." Two 
evident purposes of the measure were preservation of the frigates 
by repairing them and employment of the vessels as instruments 
of protection. Repair was justified on grounds of expense, time, 
and superiority of the seasoned over the green timbers that would 
be used in new vessels. Admitting the frigates were not capable 
of resisting even a small squadron of the British fleet, Giles con- 
tended they would be useful in defense of a town under attack 
and should be considered a part of the "combined system of 
forces." By being prepared for war, the United States would 
contribute to the maintenance of peace. The issue, he asserted, 
was whether Great Britain or the United States should regulate 
the commerce of the United States.14 
Moving to postpone consideration of the bill, Crawford said 
the senator from Virginia had convinced him that the additional 
naval force was either to protect commerce in time of peace or 
to prepare the nation for a declaration of war, which "we intend 
to issue, or expect to be issued against us, by one or both of the 
great belligerent nations." The  means, however, were not ad- 
equate to the object; the inadequacy of the navy to protect 
commerce was glaring. Even if $100 million were spent over the 
next four years, commerce would still be unprotected or the 
nation would be involved in war. So apparent was the inadequacy 
of the proposal to provide protection for commerce that Crawford 
thought it reasonable to suppose it was intended to prepare for 
a declaration of war which the United States planned to issue. 
Crawford briefly reviewed the history of the embargo and the 
refusal to allow letters of marque and reprisal; if the country 
ever intended to declare war before she was invaded, March 1809 
13 Crawford to Dear Capt. [James Hamilton, Wrightsboro, Ga.], Jan. 8, 1810, 
copy in Ulrich B. Phillips Papers (Yale). 
14 Annals, 11th Cong., 2d sess., 532-35, 536-38. 
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was the time. Then, he said, there was "cause, and more than 
cause for war, if war would have produced redress. . . . Our 
ships were then in our ports-our seamen were a t  home-the 
property of the nation had been gathered in from the winds of 
heaven, and we were prepared to strike where the enemy was 
vulnerable." Though Crawford had been sensibly affected by 
the insulting conduct of Britain's minister (the notoriously ill- 
tempered Francis James Jackson), he did not think it proper to 
merge the aggravations and accumulated wrongs of the nation 
in the quarrel between the negotiators of the two countries and 
said, "Let it . . . be the wisdom of this nation to remain at 
peace, so long as peace is within its option."15 
It  was not to France's interest, Crawford asserted, to declare 
war on the United States, for the British fleet would in effect be 
on the side of the United States. Britain would gain little by 
war, since she gets all she wants by purchase and capture. If 
the frigates are in port, they cannot protect the commerce; if 
they go out to prey on commerce, few if any will ever return 
to port. At this point, Crawford turned to an attack on President 
Madison's message of January 3, 1810, which, he said, 
in point of obscurity, comes nearer my idea of a Delphic oracle 
than any State paper which has come under my inspection. I t  is 
so cautiously expressed that every man puts what construction on 
it he pleases. Is he for war? The Message breathes nothing but 
destruction and bloodshed. Is he for peace? The Message is mere 
milk-and-water, and wholly pacific. Is he for the bill before you? 
The Message calls for its passage. Is he a friend of a large stand- 
ing army? Why then the Message means 20,000 regular troops. 
Is he friendly to the militia? The Message does not call for regular 
troops-it means militia. Thus, sir, the Message means anything 
or nothing, at the will of the commentator. If the Message is 
oracular in its meaning, it was no less miraculous in its promulga- 
tion. The newspapers to the east of this, stated that such a 
message would be delivered, and stated its contents nearly one 
week before it reached the two Houses of Congress. T o  account 
for this phenomenon, is neither within my power or province.16 
T h e  Georgian believed it was vain for the United States to 
contend upon the ocean with a nation that spent $300 million 
15 Ibid., 541-43. 
16 Ibid., 544-45. 
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annually, or six times the total exports of the United States. He 
agreed with Giles that the Republicans had reduced the navy 
to a "Peace Establishment," but they had stopped short of their 
duty: "they should have amputated the fungus of the body 
politic. . . ." Indeed, the nation had spent $12 million on a 
navy built only for the purpose of patronage. He could see no 
reason for the enormous expense and cautioned that armies and 
fleets must be employed in war activities to justify their exorbitant 
costs. If the nation becomes involved in war, the conflict should 
be prosecuted with vigor, both offensively and defensively, and 
the "energies and resources of the nation ought to be put in 
requisition." Until that time Crawford was opposed to measures 
that would exhaust the treasury without adding to the substantial 
defense of the country.17 
Crawford was still puzzled about the motives of the backers 
of the frigate bill even after it had been overwhelmingly passed. 
The  expenditure for the navy would be increased to at least $3.5 
million, and since the supporters acknowledged they neither 
expected to declare war nor to have war declared by another 
nation he could not understand why they would incur this 
expense when the treasury was empty but had refused such an 
expenditure when there was a surplus of revenue and the danger 
of war was as great or greater than at the present time. Three 
months later he perhaps saw the political nature of their position, 
for John Randolph (whose remarks in the House on the frigate 
bill were similar to but more spectacular than Crawford's) 
believed Crawford, Bibb, and John Taylor would leave Wash- 
ington with a thorough "detestation of the Cabal [i.e., the Smith 
brothers-Leib-Giles group] who have been permitted to disgrace 
. . . our country."18 At this time, and later, the cabal-aided and 
abetted by the ~ederalists-seemed more interested in embarrass- 
ing the President than in defending the nation's honor and rights. 
Measures requiring more expenditure than those recommended 
by the executive would help to increase general discontent with 
the administration. 
17 Ibid., 545-47. Only five senators voted with Crawford on this issue: Joseph 
Anderson and George Washington Campbell (Tenn.), James Turner (N.C.), and 
John Condit and John Lambert (N.J.). The statement by Anderson, Giles, 157, that 
Crawford's views, with the exception of the criticism of the message, no doubt 
came direct from Gallatin appears to be without substantiation. 
l8Crawford to Carr, Jan. 29, 1819, Henry Jackson; Randolph to Joseph H. 
Nicholson, April 29, 1810, Randolph-Garnett. 
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During 18 10 and 18 1 1 Crawford actively promoted the terri- 
torial interests of the United States and supported an increased 
effectiveness of the army, but he retained his dislike and distrust 
of the naval establishment until some time after war had been 
declared against England. After an illness of about six weeks, he 
James Lloyd, and Joseph Bradley were-on February 21, 1812- 
designated the committee to consider the report of the secretary of 
the navy. Six days later Lloyd offered an amendment to a bill 
on the naval establishment authorizing construction of several 
new frigates, and he and Giles spoke for the proposal.19 On March 
2 Crawford opposed the measure in his last major speech in the 
Senate. 
Replying to Lloyd, Crawford said it was incorrect to state that 
commerce had paid into the treasury the sum of $200 million 
and that the government had done nothing for commerce while 
commerce had done everything for the government. Imposts and 
duties were not paid by commerce but by the consumer-the 
money was "collected immediately from the merchant but ulti- 
mately from the nation." If demand exceeded supply, the con- 
sumer paid; if supply exceeded demand, the grower paid in the 
form of a reduction in price equal to the duty imposed.20 The  
only money that came to the treasury which could justly be 
credited to commerce was that retained by the government on 
debentures: this amounted to 0.7 percent upon goods paying a 
duty of 20 percent ad valorem and had never amounted to more 
than $400,000 in any one year. 
The  charge (by Senator Obadiah German of New York) that 
the people of the southern and western states were hostile to 
commerce and that opposition to building the frigates was rooted 
in that hostility resulted, Crawford maintained, either from 
ignorance or from prejudice. He pointed out that cotton com- 
prised approximately one fourth of the country's exports and 
insisted that the grower was not less interested in commerce than 
the merchant and shipholder, because the price of the product 
was determined by the market and the cost of transportation. Con- 
sequently, every circumstance that tended to destroy competition 
and reduce the number of markets directly affected the grower. 
But the landholders, country people, and most agriculturists in 
19 Annals, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 127, 131-47. 
20 Ibid., 149-51. 
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the United States never had, and never could have, any direct 
interest in the "mushroom commerce" which was carried on 
chiefly with the French and Spanish colonies. As a neutral the 
United States had a right to prosecute that trade no matter how 
it affected the belligerents, and, as a result of the drawback system 
(a substantial refund of duties when imported goods were re- 
exported), the shippers of the United States had been able to 
undersell the British in the foreign markets. But by contending 
for the right to engage in a trade not open to them during peace- 
time, the United States had jeopardized the general commerce of 
the nation and "sacrificed that which is essential to the growth 
and improvement, and to the comfort and happiness of the 
people." How could anyone contend that nothing had been done 
for commerce and that steps had been taken to ruin cornrner~e?~~ 
In commercial matters, Crawford said, the United States wanted 
only a good market for the surplus production of the country. 
Britain furnished the most suitable and extensive market, and the 
benefits of commerce, conducted on just and liberal principles, 
were strictly reciprocal. The  "contest" about to be entered was 
a result either of dispute over the colonial trade or of commercial 
jealousy of Great Britain. It  was rendered necessary by the in- 
justice of Britain, but if it was "dishonorably abandoned" the 
fault for abandonment and total exclusion from the carrying trade 
must rest with the "Eastern gentlemen." 
Crawford believed that Lloyd's estimates of the cost of naval 
expansion were about one half what they should be. Besides, the 
frigates would have no real effect by preying on British commerce, 
and the idea of protecting American commerce with them was 
"worse than visionary." Only annihilation of the adversary's 
naval force would provide such protection. He maintained, how- 
ever, that "Individual enterprise, directed by individual interest, 
will more effectively destroy the commerce of the enemy, than 
any number of frigates in the power of the Government to build 
and employ." How this was to be done Crawford did not say, 
but perhaps he was referring to the issuance of letters of marque 
and reprisal. 
He reminded his colleagues that every additional expense 
involved the possibility of additional taxes. Expense should not 
be a determinant, for if war was thought necessary, 
21 Ibid., 152-55. 
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We ought not to doubt for a moment that the people will will- 
ingly furnish the means necessary for its vigorous and successful 
prosecution. If there is not a sufficiency of good sense and patri- 
otism in the nation to submit to the impositions necessary for the 
successful execution of those measures which have been adopted 
pursuant to their wishes, and for the protection of their rights, 
then indeed our rights and liberty are but empty names-the idea 
of our free and happy Government, an idle phantom! Whenever 
the fact shall be demonstrated, the preservation of our Constitu- 
tion, and the integrity of the Union, will not be worth a struggle. 
But until it is demonstrated, its possibility ought not to be ad- 
mitted, and will not be admitted by the National Legi~la ture .~~ 
T h e  Lloyd amendment was defeated 19 to 13 on March 6, and 
in the final act the funds for repairs-reduced from $480,000 to 
$300,000-were to be used only to ready the Chesapeake, Con- 
stellation, and Adams for active service. T h e  measure authorized 
officers and men for these three ships and permitted an annual 
expenditure of $200,000 for three years to purchase materials for 
repairing the Philadelphia, General Greene, New York, and 
Boston.23 
Crawford continued to oppose expansion of the navy after the 
declaration of war against Britain; in December 1812 he was 
one of two senators voting against the building of more ships. 
T h e  brilliant achievements of the navy in the conflict changed 
his attitude, and he heartily approved the large appropriations for 
the navy in the postwar years. 
T h e  war sentiment of the country had increased steadily during 
the winter of 18 1 1 and the spring of 18 12, but Madison did little 
or  nothing either to check the fever or to encourage it. T h e  
President did believe, however, that Congress should declare war 
on Britain before adjourning-if there was no "accommodation" 
with that country. At least this is what Monroe, on March 31, 
told the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, which committee 
was then more powerful than its Senate ~ o u n t e r p a r t . ~ ~  T h e  next 
day Madison sent a secret one-sentence message to Congress asking 
for a sixty-day embargo on all vessels in port and on all arriving 
thereafter-a step intended as a prelude to war, though not so 
22 Ibid., 156-59, 160. 
23 Ibid., 164; 2 Stat. 699. 
24 Harry Ammon, James Monroe: The Quest for National Identity (New York. 
1971), 305. Hereafter cited as Ammon, Monroe. 
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publicized at the time. Controversy over the secrecy of the Senate 
discussion, defeat of a resolution calling for information from the 
President, and consideration of placing a communication from 
Jonathan Russell (then in Paris) before the Senate were followed 
by the defeat of attempts to repeal the acts governing intercourse 
between the United States and Britain and France by the ex- 
tension of the embargo to ninety days, and the President's signing 
of the measure on April 4.25 Memorials and petitions to repeal 
or modify this restriction on commerce, generally considered a 
concession to the more moderate Republicans, began to appear 
almost as soon as the law was enacted. 
Crawford, removed from active participation by virtue of his 
position as presiding officer, voted consistently with the war party. 
He opposed the reduction of the term of military service from 
six months to three, favored the bill for raising an additional 
military force, voted against all emasculating amendments to the 
act declaring war, and favored the measure authorizing issuance 
of treasury notes for financing war  preparation^.^^ 
The declaration of war was to come almost as soon as Crawford 
had expected; early in May he had felt that unless a change took 
place in the sentiments of the representatives from the East 
hostilities would come by the middle of June. The  Federalists 
had made gains in Massachusetts and the merchants were making 
every effort to procure repeal of the nonimportation act and to 
prevent adoption of measures of hostility by presenting petitions 
and memorials and by refusing to subscribe to the loans. The  
last, Crawford thought, would certainly tend to prolong the war 
or bring it to a disgraceful issue. The  rise of anti-Madison 
sentiment in New York indicated to the Georgian that New 
Yorkers-Republicans and Federalists-were more interested in 
promoting DeWitt Clinton for the presidency than in promoting 
the public good. He realized that a nation such as the United 
States could never be as well prepared for war as a nation where 
the power of declaring war rested in the executive. Men of energy 
and talent in key positions would help, but this happy condition 
did not prevail. I t  was widely believed that Secretary of War 
25 Crawford to Monroe, April 2, 1812, James Monroe Papers (MDLC); Annals, 
12th Cong., 1st sess., 189-91. 
26 Annals, 12th Cong., 1st sess., 191-93, 209, 267, 270, 286-87, 296-98, 300, 305, 
308-9, 311. 
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William Eustis (whom Crawford thought a tool of Samuel Smith 
and Giles) and Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton were in- 
capable of handling their duties, but since Madison was almost 
the only exception to this opinion they were retained in office.27 
The  paucity of evidence-and the ambiguity of some extant 
material-makes it impossible to determine precisely the role 
Crawford played immediately prior to and following Madison's 
war message of June 1. A fragment of a communication from 
Monroe to Gallatin aslzed Gallatin to see Crawford and "explain 
to him the policy of the plan preferred" before he came to the 
President's on the morning of June 1. This explanation hopefully 
would avoid difficulty in the Senate committee, but it is not clear 
whether Gallatin, Crawford, or both of them were going to confer 
with Madison. The fragment does seem to say that Monroe 
thought only a naval war should be attempted at the moment, 
and Madison's chief biographer holds this view. Monroe's most 
recent biographer disagrees, noting that such a stance would be 
inconsistent with Monroe's earlier and later positions. Certainly, 
in light of Crawford's attitude toward the navy he could scarcely 
be expected to support such a limited d e c l a r a t i ~ n . ~ ~  Had Monroe 
held such a view of the war, he would have become political 
bedfellow of Smith, Leib, and Giles who sought unsuccessfully to 
limit the war to naval operations and then to require measures 
against France unless proof of the repeal of the decrees was soon 
received. The  opposition to war was strong, but the declaration 
of June 18 was plenary. Smith, Leib, and Giles joined Crawford 
and fifteen others in carrying the measure, 19 to 13. 
For more than two years before the declaration of war, Craw- 
ford had been periodically involved as agent of the President 
or as intermediary in activities and negotiations-some semisecret, 
some official-that he and others hoped would make both East 
and West Florida parts of the United States. On June 10, 1810, 
Secretary of State Robert Smith informed Crawford that Madison 
wished him to select a "gentleman of honor and discretion" to 
execute a trust of "interest and delicacy."29 Crawford chose 
27 Crawford to John Milledge, May 9, 1812, Crawford, MDLC; Crawford to 
Charles Yancey, July 3, 1812, Keith Read Collection (UGL). 
28 Monroe to Gallatin, June 1, 1812, Gallatin; Brant, Madison, 5:476-77; Ammon, 
Monroe, 309, 632 n 60. 
29 See Clarence E. Carter, ed., T h e  Territory of Orleans, 1803-1812 (Washington, 
D.C., 1940), 885. 
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George Mathews, former governor of Georgia who had signed the 
Yazoo land bill, to try to arrange with Vizente Folch, comman- 
dante proprietario (though generally referred to as governor) 
of the Floridas for a peaceable and mutually satisfactory transfer 
of the Spanish possessions to the control of the United States. 
The  exact relationship between the Mathews-Folch interview at 
Mobile and Folch's proposal to treat directly with the President 
for the transfer of his province (carried to Washington by John 
McKee) is not at all clear,30 but Madison's proclamation of 
October 27, 1810, directing the seizure of West Florida and the 
disavowal of Folch's intent by his superiors brought failure to 
this phase of activity by hlathews and others. 
However, Folch's offer and Mathews' report-relayed by Craw- 
ford to Smith-that he and the Spanish official had agreed it was 
to the "joint interest of the United States and the Spanish prov- 
inces to prevent any European nation from obtaining a footing 
in the new world" raised Madison's hopes that prompt action 
might bring acquisition of both West and East F10rida.~~ Congress 
took only twelve days to respond favorably to Madison's request of 
January 3, 1811, for a declaration that the United States "could 
not see, without serious inquietude, any part of a neighboring 
territory, in which they have, in different respects, so deep and 
so just a concern, pass from the hands of Spain into those of any 
other foreign power." T h e  President was authorized to take 
possession of all or any part of the Floridas east of the Perdido 
River if local authorities agreed to such action. Folch was in- 
formed of acceptance of his offer, and Mathews and McKee were 
appointed commissioners to carry it 
30 Nor is i t  clear exactly when Crawford appointed Mathews. A delay in  the 
transmission of letters, or the failure of Crawford to write-maybe because he had 
not yet engaged Mathews-seems to have resulted in Washington's remaining unin- 
formed until early fall. Mathews seems to have become active in September 1810. 
31 American State Papers: Foreign Relations, 3:395; Crawford to Robert Smith, 
Nov. 1, 1810, Miscellaneous Letters (National Archives). Also in the fall of 1810 
Crawford served as intermediary between Buckner Harris and the government on 
East Florida matters. See B. Harris to Crawford, Nov. 21, 1810, ibid. Almost nothing 
is known about Crawford's role here, but some intriguing references in this Harris 
letter lead to the speculation that his role was greater than the direct evidence 
indicates. 
32  Annals, 11th Cong., 3d sess., 370, 371-80, 1251-63, 1273-74. T h e  West Florida 
question is thoroughly treated in Isaac Joslin Cox, T h e  West  Florida Controversy, 
1795-1813 (Baltimore, Md., 1918). For Mathews' activities, see esp. 463, 481, 488, 
522-23, 526-28, and I. J. Cox, "The Border Missions of General George Mathews," 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 12 (Dec. 1925):309-33. Paul Kruse, "A Secret 
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This so-called agreement with Folch did not come to fruition, 
- 
and many of the later maneuverings and machinations, especially 
in East Florida, seemed to hinge on interpretation of the term 
"local authority." Quite often the United States seemed to have 
a hand in establishing a "local authority" which then expressed a 
desire for attachment to the United States. The  short, thick, 
red-headed, seventy-four-year-old Mathews, who wore a three- 
cornered cocked hat, top boots, and a shirt full-ruffled at the 
bosom and wrists, and who acknowledged only George Washing- 
ton as his superior, apparently kept in close touch with Crawford, 
communicating his plans by mail and personal contacts and 
requesting the senator to explain them to the government. Craw- 
ford, in early November 1811, informed Madison that as soon 
as the Senate was organized he would relay what Mathews had 
told him.33 The  President certainly knew of Mathews' intent to 
seize Amelia Island and seemed not displeased that he did so. But 
the use of agents in territory of another nation and seizure of 
a portion of that territory was highly embarrassing, following so 
closely on the Senate consideration of, and wide publicity given 
to, the John Henry letters. These letters, at most, showed that 
the British had paid an agent to promote subversion in the New 
England area, but the administration righteously used them to 
stir up anti-British feeling. Madison resolved his dilemma by 
having Monroe disavow Mathews' action on April 4, 1812.34 
Crawford, extremely mortified by the disavowal, informed an 
angry and disgusted Mathews that the gentlemen at his boarding 
house had generally been in favor of supporting Mathews but had 
been overruled by the cabinet. He had feared the situation would 
not be acceptable to the President, for Crawford's reading of the 
patriotic manifesto indicated to him that an arrangement made 
Agent in East Florida: General George Mathews and the Patriot War," Journal of 
Southern History 18 (May 1952):193-217, is primarily concerned with the secret 
aspect of events and makes little mention of Crawford. Rembert W. Patrick, Florida 
Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia-Florida Border, 1810-1815 (Athens, Ga., 
1954). focuses a large part of his story on Mathews, but Crawford's role in late 1812 
is not mentioned. Nor are some of the earlier Crawford materials in any of these 
items. Mathews and McKee were in Washington the first part of January 181 1 when 
they received instructions from Robert Smith, and Mathews talked with Madison. 
33 Mathews to Crawford, Oct. 11, 1811, Golding; Mathews to Monroe, Oct. 14, 
1811, Monroe, MDLC: Crawford to Monroe, Nov. 5, 1811, Miscellaneous Letters 
(National Archives); Gilmer, Sketches (1855), 78. 
34 Adams, History, 6:176ff.; Niles' Weekly Register 2 (March 14, 1812):19-29, 31; 
(March 21, 1812):44-45. 
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by an agent of the United States had produced the revolution, 
rather than the revolution producing the arrangement. Governor 
David B. Mitchell of Georgia had been directed to return the 
area, but Crawford expected war by June 1, and then he presumed 
there would be agreement on the propriety of holding East 
Florida. Further, if Mathews should get possession of Augustine 
before he received news (supposedly official) of the disavowal, 
it was hoped he would hold it-and Crawford did not think 
Mitchell would be in a hurry to hand it over to the Spanish. If 
the province should be retained, or taken later, he saw little 
difficulty in obtaining the government of it for mat hew^.^^ 
Three months later-about seven weeks after the declaration of 
war on Britain-Mathews came directly from Augustine, which 
he had taken, and spent two days with Crawford in Georgia. The  
patriots, with Mathews' consent, had formed a government, and 
Crawford thought Mathews more concerned about them than 
about himself. If they could be secured from loss and injury- 
and especially if the country should be taken and retained-the 
old general would be reconciled to the mortification resulting 
from the disavowal of his seizure of Amelia Island. Crawford's 
comments on the term "local authority" as used in the act of 
January 1811 seem to offer justification for the actions of the 
patriots. Public feeling in Georgia was high on the Florida 
matter; much dissatisfaction would arise if the troops were with- 
drawn, the country given up, and the patriots abandoned, but 
Crawford would endeavor to reconcile public opinion to whatever 
course the President should adopt. Apparently Mathews was not 
completely satisfied with his conversations with Crawford: he 
set out for Washington to deal directly with the President-one 
author says to "thrash" him-but he died at Augusta on August 
30.36 
Crawford continued to hope that Florida could be acquired 
without direct official force, and he informed Monroe of his 
willingness to receive it for the United States. If the Spanish 
governor, by sanction of the Spanish minister to the United States, 
could officially cede the area, such action would be within the 
35 Crawford to Mathews, May 4, 1812, Read. The last part of this letter is badly 
mutilated, but the sense of it seems to be that the government would be anxious 
to soothe Mathews' feelings. 
36 Crawford to Monroe, Aug. 6, Sept. 9, 1812, Monroe, MDLC; Gilmer, Sketches 
(1855), 78. 
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letter of the law of January 1811 and would "compel our mal- 
contents in the senate to support it." Or perhaps the province 
could be placed in the custody of the United States as indemnity 
for Spanish spoliations on American commerce-the conditions 
of delivery mattered not to the Georgia senator. He was not to 
have the pleasure of accepting the area for his country, but 
toward the end of 1812 he believed the Spanish minister had 
written to the Cortes requesting power to cede Florida in full 
satisfaction of all spoliation 
After the coming of war with England, sentiment for military 
action against Spain (England's ally) increased. In  November 
and December 1812 and early January 1813 Crawford corre- 
sponded with Brigadier General Thomas Flournoy, in command 
of United States troops in the Southeast, cautioning him that he 
would have to take military action soon against the Spanish in 
Florida, expressing apprehension that Flournoy did not have the 
necessary equipment, and hoping military activities in the South 
would dispel the gloom which had hung over the troops in the 
North and East. Flournoy said he had done all he could to get 
ready to act, but he did not have the required materials. Georgia 
had not delivered on her promises, and he asked Crawford to 
file his application for resignation rather than permit him to be 
ordered to attack Augustine with the "few naked troops" under 
his command.3s Flournoy was not ordered to move; Crawford 
could get only thirteen other senators to support his motion to 
make the seizure of East Florida contingent upon hostilities with 
Spain; but he was with the majority (22 to 11) in approving the 
West Florida possession measure.39 The  acquisition of East 
Florida had to wait for the Adams-Onis treaty of 1819-1821. 
Crawford had not hesitated to criticize ineffectiveness in the 
executive branch prior to the war with Britain, and this ineffec- 
tiveness was less tolerable to him during the conflict. Incompe- 
tency of the men who would have principal management of the 
37 Crawford to Monroe, Sept. 9, 1812; Crawford to David B. Mitchell, Dec. 4, 
1812, Crawford, MDLC. Crawford said he  could not blame Onis if he took such 
action merely to gain time. 
38 Crawford to Flournoy, Nov. 19, 21, Dec. 26, 1812; Flournoy to Crawford, Jan. 
5, 1812 [1813], Thomas Flournoy Papers (MDLC): Crawford to Flournoy, Nov. 30, 
1812, Flournoy Papers (Clements Library, Ann Arbor); Crawford to John Milledge, 
Dec. 26, 1812, Crawford, MDLC. 
39 Annals, 12th Cong., 2d sess., 127-33. T h e  measure was signed on February 13, 
1813. As secretary of treasury Crawford strongly urged the acquisition of Florida. 
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war had caused him misgivings about entering the conflict, and 
he feared continuation of the war would only lead to other 
defeats such as Detroit. He wrote scathingly of Eustis' and 
Hamilton's preoccupation with trivia; if Madison could not 
bring himself to dismiss unfaithful or incompetent officers, he 
must be "content with defeat and disgrace in all his efforts during 
the war. So far as he may suffer from this cause, he deserves no 
commiseration, but his accountability to the nation will be great 
indeed."40 
Continued defeat and criticism brought change by year's end. 
On December 3 Monroe sent Crawford a note saying he wished 
a conference with him. Monroe wanted to avoid attention, 
stated in confidence that Eustis had resigned, and said that he 
might be offered the secretaryship of war. He wished to talk 
about the circumstances connected with, and public reaction to, 
this app~intment.~'  
There is no record of this interview, but apparently Crawford 
informed Monroe (who had become acting secretary when Eustis 
resigned) that Senate confirmation as permanent secretary was 
by no means certain. Opposition stemmed primarily from the 
fact that Monroe was a Virginian, and resentment of the Virginia 
influence mounted with every year one of the dynasty occupied 
the presidential chair. Rejection by the Senate would injure 
Monroe's chances of succession, as would the placing of a rival 
in the state department. Monroe declined to be nominated as 
permanent secretary, and Madison continued his search.42 
Crawford was asked (whether by Monroe or Madison or both 
is not clear) to give hi; opinion about John Armstrong, Henry 
Dearborn, Daniel Tompkins, and William Henry Harrison, the 
leading candidates for the position. He had no personal knowl- 
edge of the last three; Armstrong, he thought, did not possess the 
confidence of the nation.43 Major General Dearborn refused the 
post, as did Crawford, who said his training and experience did 
not qualify him for the position when the nation was at war. I t  
is not clear when the offer was made to Crawford; apparently the 
40 Crawford to Monroe, Sept. 9, 1812, Monroe, MDLC. Adams, History, 6:395-96, 
incorrectly gives the date of this letter as September 27, and his quotations from 
it contain several inaccuracies, without, however, changing the meaning of the 
communication. 
41 Monroe to Crawford, Dec. 3, 1812, Monroe, MDLC. 
42 Ammon, Monroe, 314-15. 
43 Crawford to David B. Mitchell, Dec. 4, 1812, Crawford, MDLC. 
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entire matter was handled through personal contacts, and some- 
time between December 3, 1812, and January 4, 1813, Crawford 
declined the offer. Some of the friends of the administration 
thought Crawford would be more valuable in the Senate; this 
may have been a factor in Crawford's decision.44 The  position 
went to Armstrong, former minister to France and at the time 
of his appointment a brigadier general in the United States 
Army. William Jones replaced Hamilton as secretary of the 
navy.45 
The  cabinet reorganization-delayed by the President until 
after the November election-did not end Crawford's dissatisfac- 
tion with Madison's administration. Everything, he wrote Mon- 
roe, depended upon the vigilance, promptitude, and energy 
displayed by the chief of the nation, and if he could not bring 
himself to believe that examples must be made of public delin- 
quents then it would be better to repeal the declaration of war 
and submit without further expense to the violation of rights 
and degradation consequent to such submission. Madison's power 
over the army was as great as that of Frederick the Great or 
Napoleon; if he failed to act, subordinates could not be expected 
to exercise vigilance, promptitude, and energy. Crawford con- 
sidered examples of severity necessary to give life and vigor to 
the military enterprises, surrounded as the United States was by 
both internal and external enemies. Madison was in an excellent 
position safely to make the necessary examples because most of 
the nation believed him to be honest, intelligent, patriotic, mild, 
and unambitious. Thus every act of severity, every dismissal from 
office, would be "ruling the people as a sacrifice of his good nature 
to a sense of his duty to the nation. . . . The fate of the Republic, 
and of Republican government is now committed to Madison's 
44 Hard evidence on this cabinet reorganization is scarce. Adams, Gallatin, 469-70, 
says that as far as can now be guessed Monroe and Gallatin wished to have Monroe 
as secretary of war, Gallatin as secretary of state, and possibly Crawford as secretary 
of treasury. Such an arrangement "would have given strength to the government 
and eliminated many causes of weakness." Brant, Madison, 6:127, probably has the 
best account concerning the secretaryship of war, but of necessity much of the 
evidence is circumstantial and inferential. See also Richmond Enquirer, Aug. 6, 
1824; Charles Tait to Crawford, April 22, 1813 (copy), Charles Tait  Papers (Alabama 
Department of Archives and History). 
45The nominations were submitted to the Senate on January 8: Jones was 
approved on January 12 (no vote was given) and Armstrong on the following day, 
18 to 15. Journal of Executive Proceedings of the Senate, 2315, 316. Hereafter 
cited as Senate Executive Journal. Crawford, who voted for both men, said the 
vote for Jones was unanimous. Crawford to [?I, Jan. 16, 1813, Crawford, MDLC. 
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hands. If the powers invested in him shall be feebly executed, 
we are lost, perhaps forever."46 
Apparently a closer personal relationship was developing 
between Crawford and Madison; in early March he wrote the 
President a completely frank letter giving him some seemingly 
unsolicited advice about General James Wilkinson. I t  was 
necessary to move Wilkinson from the New Orleans station: the 
general's character was not above suspicion and a great majority 
of the people of Louisiana opposed his remaining in New 
Orleans. Crawford indicated the possibility of moving Wilkinson 
to Norfolk, New York, or Philadelphia where he might be less 
obnoxious to the inhabitants-if the vote of the senators on 
Wilkinson's recent promotion reflected the wishes of the people. 
Crawford hoped Willtinson would not be sent to the Southeast 
and sincerely regretted that the cabinet felt it necessary to employ 
him anywhere.47 Wilkinson was transferred to the Northern 
theater. 
Crawford's work in the Senate was done; on the very day of 
this letter Congress adjourned, and apparently at about this time 
Crawford agreed to become the successor to Joel Barlow, minister 
to France, who had died near Cracow the preceding December 
26. Barlow had made the unusual move of leaving Paris-not 
departing his carriage until reaching Berlin-to go eastward to 
meet the French officials, retreating from Russia, and had just 
completed his conversations toward an agreement that proved 
totally unacceptable to the United States. On May 28 Crawford 
was commissioned minister plenipotentiary to the court of the 
Emperor of the French and King of Italy.48 For most of the next 
two years he was absorbed in diplomatic matters. 
46 Crawford to Monroe, Jan. 24, 1813, Monroe, NYP. 
47 Crawford to Madison, March 3, 1813, Madison Papers (MDLC). On March 1 
the Senate had confirmed, 16 to 12, Wilkinson's promotion to major general. Craw- 
ford voted with the minority. On the same day he  cast one of the majority votes 
in the 23-to-4 confirmation of Harrison to the same rank. Senate Executive Journal, 
2:329-30. 
48 T h e  original of the commission is in the Golding Collection. Crawford had 
been approved (no vote given) by the Senate on May 28. Senate Executive Journal, 
2:346. He resigned his Senate seat on March 23, 1813; William H. Bulloch replaced 
him in the session which began on May 24, but on December 6, 1813, William W. 
Bibb was seated to serve the remainder of Crawford's term. T h e  choice of Crawford's 
successor was not an  easy matter for the party in Georgia: several declined to 
stand for his seat, and one of Crawford's friends noted that the Republicans "had 
slept a t  the posts ti1 the helm was well nigh grasped from their hands." Thomas 
W. Cobb to Charles Harris, Oct. 21, 1813, Read. 
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The new minister was his own man. In five and a half years he 
had risen from state prominence to near preeminence on the 
national scene, a rise that involved no truckling to any man or 
group and no discoverable political bargains. As a senator he 
had forcefully expressed his position on the major issues before 
the nation. He had believed that war should come when the 
embargo was repealed; he had become the champion of the bank 
after only two years in the upper house; he staunchly defended 
the rights of his state, but he was an ardent nationalist and 
expansionist; he submitted to no party discipline and severely 
criticized inefficiency and ambiguity-even in the chief executive; 
by 1812 he was a close personal friend of Secretary Monroe and 
Secretary of the Treasury Gallatin and sometimes spokesman for 
them and for Madison in the Senate; he had declined the secre- 
taryship of war. He was an able senator, considered by many to 
be qualified to assume the presidential office. There is no 
evidence that he had presidential ambitions at that time, and 
apparently he wished to remain in the Senate. However, he 
was persuaded that he might perform valuable ministerial services 
for his country. At forty-one Crawford began his only trip 
abroad. 
Minister to France 
MARCH AND APRIL 1813 were busy months of preparation for 
Crawford: a fatiguing nineteen-day trip to Woodlawn, resigna- 
tion from his Senate seat, selection of Henry Jackson, a professor 
at Athens, as secretary of legation, attention to his personal 
affairs, and taking leave of friends and family. About the first 
of May he began the trip back to Washington, and early on June 
4 he and Jackson set out for New York. T o  lessen the possibility 
of capture on the ocean voyage, his departure time from the 
capital had been kept secret, and to protect his anonymity Craw- 
ford did not register at the inns or add his name to the window 
sills-as did Jackson-in a dining room in Pennsylvania. A week 
in New York, involving social engagements with Mrs. Albert 
Gallatin, John Jacob Astor, the Russian consul at Philadelphia, 
and Robert Fulton, brought some relief from the arduous carriage 
and stage trip.l 
A favorable wind sprang up  on June 18, and the next day the 
brig Argus under Captain William H. Allen (age twenty-nine) 
was put to sea. The  voyage was not particularly pleasant for Craw- 
ford. He stayed on deck the first day until he was soaked with 
rain, and he "cascaded copiously." Since the deck was no defense 
against attack, he retired to his berth where he was free from 
violent retching. By June 27 he was almost over his seasickness, 
but his stomach felt as if it were the receptacle for the grease and 
tar the ship carried. A storm struck on June 30; the deck was 
awash, the brig made eleven knots with only the main foresail 
up, and Crawford feared she might be swallowed up. The  next 
morning the storm increased, the main foresail was taken in and 
the ship allowed to roll. Crawford rolled until he was "quite 
sore and exhausted"; he was very sick during the storm, and even 
two days later the best Madeira tasted like salt and weak vinegar. 
He had not been much impressed by the sunset on June 22, but 
the storm was "grand and magnificent." The  weathering of the 
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thirty-six-hour disturbance let him view with tranquillity and 
composure the "grandeur and sublimity of the scene," and he 
"felt, deeply felt, the insignificance of things, which under other 
circumstances, were of the highest importance." Allen, under 
orders to avoid engagement if possible, sighted several ships dur- 
ing the voyage: one-an American vessel that had been captured 
by the British-Allen burned after she struck colors; two other 
British ships, a brig and a frigate, did not engage. 
Crawford landed at L'Orient on July 11. He noted that he was 
in a country where the rulers were "everything, and the people 
nothing," while in the United States one was "insensible of the 
existence of governments but in the granting of benefits.02 His 
twenty-one-month stay in France seemed to deepen his devotion 
to the principles of republicanism. Sickness delayed his departure 
from the port, but on July 19 he, Jackson, and two servants began 
the journey to Paris where they arrived at the "Hotel D'Btrangkr" 
on July 24. 
When Crawford arrived in France, that nation had known 
only about one year of uneasy peace in the preceding twenty 
years, and the European War of Liberation against the domina- 
tion of Napoleon was in a state of high preparation. A month 
earlier, the English had concluded a subsidy treaty with Prussia 
and Russia, and approximately one month after Crawford reached 
Paris Napoleon won his last great victory, Dresden, on German 
soil. Before the end of October he had suffered decisive defeat 
at Leipzig. His empire fell in on itself; on April 12, 1814, he 
abdicated and was exiled to Elba. 
Difficulties of various kinds had arisen between the United 
States and France from the early 1790s, but the Convention of 
1800 again placed the two nations in an amicable relationship- 
at least temporarily. The  institution of the Continental System 
and subsequent highhanded and illegal actions of the emperor 
and his minions strained that relation. Until the time of the 
1 Crawford to David B. Mitchell, March 23, 1813, Telemon Cuyler Collection 
(UGL); Crawford to Monroe, March 20, 1813, Records of the Department of State, 
Diplomatic Despatches, France, Volume 14 (National Archives). Hereafter cited as 
DD France 14. Information on the trip from Washington to France is taken from 
Crawford's manuscript journal, kept at the suggestion of Charles Tait. It contains 
entries from June to November 1813 and is a part of the Crawford Letterbook 
(MDLC). 
2 Journal, July 11, 1813. 
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embargo the offenses of the French had differed little from those 
of the English (except for impressment), but in April 1808 the 
Bayonne decree ordered seizure of all American vessels then in 
French ports. Slightly less than two years later the Rambouillet 
decree commanded seizure and sale of all American shipping 
that had entered French ports since the effective date of the Non- 
Intercourse Act of 1809. Ships and cargoes-contraband or not- 
were captured and burned on the high seas or seized and sold in 
the ports, a licensing system which violated all principles of a 
free commerce was instituted, interminable delays were imposed, 
return cargoes were required, and France steadfastly refused to 
pay-or even to recognize responsibility for-indemnity for her 
illegal actions. Napoleon needed the articles of commerce; he 
took them whenever it suited his purpose. The  Cadore letter and 
the falsely dated St. Cloud decree further convinced the United 
States of the perfidy and complete lack of scruple of the French 
government. The  injuries inflicted by France were less than those 
of the English, but-as Crawford had said several years before- 
the difference resulted only from the inability of the French to 
commit greater depredations. The  diplomatic bargaining power 
of the United States vis-A-vis France was probably lessened by the 
declaration of war on England; committed to war against the 
greatest naval power, the United States could ill afford a complete 
rupture with France. The  dismal performance of the American 
military establishment prior to Crawford's arrival in France 
scarcely permitted him to negotiate from a position of strength. 
His assignment was indeed a difficult one. 
Monroe told Crawford he was to be governed by the careful 
initial and subsequent instructions to his predecessor which he 
would find in the embassy files. He was to seek indemnity for 
illegal captures at sea and for spoliations on the commerce of 
the United States in French ports and to try to place commercial 
relations with France on a footing of reciprocal advantage, that 
is, eliminate the return cargo requirement and abandon the 
license ~ystern.~ The  United States could not relinquish claims 
3 Napoleon used the license system to undercut Russian commerce, and this action 
helped to bring Russia's defection from the Continental System. England also used 
it, and some American ships-flying the English, then the French, then the English 
flag-traded between France and England. Under the license system only the holders 
of licenses could trade, they were subject to the restrictions imposed, and Napoleon 
changed the rules when whim and advantage dictated. 
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for a just reparation for spoliations under the Bayonne and 
Rambouillet decrees; if these claims were refused, Crawford was 
to decline any arrangement whatever with the French govern- 
ment. However, Barlow had indicated that an agreement had 
been reached on some matters of spoliation and commerce; if 
Crawford thought the terms satisfactory, he should sign and 
forward the treaty. If he did not approve them, he should notify 
the French government and try to obtain alterations. 
Indemnity was also to be demanded for spoliations on the 
United States commerce with Lisbon and Cadiz, and this French 
obligation might be discharged in stock or negotiable paper if 
France was not able to make payment in specie. Crawford should 
negotiate only on injuries resulting from violations of neutral 
rights; the attitude to be taken toward France if an accommoda- 
tion was made with England would be decided at the proper 
time. On that point, Crawford was cautioned in his communica- 
tions to the French government not to compromit the United 
States. 
No arrangement was to be entered into unless there were just 
reparations for damages under the two most obnoxious decrees, 
but Crawford was informed that relations with France might be 
improved by restoring to their owners American vessels still 
detained under the decrees and by placing commercial relations 
with France on a just and stable foundation. The  violations had 
come as a result of edict; normal relations might be restored in 
the same manner, and the President wished Crawford to follow 
that course if unable to negotiate a treaty. Madison had been 
greatly dissatisfied with the conduct of the French government 
since the beginning of the Barlow mission; failure to correct the 
situation before the emperor's expedition to Russia was a new 
offense to the United States, and the lack of success of the Barlow 
negotiations at Vilna had simply added to the ~f fense .~  
Crawford, the only United States minister in western Europe, 
was given superintendence of all consuls of the United States in 
France, her European dependencies, and Italy and was instructed 
to adopt appropriate measures to keep them in strict performance 
of their duties. Because of the delay in the sailing of the Argus, 
4 Monroe to Barlow, July 26, 1811; Monroe to Crawford, May 29, 1813, Records 
of the Department of State, Diplomatic Instructions, All Countries, Volume 7 
(National Archives). Hereafter cited as DI 7. 
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Crawford received Monroe's long communication on consular 
difficulties before he left New York. David Bailie Warden, 
William Lee, and Isaac Cox Barnet (consuls at Paris, Bordeaux, 
and commercial agent at Le Havre, respectively), had all moved 
to assume varying degrees of control of United States diplomatic 
relations since the death of Barlow. Warden, a favorite of some 
of the French functionaries, assumed the title of consul general, 
acted the role of a chargk d'affaires, and took supervision of some 
of the embassy papers, which should have remained with the 
secretary of the legation, Barlow's nephew Thomas. The  effron- 
tery of the other two appeared less serious, but Crawford was to 
relay the President's displeasure with their conduct and to com- 
municate their explanations to Monroe. Crawford gave the 
matter the early attention he promised and severely reprimanded 
Warden and Lee for publicly disputing and quarreling over the 
handling of prize vessels and commissions on the sale of such 
vessels. Warden continued to deal with French officials and 
refused to recognize his dismissal on May 3 1, 18 14, until Crawford 
should give him a legalized copy of Monroe's communication 
authorizing the action. He received no such document and had 
to accept his dismissal, but he refused to turn over many embassy 
papers until informed that the settlement of his account depended 
on their delivery. The  matter was finally resolved in August 
1814.5 
Diplomatic exchanges with the French government were also 
slow paced. In reply to Crawford's letter announcing his appoint- 
ment and arrival, the Duke of Bassano (Maret), said that he 
would be glad to receive communications from Crawford. Re- 
ceiving this letter on August 8, Crawford decided to communicate 
6 Monroe to Crawford, June 10, 1813, Crawford Papers (Duke University Library); 
Crawford to Monroe, June 15, 1813, Monroe, MDLC; Crawford to Warden, July 
25, 1813; May 31, June 8, Aug. 4, 1814, David Bailie Warden Papers (Maryland 
Historical Society); Lee to Warden, June 29, July 10, 12, 17, 1813, ibid.; Crawford 
to Monroe, Aug. 15, Sept. 3, 20, 1813: Jan. 16, 1814, DD France 14; Monroe to 
Crawford, Feb. 8, 1814, DI 7; Journal, passim. More detailed information may be 
found in DD France 15; Consular Instructions, 1801-1817; Despatches from Consuls, 
Bordeaux, 111; Despatches from Consuls, Paris, IV, V (National Archives). In 
correspondence on this matter Crawford commented favorably on several people 
who had been helpful in various ways. Among these were Asbury Dickins, who 
later served as one of Crawford's clerks in the treasury and as "campaign manager" 
in 1824, and George W. Erving (later minister to Spain) who for many years was 
to write long and gossipy letters to Crawford. Erving numbered his letters, but  
only a few of them have been located. 
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with Bassano, but then changed his mind. He did not think the 
correspondence could be brought to a conclusion before Napoleon 
reached Paris-Crawford did not intend to go to Dresden-and 
he doubted that Bassano could act without the authority of the 
emperor. Then, too, he thought it most important that his first 
communication be "dressed up entirely to the palate" of Napo- 
leon, who might otherwise stop the correspondence by saying 
Crawford was not the accredited minister of the United States. 
Another reason for delay was the belief in Paris that the emperor 
did not like the Russian offer to mediate the American-British 
confl i~t .~ 
The legation files contained no copy of the agreement Barlow 
had drawn with the French government; but if the copy Crawford 
secured from the office of exterior relations and sent with his 
letter of August 15 was accurate, the minister understood how 
Barlow could be considered a tool of the French government. 
This document, which gave sanction to the license system and 
placed arbitrary power in the hands of French officials, he pro- 
posed to lay aside unless it could be used as evidence of France's 
admission of the principle of indemnity. Crawford was probably 
most troubled by two secret articles which were to be made 
patent only by mutual consent. According to these, the French 
government was to deliver eighty licenses to the American 
minister who could dispose of them as he thought proper. Each 
license was for one cargo of not less than 300 tons and not more 
than 400 tons, with eight months allowed for execution. Any 
flag except the English could be flown, no hindrance or imped- 
iment would be placed in the way of the vessels, and no other 
license for similar cargo would be granted within the eight 
months. In return for these licenses, the minister of the United 
States agreed to cause to be exported from France within an 
unspecified number of years either French or Italian produce 
to the value of that imported under the licenses. Money, up to 
6 Crawford to Bassano, July 27, 1813: Bassano to Crawford, Aug. 1, 1813; Crawford 
to Monroe, Aug. 15, 1813 (no. 3). Most of Crawford's communications to the French 
government are in the Crawford Letterbook, as well as in DD France 14, which also 
contains many of the letters from Crawford to Monroe. In addition, communications 
from American officials to the French government may be found in Archives des 
Affaires Ctrangeres, Correspondance Politique, Etats-Unis, Vols. 69 (part IV), 70, 72. 
78, 79, and Supplement, Vol. 5 (photostats, MDLC). For some reason these volumes 
contain only a small amount of the Crawford correspondence of 1814. 
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$6 million, from this arrangement was to be used to satisfy 
indemnity  claim^.^ Certainly this was not an agreement which 
Crawford's instructions would allow him to sign and forward for 
State Department approval. 
While trying to decide whether to communicate with the 
French government on the major purpose of his mission before 
being officially received, Crawford wrestled with the consular 
problem, became acquainted with many Americans and a number 
of Frenchmen (including Barb6 Marbois, Dupont de Nemours, 
and Lafayette), observed and commented on several facets of 
French life and culture, moved the American ministry to Hate1 
Le Grand Batellikre, began the study of French, and engaged 
a coach, horses, and coachman for 500 francs per month. The  
coach apparently was much more useful for social purposes and 
pleasure than for performing any functions connected with the 
solution of spoliation claims, and nondiplomatic occasions seemed 
sufficiently numerous. Among other places, he visited the gallery 
of statues and paintings where the only "drawback" he found was 
the continued "recurrence of the crucifixion in glowing colors." 
He thought the Venus de Aledici and Apollo Belvidere beautiful 
statues, but his sensations were not "glowing" when he went 
through the gallery. A little later he considered the vocal and 
instrumental music of the opera good, but his senses were not 
"hurried away as most people represent theirs to be." Of the 
nude statues in the Luxemburg Gardens and the "Thuelleries," 
he remarks, "I am not pleased with their nudity. If I was supreme 
legislator of the United States I would prohibit the importation 
and even the manufacture, of naked people, in marble, plaster, 
or paper." 
On one occasion Crawford dined with Mrs. Barlow, her family, 
and George W. Erving (sensible and well informed but eccentric 
in manner and dress) at Dravel, the 1,200-acre seat of Daniel 
Parker, who had been viewed by many Parisians as the American 
minister for the last ten years. With Parker lived Mrs. Henry 
71n DD France 14. Irving Brant, "Joel Barlow, Madison's Stubborn Minister," 
William and Mary Quarterly 15 (Oct. 1958):447-48, says that Barlow proposed the 
money for indemnity be raised in this manner and that Uassano knew this was 
unauthorized and contrary to American policy. Vernon G .  Setser, T h e  Commercial 
Reciprocity Policy of the United States, 1774-1829 (Philadelphia, 1937), 178-80, 
briefly describes the commercial convention, says nothing about any recognition of 
indemnity claims by France, and makes no mention of the articles Crawford 
transmitted. 
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Preble (sister-in-law of the late Commodore Edward Preble) and 
her three children. Even in Paris, said Crawford, this arrange- 
ment produced some slanderous tales, not very honorable to 
Preble, his wife, or Parker. It  was understood that Preble was an 
occasional visitor but had no "ostensible, or as is believed, 
covert connections with Mrs. Preble." As the minister noted in 
connection with another relationship, "They order these things 
well in France."* 
On September 8 Cratvford received Bassano's reply to his letter 
of August 16. Crawford's uncertainty as to how to comply with 
Bassano's wish that the minister's credentials be presented to the 
emperor stemmed from the Parisians' belief that Bassano and the 
emperor would be absent from Paris all winter. He was em- 
barrassed by his position: he had not been received officially and 
felt he could not comply with the requests that came every day 
from American citizens for him to help with their cases before 
French tribunals. He told Monroe he had not then determined 
what course he should take.9 
Crawford was not completely honest here, for his journal 
indicates he had determined on September 6 to discuss the 
indemnity claims. The  next day he began working on a com- 
munication to the French government; he continued that activity 
on September 9 and 10 and was "much relieved" when he sent 
his statement of the American case to Bassano. Carefully express- 
ing dissatisfaction with the long and indefinite delay in his 
recognition as minister, Crawford indicated that the interest of 
the United States required him to avail himself of the offer of 
August 1 to communicate directly with Bassano. The  duke, he 
noted, was well informed on the nature of the United States 
claims for acts committed in "violation of principles consecrated 
by the usage and practice of all civilized states." The  causes of 
delay had not been within the control of the United States, her 
arguments had not been answered, and yet her efforts had not 
been attended with success. 
The deep solicitude the American Government has constantly 
manifested to obtain just reparation for these acts of violence 
and injustice had not been so much the result of the magnitude 
of the interest in an abstract point of view, as of the magnitude 
SSee Journal, esp. July 28, 30, Aug. 1 ,  3,  6, 8, 15, 17, 18, 19, 25, 26, Sept. 1, 1813. 
9 Crawford to Monroe, Sept. 8, 1813, DD France 14. 
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of the consequences which will probably flow from the rejection 
of this just and equitable claim. It is not necessary for me to 
enter into a long and labored train of reasoning to prove that 
the acts of which the United States complain are in open hostility 
with the principles of moral justice and have no other founda- 
tion than that of force. This has already been proven in a most 
irrefragable manner by my predecessor in his letter of 5th June 
1812 to the Duke d'Albe. 
But, said the minister, the condemnation and subsequent con- 
fiscation of vessels and cargoes under regulations adopted after 
the arrival of the vessels in ports of the empire, followed by the 
ultimate rejection of the claim for indemnity, "would inflict a 
deadly wound upon the commerce of the nation which the 
utmost exertions of the government would be unable to heal 
as long as the victims of its injustice should be able to give 
publicity to the history of their wrongs." 
Even though France had recognized the principle of indemnity 
in the agreement negotiated with Barlow, French action was still 
irreconcilable with their contention that the long and destructive 
wars of Napoleon were fought for the "obtainment" of the rights 
of neutrals. The  lawless and wanton depredations continued 
daily: cargoes were taken and ships seized and burned while 
bound to the ports of Spain and Portugal which were neither 
besieged nor blockaded. And these "atrocious outrages" were 
justified by orders issued under the long-revoked Berlin and 
Milan decrees. These actions could not be attributed to neglect, 
for Barlow had called attention to this last December. The  
President had instructed that reparation be demanded for all 
wrongs committed on American commerce since the revocation 
of the Berlin and Milan decrees-and that orders be given im- 
mediately to prevent all such depredations in the future.1° 
This state paper brought no worthy results. Five days later the 
minister protested the referral to the emperor of the favorable 
decision by the council of prizes in the Nancy case-because the 
minister of marine opposed that decision. This vessel, which 
left the United States on January 20, 1813, for nonbesieged and 
nonblockaded Lisbon with a cargo containing no contraband, 
was burned at sea on February 4 by the French frigates Elbe and 
10 Crawford to Bassano, Sept. 11, 1813 (triplicate), ibid. The Journal says the 
note was sent on Sept. 10, but all Crawford's later references are to Sept. 11. 
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Hortense. Every writer of celebrity said the vessels of nations 
in amity with France were not subject to French capture in the 
prosecution of this trade, and whether it could have been 
captured under the Berlin and Milan decrees would not even 
be asked-the United States had never admitted, and would 
never admit, the justice or legitimacy of those decrees. Besides, 
they were no longer in force. In addition, the owner of the 
Nancy, on representation of the captors, was imprisoned for fifty 
days. Crawford's hopes for an early decision, an inquiry, and the 
most exemplary punishment for those who had so unjustly ad- 
ministered the laws of the emperor were not to be realized.ll 
The Nancy case was not settled until February 1815. 
Crawford was well aware of the influence of European and 
American events on his negotiations and thought the outcome 
of the Russian mediation offer would have a decided bearing on 
his efforts. He wanted John Quincy Adams (the American 
minister to Russia) to be successful, even though Adams' success 
would "greatly embarrass" Crawford's own diplomatic activities. 
He suggested that the two keep each other informed of develop- 
ments. Shortly thereafter he wrote Gallatin (who had been sent 
to seek Russian mediation of the war and who was soon appointed, 
with Adams and three others, to negotiate with the British) that 
he could not make any progress toward the claim for indemnity- 
"if I ever do." The  major part of this letter was concerned with 
the American armies where he saw "so little talent for command 
. . . that it requires no insurmountable obstacle to stop their 
advances." He especially lambasted William Henry Harrison 
and expected no success for American arms so long as they were 
under the command of such men. He entreated Gallatin: "For 
God's sakes when you return, endeavor to rid the army of old 
women, & blockheads, at least in the genl staff."12 Certainly the 
records of the American military had not strengthened Craw- 
ford's position. 
Throughout his ministry Crawford wrote long, informative, 
and quite accurate letters to Monroe on the military and political 
situation in France and the rest of Europe. In  late September 
he indicated that many Parisians rejoiced at the emperor's 
11 Crawford to Bassano, Sept. 16, 1813, DD France 14. 
12 Crawford to Adams, Sept. 13, 1813, Crawford Letterbook; Crawford to Gallatin, 
Sept. 22, 1813, Gallatin. 
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humiliations; he was astonished at the freedom and asperity of 
comments against the emperor, and he believed there would be 
no lasting peace until France was reduced within the Rhine. 
More important perhaps to Monroe was Crawford's belief that 
the probable expulsion of France from Spain would permit the 
English to use a large body of veterans in the defense of Canada 
and thus prevent the United States from taking that country. 
Or these troops could be used against some vulnerable point of 
the United States. Next to a numerous and well-disciplined army, 
Crawford believed prohibition of export of provisions of all kinds 
would be the most effective means of defeating a British move 
against the United States the following year. In  November he 
wrote that if Canada were not acquired by the end of the 
European campaign, the United States might be invaded in the 
spring.13 
On Sunday, November 14, nearly four months after his arrival, 
Crawford was received by Napoleon. The  minister made his 
speech, and the translation was read to Napoleon by M. de Cabre. 
In answer to a few observations which Crawford made in pre- 
senting his credentials, Napoleon (whose countenance was "serene 
and frank") said he had great regard for the United States and 
would do everything in his power to make the relations between 
the two countries as friendly and beneficial as possible.14 
Almost immediately there were changes in the government: 
Bassano became secretary of state and Vicence (Caulaincourt) 
minister of foreign relations. On November 23 Crawford wrote 
to Vicence expressing the desire that the long pending discussions 
be "conducted to a prompt and equitable termination."15 In a 
conference four days later Crawford was informed that the 
emperor was disposed to adjust every cause of controversy but 
thought the United States had done wrong to mingle the matter 
of indemnity with the speculations of the merchants of Paris and 
Bordeaux. This would cause France to pay more than she should 
and the speculators would profit. The  United States, said Craw- 
ford, had never been disposed to make such a connection; rather, 
13 Crawford to Monroe, Sept. 28, Oct. 9, 15, Nov. 10, 1813, DD France 14. 
14 Journal, Nov. 11, 13, 14, 1813; Crawford to Monroe, Nov. 19, 1813, DD France 
14. For some of the stories connected with this official occasion see Cobb, Leisure 
Labors, 186; Eugene Vail, "Reminiscences of Wm. H. Crawford," Southern Literary 
Messenger 5 (1839):362. The last entry in Crawford's Journal was on November 
14, the day of his recognition. 
15 Crawford to Vicence, Nov. 23, 1813, Crawford Letterbook. 
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it had uniformly insisted that the French government repair the 
injuries it had inflicted upon Americans without the United 
States being a party to that reparation. Clarification of the 
emperor's point of view revealed that he had reference to the 
plan of indemnity discussed with Barlow, whereupon Vicence 
was told that the United States had been decidedly opposed to 
the license system in every possible form and that no arrangement 
connected with that system would be acceptable. Vicence spoke 
no English and Crawford no French, so M. de Cabre was 
designated as the future conferee with Crawford. Crawford 
thought, however, that everything had been said that needed to 
be said; he would await the decision of the emperor.16 
Four weeks later Crawford learned that Vicence had, ac- 
cording to his promise, made a detailed report to Napoleon; the 
moment a decision was reached Crawford would be notified. 
Spurred by the newspaper announcement of January 15 that 
Napoleon was to place himself at the head of the troops, Crawford 
determined to write Vicence urging more strongly the necessity 
of immediate decision. On the day Crawford was to present the 
note, Vicence set out for the emperor's headquarters at four in 
the morning, and the impression prevailed that Napoleon would 
leave immediately for Metz. Crawford thought this departure 
would render his note useless and decided not to send it; he 
regretted that decision since Napoleon was still in Paris the next 
day. Though his patience was exhausted and he was becoming 
apprehensive of accomplishing anything beneficial, on January 
18 Crawford pressed upon Vicence the necessity of an immediate 
conclusion of the problem. He thought that before the end of the 
year Britain and the United States would be the only contestants, 
and the cause of the United States would be the cause of the 
civilized world. Should a "concurrence of untoward circum- 
stances" compel the United States to quit the war and acknowl- 
edge the legality of the principles insisted upon by Great Britain 
before the nations of Europe were awakened to the sense of 
danger, the principles of maritime law for the world would be 
"dictated from the deck of a British ship of war and promulgated 
16 Crawford to Monroe, Dec. 1,  1813, DD France 14. At this meeting Crawford 
brought up the matter of the communication of the St. Cloud decree, falsely dated 
April 28, 1811, which the French never chose to explain. See Bradford Perkins, 
Prologue to War: England and the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, Cal., 1961), 
247, 250, 336; Brant, "Joel Barlow, Madison's Stubborn Minister," 439-52. 
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by the thunder of its artillery." Crawford did not think this 
would happen, but it was his duty to labor with indefatigable 
zeal to prevent even its possibility. Settlement of differences 
between the United States and France would dispel the possibility 
of United States withdrawal and might shorten the connection 
of some of the continental powers with England. The  strongest 
reason for settlement, however, was the justice of the claim. 
Further delay by France would simply add to the original injury 
and indirectly advance the interests of the common enemy.17 The  
French felt no such urgency about spoliation claims-allied armies 
were on French soil and pressing toward Paris. 
Official Washington was less discouraged than Crawford. Mon- 
roe relayed Madison's approval of the minister's course and 
thought the accounts of the audience with the emperor and the 
interview with the minister of foreign affairs indicated a disposi- 
tion to accommodate the differences of the two nations. He 
suggested it might be advantageous to the United States, in 
relation to French and British affairs, for a regular correspondence 
to be maintained between Crawford and United States com- 
missioners soon to be negotiating with England at Goteburg. 
Long before this letter reached him, Crawford expressed serious 
doubts about the success of the negotiations and conveyed his 
expectation that the Bourbons would be restored if the allies 
reached Paris.ls 
T h e  allies continued to advance toward Paris, a provisional 
government was set up, and near the end of March Louis XVIII 
returned to France. At about this time Dupont de Nemours, 
secretary of the provisional government, remarked that France 
would pay for all the illegal confiscations which had been com- 
mitted on American commerce; this suggested that the change 
in government had brightened the prospects for remuneration. 
Crawford requested new credentials and permission to return 
home as soon as he had made a fair experiment with the restored 
Bourbon government. He did not despair of success, but the 
17Crawford to Monroe, Jan. 16, 1814; Crawford to Vicence, Jan. 18, 1814, DD 
France 14. 
18 Monroe to Crawford, Feb. 8, 1814, DI 7; Crawford to Monroe, Feb. 15, 1814, 
DD France 14. Madison considered appointing Crawford to the peace commission 
(which met with the British at Ghent), but the French minister to the United States 
said such action would retard the negotiations in France. Brant, Madison, 6:239-40. 
The correspondence between Crawford and the commissioners is discussed briefly 
below. 
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longer he remained the stronger became his desire to return-he 
had found nothing in France in unison with his feelings and 
sentiments.19 
Monroe was pleased with the turn of events, for he thought 
the French under Louis XVIII might assume a less imposing 
attitude, that France might suffer injuries from other powers, 
and that it might be to her interest to cultivate the friendship 
of the United States. If such were the case, Crawford might obtain 
from the Bourbons redress for the wrongs committed by the 
previous government. He sent a letter of credence in blank 
which Crawford filled in. Crawford was presented again on 
August 16, but the incidents of this public audience furnished 
him no data from which he could draw any rational conclusions. 
Rather, he thought that any act of justice or apparent friendship 
on the part of the existing government would result from the 
conviction that the interest of France required it.20 The  presence 
of Talleyrand (the Prince of Benevent) as secretary of state for 
foreign affairs in the new government would afford some justifica- 
tion for Crawford's estimate. 
In opening negotiations with the new government Crawford 
pointed out to Talleyrand some of the violations of neutral rights 
that had taken place during the war between France and England 
(now over), denied the legality of a paper blockade, and empha- 
sized that England had established a paper blockade of the coast 
of the United States. The United States, when neutral, adhered 
"inviolably to the principles of public law recognized by civilized 
nations"; as a belligerent she wished to give the maritime states 
of Europe the "strongest evidence" of her respect for these 
principles. T o  that end the President had issued a proclamation 
strictly forbidding the commanders of public vessels of the United 
States to interrupt, detain, molest, or vex any vessel belonging to 
any neutral or friendly power and directing that such vessels as 
19 Crawford to Monroe, Feb. 28, March 1, 16, 26, April 11, 12, 18, 1814, DD 
France 14. Monroe indicated to Crawford (June 1814, Golding) that he must allow 
a little time for the choice of his successor and for the "difficulties of the moment." 
Crawford recommended Clay as his successor; Clay thanked Crawford but decided 
two months later to accept his election to Congress, which had already taken place. 
Europe held no attractions for him, Clay said. Crawford to Monroe, Aug. 17, 1814, 
DD France 14; Clay to Crawford, Aug. 22, Oct. 17, 1814, James F. Hopkins, ed., 
Mary W. M. Hargreaves, assoc. ed., T h e  Papers of Henry Clay, 3 vols. (Lexington, 
Ky., 1959- ), 1:971-72, 990. Cited hereafter as Clay Papers. 
20 Monroe to Crawford, June 25, 1814, Crawford, Duke; Monroe to Crawford, 
June 27, 1814; Crawford to Monroe, Aug. 17, 1814, DD France 14. 
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were actually bound for American ports be rendered all the aid 
they might require. Further, the President was determined to 
favor by every means in his power the commerce of France with 
the United States. Talleyrand replied that all American vessels 
sailing into French ports would be received in a friendly manner.21 
Many were received in the same "friendly" manner as during 
Napoleon's time; Crawford's success was neither greater nor less 
than with the Napoleonic government. 
Crawford communicated the President's proclamation to the 
ministers, in Paris, of all neutral nations at whose courts the 
United States had no ministers. Convinced that the best informed 
Europeans he had been in contact with were either wholly un- 
acquainted with the causes of the war or had received all their 
information from English newspapers, he sent along with the 
proclamation a brief statement reviewing the English claims for 
continuing the war, the American contentions on neutral rights, 
the desirability of dropping or postponing the issue of impress- 
ment, and the reasonableness of a status quo ante bellurn 
(though more advantageous to Britain than to the United States) 
as the major premise of a peace treaty.22 
Crawford did not hurry to bring up again the general indem- 
nity claims: Talleyrand was at the European congress in Vienna, 
the French internal situation was explosive (with the possibility 
that the Bourbons might be replaced during the winter), and he 
was trying to settle some current cases, which he did not want 
to connect with the general claim. Among the current cases was 
that of the D e ~ a t u r . ~ ~  
The  Decatur, a letter of marque, had been seized and held from 
the security of port for forty-five days. The  French first justified 
their action on the ground that the vessel was armed; later they 
used the pretext that she was a privateer by virtue of having 
captured during her voyage a British merchant vessel (which had 
been ordered to a port in the United States) and carried prize 
cargo. Action against the Decatur did not conform to the French 
regulations of May 22 governing commerce between France, now 
neutral, and the United States and Great Britain, the only remain- 
21 Crawford to Benevent, Aug. 22, 1814; Benevent to Crawford, Sept. 2, 1814, 
ibid., 15. 
22 Crawford to Monroe, Sept. 10, 1814 (two letters); "Reflections upon the War 
between the US and England," by Wm. H. Cr., ibid. 
23 Crawford to Monroe, Sept. 26, 1814, ibid. There are five letters of this date. 
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ing belligerents. Those regulations contained only two prohibi- 
tions: no belligerent ship could arm in the ports of France and 
the sale of American prizes was provisionally suspended. 
In his communications on the Decatur Crawford vigorously, 
almost heatedly, presented the American case to Jaucourt, with 
whom he dealt while Talleyrand was in Vienna. Among the 
many points he made were: France's actions as a neutral were 
very different from those of the United States when she was 
neutral; England's failure to remonstrate against the French 
regulations was an admission of their conformity to the laws of 
- 
neutrality; conditions dictated that American commerce be 
armed, and the French action raised doubts about the "friendly 
disposition" of France toward that commerce; France was apply- 
ing her regulations unevenly, for three fully armed British letters 
of marque (according to the declaration of one of their captains) 
had entered Bordeaux after the Decatur had been detained; the 
sole object of a privateer was capture of enemy vessels, while the 
taking of prizes was incidental to the commercial purpose of a 
letter of marque; the character of a vessel cannot depend upon 
incidental circumstances; and a neutral can take no cognizance 
of acts between belligerents unless those acts occur within the 
jurisdiction of the neutral. Crawford considered the French 
action so flagrant that he wondered whether the United States 
- 
could keep a minister at the French court unless the matter was 
settled; certainly he could not stay. I t  was near the end of 
March 1815 before all the troublesome and unreasonable restric- 
tions were removed and the Decatz~r was allowed to proceed with 
reloading.24 
By that time Napoleon had returned to France, the United 
States and England were at peace, and Crawford had not only 
completed his interchanges with the Ghent commissioners but 
had served as their host and guide during a visit to Paris. A 
regular correspondence between Crawford and the commissioners, 
suggested by Monroe for their mutual advantage, began about 
the middle of April 1814 and ended the day before the treaty 
was signed, with letters to and from each of the commissioners 
and to them collectively. Crawford played an active role and 
24 Crawford to Jaucourt, Sept. 30, Nov. 3, 30, 1814; Crawford to Monroe, Oct. 
21, Nov. 5, Dec. 12, 16, 21, 1814: Jaucourt to Crawford, Dec. 14, 1814, ibid.; Craw- 
ford to Jaucourt, March 7, 1815; Crawford to Monroe, March 16, 28, 1815; Jaucourt 
to Crawford, March 7, 1815; Vicence to Crawford, March 24, 1815, ibid. 16. 
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one of substantial importance, but most accounts of the making 
of the Treaty of Ghent do not even mention him.25 
Crawford, in Paris, was more advantageously located than the 
commissioners for learning about the attitudes and positions of 
the various European powers. He soon informed them that they 
should not count on the influence of any allied powers on their 
deliberations, examined the possibility of any fruitful results of 
the tsar's interesting himself in mediating the war, told of placing 
before Alexander I (via Lafayette) a short statement of the 
reciprocal causes of complaint between the United States and 
Britain, and correctly expected no beneficial results from Alex- 
ander's proposed visit to London.26 
Original instructions to the commissioners called upon them to 
resolve the issue of impressment, but before negotiations really 
began the allies had achieved victory over Napoleon, thus greatly 
curtailing England's need for seamen. The  changed situation was 
quickly realized by those in Europe: Bayard and Gallatin wrote 
Monroe on May 6 and 10 that Britain would not officially give 
up  the right to impress, and Crawford wrote on May 11 urging 
Monroe to change the instructions on that issue. On May 13, in 
the same letter in which he reviewed the tsar's role, Crawford 
told of his letter to Monroe and discussed the relation of impress- 
ment to the negotiations. He did not expect the British to 
relinquish the principle by treaty, but he was confident that peace 
could be made without "admitting the legality of their claim.- 
This is all we can expect in the present state of the world. This 
will leave us free to apply the proper remedy when the evil shall 
be felt." Crawford believed negotiations should not be jeopar- 
dized by waiting for new instructions; there were occasions when 
a public officer should not "hesitate to jeopardize his own reputa- 
25 Philip Jackson Green, The Life of William Harris Crawford [Charlotte, N.C., 
19651, 95-112, details Crawford's relations with the commissioners, but he did not 
use several important sources. Fred L. Engelman, The Peace of Christmas Eve 
(New York, 1962), devotes little space to Crawford's activity in this area. 
26 Crawford to Monroe, April 20, 1814, DD France 14: Crawford to Commissioners, 
May 13, 28, 1814; Crawford to Gallatin, May 24, 1814, Gallatin. Most of the Craw- 
ford communications are in DD France 14 and those to Clay and the commissioners 
at the appropriate chronological places in Clay Papers, 1, 2. Some appear in the 
American State Papers: Foreign Relations, 3, and "Letters Relating to the Negotia- 
tions at Ghent," American Historical Review 20 (Oct. 1914):108-29, is useful. Henry 
Adams, ed., The Writings of Albert Gallatin, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1879), does not 
include a number of the letters, and by shortening others Adams has minimized or 
eliminated Crawford's role. This work is hereafter cited as Adams, Gallatin 
Writings. 
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tion" rather than the national interest. Clay thought their 
instructions would not permit them to take the action Crawford 
suggested, but if continuation of the war hinged on that single 
point, the United States government would not persist in de- 
manding the "abandonment of what is now a mere theoretic 
pretension, the practical evil having for the present ceased; and 
if I were persuaded that the interests of our Country demanded 
of me the personal risk of a violation of instructions I should not 
hesitate to incur it."27 James A. Bayard, in Paris from May 31 
to June 15, 1814, agreed with Crawford on every question relative 
to the peace.28 
It  was June 27 before Monroe sent new instructions authorizing 
the commissioners to omit "any stipulation on the subject of 
impressment, if found indispensably necessary to terminate" the 
war. Monroe mentioned having received the Gallatin and Bayard 
letters but said nothing of Crawford's letter of May 11, so it is 
possibly safe to conclude that Crawford had no immediate in- 
fluence on changing the instructions. His insistence, however, was 
that the commissioners proceed without waiting for the change.29 
Throughout the summer and early fall Crawford expressed some 
distrust of the British and rather despaired of success of the 
negotiations. All but Clay, among the commissioners, shared this 
pessimistic attitude. 
Bayard and Jonathan Russell kept Crawford posted on the 
negotiations which actually began in August, and toward the end 
of that month the commissioners seriously considered Adams' 
return to St. Petersburg via Vienna where he would personally 
inform Alexander of what was happening at Ghent-that is, the 
delaying tactics and uncompromising position of the British, who 
said American recognition of an Indian buffer state was absolutely 
prerequisite to discussion of other matters. By early October 
Crawford "anxiously wished" the negotiations might be closed. 
27 Crawford to Commissioners, May 13, 1814; Clay to Crawford, July 2, 1814, 
Clay Papers, 1:904-9, 937-39. Adams' version of Crawford's letter, Gallatin Writings, 
1:614-17, contains none of the material in the text above. 
%Elizabeth Donnan, ed., Papers of James A.  Bayard, 1796-1815, American 
Historical Association, Annual Report, 1913, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1915) 
2:509-10; Crawford to Clay (via Bayard), June 10, 1814, Clay Papers, 1:932-36. 
During the stay in Paris, Bayard and Crawford visited the underground caverns, the 
Louvre, Versailles, and other points of interest, and dined with Lafayette, Marbois, 
LaForest, and others. 
29 Monroe to Commissioners, June 27, 1814; Monroe to Crawford, June 27, 1814, 
DI 7. 
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He thought, however, they would be continued until Castlereagh 
was satisfied that the Congress of Vienna would terminate 
amicably; England would then be free to play whatever hand 
she wished. Though Crawford had sent his statement on the war 
and peace to the European powers after the defeat of Napoleon, 
he felt the true state of the negotiations should be made known to 
the principal powers by either Adams or Gallatin-and directly 
to the emperor of Russia or Talleyrand. However, it might be 
unsafe to trust the latter.30 The  idea of Adams or Gallatin going 
to Vienna persisted until the middle of October when the meet- 
ings began to turn toward meaningful discussions. 
The  unanimous opposition of the commissioners to the 
British-proposed Indian state forced that item into the back- 
ground, but some difference of opinion developed-and sharp 
and heated controversy came a few years later-over the fisheries- 
Mississippi River proposal. Apparently Russell's letter of Novem- 
ber 4 gave Crawford his first news of the British position that if 
the United States were to retain the fishing rights acquired by 
the treaty of 1783 Britain should have the right to navigate the 
Mississippi River. This letter caused Crawford "much uneasi- 
ness," and he could not think of a "solitary reason which offers 
itself in favor of proposing a free navigation of the Mississippi 
River as an equivalent of taking fish within the British jurisdic- 
tion and of drying them on their uninhabited shores." This 
privilege was advantageous to the United States, but, said Craw- 
ford, it ought not to be purchased at the "expense of an equiv- 
alent" of "value to the enemy only as it is directly injurious to 
us." Since American ports were all free and British vessels could 
enter them without difficulty with cargoes that were not pro- 
hibited, why should Britain be permitted to navigate the river? 
And what is the "object of their solicitude in accepting this as 
an equivalent?" Certainly it would make it easier to smuggle 
prohibited articles and to embroil the United States with the 
Indians. He hoped this offer had not been made; if it had been, 
it no doubt was accepted unless everything that had been done 
at Ghent was a farce.31 
30 Crawford to Gallatin, Oct. 6, 1814, Gallatin, NYH; Charles Francis Adams, ed., 
Memoirs of John  Quincy Adams . . ., 12 vols. (Philadelphia, 1874-1877), 3:23, 53. 
Hereafter cited as Adams, Memoirs. 
31 Crawford to Gallatin, Nov. 10, 1814, Gallatin. Earlier Crawford had expressed 
a similar view regarding introduction of manufactures into the United States 
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Clay (with support from Russell) bitterly opposed any mention 
of the fisheries-river issue in the American projet and declared 
he would not sign any treaty that restored to the British the right 
to navigate the river. After several votes, the group left the 
question unnoticed in their proposal. On December 23 Russell 
detailed the differences of opinion in general, noted that the 
British had been told a status quo ante bellum was required, and 
indicated a treaty was close. It  was signed the next day, and two 
days later the Duke of Wellington informed Crawford of this 
action.32 The "major premise," as Crawford had several times 
suggested, was the status quo ante bellum. 
During his ministership Crawford also carried out his assigned 
duties as supervisor of all the American consuls in western 
Europe. In addition to the problems of prize ships and cargoes 
he also had to administer through the consuls and vice consuls 
the activities concerning distressed seamen and prisoners of war. 
These sometimes involved citizenship, alleged acts of barbarity, 
inhumanity, and cruelty by captains of American vessels, and the 
always troublesome problems of finance. But these matters seem 
to have been resolved with little more than the anticipated 
diffi~ulties.~~ At the end of the war with England Crawford 
devoted some attention to the appointment of consuls in Europe, 
detailing for Monroe those who then held posts and were ap- 
pointed by the President, and noting that a number of those 
listed in the almanac for 1814 (which Monroe had sent to him) 
were either dead or had returned to the United States some 
years before.34 
should Britain secure control of Louisiana in her upcoming invasion attempt. 
Crawford to Monroe, Aug. 17, 1814, DD France 14. 
32Adams to Crawford, Nov. 17, 1814; Clay to Crawford, Nov. 24, 1814; Russell 
to Crawford, Dec. 2, 1814, Golding; Russell to Crawford, Dec. 23, 1814; Wellington 
to Crawford, Dec. 26, 1814, Letters to Crawford; Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy 
Adams and the Foundations o f  American Foreign Policy (New York, 1949), 209, 
213,214. In  his discussion of Ghent, 196-220, Bemis does not mention Crawford and 
cites only two Clay letters to Crawford. Available evidence indicates that Russell 
eight years later, in supporting Clay for the presidency but perhaps concerned 
more with discrediting Adams, distorted the events at  Ghent. Ibid., 498-509; House 
Documents, No. 75 (serial 67), 17th Cong., 1st sess. Hereafter cited as House Doc. 
33See, for example, Crawford to Bassano, Oct. 16, 1813; Crawford to LaForest, 
April 21, 1814, Crawford Letterbook; Crawford to Bassano, Oct. 15, 1813; Crawford 
to Monroe, March 10, April 20, June 8, 1814: Circular to Consuls, Sept. 23, 1813, 
Jan. 24, 1814, DD France 14; Crawford to Monroe, Dec. 30, 1814, ibid. 15; Monroe 
to Crawford, Aug. 30, 1813, Feb. 13, 1814, DI 7. 
34 Crawford to Monroe, Dec. 28, 1814, DD France 15; Crawford to Monroe, Feb. 
15, 1815, Monroe, MDLC. 
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Nearly a year after leaving Europe Crawford recommended an 
increase in the pay of some of the ministers and thought some 
changes in the consular system might be desirable. Most of the 
consuls (in reality perhaps more representative of business than 
of the government) were not on salary, but they were usually 
able to enter into partnership with the "most respectable" 
mercantile houses in the various ports by investing only the 
"advantage of their position." Because such associations might 
subordinate their official acts to their economic interests, it might 
be preferable to give them an annual salary and prohibit their 
trading activities. The  salary, Crawford said, would have to be 
considerable or it would not be equivalent, and it would need 
to be given to all consuls, not just those at the capital cities. He 
also thought it might be beneficial to appoint a consul general 
(with a competent salary) to each of the principal commercial 
states with the power to superintend the conduct of and make 
general regulations for the other consuls in that country. T o  
help raise money for the consular salaries a small tonnage duty 
might be levied on all American vessels entering foreign ports; 
when the duty collected in a port exceeded the salary of the 
consul stationed there, the surplus could be used toward the 
salary of another consul in the same state where the fees had not 
been equal to the salary.35 The  merits of the proposal seem 
obvious, but not until 1856 did Congress systematize the consular 
service. 
While Crawford was bringing the Decatur case toward a 
satisfactory resolution, encountering occasional difficulty in meet- 
ing the financial requirements of distressed seamen, and serving 
as host and guide for some of the Ghent commissioners who were 
still in Paris,36 he was informed that Napoleon had escaped from 
Elba, had landed in France, and was advancing toward Paris. 
Crawford would not predict whether the Bourbons would be 
overthrown, but he detected little enthusiasm for them and 
35 Crawford to Monroe, April 5, 1816, Gallatin. 
36Adams arrived during the first week of February: the others had come in 
early January and had been presented to the king two weeks after arrival. All but 
Bayard, who was dangerously ill, were again presented on February 7, at which 
time Crawford-in reply to the king's question-identified Adams as the son of the 
"celebrated Mr. Adams." Clay left for London on March 17 and Gallatin followed 
a few days later. Adams, Memoirs, 3:151, 185-86: Clay Papers, 23-9: Crawford to 
Monroe, March 21, 1815, Monroe, MDLC; Bayard to [Isaac Cox Barnet?], April 
23, 1815, Donnan, ed., Bayard Papers, 380. 
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thought the sovereign who in the nineteenth century presumed 
to rule by divine right "must not expect any enthusiasm in 
support of his  pretension^."^^ Three days later, March 19, the 
royal family had left the Tuileries, and Napoleon occupied it 
the next morning. The  papers of that morning displayed an 
entirely changed tone, but since his departure for the United 
States was near, Crawford thought he could avoid any connection 
with the court without giving offense or in any way committing 
the interests of the United States. He was now convinced that 
if the Bourbons ever regained the throne it must be by the same 
means Napoleon's restoration was effected, for the great mass of 
talent, wealth, and enterprise were opposed to the Bourbons and 
the principles upon which they were willing to rest their right 
to the throne.38 
The  corps diplomatique had been meeting every day since 
Napoleon had landed on French soil, but only on March 20 
did Crawford hear of these meetings. Since he had not been 
informed, he would not attend, and he now felt war more than 
probable-it would start between England and France and then 
spread to a general conflict. Within a week the foreign ministers 
had applied for their passports, and many had left Paris. Craw- 
ford was the only remaining minister who did not represent a 
nation at war with France at the time of the abdication of 
Napoleon, and he planned to leave soon.39 
But he did not get away as soon as he expected, and he had 
one more interview with Vicence. On April 3 he reviewed the 
situation of prizes brought in by American ships and the pro- 
visional suspension of sales by the king. When Vicence was 
reminded of the claim for indemnity and was asked the sentiment 
of Napoleon on the matter, his countenance immediately changed 
-he had supposed a solution had been arranged by the last 
government. T o  Vicence's statement that since the United States 
and Britain were at peace and the issue ought to be considered 
settled, Crawford retorted that the wrongs committed by France 
could not possibly have been arranged in a treaty between the 
37 Jaucourt to Crawford, March 7, 1815; Crawford to Monroe, March 8, 16, 1815, 
DD France 16: Crawford to Monroe, March 16, 1815, Monroe, MDLC. Crawford 
noted that he had been ill for four weeks but was considerably improyed in the 
past few days. 
38 Crawford to Monroe, March 21, 1815, DD France 16. 
39 Crawford to Monroe, March 21, 28, 1815, ibid. 
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United States and England. Whereupon Vicence said he would 
examine it as soon as "other pressing avocations would permit." 
Crawford, who had decided to let the temper of this discussion 
determine his relations with the new government, presently 
informed the duke of his imminent return to the United States.40 
Having determined there was no possibility of settling the 
indemnity claims, Crawford made preparations to leave. On 
April 24, at Grignon's in the Rue Neuve des Petits Champs, 
forty-five people attended a farewell dinner for him, and two 
days later Crawford left for England. He did not expect to be 
there more than ten days, and on May 9 he wrote Bayard that 
he, Clay, and Gallatin (the last two negotiating a commercial 
treaty with England) would arrive at Plymouth on May 16 or 
17.41 But negotiations did not go as rapidly as expected, de- 
parture dates were several times postponed, and finally Crawford 
was informed that Gallatin had written the Neptune captain for 
a sailing date of June 25.42 
Bayard, too ill to attend the dinner for Crawford in Paris, was 
now in a "debilitated" condition. At the end of May Crawford 
had told Clay that in determining the sailing date of the Neptune 
Bayard's condition and feelings ought to be considered "without 
any regard to my c~nvenience ."~~ Apparently fearful that further 
delay in sailing might result in Bayard's death before he got 
home, Crawford did not wait for Clay and Gallatin. He ordered 
the Neptune to sail on June 18, leaving Clay and Gallatin (and 
Adams who arrived soon after) to complete the negotiations on 
July 2. Crawford and Bayard arrived at Wilmington, Delaware, 
on August 1 and Bayard died six days later.44 
40 Crawford to Monroe, April 15, 1815, ibid. 
41 Crawford to Bayard, May 9, 1815, Simon Gratz Collection (HSP). Henry Jackson 
had been left as charge in Paris: Russell returned to Sweden; Adams, the new 
minister to England, did not reach London until after Crawford left that place; and 
Gallatin, after a brief visit to the United States, took up his post as minister to 
France. 
42 Clay to Crawford, June 10, 12, 1815, Letters to Crawford. 
43 Crawford to Clay, May 31, 1815, Clay Papers, 2:39-40. Clay's letter of May 27, 
referred to by Crawford, has not been located. 
44 Bayard and his friends felt the "warmest gratitude" to Crawford for his 
attentions, and Crawford explained to Mrs. Gallatin the reasons her husband had 
been left in England. Donnan, ed., Bayard Papers, 34811; G. B. Milligan to Craw- 
ford, Ang. 4, 1815, Golding; Crawford to Hannah Nicholson Gallatin, Aug. 16, 
1815, Gallatin. In a long fragment draft to Clay (n.d., Golding), which probably was 
not sent, Crawford stressed the importance of Clay and Gallatin remaining until the 
treaty was concluded, examined the reasons the Neptune should no longer delay 
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While in France Crawford frequently was distressed by the 
continued inefficiency of the administrators of the war effort, 
the inadequacy and failure of the military leaders, and the 
division and discontent the war had brought among the people 
of the United State~.~5 He also speculated on how the United 
States might avoid war in the future, concerning himself with 
the depredations belligerent maritime powers would commit on 
the commerce of a neutral nation. T o  him only two ways seemed 
open: diminish the inducement to depredate or counteract that 
inducement by a constant state of preparation. The  first could 
be done by repealing the system of drawbacks and thus keeping 
commerce near its peacetime level; achievement of the second 
would mean maintaining a war establishment-and taxes-from 
the beginning to the close of every war between the principal 
maritime states of Europe. The earlier policy of becoming the 
carriers of the weaker belligerents and at the same time trying to 
avoid war would subject the commerce to depredations of the 
stronger belligerent. But to form a correct judgment of the 
merits of the two policies the profits of one ought to be compared 
with the costs of the other, and the possibility of having to enter 
war no matter what policy had been followed, as well as the 
subsequent loss of the profit of the carrying trade and of the 
direct commerce, ought to enter into the evaluation. But to 
insist upon the exercise of national rights and permit the habitual 
violation of those rights degraded the national character and 
invited aggression of a more general and vital nature. 
However, he thought the problem would resolve itself when 
the United States reached a population of thirty million; then 
the country could venture upon the enjoyment of the trade of the 
weaker belligerent without the danger of being forced into war. 
Meantime, no agreement should be made to abstain from such 
trade. The  commerce of the United States could be controlled 
by changes in the revenue laws, changes made at the pleasure of 
the United States without offense to others. He did not believe 
the report that Trinidad had been exchanged for the Floridas; 
sailing, and regretted not having gone immediately from Plymouth to Liverpool, 
thus avoiding the unpleasant situation he was then in. 
45See, for example, Crawford to Gallatin, Sept. 22, 1813, Gallatin: Crawford to 
Monroe, Jan. 16, May 11, Sept. 10, 1814, DD France 14: Crawford to Charles Tait, 
Oct. 12, 1814, Tait. Several letters Crawford had asked Gallatin to pass on to the 
addressees are in the Gallatin Papers. 
76 MINISTER T O  F R A N C E  
even if this were true, the English control of Florida during 
peacetime could not be very injurious to the United States. He 
concluded that when "our population shall double that of the 
British Isles, her possessions in our neighborhood may be con- 
sidered more in the nature of security for her good behavior 
than as endangering our peace, or injurious to our  interest^."^^ 
There is no doubt that Crawford did not accomplish the major 
purpose of his mission, but the later accusation of his political 
foes that his appointment was strictly political and that failure 
resulted from Crawford's deficiencies does not seem justified. 
Crawford was well regarded by his contemporaries, and Bayard, 
a staunch Federalist, thought him the ablest and most influential 
man in the Senate at the time of his appointment. Henry Adams 
later described him as the "only vigorous Republican leader in 
the Senate" but thought Crawford's manners and temper "little 
suited to the very delicate situation" in which he was placed.47 
Crawford's letters to Monroe and communications to the French 
government indicate abilities of a high order, and though he 
disliked the court etiquette and thought he might have made 
"many blunders" there is no intimation that his manners and 
his alleged temper in any way affected negotiations. H e  was 
brusque and harsh only in preventing the Russians from violating 
the diplomatic immunity of his mission grounds and quarters. 
His advice to and consultation with the Ghent commissioners 
reveal a thorough comprehension of the European situation and 
helped those commissioners to arrive at new positions or gave 
support to positions which they had independently reached. It 
seems reasonable to assume that no one could have settled the 
issues with the French government at that time, and in all fairness 
it should be noted that these problems did not yield to solution 
for almost twenty years. 
Crawford must have been happy to return to his own country; 
he had felt rather useless in France, and though he had made 
some warm and lasting personal friendships he felt no particular 
attachment to the French nation.48 Indeed, his French experience 
46 Crawford to Jonathan Fisk, Dec. 8, 1814, Jefferson Papers (MDLC); Crawford 
to Monroe, Feb. 21, 1815, Monroe, MDLC. See also Jefferson to Crawford, May 31, 
1816, Jefferson. 
47 Adams, Memoirs, 2519; Adams, History, 7:49; Adams, Gallatin Life, 510. 
48 The acquaintance with Lafayette ripened into a strong friendship, and Craw- 
ford kept Lafayette's letters with "more than usual care." Dudley, "Crawford," 9; 
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strengthened his already strong devotion to republicanism. He 
was not, as he had expected when he asked permission to come 
home, to return to the service of his state as a United States 
senator; for almost ten years he would be a member of Madison's 
and Monroe's cabinets. 
several letters from Lafayette to Crawford are in the Lafayette Papers at the 
University of Chicago. 
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WHILE THE UNITED STATES and England remained at war, Craw- 
ford anticipated resuming an elective office when he returned 
home. But, in February 1815, shortly after the war ended, he 
seemed to have little expectation of remaining in public service; 
the needs of his family and of his farm would determine whether 
he returned to the practice of 1aw.l Exactly one week after 
Crawford expressed these sentiments, the Senate confirmed him 
as secretary of war, replacing Monroe who had re~igned .~  Before 
he left Paris, Crawford received unofficial news of this action 
from Gallatin in London, but no one in Washington wrote him 
on the matter. Madison, who had made the nomination without 
consulting Crawford, did not write because he "had taken it for 
granted" that Crawford would leave Europe by early April; even 
so, as late as May 18 the President was wondering whether Craw- 
ford would return soon or remain in France to pursue the purpose 
of his mission under the changed  condition^.^ 
Crawford had been in England some days before he learned 
from newspapers-not from the expected dispatches-brought by 
the Neptune that he had been appointed to head the War 
Department. From Plymouth, before sailing for home, he ex- 
pressed an indebtedness to the President for his continued con- 
fidence in him after the total failure of the mission to France, 
but he regretted the appointment. Crawford said his services 
were entirely at the command of the government so long as the 
war continued, but when peace was made he had decided to 
devote his time to his domestic interests. He had no expectation 
of a new position and would make no decision until he reached 
the United States and talked with Monroe and Madison. Perhaps, 
he mused, the appointment had not been made; he had no 
official notification of it. In fact, since the middle of December 
1814 he had received from the United States only a letter of 
introd~ct ion.~ 
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The Neptune arrived at Baltimore on August 2, and Crawford 
went to Washington by steamer that afternoon and evening. The  
following day he was handed letters from Monroe and Madison 
and a commission as secretary of war. On August 4 Crawford 
accepted the appointment, noting that the harmony he presumed 
to exist in the cabinet was a factor in his decision. He would 
endeavor to promote that harmony, promised exertion in the 
discharge of his duties, and expressed the desire to extend the 
reputation of Madison's administration and to strengthen and 
perpetuate the republican  institution^.^ Though he had thought 
himself unqualified to handle the department during wartime, 
Crawford seemed to have no such misgivings concerning ad- 
ministering the office during peace. By Tuesday, August 8, the 
new secretary had assumed his duties; two weeks later he left the 
capital for 'CVoodlawn,G spent five weeks in Georgia, and-with 
his family-was again in Washington on November 14. The  
Crawfords were not to return permanently to Georgia for nearly 
ten years. In that time the promise of a bright political career 
had been fulfilled, though the final goal of the presidency was 
never attained. 
Cra~vford's tenure as secretary of war ended in October 1816, 
but in the short time he held that office he effected some notable 
innovations, began several programs that were carried to fruition 
by his successors, laid the bases for some disastrous enmities, and 
made a thoughtful report on the Indians which was almost 
brutally distorted in 1816 and revived in 1824 to assist in Craw- 
ford's political assassination. All seem to attest to Crawford's 
1 Crawford to Charles Tait, Feb. 22, 1815, Tait. 
2 Previously Henry Dearborn had been rejected, but the Senate consented to erase 
this record from its journal. There was no roll call vote on Crawford's approval. 
Senate Executive Journal, 2:625, 626, 627; National Intelligencer, March 4, 1815; 
Adams, History, 9:89. Alexander J .  Dallas carried the duties of secretary of war 
and secretary of treasury during many months of 1815. 
3 Gallatin to Crawford, April 15, 1815, Letters to Crawford; Madison to Monroe, 
May 18, 1815, Monroe, MDLC. 
4 Crawford to Monroe, June 14, 1815, DD France 16. 
5 Crawford to Monroe, Aug. 4, 1815, ibid.: Madison to Crawford, July 18, 1815; 
Crawford to Madison, Aug. 4, 1815, Golding. The  original commission, dated 
Aug. 1, 1815, is in ibid. 
6 War Office, Military Book No. 8 (National Archives); National Intelligencer, 
Aug. 26, 1815. T h e  first item is hereafter cited as MB 8. Crawford received 
something of a hero's welcome in Georgia and was the honored guest at  a ball 
in Lexington and at  a public dinner in Athens. A partisan described him as the 
"most imposing gentleman who had ever been seen in Georgia." Athens Journal, 
Sept. 14, 1815; Athens Gazette, Sept. 14, Oct. 12, 1815; Gilmer, Sketches (1855), 127. 
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devotion to duty and his capacity for work, but it has been 
fashionable to detract from his abilities and achievements. In  
reality, Crawford as secretary of war (and secretary of treasury) 
was reasonably imaginative, practical, efficient, administratively 
competent, and ethically sound.7 
The  early months of the War of 1812 had demonstrated the 
inefficiencies of the War Department and the ineffectiveness of 
the army commanders. Crawford and others thought poorly of 
the head of the department and a number of the generals, but 
deficiencies were not due entirely to personal shortcomings- 
improper organization lay at the base of some of the difficulties. 
Some reorganization was effected by the act of March 3, 1813, 
but exactly two years later the law fixing the peacetime military 
establishment at 7,950 officers and men all but destroyed those 
administrative gains. The  postwar legislation greatly reduced 
the adjutant general and topographical departments and replaced 
the departments of the inspector general and quartermaster with 
four brigade inspectors and quartermasters. The  President saved 
some of the wartime gains by deciding the more recent measure 
did not apply to the ordnance and purchasing departments or 
to judge advocates and chaplains. Further, he ordered the pro- 
visional retention of an adjutant and inspector general, two 
adjutants general, a quartermaster general, a paymaster of the 
army, an apothecary general, five hospital surgeons, and a number 
of assistants for each of these staff  officer^.^ 
Crawford definitely did not approve of the postwar changes 
made by Congress. He maintained that the evidence furnished 
by the first two campaigns of the late war "incontestably estab- 
lished" the expediency and necessity of having a peacetime 
organization of the military that would make it efficient in time 
of war. Further, a complete organization of the staff would 
contribute as much to economy as to efficiency. The  stationary 
staff should be organized without reference to the number and 
7 For an especially laudatory view see L. D. Ingersoll, A History of the War De- 
partment of the United States (Washington, D.C., 1879). 75-76, 455, 457. 
8 For an account of the wartime and immediate postwar organization of the War 
Department see Lloyd Milton Short, The Development of National Administrative 
Organization in the United States (Baltimore, Md., 1923), 125-29. The officers 
mentioned above were referred to as the general staff, but it should be noted that 
these military and civilian officials were concerned with housekeeping functions of 
the army, not with overall general military planning. 
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distribution of troops, and he urged that a general staff be 
established for each of the two military divisions (northern and 
southern) set up by the general order of May 17, 1815. Congress 
responded favorably to Crawford's recommendations with the 
act of April 24, 1816, which completely reorganized the general 
staff and made permanent the provisional actions of President 
Madison. In December 1818 Calhoun told Congress that the 
staff organization of 18 16 combined simplicity with efficiency; 
he made only a few  change^.^ 
The JYar of 1812 had also clearly shown that systematic pro- 
tection of the coast and interior was essential to the defense of 
the country. Early in 1816 Crawford emphasized the necessity of 
coastal fortifications, indicated the intention of the government 
to complete those that had been started and to establish others 
as rapidly as appropriations would permit, and asked the gover- 
nors to use their good offices in securing cession to the United 
States of the sites of the fortifications.1° In the winter and spring 
of 18 16 correspondence among Jacob Brown (commanding the 
northern division), Joseph G. Swift (senior officer of the corps 
of engineers), and Crawford led to agreement on most of the 
details concerning repairs to be made, new works to be under- 
taken, surveys of canals and bridges to be conducted, number of 
officers needed in the corps, and pay of troops to be used in 
construction work. Congress responded favorably to Crawford's 
request with the act of April 29, 1816, which provided an ap- 
propriation of $838,000 for the launching of a major program 
of fortifications.ll One phase of the program-doubtless triggered 
by the British activity in the Chesapeake Bay and the easy invasion 
of Washington-called for a joint survey by the army and navy to 
determine what fortifications were necessary to prevent the entry 
of a hostile fleet into the bay, and to defend points within the 
bay should such an entry occur.12 
Contractual problems, personal interests, sectional and regional 
9 Crawford to Richard M. Johnson, Dec. 27, 1815, MB 8; American State Papers: 
Military Aflairs, 1:636, 780; 3 Stat. 297. 
10 Crawford to various governors, Jan. 16, 1816, MB 8. 
11 Crawford to Jacob Brown, April 3, May 7, 1816; Brown to Crawford, April 
26, May 31, 1816: Brown to Swift, April 27, 1816, Jacob Brown Letter Book, Jan. 1,  
1816-Feb. 5, 1828 (MDLC); Swift to Crawford, Jan. 9, 1816; Crawford to James 
Barbour, April 9, 1816, James Barbour Papers (NYP). 
12 See Crawford to George Bomford, May 31, 1816, MB 9. 
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wishes, and spheres of jurisdiction sometimes caused vexing delays 
in carrying out the program, but these yielded to administrative 
patience and judicious compromise. And so did the shortage 
of supervisory personnel. Swift had indicated he needed sixty 
more officers in the corps of engineers. Crawford used this ex- 
pressed need to revive his recommendation-made while in 
France-that French engineers be employed in the United States 
when they became available. Especially did he mention the 
illustrious Simon Bernard. He thought Swift might not want to 
recommend a Frenchman for a major generalcy, but suggested that 
Bernard's value to the United States might be apparent in light 
of the number and importance of the fortifications to be built 
in the next four years at an expenditure of about $4 million. 
The  employment of Bernard might also produce the promotion 
of several other men in the corps-and this would be desirable.13 
Congress did authorize the President to employ a foreign 
engineer; Henry Jackson in Paris was directed to communicate 
with Bernard, and Crawford wrote directly to him, indicating 
the prospect of permanent employment in one of the academies 
expected to be established. With the permission of the French 
minister of war Bernard came to the United States, where he took 
on responsibility for the construction of Fortress Monroe and 
several fortifications around New York City and for much of 
the civil engineering connected with the Chesapeake and Ohio 
Canal and the Delaware Breakwater.14 The  fortification program 
was moving smoothly when John C. Calhoun became secretary 
of war. 
Meanwhile Crawford was moving to stop violations of regula- 
tions and to improve the quality of education at West Point, 
which was under the supervision of the secretary of war. Some 
young men, admitted as cadets in 1813, had never appeared at 
the academy; some instructors thought some of the cadets un- 
qualified and indicated that the required admissions examinations 
13 Crawford to Monroe, May 11, Aug. 17, 1814, DD France 14; Crawford to 
Gentlemen, Oct. 14, 1814 (copy); Commissioners to Crawford, Oct. 19, Dec. 2, 
1814, Gallatin Letter Book, 2:250-51, 252-53; Crawford to Barbour, April 9, 1816. 
Iscrawford to Gallatin, May 6, 1816, Gallatin; Crawford to Bernard, May 6, 
1816, MB 9; Gallatin to Crawford, Aug. 6, 1816, Gallatin Letter Book, 4:18-19. 
Bernard returned to France after the revolution of 1830, was made a lieutenant 
general by Louis Philippe, and served as minister of war in 1836. Reports to 
Congress on the fortifications program may be conveniently located in Niles' Week ly  
Register. 
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were not being given to all prospective students. Crawford 
requested General Swift (superintendent of West Point by virtue 
of his seniority in the corps of engineers) to forward without 
delay the names of those not properly qualified. Recommendation 
of unqualified young men made it necessary for the academic 
staff to give an admission examination, the act of 1812 defining 
qualifications would be the guideline, and the letter of appoint- 
ment would be delivered only after successful completion of the 
examinat ion. lThe bluntness of Crawford's last letter seems 
to have settled this matter. 
Crawford made slight changes in the course of study which 
had been in effect since June 1810, answered complaints by 
altering some eating and mess-house regulations and demanding 
compliance with others, and made arrangements for purchase 
abroad of books, maps, and instruments that would be useful 
in the academy's instructional program. He also had friends 
send him muskets, rifles, and pistols of European manufacture 
that exhibited interesting or advanced features, and thus might 
be of value to the American military.16 
Congress had not acceded to the request to provide for a 
complete topographical survey of the interior of the United 
States, but limited activity in this area was possible. Crawford 
detailed Major Stephen Long (from General Jackson's command) 
to make a survey of the Upper Mississippi Valley as far west as 
Prairie du Chien. Long's publication of his observations was 
followed by Jackson's order of April 1817 forbidding officers 
under his command to obey any order of the War Department 
that had not been transmitted through him. Crawford thought 
this incident one of the causes of Jackson's hostility to him.17 
Perhaps more basic to that decade-long hostility were the 
differences of opinion between the two men on Indian lands and 
Indian treaties. From time to time, Crawford-in conformity 
with his duties and with national law-instructed the commanding 
generals to remove intruders and squatters from Indian (and 
1s Andrew Ellicott to Jacob Brown, Feb. 8, 1816, Jacob Brown Papers (MHS); 
Crawford to Swift, May 2, 10, 1816, MB 9. 
Iscrawford to Swift, July 1, 1816, NB 9; Contract. Crawford to George Boyd, 
Oct. 9, 1816, George Boyd Papers (Huntington Library); Crawford to Gallatin, 
Oct. 10, 1816, Gallatin; Jonathan Russell to Crawford, June 22, 1816, Jonathan 
Russell Papers (Brown University Library). 
17 Crawford to Stephen Long, June 18, 1816, MB 9; Crawford to Charles Jared 
Ingersoll, Aug. 17, 1822, Ingersoll Papers (HSP). 
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public) lands and to destroy their habitations and improve- 
ments,18 and in March 1817 he ordered renegotiation of the 
Treaty of Fort Jackson. This treaty, concluded by the general 
with the Creek, was protested by the Cherokee who contended 
some of their lands were included in the cession. Jackson, in 
Washington when the Cherokee chieftains arrived, defended the 
treaty, and urged Madison and Crawford not to receive the 
deputation. Crawford did see the chieftains, believed their claims 
just, and with Madison's approval ordered renegotiation. Jackson, 
far from pleased, believed the facts did not support the Cherokee 
claims; he could not understand what led the President to 
surrender the best portion of the country ceded by the Creek and 
maintained that the security of the lower country had been given 
up with the five million acres. The  people complained loudly, 
he said, of the government action.l9 
On the very day Jackson expressed the above sentiments, he, 
David Meriwether, and Jesse Franklin were appointed with full 
power and authority to adjust all differences between the Chick- 
asaw and the United States. The  instructions of July 3, 1816, 
were followed two days later by a few admonitions from Craw- 
ford, probably prompted by the Chickasaw deputation's strong 
complaint against the "menacing stile" of a Jackson letter. I t  
was expected, the secretary said, that the conduct of the three 
would be conciliatory and calculated to "inspire the nation with 
a just sense of the equity and magnanimity of the conduct of the 
government toward them." He thought the wants of the Indians 
and conflicting claims of the Chickasaw and Cherokee would 
make the commissioners' task easier, and he advised that they 
"press or relax according to the disposition of the I n d i a n ~ . " ~ ~  
Jackson was probably infuriated by this advice on behavior, 
18 See, for example, Crawford to Edmund Gaines and Jacob Brown, Jan. 27, 1816; 
Crawford to Andrew Jackson and Alexander Macomb, Jan. 29, 1816, MB 8. For a 
discussion of this problem see Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Policy in the 
Formative Years: The  Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts, 1790-1834 (Cambridge, 
Mass., 1962), 139-87. 
19 James Parton, Life of Andrew Jackson, 3 vols. (Boston, 1883), 2:355-56; Crawford 
to Jackson, March 8, 1816, MB 8; Jackson to Crawford, June 4, 1816, Andrew Jackson 
Papers (Duke). 
20 Crawford to Jesse Franklin, June 4, 1816; Crawford to Franklin, Meriwether, 
Jackson, July 5, 1816, Miscellaneous Papers, Series I, Vol. I1 (North Carolina De- 
partment of Archives and History); Madison to Crawford, June 29, 1816, Gross; 
Crawford to Madison, June 11, 1816, Adrian Hoffman Joline Collection (Hunting- 
ton Library). Other commissioners were appointed to treat with the Choctaw and 
the Cherokee. 
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but there is no record of reply or comment from him. The  treaties 
were soon concluded, and Crawford was well aware that he was 
not the most popular man in the West: he had been denounced 
and burned in effigy in Tennessee because of the Cherokee con- 
vention and in the Mississippi Territory for being disposed to 
remove the intruders from the public lands. He expected the 
distemper of Tennesseans soon to disappear because lands ceded 
by the Cherokee and Chickasaw treaties connected the settlement 
in Tennessee with the Gulf of Florida. Crawford was pleased 
with this important cession but felt it "scandalously violated" the 
1802 agreement between the United States and Georgia by which 
the central government agreed to remove the Indians from 
Georgia in return for the Georgia cession of the Alabama-Missis- 
sippi region. Treaties with the Sac and Fox extended the Illinois 
purchase to the shores of Lake Michigan, and Crawford thought 
if the Choctaw claims east of the Tombigbee River could be sat- 
isfactorily adjusted "we have nothing further to desire in the 
West for many years."" Like many Americans of the period, he 
apparently believed it would be years, maybe generations, before 
the land already held by the United States would be populated. 
While the matters of Indians and public lands were not with- 
out excitement and permanent effects, something of a national 
furor was created by Crawford's report on Indian affairs. Sub- 
mitted on March 3, 1816, in answer to a Senate resolution, this 
lengthy report and extensive accompanying documents and state- 
ments constitute an important survey of the Indian "problem." 
The documents dealt with annuities due and the sums actually 
paid to the Indian tribes within the United States, the presents 
made to them, and the general expenses of the Indian service 
during the four years preceding March 3, 1815. The  War of 
1812 had prevented payment of some annuities; on the other 
hand, the amounts shown as presents included a great quantity 
of provisions furnished friendly tribes that had taken refuge 
within American settlements. These presents had swelled to un- 
reasonable amounts; Crawford thought it necessary to discontinue 
the practice or to devise some checks to prevent recurrence of 
the existing s i t u a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
21 Crawford to Gallatin, Oct. 9, 1816, Gallatin; Adams, Gallatin Writings, 2:12-13. 
22 American State Papers: Indian Affairs, 2:26-28; the accompanying materials 
are on pages 29-88. 
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Some statements indicated that the Indian trade, conducted 
through the factor system, showed an annual profit of $15,000; 
but the annual support from the treasury exceeded $20,000, 
resulting in an annual loss of $5,000. Better management, more 
intimate acquaintance with the trade, more skillful selection of 
goods and of agents vending them, and a considerable increase 
in the capital invested would produce a small and increasing 
profit. But profits could not be any inducement for continuing 
the system; justification could be found only in the influence 
gained by the government over the tribes. By disallowing all 
intercourse between the tribes and the whites-except those who 
have the permission of the government and over whose conduct 
a direct control is exerted-peace between the Indians and the 
government had been greatly promoted. 
If civilization of the tribes was considered more important than 
acquisition of the Indian lands, the secretary would continue the 
present system. Modifications were needed, and success depended 
on exercising all the influence that went with annuities and 
presents. He believed that skillful direction of the program would 
bring the tribes "distinct ideas of separate property," first in 
things personal and then in relation to lands. More attention 
must be given to Indian habitations and to the increase of 
distinct settlements: a portion of the land should be preserved 
to an individual, who should acquire full title after a stipulated 
number of years of residence on and cultivation of the land. 
Such a policy and a liberal commerce with the Indians might 
bring complete success, but commerce on the contract scale and 
profit basis would tend only to diminish the influence of the 
government and alienate the Indians. Trade must be greatly 
extended or abandoned to individual enterprise. Crawford would 
greatly expand it, for to keep the trade in the hands of the 
government and only partially supply the wants of the Indians 
would make them feel the influence of the government only in 
their "privations and wret~hedness."~~ 
Under existing laws the governors of the territories were re- 
quired to grant trading licenses to all who gave security. Craw- 
23 Ibid., 27. Crawford would permit British merchants from Canada to participate 
in the trade with some of the Indians until the United States was in a position to 
know about and meet their wants. Gradually all foreign participation should be 
ended. 
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ford believed the governors should have power to refuse licenses 
for reasons of character, and that requiring an oath to obey the 
laws governing the trade-especially in connection with the sale 
of spirituous liquors-might improve the quality of the traders. 
He supported the proposal of Governor Ninian Edwards of 
Illinois Territory and the superintendent of Indian affairs for 
the development of a depot (in the St. Louis area) that could 
supply the regular and established trading houses and make 
advances of goods up  to $10,000 value to persons of good moral 
character. 
In answer to a portion of the resolution, Crawford thought it 
would be highly proper to place the management of Indian 
affairs in a separate and independent department if the govern- 
ment was to retain control of commerce with those nations. The  
small military force required at the various trading posts could 
be furnished by the War Department no matter who supervised 
the trade. This constituted no burden, but the accounts and 
accounting procedures heavily taxed the time of the secretary 
of war. Accounts of the Indian trade were returned to the 
Treasury Department; those of the agents to the several tribes 
were returned to and settled in the War Department. The  
determination and payment of annuities were particularly trou- 
blesome and time-consuming. Crawford detailed the elaborate 
procedure for deducting amounts for robberies, thefts, and 
depredations; the hearing of the extrajudicial evidence; and the 
necessity for the secretary to approve almost every disbursement 
of money connected with the Indian service. The  year-by-year 
accumulation of accounts had become so great that legislative aid 
was required to correct it: a separate department to handle the 
Indian accounts was not the answer; the accounting office must 
be reorganized. If a new department were formed, many of the 
miscellaneous duties of the State Department should be trans- 
ferred to it; such transfers would be brought to the attention of 
the Senate when reorganization was under discussion. 
Although Crawford could think of a plan of trade with the 
Indians that would be less expensive to the government, he 
believed the existing system with the suggested modifications 
would be of greatest advantage to the Indians. He emphasized 
that capital in the area where people were knowledgeable in the 
Indian trade was not sufficient for commerce among the citizens. 
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This capital was exposed to no  risks, and the profit was great; 
consequently it would not be employed in the Indian trade. 
Those in  the commercial cities who had capital would not supply 
the money because of the risks and the "casual want of integrity" 
of the traders. T h e  proposed St. Louis depot would be highly 
beneficial in supplying this capital and skilled persons and would 
eventually justify relinquishing the trade, under judicious regula- 
tions, entirely to individual enterprise. 
All his views, Crawford said, were founded on the conviction 
that i t  was the true policy and earnest desire of the government 
"to draw its savage neighbors within the pale of civilization." If 
he was mistaken, and the primary object of the government was 
to extinguish the Indian titles and take their lands as rapidly as 
possible, then commerce with them ought to be abandoned to 
individual enterprise with n o  government regulation. This 
would bring continual warfare and the extermination or  ex- 
pulsion of the Indians to more distant and less hospitable regions. 
The correctness of this policy cannot, for a moment, be admitted. 
The utter extinction of -the Indian race, must be abhorrent to the 
feelings of an enlightened and benevolent nation. The idea is 
directly opposed to every act of the government, from the decla- 
ration of independence to the present day. If the system already 
devised, has not produced all the effects which are expected from 
it, new experiments ought to be made. When every effort to 
introduce among them the ideas of separate property, as well in 
things real as personal, should fail, let intermarriages between 
them and the whites be encouraged by the government. This 
cannot fail to preserve the race, with the modification necessary 
to the enjoyment of civil liberty and social happiness. It is be- 
lieved, that the principles of humanity in this instance, are in 
harmonious concert with the true interests of the nation. It will 
redound more to the national honor, to incorporate, by humane 
and benevolent policy, the natives of our forests in the great 
American family of freemen, than to receive, with open arms, the 
fugitives of the old world, whether this flight has been the effect 
of their crimes or their virtues.24 
24 Ibid., 28. Lewis Cass seems to have drawn rather heavily on Crawford's report 
for his thirty-seven-page "Proposals of Organizing the Indian Department" [1816], 
Edward E. Ayer Collection (Newberry Library). See also Francis Paul Prucha and 
Donald F. Carmony, eds., "A Memorandum of Lewis Cass: Concerning a System 
for the Regulation of Indian Affairs," ?Yisconsin Magazine of History 52 (Autumn 
1968):35-50. John C. Calhoun later paralleled many of Crawford's suggestions, 
SECRETARY OF WAR 89 
Three days after this report was sent to the Senate the Re- 
publican caucus met and nominated James Monroe for the pres- 
idency. Crawford received only eleven fewer votes than Monroe; 
the placing of his name before the caucus in opposition to 
Monroe's brought forth a torrent of ridicule and abuse centering 
on the intermarriage proposal and the last sentence of the above 
quotation, which, it was asserted, slandered and derogated a vast 
majority of the population of the country. The  harsh criticism, 
sarcasm, and irony revived when Crawford was a candidate for 
the presidency eight years later, but before then he had ex- 
plained that he was not the first to advance the idea of civilizing 
the Indians by intermarriage, that the idea had gained some 
acceptance among the Creek, Cherokee, and Chickasaw, and that 
he had no intention of casting an unjust reflection on foreigners. 
Perhaps the expressions used were not "best calculated" to convey 
his meaning, but he said he had just entered the department, was 
extremely pressed by business, and was severely afflicted with 
rheumatism. The idea he intended to convey was that "we had 
acquired reputation by the reception we gave to foreigners with- 
out enquiring into the cause of their emigration, & by facilitating 
their incorporation into the mass of our citizens, & that we would 
acquire still more reputation by civilizing the children of the 
forest & incorporating them into the great body of the nation."25 
Had he put it this way in 1816, he probably would have had only 
the intermarriage proposal to haunt him. 
Criticism did not cause Crawford to slacken his efforts to 
improve the condition of the Indians and the management of 
the government operations among them. He took steps to gain 
as much reliable information on the tribes as possible; to ensure 
that reports were properly made in connection with the law 
of May 7, 1816, which embodied his recommendations on foreign 
participation in the trade and some other matters; to gather 
information on all sub-agents, interpreters, and other persons 
connected with Indian relations; to explore the matter of the use 
among Indians of persons skilled in the mechanical arts; to ap- 
prove a "pilot" school among the Cherokee who would be fur- 
including division of the land among individual families and the factor system, but 
on May 6, 1822, the licensed traders and managed trading houses were abolished. 
Report of the Secretary of War, Dec. 5, 1818, ASPZA, 2:181-85; 3 Stat. 679-80. 
25 Crawford to Charles Jared Ingersoll, July 4, 1822, Ingersoll. 
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nished plows, hoes, and axes for the purpose of introducing the 
"art of cultivation" among the pupils (if there was a female 
teacher of sufficient skill to teach the women spinning and weav- 
ing, the necessary materials would be furnished); to grant per- 
mission for groups to move; and in general to handle the 
multifarious duties with understanding, efficiency, and some 
degree of i m a g i n a t i ~ n . ~ ~  
In the spring of 1816 the announced intention of Alexander 
J. Dallas to quit as secretary of treasury in September-or sooner 
if his successor could be found-gave Madison the desired op- 
portunity to try to make his cabinet more national in character 
by appointing a Westerner to head one of the departments. He 
wanted Henry Clay to become secretary of war; this meant, then, 
that Crawford would have to assume another position. But 
Crawford was content with his position and gave Madison a 
decided negative when the President "pressed" him to succeed 
Dallas. There were "reasons" for not putting Clay in the 
treasury post, Crawford said, and for these he would yield to the 
President's wishes had he not expected to retire in March 1817. 
Later he said he also opposed transfer because he might be 
charged-by the papers which delighted in assailing him-with 
being influenced by the "foolish vanity of wishing to fill all the 
major  department^."^^ 
In early July, when Crawford left for Georgia, he called 
Madison's attention to the serious opposition being made to 
Clay's reelection to the House; a communication indicating 
Madison's intention to offer Clay a cabinet post might be helpful 
to Clay. From Wilkes County, Georgia, a month later, Crawford 
wrote that his views and wishes had not changed, but a desire 
to enable Madison to form a cabinet according to the President's 
views of general policy imposed on him the duty of complying 
ZsSee, for example, Crawford to David Holmes, Sept. 2, 23, Oct. 4, 1816, Terri- 
torial Archives, Governors' Records, Series A, Vol. 16 (Mississippi Department of 
Archives and History): Crawford to Ninian Edwards, May 8, 1816, Ninian Edwards 
Papers (Chicago Historical Society): Crawford to Erastus Granger, Sept. 2, 1816, 
Erastus Granger Papers (Buffalo Historical Society); Crawford to Brothers of the 
Six Nations, Feb. 12, 1816: Crawford to David Holmes, May 10, 1816, Ayer Collec- 
tion; Crawford to Rev. G. Kingsbury, May 14, 1816, MB 9; several letters to Crawford 
in  1815 and 1816, William Clark Papers (Missouri Historical Society). See also 
Prucha, American Indian Policy, 215-24. 
27 Crawford to Gallatin, May 6, 1816: Crawford to G.  W. Erving, May 14, 1816, 
Gallatin; Adams, Gallatin Writings, 1:699-700: Crawford to Thomas Worthington, 
Nov. 23, 1816, Thomas Worthington Papers (Ohio State Library). 
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with Madison's wishes. However, should Clay decline the ap- 
pointment and the selection of another person not make the 
change necessary, Crawford preferred to remain in the War 
De~artment.~B 
Apparently Crawford and Madison discussed the transfer when 
Crawford stopped at Montpelier on his return trip to Washing- 
ton, and at the end of September Madison had communicated 
Clay's relusal of the secretaryship of war. Crawford felt he should 
not be pressed further on the subject-his conditional acceptance 
of transfer was limited to Clay's acceptance. But the President 
had written Crawford and Dallas that the post had been offered 
to IVilliam Lo~vndes of South Carolina; he told Dallas he had 
informed Cratvford of this step "with an intimation of the 
expediency of his assuming the Treasury Department as soon 
as he can make it convenient to do Extant materials do 
not tell the whole story; additional conversations must have 
occurred to remove Crawford's objections to transfer, stated as 
late as October 9. Lowndes also declined the appointment, but 
Crawford became secretary of treasury on October 22, 1816. He 
served the remainder of Madison's term, was reappointed by 
Monroe and served under him for eight years, and declined 
appointment by John Quincy Adams to the same post.30 
In his administration of the War Department Crawford ap- 
pears to have been governed by his belief in the tripartite division 
of powers, harmony between and among the branches of the 
government (with no increase of the executive power and in- 
fluence vis-&-vis the legislative), rather wide legislative discretion, 
rather narrow jurisdiction-but absolute within its limits-for the 
judiciary, minimum government regulation of the relations 
between individuals, and gaining approval for one's position by 
28 Crawford to Madison, July 9, Aug. 8, 1816, Madison, MDLC. 
29 Madison to Crawford, Sept. 30, 1816, Gross: Madison to Alexander J. Dallas, 
Sept. [30?], 1816, George M. Dallas, L i f e  and Writ ings o f  Alexander J. Dallas 
(Philadelphia, 1871), 477; Crawford to Gallatin, Oct. 9, 1816, Gallatin. Brant, 
Madison, 6:412, has no information to bridge the gap on Crawford's transfer. 
Raymond Walters, Jr., Albert Gallatin: Jeffersonian Financier and Diplomat (New 
York, 1957), 302, says that Crawford took the treasury as "consolation." Further, 
he states, "Hopeful that Gallatin might fit into his future plans, Crawford showered 
him with gossipy letters on political and economic subjects, local and national." 
This is an unrealistic estimate and unfair judgment: Crawford and Gallatin had 
been close friends since 1810 and often corresponded on matters of common interest. 
30 George Graham, chief clerk under Crawford, served as acting secretary of war 
until the appointment of Calhoun. Crawford's commissions as secretary of the 
treasury, dated Oct. 22, 1816, and March 4, 1817, are in the Golding Collection. 
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appeal to reason and judgment only. He expected his sub- 
ordinates to follow his example of devotion to duty; they should 
also function efficiently and economically. He expressed strong 
disapproval of dishonesty and any actions which might encourage 
that character is ti^.^^ He displayed these same beliefs and ethics 
as secretary of treasury. 
31 See, for example, Crawford (from Woodlawn) to Gentlemen, Sept. 22, 1815, 
Crawford, Duke; Crawford to G. W. Erving, May 14, 1816, Gallatin. 
The Treasury: 
Organization and Administration 
CRAWFORD had resisted transferring to the treasury, and he was 
not happy with the organization and distribution of functions 
in the largest of the departments in Washington. His duties as 
secretary of war had been numerous, but those of secretary of 
treasury were myriad. The department was a potpourri of 
agencies, commissions, organizations, services, and institutions 
over which the chief officer exercised direct, indirect, intermediate, 
joint, or only nominal supervision. Among these were the 
customs service (with its collectors, inspectors, weighers, gaugers, 
and other functionaries), the land offices (under the register and 
the receiver of the public monies, but with the General Land 
Office a Washington-based administrative and clerical agency), 
the internal revenue service, the post office, lighthouse service, 
coastal survey, Marine Hospital Service, the sinking fund, the 
mint, and the office of the commissioner of claims. The  secretary 
had other responsibilities, especially in connection with audits 
of accounts, to say nothing of the important relations between 
the treasury and the newly established Second Bank of the United 
States and his advisory and consultative role as a cabinet mem- 
ber.l 
The personnel of the department in Washington far exceeded 
that of any other, but the multiplicity of duties, cumbersome 
procedures, and division of responsibilities contributed to in- 
effective if not inefficient operation. Settlement of public ac- 
counts and making individuals accountable for the collection 
and expenditure of public money presented perhaps the greatest 
difficulty. The never-strong accounting system had broken down 
under the impact of claims during the War of 1812. Until 1817 
the problem was accentuated by the army and navy accountants 
serving as auditors, and final settlements were often not made 
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for years. Crawford had called attention to some of these 
problems in his report on Indian affairs in early 1816, and as 
secretary of treasury one of his first objectives seems to have been 
an increased effectiveness of the headquarters office. 
Stimulated by Crawford's report, the Senate required-by a 
resolution of April 20, 1816-the four secretaries to report jointly 
a plan to ensure the annual settlement of accounts and a "more 
certain accountability" of public expenditures. Their report of 
December 1816, sometimes called the "first essay in administrative 
reorganization," was developed by Crawford and signed by him, 
Monroe (secretary of state), Benjamin Crowninshield (secretary 
of navy), and George Graham (acting secretary of war). I t  rec- 
ommended the placing of a miscellany of functions-supervision 
of the territorial governments, construction and maintenance of 
national highways and canals, the post office, the patent office, 
and the Indian department-in a home department and some 
reorganization of other offices as well as an increase of pe r s~nne l .~  
Part of the delay in the settlement of  account^,^ the secretaries 
said, was due to excessive loads imposed on the heads of the 
departments; part resulted from procedures. In keeping with 
the intention of the original organizers of the department, the 
primary and final settlement of accounts should rest with the 
treasury; the office of superintendent general of military supplies 
and army and navy accountants should be abolished; four ad- 
ditional auditors and another comptroller should be added, and 
a solicitor responsible for the prosecution of delinquent officials 
should be authorized. The  secretaries recommended that the 
cumbersome, slow, and ineffective process of settling accounts 
be replaced by a summary process permitting seizure and sale 
of the real and personal properties of the delinquents and their 
sureties. 
Congress did not act favorably upon the home d e ~ a r t m e n t , ~  
1 For a discussion of the accretion and shifting of duties and offices in the 
Treasury Department see Short, National Administrative Organization, 143, 150-58, 
169, 201-2. See also J. H. Powell, Richard Rush: Republican Diplomat, 1780-1859 
(Philadelphia, 1942), 14-15, 20-21. 
2 ASP: Miscellaneous, 2:417-18. Crawford and Monroe had had experience in two 
departments: Graham, chief clerk when Crawford was secretary of war, was later to 
head the General Land Office. 
3Arrearages in War Department accounts went back to 1798; no post office 
accounts after 1810 and no Treasury Department accounts after June 1815 had 
been settled a t  the end of 1816. 
4 A  Senate bill to create a home department, proposed several times before 1816, 
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summary process, and solicitor proposals, but it approved the 
abolition of the office of the superintendent general of military 
supplies and the army and navy accountants and the appointment 
of another comptroller and four more auditors. I t  stipulated that 
the annual published list of individuals whose accounts had not 
been settled should be continued, but the comptroller was 
authorized to stop publication of three-year delinquents after three 
listings and was allowed to distinguish cases where arrearage was 
a matter of form.5 All accounts were to be settled within a year; 
how the secretary was to accomplish this is not clear, for he was 
given no additional authority. In the actual reorganization the 
work among the auditors and the comptrollers was so divided 
as to separate completely military and civil accounts. With minor 
modifications, this system of accountability endured in principle 
until 1921.6 
Extant materials do not reveal whether Crawford actively 
sought congressional approval of the recommendations concern- 
ing the treasury, but he definitely contributed to passage of the 
measure by refusing to remain as secretary unless changes were 
made in the department and Georgia was granted some compen- 
sation for the claims connected with cession of her western lands 
to the central government. On January 28 he met with Peter 
Hagner, who later became the third auditor, to discuss the bill 
before the Senate for a better organization of the departments7 
Further, a copy of the bill to regulate the hire and compensation 
was defeated on January 29, 1817. See Short, National Administrative Organization, 
98, 205-8; Leonard D. White, T h e  Jeffersonians: A Study i n  Administrative History, 
1801-1829 (New York, 1951), 171. T h e  Department of the Interior was established 
in 1849. 
5 3 Stat. 366-68 (March 3, 1817). T h e  earlier lists, published and republished until 
the accounts were settled, had wrongfully placed many individuals in an  unfavorable 
light: when accounts were not settled, names were published even though the claim 
might be against the government rather than the individual. 
6 White, Jeffersonians, 11. Crawford pointed out nearly four years later that the 
act of March 3, 1817, had added only one government employee, the fifth auditor; 
persons appointed to the other new positions held offices abolished by the act. 
Crawford to Samuel Dana, Jan. 9, 1821, Treasury Department, Series E, Vol. 6. 
This series, Letters and Reports to Congress, ends in February 1821, and there 
is a gap in these books from 1812 to Dec. 16, 1816, when Volume 6 was started. All 
Treasury Department records, unless otherwise indicated, are in  the National 
Archives. 
7 Crawford to Gallatin, March 12, 1817, Adams, Gallatin Writings, 2:23-25; Monroe 
to James Barbour, March 3, 1817, Barbour; Monroe to Crawford, March 4, 1817, 
Golding; Invitation, Jan. 28, 1817, Peter Hagner Papers (University of North 
Carolina Library). 
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of clerks and messengers was sent to Crawford, and he was asked 
for suggestions of changes that might be necessary if the measure 
for the prompt settlement of accounts was passed. Crawford, in 
turn, asked the register and other officers of the treasury to make 
an estimate and specifically requested the comptroller to confer 
with the accountants of the War and Navy  department^.^ 
Within the year after reorganization Crawford's chief sub- 
ordinates reported to him, and he to the Senate, on the operation 
of the new set-up. First comptroller Joseph Anderson said that 
more clerks were needed to deal with such matters as the new 
tariff levies, the convention with Great Britain, recent acts rel- 
ative to tonnage, and the extensive correspondence with the 
district attorneys and marshals. Others echoed this need, while a 
small minority were satisfied with the existing s i t ~ a t i o n . ~  Craw- 
ford reported good progress in some offices and stressed the great 
amount of work still to be done in others. He called attention 
to the increase in amount and complexity of work caused by 
the internal and direct taxes, the greater number of government 
depositories after the failure to recharter the first Bank of the 
United States, and the subdivision of the revenue into cash, 
special deposits, small treasury notes, and treasury notes bearing 
interest. The  greatest backlog of work was in the office of the 
third auditor, where a mass of the old accounts of the War 
Department remained unsettled. He said remedies of the "most 
energetic character" were required. 
The  lack of power to compel delinquent officers to render their 
accounts was seriously felt. Crawford detailed and criticized the 
existing methods; his views of December 1816 had been strength- 
ened by his experience of the last twelve months. As long as a 
person held office, threat of removal might be sufficient to bring 
settlement of his account, but means of compelling settlement 
were "extremely defective" after he was out of office. The  gov- 
8 Samuel D. Ingham to Crawford, Feb. 11, 1817, Crawford, Duke. Newspapers 
paid little attention to the recommendations of the secretaries, but the Georgetown 
Messenger, Jan. 16, 18, 1817, regretted congressional indifference toward the pro- 
posals and opposed the adoption of a summary process. The actual procedures of 
reporting on collection, disbursement, and the auditing and settling of accounts 
prior to 1817 are in White, Jeffersonians, 163-64. 
9 These letters are in Senate Doc., No. 74 (serial 2). 15th Cong., 1st sess., 12-21. 
Richard Cutts, former superintendent general of military supplies, had been ap- 
pointed second comptroller. The third auditor, Peter Hagner, said there were 
more than 5,000 accounts on the books of his office. 
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ernment could lose, by continued delay in making changes, the 
whole amount of the many still unsettled accounts from the War 
of 1812. He suggested the rejection of all vouchers not presented 
to the accounting officer of the treasury before commencement 
of an action for recovery and the appointment of an officer 
charged exclusively with instituting and superintending such 
suits brought by the United States. He was fully convinced that 
the duties now required of the first comptroller "cannot be 
performed by any officer whatever." 
Crawford then expressed what might be considered the first 
principles of administrative supervision. It  is not expected, he 
said, that the principal officers in the primary or secondary de- 
partments of government will be able minutely to examine every 
case they decide; but unless it is understood that a certain 
portion will be so examined, "a degree of negligence and laxity 
on the part of the subordinate officers in those departments, 
whether principal, or secondary, may be reasonably expected." 
Further, the "gradation from unintentional error, to willful 
negligence, and from the latter to deception, is gentle and almost 
imperceptible." The  principal officer is responsible to the nation 
for the correct discharge of his official duties. If his duties are so 
great and multifarious as to prevent his adequate examination 
of the acts of his subordinates, "there is imposed upon him the 
highest responsibility without the adequate means of acting up 
to that responsibility." This he believed to be the situation with 
the first comptroller. The  appointment of a solicitor was 
essential, whether or not Congress enacted the proposed changes 
concerning the collection of debts. Crawford's additional com- 
ments on the changes made the year before, the failure to provide 
some relief to the secretary of war, and the complications result- 
ing from transferring the Indian accounts to the fifth auditor 
indicate that he was not entirely pleased with what Congress 
did do and was clearly displeased about the lack of action on 
other parts of the four secretaries' proposals.1° 
Congress, however, wanted a fuller accounting of the executive 
departments. Crawford transmitted the letter to his subordinates, 
but in addition he requested a detailing of the duties of each 
clerk, information on those who presided over independent 
10 Ibid., 5-9. See also ASPM, 2:460-66. 
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branches of the service with those subordinate to them, and 
information on those who performed a service independent of 
any control other than that of the principal officer of the de- 
partment, either directly or through the chief clerk. It  was 
desirable, he said, that the statement should show the relative 
importance of the different branches and the degree of responsi- 
bility attached to the discharge of the duties respectively required 
in those branches. In effect, he called for full job descriptions 
for all positions.ll 
The  collected information was submitted by the secretaries 
of state, war, treasury, and navy, but only the jobs of the clerks 
of the Treasury Department were described in detail.l2 Congress 
took no action on Crawford's recommendations, and during the 
next session Crawford returned to the expediency of appointing a 
solicitor and to the desirability of adopting a summary process 
for the recovery of public monies. He noted that such a process 
had been adopted in cases of less urgency, and all objections to 
it should be removed by making its operation "entirely pro- 
spective." Without the solicitor, aided by the summary process, 
it was "hardly practicable" to secure the prompt settlement of 
accounts and efficiently protect the public interest against those 
defaulting officers who embezzle the public money and "degrade 
the government by which they are employed."13 More than a 
year later Congress finally authorized the President to appoint 
a treasury official as agent for recovery of sums due the United 
States and sanctioned a summary process to be used against all 
officers of collection. The  transfer of the prosecuting power from 
the first comptroller to the agent and the pressure brought by 
Congress for more vigorous action produced favorable results.14 
Whether requests from Congress for information were initiated 
by the departments in order to instigate or stimulate discussion 
of legislation they thought desirable is generally impossible to 
determine, but on several occasions such was doubtless the case.15 
11 Crawford to Richard Cutts, Jan. 29, 1818, Letters Received, Second Comp- 
troller's Office, Aug. 16, 1817 to Dec. 30, 1820. Letters to other subordinates may be 
found in the appropriate places in the National Archives. 
12 House Doc., No. 194 (serial l l ) ,  15th Cong., 1st sess. The 152 Treasury De- 
partment clerks, including thirteen in the General Land Office, were paid an 
annual total of $134,046.58, with very few receiving more than $1,000. 
13 Crawford to Samuel Smith, Jan. 14, 1819, Series E, Vol. 6. 
14 3 Stat. 592-96 (May 15, 1820). Stephen Pleasonton, fifth auditor, was designated 
the agent. 
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Then, too, in this period Congress was reacting to the strong 
leadership in the departments and asserting its own control over 
certain government operations, especially expenditures. And 
having no aid or staff of their own, congressmen could best secure 
information by requiring reports from the executive branch. 
Whatever the case, the Treasury Department in the 1820s made 
as many reports to the House as the other three major depart- 
ments combined. Annually the secretary was required to make 
seventeen, the first comptroller three, the treasurer one, and the 
secretary (as chairman of the sinking fund commission) one.16 
The reports on the balances and settlement of accounts were 
among the more elaborate and important, and some of those 
showed that accounts remained unsettled twenty years after 
judgment had been rendered. Rarely, however, did the govern- 
ment lose large amounts of money. Peter Hagner, the third 
auditor, found the accounts transferred from the War Depart- 
ment the most troublesome. In almost all cases, additional 
vouchers were necessary before final settlement; some accounts 
had not even been entered on the books; it was necessary to 
have correspondence with every receiver of public money-which 
correspondence in three and a half years filled twenty-three 
letterbooks. But Hagner reported substantial progress. Although 
he would have nine fewer clerks (as required by law) after 
January 1, 1821, he thought he could continue to reduce the 
number of unsettled accounts.17 
As the accounts were audited, reviewed, and "settled," those 
who were delinquent in their payments were soon dismissed from 
office, but no law would permit the comptroller to clear from his 
15 Crawford was quite active in drafting bills for congressional consideration; 
discussions on this activity sometimes took place in cabinet meetings, references 
dot his letters and correspondence, and within ten days in January 1819 he sent 
four draft bills to congressional committees. Adams, Memoirs, passim; Series E ,  
Vol. 6. 
16 White, Jeffersonians, 94; House Doc., No. 1 (serial 76), 17th Cong., 2d sess. 
The secretary of war made eight; the secretaries of state and navy, seven each; and 
the secretaries of navy, war, and treasury (as commissioners of the naval hospitals), 
one. 
17 Senate Doc., No. 101 (serial 15), 15th Cong., 2d sess.; House Doc., No. 80 (serial 
36), 16th Cong., 1st sess.; ibid., No. 10 (serial 50), 16th Cong., 2d sess. At the time 
the indefatigable Hagner began work on these accounts they amounted to more 
than $40 million, "distributed in the hands of several thousand persons." Hagner 
to Joseph Anderson, Nov. 20, 1820, ibid. On accounts and balances also see House 
Doc., No. 68 (serial 67) 17th Cong., 1st sess.; ibid., Nos. 148, 149 (serial 102), 18th 
Cong., 1st sess. 
100 THE TREASURY 
files the accounts of persons deceased or insolvent. Such legisla- 
tion was urged in February 1825.18 
Crawford's strong recommendations for effecting amelioration, 
the devoted efforts of his subordinates, and increased congressional 
concern had brought remarkable improvement in the state of 
the accounts by 1821. The  failure to recharter the first Bank 
of the United States, new duties resulting from postwar legislation 
and international agreements, problems attending the first years 
of the operation of the Second BUS, the enormity of land pur- 
chases, the Panic of 1819 and subsequent retrenchment, and the 
slowness of congressional action could not be completely offset 
by even the most vigilant supervision and indefatigable efforts. 
Then, too, the prevailing concept that public officials were 
gentlemen had its influence; one outstanding student of govern- 
ment administration has noted: "when one gentleman had to 
deal with another in a business disagreeable to both there was 
a wide margin of tolerance . . . some debts remained uncollected 
pending improvement in the fortunes of the debtor-always to 
be hoped for, if not always achieved."lS 
Crawford was careful that all operations of the department be 
kept within established legal bounds, and efforts to catch up  
and to improve the operation of the office never ceased. The  
annual survey of the department in the fall of 1822 showed that 
most employees had no remunerative activity other than their 
clerical jobs, that personnel had increased about 10 percent in 
five years, and that salaries totaled nearly $174,000, or about 
$4,000 less than the appropriation for that year. The  existing 
organization of the offices was termed simple, and no change 
was contemplated. Economy could be effected by reducing 
salaries or the number of employees; the first, Crawford thought, 
would be impolitic, but he believed that a reduction of personnel 
would be found "practicable" in some of the offices. Indicating a 
thorough understanding of the human being, Crawford said 
such reduction "will depend more upon the character and con- 
duct of the principal officers of the Department, than upon legis- 
l8House Doc., No. 149 (serial 102), 18th Cong., 1st sess.; ibid., No. 107 (serial 
118), 18th Cong., 2d sess. The report to the second session of the Eighteenth 
Congress showed the accounts of approximately five hundred individuals amounting 
to several million dollars had remained on the books for more than three years 
prior to 1824. 
19 White, Jeffersonians, 182. 
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lative ena~tments."~O The  Washington office underwent no 
further significant changes before the end of Crawford's term. 
Effective operation of the Washington office of the treasury 
depended to a considerable extent upon the timeliness, exactness, 
and comparability of reports from its field officials charged with 
collecting the money due the government. These were principally 
the collectors of the customs and receivers of the public monies 
at the land offices; their accounts were returnable directly to the 
treasury and were not the source of as many difficulties as were 
the accounts over which the treasury had no initial control. But 
with the customhouses spread from Maine to the Gulf of Mexico, 
the land ofices deep in the interior, and the slowness of the 
co~nmunication system-or the absence of a system-it is little 
wonder that treasury officials spent much time informing and 
directing the collectors and receivers and not surprising that 
some should be far behind in reports and payments before 
negligence, laxness, or fraud became apparent to their superiors. 
Contact between Washington and the field was maintained 
through regular reports on imported goods, collection of imposts 
and tonnage duties, registration of vessels, amounts of bonds 
posted and suits for collection of defaulted bonds, land sales, 
deposits of monies, and other activities; correspondence on par- 
ticular problems as they developed; circulars of instructions 
interpreting revenue and trading laws, treaties, and general duties 
of officers; and particularized directions dealing with specified 
problems. Regular or routine reports and much of the corre- 
spondence went to or from the commissioner of the revenue or 
the first comptroller. The  latter official also issued over his 
signature many of the circulars to the collectors, naval officers, 
and surveyors of the customs. Some of these directions were very 
lengthy and on occasion contained court opinions and were 
accompanied by the tariff and other pertinent laws. Though 
20 Adams, Memoirs, 6:143-44 (June 11, 1823); House Doc., No. 4 (serial 76), 17th 
Cong., 2d sess. In  a similar vein is Crawford's one-sentence reply to a query on 
safety regulations for steamboats: "I am of opinion, that legislative enactments are 
calculated to do mischief, rather than prevent it, except such as subject the owners 
and managers of those boats to suitable penalties in case of disasters, which cannot 
fail to render the masters and engineers more attentive, and the owners more 
particular in the selection of those officers." House Doc., No. 69 (serial 116), 18th 
Cong., 2d sess. T h e  increase from thirteen to twenty-nine clerks in the General Land 
Oflice accounted for the total increase in the Treasury Department. T h e  ninety- 
seven clerks in the State, War, Navy, and Post Office departments were paid ap- 
proximately $100,000. Niles' Weekly Register 22 (March 30, 1822):70-71. 
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authorization for action was delegated, the secretary bore the 
responsibility, and his name is to be found on practically every 
known type of communication and d i r e ~ t i v e . ~ ~  
Required reports might be weekly, monthly, or at longer 
intervals, but Crawford seems to have maintained a continuing 
review of their periodicity and form in order to make them more 
reasonable and informative and at the same time more helpful in 
protecting the interest of the government by ensuring a stricter 
accountability of the reporting officials.22 
Almost immediately upon taking office he told the collector 
at Philadelphia to take the necessary measures to deposit in the 
BUS, for collection purposes, all the customhouse bonds out- 
standing on January 1, 1817, and the following spring he in- 
formed all collectors of new procedures resulting from the 
agreement between the treasury and the BUS by which the latter 
assumed responsibility for collection of the bonds for import 
duties. The  weekly returns of money deposited in the several 
offices of the BUS and in state banks to the credit of the treasurer 
of the United States were thereafter to be made to the cashier 
of the BUS rather than to the Treasury D e ~ a r t m e n t . ~ ~  Crawford 
thought it advisable to recapitulate the regulations which were 
not altered by the agreement and to add such as "are thereby 
indispensable." Every receipt for public money must show 
whether the money came from customs, internal revenue, direct 
taxes, postage, or other sources, and weekly statements made to 
the BUS must "strictly correspond" with those receipts. All 
deposits must be entered to the credit of the BUS for use of the 
treasury, and all treasury drafts would be drawn upon the cashier 
of the BUS and would designate the office of discount and deposit 
-or state bank employed as such-at which it was to be paid. 
These drafts would be returned to the treasury by the BUS. In 
addition, monthly returns to the treasury oi the state of the 
21 These materials, vast in quantity but with some serious gaps, are in the 
Treasury Department Records, National Archives. And, of course, those dealing 
with the collectors and receivers-even when one includes Hagner's twenty-three 
letterbooks of special correspondence with the receivers-constitute only a small 
portion of the total. An account of the normal operations of the treasury at  any 
given time would be a monograph in itself: here only a smattering of activity 
concerning customs, lands, and personnel will be given to indicate method of 
operation and some special problems. 
22 See, for example, Treasury Circulars, Feb. 3, April 29, 1817: June 3, 1819. 
23 Crawford to John Steele, Oct. 30, 1816, uncat. letter, HSP; Treasury Circular, 
April 29, 1817. T h e  BUS, in turn, reported to the treasury. 
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receiving offices and the state banks in which public money had 
been deposited must be made on the previously prescribed 
forms.24 
But the treasury was left without a clear picture of its available 
resources because the collectors made deposits on whatever day 
of the week suited their whims. T o  bring uniformity and reg- 
ularity the BUS was requested to issue on each Monday a 
certificate of deposit (bearing the date of the last day of the 
preceding week) for sums received during the preceding week 
and to forward to the treasury each Monday returns showing the 
amount of these receipts. The  collectors were told to apply on 
Mondays for the certificates and to forward them with their 
returns to the d e ~ a r t m e n t . ~ ~  Thus the treasury would have a 
double check on the collectors and on the places of deposit. 
The  monthly schedule of bonds liquidated for duties was 
designed to give the treasury the earliest information on the 
amount of duties accrued monthly on imports and tonnage. But 
seemingly some reports were rendered long after the end of 
the month, while others detailed information on bonds accrued 
months before-thus defeating the purpose of the reports. The 
treasury requested that the schedule for each month be forwarded 
as early as practicable-at the latest within thirty days-and as 
far as practicable that it be concerned only with the bonds for 
duties accrued within the month reported on.2B 
When examination of monthly returns revealed that a receiver 
of public monies had retained a considerable quantity, the 
treasury asked to be "informed why the same has not been 
deposited . . . in conformity with the instructions heretofore 
given by this department." Or, when the treasury was hard 
pressed for money (as during the period after 1819), the collectors 
were asked to deposit all except the amount absolutely necessary 
to defray the current expenses of the 
24 Treasury Circular, April 29, 1817. 
25 Ibid., June 3, 1819. 
26 Ibid., June 22, 1822. T o  ensure uniformity of weekly reporting on bonds put 
in suit for collection, a new form was prescribed by the treasury circular of July 3, 
1819. In 1823 every accountable officer was required to make quarterly returns 
within three months after the end of each quarter (six months if the officer were 
out of the country). Any failure was to be reported to the President, and the 
offender was to be dismissed, unless he could make his peace with the chief 
executive. 3 Stat. 723-24 (Ian. 31, 1823). 
27 See, for example, Crawford to Samuel Quinby, Aug. 21, 1819, Series N, Vol. 
"0"; '1Villiam Jones to James Mauney, Oct. 4, 1820, Treasury Circulars. 
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From time to time special reports were required of the collec- 
tors, receivers, and others connected with the revenue. By these 
the department officials sought information for a report to one 
of the houses of Congress, secured data on the functioning of a 
particular law or regulation, or gained evidence that would 
enable the President to decide whether to modify the bonds of 
certain officials. Regular and special reports were means to 
an administrative end and Crawford-as the agent of the chief 
executive-sought as many and as efficient checks as were reason- 
able under the cir~umstances.~~ 
But no matter what continuing supervisory efforts were made, 
losses to the government did occur. Duties were not paid when 
articles were imported; bonds, payable from six to twelve months 
from their dates, were posted. In effect, this meant that slightly 
less than one fourth of the revenue was collected the first year, 
nearly three fourths the second year, and the remainder the year 
following.29 When payment was not made at the designated 
time, bonds were placed in suit by the district attorney-acting 
after he had been notified by the collector. Delay by that official, 
deceitful practices, insolvency, flight, death, and other factors 
resulted in a loss of about 5 percent of the import duties. The  
summary process, sanctioned in 1820, seems to have helped in 
reducing government losses.30 
There were, of course, other ways by which the government 
might be deprived of its legitimate income. In the spring of 
1817 Crawford wrote to James H. McCulloch of Baltimore of 
the general impression that frauds upon the revenue were being 
committed by invoicing merchandise (subject to ad valorem 
duty) which cost less than twenty-five cents per yard with that 
which cost more in order to produce an average above twenty- 
five cents and thereby introducing coarse and cheap fabrics with- 
out paying the duty contemplated by the tariff.31 Also, articles 
not described in the invoice had been imported. A more rigid in- 
2sSee Treasury Circulars, Nov. 11, 1817; May 25, 29, June 22, Sept. 1, 1818: 
Crawford to Monroe, July 14, 1820, Gratz. 
29 Revenue from import duties by no means reflected the existing state of trade, 
and this method of securing government revenue was sharply criticized because of 
the uncertainty and fluctuation of the source. 
30 For an especially full report on this matter see Crawford to president pro tern 
of the Senate, Feb. 25, 1822, Senate Doc., No. 83 (serial 60), 17th Cong., 1st sess. T h e  
task of the district attorney was not made easier by the uncertainty and the division 
of supervisory authority among the attorney general and the secretaries of state 
and treasury. See House Doc., No. 123 (serial 387), 26th Cong., 2d sess., 195-96. 
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spection system was ordered, but five months later Crawford 
concluded, from communications from the collectors, that 
continuance of the new inspection practices would produce more 
inconvenience to the fair and honorable importer than advantage 
to the treasury. Therefore, they no longer formed a general rule 
for the collector, but they could be enforced when that official 
thought circumstances warranted-especially in cases of importa- 
tion upon c~ns ignmen t .~~  
The  Baltimore situation, in customs and in banking matters, 
was especially troublesome. The  district attorney had told 
Crawford that the inspectors there were in the habit of receiving 
bribes from the importing merchants, but the "informers" were 
unwilling to testify publicly. Indignant letters from Crawford to 
McCulloch were answered with the retort that all the inspectors 
were honest men. On numerous occasions the cabinet discussed 
conditions in Baltimore, including action that should be taken 
against "privateers" and "pirates" in the area.33 But the climate 
produced by the illegal activities during the War of 1812 per- 
sisted and only gradually yielded to improvement and correction. 
Smuggling was also carried on without the connivance of 
officials. At times duties were thought to be a contributing 
factor, and on other occasions a modification of rules governing 
certain trade might have increased the illicit introduction of 
goods.34 But no matter what the cause, the treasury was to be 
informed of every violation of the revenue laws resulting in the 
illegal introduction of foreign merchandise. Weekly reports were 
to be made whenever violations occurred, and in all cases of 
smuggling the species and value of merchandise were to be 
described and the names of the parties concerned or interested 
in the transaction were to be given.35 
The  enforcement of the laws against illegal importation and 
smuggling depended to a considerable degree upon the efficiency 
of the revenue cutters. In the summer of 1819 the secretary told 
31 Under the minimums system cotton goods valued at less than twenty-five 
cents per yard were dutiable at twenty-five cents a yard. 
32 Treasury Circulars, May 7, Oct. 8, 1817. 
33 See Adams, Memoirs, 4:318-19, 401, 415, 445 (March 29, July 16, Aug. 21, Nov. 
22, 1819): 5:64-66, 146-47, 154-55 (April 11, 12, June 9, 19, 1820). Crawford thought 
McCulloch should have been removed "long ago." Ibid., 5:154. 
34See Treasury Circulars, Jan. 18, 1819, and Sept. 7, 1821, allowing certain 
discretionary action in reference to the law of April 20, 1818, and seeking informa- 
tion concerning the effects of the law of March 2, 1819. 
35 Ibid., June 22, 1822. 
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the captains of the cutters that the effectiveness of their vessels 
would be greatly diminished if they remained relatively station- 
ary. If the captains were uncertain of their authority as officers 
of the customs, they should consult the collectors under whom 
they were placed-though they could determine most of their 
duties from copies of the acts of 1793, 1799, 1818, and two of 
1819 which he enclosed. H e  cautioned them about the nature 
of the illicit trade and recommended that they keep logs, a copy 
of which should be forwarded to the treasury each month. 
T h e  conduct of the officers was the subject of a long paragraph: 
While I recommend, in the strongest terms, to the respective 
officers, activity, vigilance, and firmness, I feel no less solicitude 
that their deportment may be marked with prudence, moderation, 
and good temper. Upon these last qualities, not less than the 
former, must depend the success, usefulness, and, consequently, 
the continuance of the establishment, in which they are included. 
They will always remember to keep in mind, that their country- 
men are freemen, and, as such, are impatient of every thing that 
bears the mark of the domineering spirit. They will, therefore, 
refrain, with the most guarded circumspection, from whatever 
has the semblance of haughtiness, rudeness, or insult. . . . They 
will endeavor to overcome difficulties, if any are experienced, by 
a cool and temperate perseverance in their duty-by address and 
moderation rather than by vehemence or violence. 
T h e  remainder of the communication underlined the idea that 
even the capture of a smuggler must be done in  a gentlemanly 
manner! 36 
Inadequacy of the cutter force and other difficulties bedeviled 
the customs service, but  the problems of Addin Lewis, collector 
at  Mobile, were probably as numerous as those of any other. 
I n  early 1817 his funds had been so depleted by drafts and the 
receipts were so small he could not meet the expenses of the 
office. One of his inspectors was about to leave with $600 due 
him, so Lewis asked the New Orleans collector to meet the 
36 Ibid., July 13, 1819. T h e  personnel complement of cutters had not been 
changed with the return of peace, but the distressed state of the revenue brought 
action in the spring of 1821. Thereafter, the maximum complement was a captain, 
first and second mates, four seamen, and two boys, with only the officers receiving 
wages higher than those of an  able-bodied seaman. Collectors were cautioned to 
exercise the greatest economy and to allow the captains no expenditure of any 
description without previous permission and the presentation of satisfactory vouch- 
ers. Ibid., March 19, 1821. 
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obligation if he could. The revenue boat, in use for several 
years, was too small and defective to be used beyond the waters 
of the bay. He needed a strong boat to deal with the smugglers 
of slaves and goods who operated under the Mexican or any 
other flag that best suited them, plundering the slaves and goods 
from Spanish ships or receiving them from privateers at sea. 
But he had only the Alabama, a four-ton sailboat with four 
oarsmen and an inspector, to "oppose the whole confederacy of 
smugglers and pirates." In September 1817 he first asked for a 
better cutter. Six years later some repair work had been done, 
but Lewis got no new or more effective vessel. Meanwhile, he 
had discussed his boat problems while in Washington, and against 
his wishes, Captain F. J. Costigan had become the new com- 
mander. He spent three pages telling how useless the cutter had 
been under Costigan and how inefficient and incompetent an 
officer Costigan had been. Lewis concluded this commentary 
with, "I should mention that he has a wife & children at the 
extreme part of Bon Succours Bay, which may account for his 
beating about that bay so often with the cutter, a place where 
she is not at all wanted."37 
Lewis also had his problems with the certificates on wine, tea, 
and distilled spirits, for he said that the certificates-which were 
to be delivered by the seller to the purchaser-were not examined 
and compared with the marks on the caslzs, boxes, and chests 
when shipped coastwise. He noted that some customhouses per- 
mitted masters of vessels to use figures to indicate the number of 
boxes of goods in their manifests rather than "expressing the 
same in words at length." This, he said, struck at the "root of 
the whole system" for "1 may be made 10, & 10-100" with the 
same pen and ink five minutes after clearance. In addition, some 
slaves seized on board the schooner Constitution "were stolen 
away from the neighborhood of this town" and would probably 
be conveyed to New Orleans. These were not the first slaves to 
be introduced illegally; perhaps more than a hundred had been 
smuggled in during the six months prior to March 1818.38 Lewis' 
37 Lewis to Beverly Chew, April 17, 1817: Lewis to Crawford, Sept. 23, 1817: Feb. 
23, June 2, Nov. 15, 1818; Feb. 27, Aug. 1, 1819: Nov. 6, 1820: Oct. 22, 1822; Lewis 
to Joseph Anderson, Oct. 3, 1821; April 17, 1823, Crawford, Yale. 
38 Lewis to Anderson, Nov. 13, Dec. 9, 1817: Lewis to Chew, Aug. 10, 1818: 1.ewis 
to Anderson, Feb. 23, 1818; Lewis to Joseph Nourse, Oct. 16, 1821, ibid. Lewis 
thought the act of March 2, 1819, had unquestionably contributed to smuggling in 
the area, and he felt the entire measure should be repealed. 
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difficulties were accentuated by the nature of the coast and the 
piracy, privateering, and other activities accompanying the revolt 
of the South American colonies, but they were by no means 
peculiar to him. 
Abuses in the importation of tea took a different turn with 
importer Edward Thomson, who surreptitiously moved large 
quantities from the customhouse at Philadelphia before duties 
had been paid or secured. Several inspectors either would lend 
their keys to the storer or would take the key from the surveyor's 
office, attend to a delivery, lock up, and then return the key. 
About 15,000 chests of tea were involved and the malpractices 
extended from 1822 to 1825. Because Thomson had become 
insolvent, the government would probably sustain a heavy loss.3g 
There were other defaulters or defrauders: the collector at 
Wilmington, North Carolina, absconded with some loss to the 
government; there were troubles with the accounts of the collec- 
tor at St. Mary's, Georgia; the collector at Savannah apparently 
"shorted" the government of more than $100,000; and there were 
reports that owners of vessels occasionally employed in mackerel 
fishing sought to obtain the legal allowances for vessels engaged 
in the Banks and cod fishing40 
In sharp contrast to Philadelphia and some of the other larger 
ports were such customs districts as Champlain and Vermont 
where the incomes of the collectors were meager. If smuggled 
goods were seized the officers of the customs might be "rewarded" 
by having their compensation further reduced-they were asked 
to pay the difference between the costs and what the smuggled 
goods were sold for. In addition they were "out of pocket" the 
amount paid to  informer^.^^ 
Crawford was from the beginning of his treasury position aware 
of the vast differences in compensation of the collectors and of the 
pressures that might be exerted to create new collection districts 
or to designate additional places as ports of entry. There was 
also the possibility of decreasing the ports of entry, but most 
39 House Doc., No. 137 (serial 138), 19th Cong., 1st sess. 
40 Crawford to Joseph Anderson, May 4, 1821, Letters Received from the Secretary 
of Treasury-First Comptroller: Anderson to Crawford, May 5, 1821, Revenue 
Letters, No. 33; Anderson to Crawford, July 26, 28, 1823, ibid., No. 36; Anderson 
to Crawford, Feb. 16, 1824, ibid., No. 37: Crawford to Samuel A. Morse (collector 
a t  Machias, Me.), Dec. 8, 1820, Treasury Circulars. 
4 1  Crawford to Thomas Newton, Feb. 24, 1817, Crawford, NYH; Senate Doc., No. 
22 (serial log), 18th Cong., 2d sess. 
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of Crawford's recommendations to this end seem to have failed 
to convince Congress. His answer to the first query from the 
House on the expediency of increasing or diminishing the ports 
of entry said that his predecessors had not made a practice of 
collecting information necessary to such a decision.42 That fall 
Crawford recommended some changes in the salaries and emol- 
uments of customs officers, but he had no suggestions on the 
number of districts and ports of entry. He admitted all his 
information was not yet exact, but he had determined that the 
emoluments of the naval officers and surveyors of the customs 
should be increased by 25 percent. He proposed that the fees 
received by the collectors be divided equally with the naval 
officers and surveyors, who in turn should pay a portion of the 
expenses of office rent, fuel, and stationery. In the larger ports- 
where there was no salary-the collector sometimes received as 
much as $30,000 net from the commission fees; in the small 
interior ports Crawford proposed raising some of the salaries 
from $250 to $500, whereas in others they should be allowed to 
remain at the $150-$250 level. He recommended an increase in 
the commission rate for several places.43 Congress did not respond 
favorably, and soon the Panic of 1819 resulted in action decreas- 
ing considerably the fees of the collectors, naval officers, and 
surveyors. Crawford agairi recommended a 25 percent increase 
in the fees for the naval officers and surveyors. He pointed out 
that the "disposition which is inherent in human nature to acts 
of benevolence, and to the exercise of patronage, requires that 
the commissions and emoluments assigned to the collectors of 
the principal ports should be regulated so as to render the 
practice of economy necessary to secure to the officer the maximum 
to which he is limited." He used the expenses and the balances 
of the ports of New York and Boston to illustrate his point.44 
In December 1818 Crawford submitted to the Senate a list, 
compiled from letters from the various collectors, of eighteen 
collectors and twenty-six surveyors who might be discharged from 
the public service at a saving of almost $10,000. Some of the 
districts were recommended for elimination-they were unpro- 
42 Crawford to Newton, Feb. 17, 1817, Series E, Vol. 6. 
43 House Doc., No. 131 (serial lo), 15th Cong., 1st sess. Crawford stressed the 
"strong temptation" to smuggling along the "whole extent of the inland frontier." 
44 Crawford to Speaker of the House, Dec. 8, 1820, House Doc., No. 26 (serial 
48), 16th Cong., 2d sess. 
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ductive-and many of the surveyors would have no duties because 
of the recommendation for the abolition of that office in several 
ports.45 Two years later he sent the same list to the House, noting 
that the saving to the government would now amount to only 
$8,000 per year. Crawford said that another saving-of at least 
$100,000 per year-could be effected by repealing that part of 
the law of March 2, 1799, which provided fees for weighers, 
measurers, gaugers, and markers. He considered the inspectors 
competent to perform those duties.46 Apparently Crawford's 
interest in economy and retrenchment was greater than that of 
Congress and extended to places other than the military. 
Earlier in 1820 he had indicated that the refusal of credit at 
the customhouse to any one whose revenue bond was due would 
ensure payment of the debt, but Congress took no action and 
allowed the old procedure of placing the bonds in suit to con- 
tinue. It  was not until 1822 that a rider to the appropriations 
bill forbade any payment as compensation for services to a person 
in arrears in his payments to the United States, and the comp- 
troller was instructed to disallow all disbursements when pay 
had been advanced to such persons and to forward to disbursing 
officers the list of those indebted to the United States. And three 
weeks later Crawford took steps to fix compensation and limit 
the number of clerks in those collection districts where emol- 
uments exceeded the sums to which the officers were limited. 
He noted that the "public interest requires that the concerns 
of the nation, and especially the collection of the revenue, should 
be managed with the same view to economy as the affairs of an 
ind i~ idua l . "~~  
Monroe's cabinet was one of first-rate executive ability. Under 
the direction of his department heads and "largely at their 
initiative the administrative machine, now over a quarter century 
in motion, had its first ~verhauling."~* Crawford was among the 
45 Proposed abolition of the office of surveyor in some Massachusetts ports involved 
eleven of the surveyors. Senate Doc., No. 27 (serial 14), 15th Cong., 2d sess. 
46 House Doc., No. 25 (serial 48), 16th Cong., 2d sess. For additional information 
on consolidation of functions and economies in the customs service see Senate Doc., 
No. 82 (serial 60), 17th Cong., 1st sess.; House Doc., No. 112 (serial 56), 16th Cong., 
1st sess.; Revenue Letters on Accounts, passim, begun in 1821. 
47 Crawford to Speaker of the House, Feb. 11, 1820, House Doc., No. 73 (serial 
35), 16th Cong., 1st sess.; Crawford to Anderson, May 4, 1822, Letters Received from 
the Secretary of Treasury-First Comptroller; Treasury Circular, May 24, 1822; 
3 Stat. 668. I t  should be recalled that congressional approval i n  1820 of a summary 
process for settling accounts did help. 
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most active of those overhaulers and doubtless could have achieved 
more had Congress been more interested in the process. But 
political consideration, patronage, and almost unbelievably long 
tenure in many offices-notably collectors of the larger ports- 
prevented further improvement. Crawford could report just 
before leaving office that the accounts of all active officers of the 
customs were current, and not a single one was indebted to the 
government. Actually, all had balances in their favor.49 But 
the accounts did not tell the whole story. The  wonder is that 
there was so little loss to the government, for there was no 
inspection of the customs service until the Jackson administra- 
tion. There were precedents for the use of this administrative 
device in the War Department and in the land offices, and it was 
in connection with the latter that Crawford introduced most of 
the elements of modern inspection. 
Public lands were second only to the customs as a producer 
of revenue for the central government. In 1812 duties connected 
with the public lands, formerly performed by the secretary and 
the register of the treasury and the secretaries of state and war, 
were consolidated in the General Land Office, whose commis- 
sioner was in charge of all land matters but operated under the 
general direction of the secretary of treasury. The  General Land 
Office, primarily a clerical office, held a unique position in 
financial matters, since it settled the accounts of the land ofices 
on its own responsibility and reported directly to the comptroller 
without the preliminary inspection of an auditor. In  1824 there 
were thirty-nine land offices in the country, each in charge of a 
register who was the "public broker for the sale of lands" and 
each having a fiscal agent, or receiver of public monies.EO Exactly 
what constituted general supervision by the secretary of treasury 
48 White, Jeoersonians, 12. 
49 Crawford to Speaker of the House, March 1, 1825, House Doc., No. 106 (serial 
118), 18th Cong., 2d sess. 
50 White, Jeffersonians, 519-22. Josiah Meigs was commissioner from 1814 until 
his death in 1822; John McLean held the office until his appointment as postmaster 
general in 1823; George Graham succeeded McLean and held the position until his 
death in 1830. T h e  land offices were always subordinate to Washington, but the 
relation of the surveyor general to the General Land Office was obscure and some- 
times inharmonious. I t  was not until 1836 that he definitely was subordinated to 
the land commissioner. Ibid., 523. See also Malcolm J. Rohrbough, T h e  Land 
Ofice Business: T h e  Settlement and Administration of American Public Lands, 
1789-1837 (New York, 1968). I t  should be noted that in two years of Crawford's 
tenure other sources brought more to the treasury than did land sales: internal 
duties in 1816 and 1817 and direct taxes in  1816. 
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varied greatly: it could take the form of consultation with the 
commissioner; it could be direct instructions to the receivers and 
registers; it could be the appointment of special representatives 
to try to secure to the government the deposits in certain banks; 
or it could be a suggestion that the commissioner exercise the 
"most vigilant superintendence" over and confide as little in the 
judgment of one of his clerks as the situation would permit. 
The  treasury's major concern, however, was with proper re- 
porting, handling of monies, and the strict accountability of the 
receivers. Crawford did not always see the instructions given the 
receivers by the commissioner, but he presumed they were 
directed to make monthly returns to the treasury as well as to the 
federal land office of the amount and price of lands sold. The  
receiver should enclose receipts and vouchers showing the amount 
carried to the credit of the United  state^.^' But the registers had 
not been in the habit of balancing their books, though legally 
required to do so annually. The  monthly reports of lands sold 
and monies entered showed no balances, and it was not until 
October 18 18 that the commissioner realized the nonfeasance 
of the registers. Monthly returns enabled the General Land 
Office to catch any errors in the accounts of the receivers, but 
Crawford was asked to decide whether the labor of balancing 
the books of the registers for the last eighteen years should be 
undertaken. The  commissioner had notified the receivers that 
the balances must be regularly transferred from quarter to quarter 
and their books posted so that an examiner might see the balances 
of the quarter preceding his in~es t iga t ion .~~ 
Crawford apparently thought Josiah Meigs' action adequate for 
the time being, but soon he decided that the monthly reports of 
the receivers were not sufficiently revealing. In  September 1819 
he notified the receivers of a change in the reporting forms so 
that the sum received for lands entered or intended to be entered 
during the month could be distinguished from those sums 
received for earlier entries. Also all accounts were henceforth to 
be countersigned by the registers. T h e  secretary believed that the 
intimation that money received had in some cases been exchanged 
for less valuable money, which was subsequently deposited, was 
51 Crawford to John Taylor and Alex Pope, Oct. 10, 1817, Series N, Vol. "0". 
52 General Land Office to Crawford, Oct. 10, 1818, GLO, Miscellaneous Letters, 
Vol. 8. The land office accounts were then in much the same condition as those of 
other government agencies. 
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"generally unfounded," but means of repelling these intimations 
should at all times exist. On the back of the receipts the kind 
of money received should be described, and only during the 
public sale of land-when this practice might be found imprac- 
ticable-could this procedure be temporarily delayed. Further, 
the receivers were told that it would be necessary for them to 
indicate upon all receipts for money paid by them-excluding 
their deposits but including their own commissions and salaries- 
the kinds of money paid out and to furnish a statement containing 
this information to the register of the land office.53 
The  lot of the land office officials was not an easy one. The 
multiplication of paper money during and after the War of 1812 
made it virtually impossible for the receiver to know what to 
accept, and the credit system contributed to enormous sales in 
the postwar period. Had payments been made-as legally re- 
quired-at the end of the second, third, and fourth years after 
purchase, the receivers might have found it easier to keep their 
books posted and the treasury could have more accurately esti- 
mated receipts. But there was an interest penalty only before the 
fifth year, and numerous relief acts had been passed since 1809. 
There was no strong inducement to punctuality since failure to 
pay did not deprive the buyers of credit, and Crawford thought 
the "abolition of the credits now allowed to purchasers, or the 
refusal of credit, in all cases where an installment is not paid when 
it becomes due, will be necessary to secure the collection of that 
portion of the revenue which is derived from the national 
domain."54 
Crawford played a large role in devising the act of April 24, 
1820, which abandoned the credit system of land purchase, and in 
framing the relief act of March 2, 1821. Several provisions of the 
latter, as well as earlier relief laws, required administrative 
53 Crawford t o  Receivers o f  Public Monies, Treasury Circulars. 
54 Crawford t o  Speaker o f  t h e  House, Feb. 11, 1820, House Doc., No .  73 (serial 
35), 16th Cong., 1st sess. Crawford noted that  sections 8 and 9 o f  t h e  act o f  April 
20, 1818, were intended t o  provide a remedy against banks that  failed t o  discharge 
their notes o n  demand,  b u t  i n  some states a corporation could not  b e  brought  in to  
court. He  suggested that  t h e  cashiers and presidents o f  t h e  banks b e  made  respon- 
sible and that a service consist merely o f  leaving a notice at t h e  banking house. 
T h e  indebtedness o f  public land purchasers at  that  t ime  was approximately $20 
million. I n  1818 Crawford had favored an  extension o f  two years for t h e  redemption 
o f  lands sold for direct taxes and bought  in b y  t h e  United States, b u t  interest o f  
10 percent should b e  charged f rom J u n e  1, 1818. Crawford t o  W i l l i a m  Lowndes, 
Feb. 2, 1818, House Doc., No. 137 (serial lo ) ,  15th Cong., 1st sess. 
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interpretation before they could be carried out. This often took 
the form of questions by the commissioner of the General Land 
Office to Crawford, who then made the decisions on the meaning 
of the law, sometimes after discussion with other members of 
the cabinet and of C ~ n g r e s s . ~ ~  
The  reentry of the BUS into the picture, the resumption of 
specie payment, the mismanagement of the BUS, the wild 
speculation, the Panic of 1819, and the new land law of 1820 
meant, of course, rapidly changing circumstances for the receivers. 
At times they were permitted to take only specie and bills of 
the BUS and its branches, but in August 1820 Crawford-to 
equalize and to increase the facilities for making payments for 
the public lands-authorized them to accept the notes of the 
incorporated banks of Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore 
(except the city bank), Richmond, South Carolina, and Georgia, 
and those specie-paying banks in the state in which the land office 
was situated. Previous instructions were superseded, except the 
one which prohibited the receipt of paper money of any bank 
which did not discharge its notes on demand in specie; "that 
prohibition must, in every case, be rigidly adhered 
Herein, of course, lay much of the problem. Banks might for 
a short time meet the demands for specie, and then through 
overissue, speculation, peculation, or other causes cease to 
function. The  government could then be-and sometimes was- 
the loser. The  secretary spelled out the procedure for the 
receivers: they were to give notice to the various banks of the 
amounts of their notes contained in each deposit; if informed 
by the cashier of the bank of deposit that any bank in the state 
had failed to redeem its deposited notes in specie, no more notes 
of that bank were to be received. "It may be proper," he said, 
"for you to take the first occasion to intimate, in respectful terms, 
to each of those banks, the consequence that will result from a 
want of punctuality in paying its notes on presentation." The  
procedure did not differ materially from that in practice before 
the economic collapse. 
55Thomas Hart Benton, Thir ty  Years View . . ., 2 vols. (New York, 1856), 1:12; 
Secretary of Treasury to Speaker of the House, House Doc., No. 73 (serial 35), 
16th Cong., 1st sess.; Niles' Weekly Register 17 (Feb. 12, 1820):419-20: GLO to 
Secretary of Treasury, May 20, July 11, 17, 1820, GLO, Miscellaneous Letters, Vol. 
10; Crawford to Meigs, July 11, 1820, May 17, 1822, Series N, Vol. "0". 
56 Crawford to Receivers of Public Monies, Aug. 1, 1820, Treasury Circulars. 
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Problems had long before appeared in several places, and some 
were quite persistent. On March 1, 1817, Crawford informed 
Meigs that the information in the enclosed letters indicated it 
was necessary to institute an examination of the books and the 
accounts of the receiver at Vincennes. Two days later the com- 
missioner said he had requested Benjamin Parke to make the 
examination, and the receiver had been directed to afford Parke 
every facility to carry out his task. Several banks, as well as 
receivers, were to be involved in the next few years, but every 
effort was made to take full cognizance of, and give consideration 
to, the economic conditions in which the Westerners were caught 
and, at the same time, keep the government losses to a minimum.57 
Some of the cases of dishonesty which even the "most vigilant 
superintendence" could not prevent were resolved with dispatch, 
but others lingered for years. Early in 1817 Monroe removed the 
receiver of lands east of the Pearl River for "incontestable 
evidence of mal-£ea~ance";~8 the dismissal of John Brahan, re- 
ceiver at the Huntsville, Alabama, office, occurred only after 
seventeen months of correspondence-and two years later it was 
determined the government had lost rather heavily. Crawford's 
communications to Brahan are not subject to misinterpretation, 
and in his letter of March 1819 the secretary stated what might 
be termed his code of ethics for the public servant: 
It is extremely desirable that the conduct of the officers of the 
government, especially those who have charge of the public 
money, should not only be correct, but there should be no possible 
cause of suspecting them to be incorrect. If there should exist any 
peculiarity in the situation of an officer which is calculated to 
excite suspicion, it is more imperiously to his interest and duty 
to exert more than ordinary diligence in the discharge of his 
official duties.59 
T o  secure direct and accurate information for the use of the 
government, special inspectors or representatives were employed 
in the Vincennes, Brahan, and other cases, but general inspectors 
57 Crawford to Meigs, March 1, 1817, Series N, Vol. "0"; GLO to Secretary of 
Treasury, March 3, 1817, GLO, Miscellaneous Letters, Vol. 7. 
58 Crawford to Meigs, April 14, 1817, Series N, Vol. "0". William Crawford, no 
relation to the secretary, was the new appointee. 
59All materials dealing with the Brahan default are in House Doc., No. 130 
(serial 69), 17th Cong., 1st sess. and ibid., No. 149 (serial 102), 18th Cong., 1st sess. 
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or examiners had been used since 1804 when Congress mandated 
the secretary of treasury to cause the books of the land offices to 
be examined and their balances ascertained once a year. For 
several years inspections were made by persons, selected by the 
treasury, who resided in the vicinity of the land offices, but-as 
Crawford later reported-the annual inspections were made in 
compliance with the injunctions of the law rather than from a 
"conviction that the information obtained was of any intrinsic 
value to the public service." In 1816 Secretary Alexander J. 
Dallas changed the procedure by directing that Nicholas B. Van 
Zandt, a clerk in the General Land Office, examine the offices in 
Ohio and farther to the west. His period of inspection was short, 
the report went to the secretary of treasury, and the commissioner 
of the General Land Office sent out the letters of instruction 
and c o r r e c t i ~ n . ~ ~  
Regular annual inspections by individuals from headquarters 
became standard procedure, but Crawford's concept of the 
purposes of inspection differed from that of his predecessors. In 
instructing Meigs to direct a thorough examination of the books 
and accounts of the receivers and registers in Ohio, Indiana, and 
the Illinois Territory-with Van Zandt as the inspector-he in- 
dicated his desire that Van Zandt be told to obtain all the 
information he could on the general character and standing of 
the officers, "with due regard to propriety and a proper respect 
for their feelings." The  officers, especially the receivers, should 
sign the statement the examiner drew at the end of his scrutiny. 
The  commentary upon the facts which the examiner might feel it 
his duty to make would be distinct from the statement and should 
not, of course, be submitted to the officers. I t  was expected that 
the banks in which the deposits had been made would give the 
inspector "every facility necessary to enable him to discharge the 
trust beneficially to the g~ve rnmen t . "~~  
This procedure seemed to bring no controversy or political 
repercussions during the inspection of Van Zandt, those of John 
Dickins in 1818 and 1819, and of Dickins and Richard B. Lee in 
1820. In 1821 two Westerners were sent on a general commission: 
Alexander Anderson of Tennessee to the offices in Mississippi and 
60 White, Jeflersonians, 523-24. A number of special examinations of particular 
offices followed the first headquarters inspection. See GLO, Miscellaneous Letters, 
Vols. 6, 7, passim. 
61 Crawford to Meigs, May 27, 1817, Series N, Vol. "0". 
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Alabama, and Jesse B. Thomas, senator from Illinois and member 
of the Committee on Public Lands, to Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Missouri, and Detroit. In addition to the usual examination of 
the offices, Thomas was authorized to enter into any agreement 
with the Bank of Vincennes that would secure the debt owed to 
the United States-any agreement that he might consider to be 
in the interest of the nation provided it did not stipulate payment 
of a sum less than the amount actually due.62 
Thomas was highly successful in his negotiations at Vincennes, 
and he inspected all the offices except Detroit. But his and Craw- 
ford's political opponents sought to make political capital of the 
appointment. Late in December 1821 Daniel P. Cook (member 
of the House from Illinois and son-in-law of Ninian Edwards, the 
other senator) hoped the editor of the Detroit paper could say 
something derogatory about Thomas' failure to visit that place 
and accused Crawford of promoting intrigue and buying support 
through patronage in a manner that subverted the party and 
violated the Constitution. Early in January 1822 Cook introduced 
a resolution concerning Thomas' employment, and the next 
month Crawford submitted the requested information to the 
House. The report of a select committee under the chairmanship 
of Louis McLane of Delaware gave a brief history of the inspection 
process, pointing out that increased receipts of the land offices 
had added to the importance of inspection at the time Dallas 
changed the procedure in 1816. It  emphasized that Thomas 
secured to the United States a large amount of public money in 
the Vincennes bank and for that service he neither received nor 
asked any compensation. The  committee did not think the 
appointment (it was not an office) a violation of the Constitution; 
senators and representatives had been given various appoint- 
ments since 1800. Nor did it see anything in the case indicating 
that Crawford or Thomas had any intention of violating the law 
or abusing or disregarding the "spirit and policy of our institu- 
tions." The employment of Thomas originated in the desire 
62 Crawford to Thomas, April 6, 1821, Jesse B. Thomas Papers (Illinois State 
Historical Library). In 1821 there were thirty-nine banks holding paper-to the 
government credit-which was irredeemable or only partially redeemable. For a 
concise statement on this matter see Crawford to Speaker of the House, Feb. 12, 
1821, Niles' Weekly Register 20 (March 17, 1821):36-37. See also Crawford to 
Speaker of the House, April 27, 1822, House Doc., No. 119 (serial 69), 17th Cong., 
1st sess.; American State Papers: Finance, 3:718-82; American State Papers: Public 
Lands, vols. 3, 4. 
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honestly to discharge an important public duty; the peculiar 
importance of the trust and the character and status of the person 
employed "calculated rather to invite than forbid his selection"; 
and there was no  reason to believe that the duty was not faithfully 
performed in  a manner conducive to the public 
Of more basic significance than the brief political furor was 
Crawford's defense of the post-1 8 15 method of examination as 
decidedly preferable to that used before: 
When a different person is employed to examine each office, the 
judgment which is formed of the manner and style in which the 
books are kept will depend upon the intelligence, the prejudices, 
or partialities, of the different examiners: but, when the same 
person examines a number of offices, the same intelligence is 
exercised in each case, exempt, too, from partiality or prejudice, 
when the examiner is not a neighbor or connexion of the officer. 
. . . An examination now is not a matter of form. The time the 
examiner is to arrive is unknown. When he does arrive, the ex- 
amination commences, and is continued without relaxation until 
it is completed. . . . It is also an object of some importance that 
the examiner should communicate, confidentially, many things 
that he would not be willing to incorporate in his report, and 
which it would be improper to incorporate. The value of such 
communications will depend entirely upon the knowledge which 
the head of the Department has of the character of the person 
who makes them.64 
Here is perhaps the first statement by a high-ranking government 
official that includes most of the essentials of a sound inspection 
system. 
There  were many other duties connected with the sale and 
management of the public lands, some even touched with a bit 
of humor. In sending Monroe a proclamation announcing the 
public sale of land in  Alabama-and each time there was a sale 
63 Cook to William Woodbridge, Dec. 28, 1821, William Woodbridge Papers 
(Burton Historical Collection, Detroit Public Library); Crawford to Speaker of the 
House, Feb. 18, 1822, House Doc., No. 71 (serial 67). 17th Cong., 1st sess.; Niles' 
Weekly Register 22 (April 13, 1822):102-5. In  his letter to Woodbridge Cook said 
that "all fair means" must be adopted or "that Rascal" will be the next President. 
A Crawford partisan thought the committee report "completely cooks Mr. Cook- 
the little serpent wreathed & twisted in its perusal-it is a statement of facts & 
reasoning highly satisfactory to the friends of Mr. Crawford." R. M. Saunders to 
Bartlett Yancey, April 3, 1822, Walter Clark Papers (NCDAH). 
64 ASPPL, 3:512 (Jan. 28, 1822); White, Jeffersonians, 525-26. 
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such a proclamation had to be issued-Crawford sent along a 
letter from General Abner Lacock relative to compensation for 
assistants in the surveying process. Crawford commented to the 
effect that he thought a cook and baggage handler were necessary, 
but he did not think that horses would in "any stretch" fall 
under the term assistant. But the compensation was low and 
everything ought to be allowed that could be.65 
The vast majority of the officials connected with the land 
offices were scrupulously honest and by 1824 grossly underpaid. 
Shortly before leaving office Crawford noted that not only had 
the compensation of the registers and receivers fallen below the 
allowable maximum of $2,000 per annum but that it averaged 
only about $850. This he considered inadequate and recom- 
mended that the commission of those officers be increased by 
one half percent of the public money received, thus restoring 
the rate to the pre-1818 level. The  receiver should also be 
allowed something for transporting the public money to distant 
places of deposit. Such an allowance might be regulated by the 
secretary of treasury, but it should in no case exceed one half 
percent of the amount deposited. The  pay of the receivers and 
registers was the same; all thirty-nine offices had reported. At 
only nine places did they receive more than $1,000; the one at 
St. Stephens received $2,13 1, while at Lexington, Missouri, the 
pay was only $278.80. All others were paid between $500 and 
$955.42.66 
No matter what the organization, the procedures, and inspec- 
tion method, or the degree of supervision, efficient and effective 
performance depended in the final analysis upon personnel. 
Crawford, who had said in late 1822 that reduction of personnel 
in an office would "depend more upon the character and conduct 
of the principal officers . . . than upon legislative enactments," 
indicated by his actions in connection with strict accountability 
and organizational reform, as well as by his remarks of earlier 
65 Crawford to Monroe, June 13, 1820, Monroe, NYP. There seem to have been 
inequities in the salaries and allowances of the surveyors and their help. For 
especially pertinent information on some of the problems of administering and 
leasing the lead mines and the salines, as well as on an interesting experiment in 
the "encouragement of the vine and olive," see GLO to Secretary of Treasury, Dec. 
19, 1816, Jan. 2, 1817, GLO, Miscellaneous Letters, Vol. 7; Senate Doc., Nos. 143, 
144 (serial 3), 15th Cong., 1st sess.; ibid., No. 70 (serial 60), 17th Cong., 1st sess. 
68 House Doc., No. 92 (serial 118) 18th Cong., 2d sess. I n  early 1818 the maximum 
salary for receivers and registers was $3,000. 
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years, that competence, honesty, and performance of duty were 
prerequisites to appointment and continuance in office. This is 
not to say that he did not appoint to, or recommend keeping in, 
office some individuals whose records would not bear close 
scrutiny in all three categories; "blemishes" may be found on 
the record of every person in an important administrative role 
for any substantial period of time. That Crawford sought to 
appoint friends to vacancies resulting from deaths, resignations, 
removals, or new positions seems only natural, but to charge 
that he used the patronage to build an electioneering engine does 
injustice to his professed and practiced concepts of the public 
service and ignores the realities of the existing situation. 
The  personnel of the Treasury Department in Washington 
and in the field was far greater than that of any other department, 
and appointments were primarily political. But until 1820 almost 
every employee had unspecified tenure; only the marshals had 
been placed on a four-year term by the Federalists. Many of the 
public employees had grown old in the service; several had 
already served large segments of forty-year careers, and removals 
were few.67 
There were additional appointments during Monroe's ad- 
ministration, and the multifarious activities of the Treasury 
Department meant that Crawford might be consulted on a 
number of appointments-or he might not be. Monroe sometimes 
acted entirely on his own, sometimes he consulted others, but 
never did he have any intention of relinquishing his presidential 
prerogative in this area. After the summer of 1822 Crawford 
and Adams both confessed to having little or no favorable 
influence on appointments, and Monroe, keenly aware of the 
scramble for favor, said he pursued his own course by appoint- 
ing those he knew and confided in. Had he distributed the 
"offices among the friends of the candidates, to guard myself 
against the imputation of favoritism . . . the office in my hands, 
for two or three years of the latter term, would have sunk 
to nothingM6* 
67 Madison and Monroe removed a total of only fifty-four civil officers in sixteen 
years. More than thirty of these were collectors. Adams, who thought Monroe too 
lenient about removals, rarely admitted any kind of inferiority, but he did note 
that "At this game [appointments] I have a perfect demonstration that Crawford 
is an  overmatch for me." Memoirs, 5:158 (June 23, 1820), 89 (May 2, 1820). Monroe 
was the only public figure of prominence who did not suffer from Adams' pen. 
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Monroe's determination to control appointments, even prior 
to 1822, is well revealed in choosing four officials for the land 
offices in Illinois in 1820-1821. The roles of the President, the 
cabinet officer under whose supervision the individuals would 
work, and of the senators of the state were all involved. Monroe 
was embarrassed by disagreement and conflicts between Senators 
Edwards and Thomas, thought the appointments should be made 
in such a way as to "put it out of the power of either to say that 
we are in any degree partial to the other," and indicated a 
division of the offices might be proper. Edwards complained of 
not getting proper consideration of his recommendations, ap- 
parently suggested that he and Thomas each choose two persons, 
and denied that he was trying to transfer the appointive power 
from the President to the senators. A troubled Monroe twice 
had Attorney General TVilliam Wirt write his friend Edwards. 
Wirt emphasized that if the President were bound by the nomina- 
tions of the senators, the appointment would not be that of the 
chief executive, who still must bear the responsibility. The  
President asked no sacrifice of the rights of the senators in op- 
posing or rejecting nominations; why should they seek to narrow 
his freedom in making such? Further, UTirt thought Edwards 
took an improper view of the nominations and would impair 
his dignity and place Monroe in a "degraded light" by bringing 
the President into party conflicts within a state. Even the most 
successful politician could "buy his triumphs too dear." In this, 
as in most other decisions, Monroe had his way.Gg 
The  public service was still small, and transactions and ap- 
pointments were widely known and talked about. There were 
few defaulters and little peculation. Monroe, Crawford, and 
other members of the administration generally held high stan- 
dards, and when deceived about the qualities of a person whom 
GsCrawford to Van Buren, May 9, 1823, Martin Van Buren Papers (MDLC): 
Crawford to Thomas Worthington, June 10, 1823, Worthington; Adams, Memoirs, 
vols. 7, 8, passim; Monroe to Tefferson, March 22, 1824, Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, 
ed., T h e  W r i t i n g  of James Monroe, 7 vols. (New York, 1898-1903). 7:11-12. Here- 
after cited as Hamilton, Monroe Writings. 
69 The  most pertinent materials on this episode are: Monroe to Crawford, July 
24, 1820, Golding. Edwards to Monroe, Dec. 22, 1820: Wirt to Edwards, Jan. 11, 15, 
1821, E. B. Washburne, ed., T h e  Edwards Papers . . . (Chicago, Ill., 1884), 166-67, 
167-68n, 186-89 (hereafter cited as Washburne, Edwards)  Edwards to Crawford, Jan. 
1, 11, 1821; Crawford "note verbale," Jan. 2, 1821; Crawford to Edwards, Jan. 10, 
1821, Edwards. As a young man Wirt had lived for some time in the Edwards home; 
he and Ninian were "almost" brothers. 
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they had been persuaded to recommend they showed considerable 
vexation. Crawford maintained that he was influenced by two 
considerations only: the qualifications of the individuals and the 
desire to give strength and popularity to Monroe's administra- 
tion. If he had failed in any case, in either of these respects, he 
said it had been because he himself had been deceived.70 
I t  seems that Crawford really did not like to choose individuals 
for office and said he found this selection "always disagreeable." 
I t  was, however, a "highly important duty which must be 
performed"; his duty was to aid the President in the solution of 
the affairs of the Treasury Department as far as he was able- 
and that duty he would discharge with "rectitude, if not with 
wisdom."71 Under pressure from individuals and his own am- 
bition, Crawford must have found this a difficult rule to follow, 
but he seems to have done as well as any of the other members 
of the administration. Extant materials indicate that he would 
not recommend some of his long-standing friends because of some 
of their actions, that others were not happy with their appoint- 
ments (feeling they deserved better), that he was well aware of 
the resentment that might be engendered by a Georgian inter- 
fering in the appointments in another state, that he was success- 
ful in some of his recommendations and not in others, that he 
did not differentiate sharply between Federalists and Republicans, 
that he was on occasion mortified by the loss of a letter of 
recommendation, and that very few of his appointees were guilty 
of violating the code of ethics to which Crawford ~ubsc r ibed .~~  
The greatest criticism and condemnation of Crawford's role in 
appointments has come in connection with the Tenure Act of 
70 Monroe to Crawford, Oct. 17, 1817, Crawford, MDLC: Crawford to Monroe, 
Aug. 17, 1821, Gratz. If anyone was ever conscientious about appointments or 
recommendations for appointment, that person was John Quincy Adams. But even 
Adams was "deceived" by his intimate friend, Dr. Tobias Watkins. White, Jeffer- 
sonians, 420-21; Adams, Memoirs, 8:141 (April 21, 1829). 
71 Crawford to Worthington, May 18, 1819, Worthington. 
72 See, for example, Crawford to Charles Tait ,  Nov. 7, 29, 1819; J. W. Walker to 
Tait ,  Dec. 20, 1819, Tait; Tait  to Thomas W. Cobb, Feb. 29, 1820, J. W. Walker 
Papers (ADAH): Monroe to Crawford. June 30, July 7, 1820; Crawford to T. U. P. 
Charlton, March 13, 1819, Crzwford, MDLC: Crawford to John M. O'Connor, April 
27, May 16, 1818, Crawford Papers (Rice University Library); Crawford to Jacob 
Brown, Jan. 26, Aug. 4, 1819: Brown to Crawford, Nov. 28, 1819: Brown to John 
Armstrong, March 2, 1820: Ambrose Spencer to Brown, Nov. 15, 1819, Brown, MHS; 
Crawford to John E. Howard and others, Aug. 25, 1819, James Bayard Papers 
(MdHS); Crawford to Monroe, Aug. 25, 26, 1823, Monroe, MDLC; Monroe to Craw- 
ford, Aug. 15, 1821, Golding. 
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May 15, 1820, which provided that the principal officers con- 
cerned with the collection and disbursement of money should 
thereafter be appointed for fixed terms of four years (though 
removal could take place at the pleasure of the appointive power) 
and that the terms of the incumbents should expire at stated 
intervals, but not earlier than four years from time of appoint- 
ment. This applied to the district attorneys, collectors of the 
customs, naval officers and surveyors of the customs, navy agents, 
receivers and registers of the land offices, paymasters in the 
army, the apothecary general and his assistants, and the commis- 
sary general of purchases. I t  did not apply to clerical help of 
those officers nor did it affect the pursers, Indian agents, post- 
masters, or any accounting or clerical officers and employees 
in Wa~hington.?~ 
Crawford and Congress had for at least four years been deeply 
concerned about a stricter accountability of those persons han- 
dling the public monies, and this seems nothing more than 
another step in that direction. There is evidence, in Adams' 
diary and in other materials contemporary with the actions, that 
Crawford was the author and drafter of bills for consideration 
by Congress, but none supports the charge that he was father 
of this one-and only an occasional partisan asserted that he 
intended to use it to advance his political ambitions.74 There is 
some important evidence that Crawford was not the author 
of the measure. On June 12, 1820, Crawford wrote Monroe 
that Vice President Daniel D. Tompkins had been with him 
that day and wanted to know if any decision had been made 
concerning David Gelston, collector at New York. Crawford 
told him that nothing had been said on the subject. Tompkins, 
indicating public opinion called for a new incumbent and that 
73 3 Stat. 582. 
74  Carl Russell Fish, "The Crime of W. H. Crawford," American Historical Review 
21 (April 1916):545-46, finds no proof that the act was the origin of the spoils 
system or that Crawford was its conscious author. He believes Crawford had no 
intention of using the law to secure his election and that the act had some justifica- 
tion as an administrative measure. Edward Channing, A History of the United 
States, 6 vols. (New York, 1912-1925), 5:353-54, rather timidly follows Fish. Theodore 
Roosevelt, Life of Thomas Hart Benton (New York, 1887), 79-80, makes several 
incorrect statements and insupportable judgments about the act. John Quincy 
Adams' charge concerning authorship and Crawford's use-or intended use, for 
Adams says Crawford's illness prevented such use-was not made until 1828. T h e  
remark about Crawford's illness in relation to use of the act is patently absurd: 
the measure had been in effect for well over three years before Crawford was 
stricken in late 1823. 
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much dissatisfaction would develop if a change were not made, 
said Gelston was eighty years of age, rich, crabbed and peevish 
with persons with whom he had to deal, and that i t  was time 
for him to be withdrawn from the laborious duties of collector. 
T h e  Vice President insisted that Gelston's case was the one which 
gave rise to the law and that Senators Mahlon Dickerson (New 
Jersey) and Nathan Sanford (New York)-the principal supporters 
of the law-had his case particularly in view. Crawford further 
detailed Tompkins' comments on possible successors to Gelston; 
he thought he should communicate this information to Monroe 
since it was "highly probable" the subject would be presented 
to him by others.75 
In  another communication to Monroe on the same day Craw- 
ford expressed his feelings about the new act. H e  said: 
The law changing the tenure of office of certain officers, certainly 
was not intended to disqualify the present, or future incumbents. 
I presume that reappointment will not take place, where there 
are any reasonable grounds of dissatisfaction. T o  remove an 
- 
officer is supposed to fix some stain upon his character. T o  omit 
to re-appoint, is nothing more, than an implied declaration that 
the person selected, has higher qualification, or stronger claims 
upon the justice and liberality of the nation, than the former 
incumbent. If an officer has discharged his duty with such in- 
telligence & integrity that the public interest cannot be promoted 
by substituting another in his place, it is presumed he will be 
continued; unless some person having stronger claims upon the 
justice of the nation cannot be otherwise provided for. These 
views I have communicated to Col0 McLane, as those which would 
probably regulate your conduct under the act. I am happy to 
find that they are in accord with those expressed.76 
75 Crawford to Monroe, June 12, 1820 (fragment), Gratz. Gelston was farther 
behind in balancing his accounts than any other collector of the public monies. 
House Doc., No. 148 (serial 102), 18th Cong., 1st sess. Sanford had been active in 
bringing about passage of the "reorganization" law of March 3, 1817. Crawford's 
detractors point to Dickerson's introduction of the bill in the Senate as another 
indication of the secretary's connection with the measure. Dickerson was a Crawford 
supporter in 1824, but extant materials do not indicate a close relationship between 
the two until considerably later than 1820. 
76 Crawford to Monroe, June 12, 1820, Monroe, MDLC. Monroe, in a letter from 
Oak Hill, presumed the law was not intended to preclude renomination if the 
officer should be thought to merit it. He felt the enclosures relative to Col. McLane 
(probably Allen McLane of Wilmington, Del.) might furnish a "suitable occasion 
for giving a practical construction" to the law. Monroe to Crawford, June 8, 1812, 
Crawford. MDLC. 
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The only papers that have been discovered which deal with 
large numbers of appointments do not indicate that the act of 
1820 was being used to create a political machine for anyone. 
On December 14, 1820, Crawford sent to Dickerson, of the 
Senate Committee on Commerce and Manufactures, a list of 
twenty-four individuals who were collectors of customs, surveyors 
and inspectors, and naval officers-spread geographically from 
Maine to Mississippi. All were renominations. The  collectors 
of Vienna and St. Mary's in Maryland had scarcely any duties to 
perform, and there was no known opposition to their appoint- 
ment. Their names were not on the list, for in consonance with 
the resolution of the Senate it was being recommended that the 
offices be abolished.77 The  following month the two individuals 
were renominated. In February 1821 Crawford wrote that the 
accounts of those persons specified in the enclosed resolution 
of the Senate had been regularly rendered and settled and the 
money received promptly paid over. All were renominations. 
The following year a list of nominations sent by Dickerson was 
returned with a statement of their accounts; nine of these were 
new appointments, but Crawford requested that two of these 
be held up because the persons had not yet gone to their posts. 
The conduct of two of the renominees was not approved. Charges 
had been brought against them, an investigation was underway, 
and delay in the decision of the Senate was requested until the 
result of the examination had been received. In April 1822 
Crawford noted that some misunderstanding had occurred rel- 
ative to the accounts of one person and he would request the 
President to withdraw the nomination the following day.78 
Crawford's massive electioneering engine seems to have been 
under the close scrutiny of the Senate and the President! 
The report of a Senate committee, chaired by Thomas Hart 
Benton, in May 1826 was sharply critical of the great amount 
of patronage in the hands of the executive branch-specifically 
the President. But the remedy was not sought in reduction or 
in a merit system but by a recommendation for repeal of the 
7 7 I t  should be noted that the Senate Executive Journals do not differentiate 
between reappointments and new appointments. By checking through them one 
could determine such in many instances, but without other materials the informa- 
tion gained would not be especially meaningful. 
78Crawford to Dickerson, Dec. 14, 1820: Jan. 5, Feb. 7, 1821; Jan. 15, April 4, 
1822, Mahlon Dickerson Papers (New Jersey Historical Society). 
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May 1820 act and transfer of the power of appointment to the 
legislative branch.79 There seems little doubt that this report 
was a part of the anti-Adams campaign of the Jackson supporters. 
However the act of 1820 may be interpreted-as a means of 
enforcing stricter accountability by providing a periodic review 
of all handlers of public money, as a way of replacing super- 
annuated individuals without fixing stains upon their characters, 
or as a device to create a political machine-there is inconclusive 
evidence connecting Crawford with its authorship, and available 
materials do not even insinuate his use of the act to promote 
his political fortunes. Had the secretary of treasury-or any other 
department head-been inclined to use the measure for that 
purpose, Monroe would effectively have prevented such. Per- 
haps no President has had a more able cabinet, and perhaps none 
has more efficiently utilized his advisers. But the decisions and 
the responsibility were Monroe's. 
Contemporary estimates of Crawford's administration of the 
Treasury Department varied according to political inclinations 
and partisanship, but it can safely be said that he was a leader 
in overhauling and reorganizing the government machine, he 
was an able and intensely honest administrator who expected his 
subordinates to adhere to a high code of ethical behavior, he 
introduced modern inspectional methods into government opera- 
tions and persistently sought strict accountability of those who 
received and disbursed the public money, he was interested in 
honorably advancing his own and Monroe's reputation, and by 
continuing and improving the Republican policy of vigilance 
he left the treasury with fewer employees (who were doing far 
more work) and a smaller payroll than it had in 1801.80 
79 Senate Doc., No. 88 (serial 128), 19th Cong., 1st sess. See also White, Jeffer- 
sonians, 390-93. 
80 ASPM, 1:260-319: Senate Doc., No. 88, 19th Cong., 1st sess. Headquarters and 
customs service personnel had increased by 103 and 187, respectively, to a total of 
1,075, but the internal revenue service had been liquidated. Crawford exercised the 
same careful supervision over the seamen's or marine hospitals, the lighthouses, 
and the purchase and erection of government warehouses as he  did over other 
operations of the department. See, for example, Treasury Circulars, Sept. 28, 1818, 
April 16, 1821; Crawford to Joseph Wingate, Nov. 5, 1821, Autograph File (Hough- 
ton Library); Crawford to John Gaillard, Dec. 9, 1818, Senate Doc., No. 52 (serial 
14), 15th Cong., 1st sess.; Richard Rush to Speaker of the House, Feb. 13, 1826, 
House Doc., No. 93 (serial 135), 19th Cong., 1st sess. Practically all the government 
warehouses had been purchased or built during Crawford's tenure as secretary. 
The Second Bank 
and the Currency 
SOME OF THE problems with which Crawford had to deal would 
never have been present-or certainly would have been less 
severe-had his efforts for rechartering the first Bank of the 
United States been successful in 1811. War heightened the 
financial chaos resulting from the removal of the restraining 
influence of the national bank: wildcat banks and worthless 
paper money increased with amazing rapidity and specie payment 
was suspended in most parts of the country by late summer of 
1814. A first recharter attempt failed in 1815, but under John 
C. Calhoun's guidance the Second Bank of the United States 
was chartered on April 10, 1816. Passage of Daniel Webster's 
resolution twenty days later required that all payments to the 
United States after February 20, 1817, be in gold or silver, 
treasury notes, notes of the BUS, or notes of banks payable and 
paid on demand in specie. Secretary Alexander J. Dallas had 
made several attempts to work out an agreement among the 
banks for resumption of specie payment but had not been success- 
ful at the time he relinquished the office to Crawf0rd.l The  
task was not an easy one, for there were legitimate interests of 
the government, the BUS, the state banks, and the individual 
that needed to be protected and served. Improperly done, 
resumption might contribute to, rather than ameliorate, the 
existing financial disorder. 
The relationships of the secretary of the treasury and the 
president of the BUS and their respective roles in currency 
matters were not explicitly defined; the influence of the secretary 
seemed to vary with economic conditions and with the faith 
the treasury head and the president of the BUS had in one 
another. The operations of the BUS have been well depicted 
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in other  place^,^ but the relations between Crawford and the 
bank presidents have not been detailed sufficiently to show the 
secretary's concept of the function of the bank, his willingness 
to "bendH-if government interests were not injured-his in- 
flexibility if government interests were threatened, and his ideas 
on money and currency. 
Crawford, one month after taking office in October 1816, 
wrote to William Jones, president of the new BUS, on the 
resumption question. He felt the principal state banks, by saying 
they would not resume until July 1, 1817, had in effect declared 
they would not bear any part of the sacrifice required to restore 
order to the currency nor forgo any of the advantages of a 
return to financial stability. But should the government refuse 
to accept the bills of those banks, the great mass of unoffending 
citizens would be the sufferers-unless the government was pre- 
pared to furnish sufficient legal currency to meet indispensable 
demands. He wished to know the bank's potential for supplying 
a national currency without the aid of the state banks. Treasury 
notes, he thought, should be withdrawn from circulation, for the 
government (with a large surplus) would be pursuing an unjust 
and unsound policy by permitting paper, which might be funded 
at 6 percent, to remain a part of the currency. If the government 
were to assume the principal burden for resumption, part of 
the profit should go to the national treasury. Noninterest-bearing 
government paper, receivable for all payments to the United 
States and not fundable at more than 5 percent, might be put 
into circulation through the agency of the BUS; the BUS could 
reissue and pay a stipulated interest to the government. Other 
possible methods were mentioned. Whatever plan was followed, 
the issue and reissue of government bills would cease when a 
sufficient amount of currency had been put into circulation. If 
issued, the amount of government paper would be limited to 
the estimated surplus revenue during 18 17, but the secretary 
"ardently desired" that this type of currency would not have to 
be used. Crawford emphasized he was taking "soundings" and 
not discussing any decisions which had been r e a ~ h e d . ~  
1 Ralph C. H. Catterall, T h e  Second Bank of the United States (Chicago, 1903), 
4, 23. 
2 See Catterall, Second Bank; Bray Hammond, Banks and Banking in America 
from the Revolution to the Civil War (Princeton, N.J. ,  1957). 
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The next month Crawford tried to convince the state banks 
that it would be to their advantage to resume on February 20, 
1817. If they did so, government money in their vaults (more 
than $11 million) would not be transferred to the BUS, and 
the treasury would draw from them only the minimum required 
in its transactions. Since receipts would probably exceed current 
demands, a pay-as-you-go policy would be followed. After July 
1 the government would draw as needed, but money would be 
transferred from the state banks to the BUS only to "sustain 
it against any pressures" which might be made upon it or its 
branches. However, if the banks persevered in their decision 
not to resume until July 1, the transfer of funds from the state 
banks would be ordered with as "little delay as the interest of 
the community will admit." Crawford pointed out that the 
interests of the banks and the community were not in opposition 
and said that any sacrifice the banks might incur by resuming on 
February 20 "will be compensated by the advantages and facilities 
which it is in the power of the treasury to afford them.04 
The  state banks still refused to change their date for resump 
tion, and Crawford turned the matter over to Jones. Jones met 
on February 1 with representatives of the larger eastern banks; the 
resulting agreement to resume on February 20, highly favorable 
to the state banks and to the treasury, set the BUS on the road 
to near disaster. The  BUS became responsible to the government 
for public deposits held by the state banks but agreed not to 
use or transfer those funds before July 1. At the same time it 
pledged itself to meet government demands on those deposits. 
The article guaranteeing mutual protection meant that the BUS 
had for all practical purposes assumed a unilateral ~bl iga t ion .~  
3 Crawford to Jones, Nov. 29, 1816, Niles' Weekly Register 15 (Feb. 6, 1819): 
437-38. 
4Treasury Circular, Dec. 20, 1817, ASPF, 4:283. T h e  demand for money had 
been heavy in the postwar period and the calling in of debts (so that specie pay- 
ment might be resumed) by even the soundest of state banks might contribute to 
serious economic disorder. See, for example, William Ward (State Bank of Boston) 
to Crawford, Jan. 1, 1817, Frank M. Etting Papers (HSP). 
BASPF, 4:496, 974-80; Catterall, Second Bank, 24-26. See also ASPF, 33231.32. 
T h e  agreement also provided that the BUS was not to call for other balances 
against the state banks until it had discounted for individuals (exclusive of those 
with duties to pay) $6 million and that it sustain "with its unbroken credit and 
whole capital" every bank that subscribed to the arrangement. Thus  the BUS 
extended its credit while the state banks contracted theirs before the reckoning 
day of specie resumption. 
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Crawford approved the agreement, but he thought it important 
for a larger proportion of the state banks to be a party to 
resumption. He suggested more might be persuaded to this 
policy if the BUS allowed the state banks to retain existing 
deposits interest free until April 1. If this would result in 
harmonious action, the beneficial consequences would be cheap- 
ly ~ b t a i n e d . ~  No general policy was adopted in this regard, and 
the inexactness of the arrangement between the BUS and several 
of the state banks troubled Crawford. However, the action of the 
BUS and the eastern banks was generally "forcing" on the other 
state banks, and specie payment was resumed with "no in- 
convenience in any part of the ~ount ry ."~  
But the western banks held rather large sums of notes as 
special deposits to the credit of the government. The  con- 
vertibility of many of these notes was a matter of great uncer- 
tainty, and Crawford was anxious that new depositories for the 
public funds be designated as quickly as possible. The  charter 
of the BUS required that public money be deposited in the 
bank or its branches (except where there were urgent reasons 
for not doing so) in places where those offices existed. In  states 
where no branches existed, the treasury would determine the 
number of depositories and leave to the BUS the right of 
selection and arrangements for the transfer of funds. There was 
no obligation to transfer public funds from an area with no 
branch bank to a branch in another area, but the government 
desired that the BUS "should be immediately or mediately the 
sole depository of the public money in every part of the Union." 
As soon as the branches of the BUS were established, the treasury 
would transmit drafts in favor of the BUS on all banks in the 
western country which distinguished between special deposits 
and cash.8 
These banks of the interior, Crawford thought, might be en- 
titled to some special consideration. Pursuant to the agreement 
6Crawford to Jones, Feb. 7, 1817, AC5303, U.S. Finance (MDLC). Crawford 
emphasized that relieving the banks of interest for the six weeks after February 20 
would more than compensate them for any premium they might have paid for specie 
beyond what they would have paid independent of engagements with the treasury. 
7 Crawford to Gallatin, April 23, 1817, Adams, Gallatin Writings, 237.  See also 
Hammond, Banks and Banking, 246-50. 
8Crawford to Jones, Feb. 28, 1817, Etting; Crawford to Jones, March 17, 1817, 
Gratz. For relationships of the treasury, the BUS, and the state banks concerning 
special deposits see Catterall, Second Bank, 453-74, esp. 453-64. 
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of early February with the eastern state banks, the issue of bills 
and discounts made by the BUS had enabled those powerful banks 
to curtail their discounts without producing a pressure upon the 
community. In the interior this curtailment had not been so 
easily effected. While Crawford was an "enemy to the principle of 
scattering banks profusely over the whole surface of the interior," 
the treasury had "too deep an interest in their credit at this 
moment to be willing to see them sunk." Once again he suggested 
that the "country banks," especially with respect to special 
deposits, not be required to pay interest before April 1; in Ken- 
tucky and Ohio interest should not be insisted upon until the 
branch banks began operation in those states. Arrangements 
between the BUS and the state banks should be more specific 
than earlier ones; the places of intermediate deposit must con- 
tinue to make weekly returns to the treasury, and money deposited 
in them would be drawn out by treasury drafts in conformity 
with the terms agreed upon by those banks and the BUS. This 
was the procedure during the existence of the first BUS; if Jones 
thought some other mode preferable, his ideas would receive 
the "most respectful con~ideration."~ 
Without question Crawford wished the BUS to be the dom- 
inant force in banking and currency circles. He viewed the 
multiplication of state banks as a "great evil" and believed it 
to be in the interest of the BUS and the country to prevent 
the creation of more of those banks-and perhaps to put down 
many of those already existing. If the BUS would complete its 
arrangements with the banks of the interior of Pennsylvania and 
the western country, measures would be taken immediately to 
exclude the receipt of bills the BUS would not consider as cash. 
Crawford had not wished the BUS to assume responsibility for 
the mass of paper that had been collected in the interior; he 
had always calculated upon some loss when the final adjustments 
of those accounts were made and thought it unreasonable to 
throw any part of this loss on the BUS. However, he was 
anxious to be rid of the special deposits arising from the current 
receipts and wished to avoid employing more banks as places 
of intermediate deposit.1° 
9Crawford to Jones, March 17, 1817, Gratz; Crawford to Jones, March 23, 1817, 
Library Company of Philadelphia. 
10 Crawford to Jones, July 19, Aug. 1, 1817, William Jones Papers (HSP). For 
extensive materials relative to public deposits, see ASPF, 4:495-1077. 
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The BUS was soon in trouble; it expanded its business too 
rapidly and brought ruin to many state banks through demand 
payment of their notes; loans increased incredibly fast; fraud and 
speculation in bank stock were quite widespread; declining 
trade hurt; and neither Jones nor the board of directors seemed 
to understand the business and the function of the bank. Gov- 
ernment pressure to set the house in order contributed to the 
injury inflicted on the state banks, and the treasury's redemption 
in July 1817 of more than $1 3 million of the public stock in 
possession of the bank led to further extension of the discounts.ll 
Within a little more than a year after beginning operations 
the BUS was on the verge of bankruptcy. Crawford did not 
wish to place additional burdens on the bank, but he did not 
want that institution to shirk any of its legal responsibilities. 
In reply to Jones' letter of May 29, 1818, presenting difficulties 
and embarrassments of the bank, Crawford admitted the BUS 
could not legally be required to become responsible for public 
money when deposited in banks over which it had no control 
or to use state banks as places of deposit merely for the purpose 
of creating depositories of public money. But in states where 
there was no branch bank, it was required that a state bank be 
employed for "transacting the duty of commissioners of loans 
and of agent for the payment of pensions." For monies deposited 
in those banks the BUS was responsible "without any special 
assumption of that responsibility." And the BUS, on its own 
proposal, "incurred a complete responsibility for the money 
heretofore deposited in the state banks selected by it for that 
purpose." At the same time, money in those banks was subject 
to any disposition the bank thought proper. 
The  BUS, Crawford said, could terminate its liability for 
deposits in those banks by relinquishing control over the money. 
This the bank had suggested, but the proposal that money 
deposited in the state banks, as places of intermediate deposit, 
be transferred to the BUS or its nearest office was "liable to 
objection." In such a transfer the state bank would be paying 
11 For problems and difficulties of the BUS during Jones' presidency, see Catterall, 
Second Bank, 26-50. Crawford rejected the idea that the power of the BUS to sell 
the stock subscribed to it (section 5 of the charter) was intended to or could operate 
as a qualification or limitation of the right of the government to redeem that stock 
at its pleasure. Crawford to Jones, June 18, 1817, Etting. On other occasions 
Crawford thought Jones' interpretations of some of the articles of charter were 
"novel" and not "contemplated" by the people who helped to reestablish the bank. 
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over public money-a duty which in the first instance might 
have been exacted from the collector. Further, such a transfer 
would abridge the right of the government to tender to any of 
the bank offices the bills of the BUS (without reference to the 
place of issue) which had been received as payment for taxes and 
debts. The treasury was not prepared to accept "any proposition 
which by implication may affect the rights of the government 
in a point so essential" and noted that transactions between 
the treasury and the BUS must not be viewed as having a 
commercial character. 
He opposed a change in the relations between the BUS and 
the banks selected as depositories only because it destroyed the 
simplicity of the arrangement, which had not been in operation 
long enough to "develop its true character." However, he re- 
luctantly consented that the existing arrangement be terminated 
but emphasized that the bills of the BUS and its branches, 
regardless of place of issue, and other bills that the bank or its 
officers ordinarily received from individuals should be received 
when and where tendered by the treasury. Soon after, Crawford 
decided that all monies deposited in the selected banks after 
June 30 were not subject to drafts of the BUS. The  banks would 
be so informed, and money would be drawn from them by 
treasury drafts in favor of the BUS or of individuals having 
demands against the treasury.12 Obviously Crawford had decided 
to keep in the hands of the treasury all possible control of the 
public funds. 
Strenuous efforts to save the BUS began in July 1818; a con- 
traction policy was initiated, and on August 28 the offices of the 
BUS were forbidden to take any notes but their own-even on 
deposit.lVome improvement took place-or at least the rate of 
deterioration was slowed. Rumors of fraud and improper 
operations spread; the enemies of the BUS continued to increase, 
but Crawford was convinced that the bank must be kept in 
operation to fulfill its vital role in connection with the public 
revenue. He did not slack, however, in determination that the 
bank operate according to the provisions of the charter. In  the 
fall of 1818 the bank notified Crawford that it would sell about 
Incrawford to Jones, June 3, 1818, Gratz; Crawford to Jones, July 2, 1818, 
Crawford, MDLC. 
13 Catterall, Second Bank, 54. At the time this restriction was applicable only 
to private accounts. 
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$400,000 worth of government stock unless it was taken within 
fifteen days for the account of the United States. Crawford said 
that if the BUS sold the stock to individuals, the United States 
still had the right to redeem the stock on the same terms as if 
the stock had remained in possession of the bank. He did not 
wish to drain the treasury of $400,000, but he did agree to take 
the 3 percent certificates (about $90,000), the only part of the 
stock it seemed important for the public to retain.14 
Congressional opponents of the bank sought to destroy it, and 
both the House and the Senate in the fall of 1818 and early 
1819 collected information about its activities. Crawford was 
somewhat handicapped in meeting the demands of the House 
investigating committee, headed by John C. Spencer of New 
York (by no means a Crawford partisan), because Jones did not 
always supply him with information sufficiently precise to pass 
on. The  committee report of January 16, 1819, was harshly 
critical of the administration of the BUS, pointed to speculation 
by bank officials and to several violations of the charter, and 
urged that the abuses be corrected.15 Crawford said he had 
neither official nor unofficial knowledge of the "highly censur- 
able" actions of the BUS until the report was made. Fairly 
presented, these actions deserved the "severest animadversion," 
but he thought the Spencer report had presented them in a most 
unfair manner. Monroe "forced" the resignation of Jones, an 
action Crawford considered "indispensable, not only as a propi- 
tiary offering upon the altar of public opinion, but for the 
preservation of the bank itself."16 
Langdon Cheves, the new president, informed Cratvford of 
the critical situation of the bank, which was "badly prepared" to 
sustain specie payments and to reinvigorate itself for future 
14Adams, Memoirs, 4:139-40 (Oct. 19, 1818). In  1817 Crawford had "compelled" 
the bank-by giving notice of the treasury's intention to redeem it-to purchase $2 
million worth of stock to replace a like amount which it had sold. 
15 Crawford to Jones, Nov. 27, 1818, C. W. Conarroe Collection (HSP); Catterall, 
Second Bank, 58-60: ASPF, 3:306-15, 315-91 (documents); Niles' Weekly  Register 15 
(Jan. 23, 1819):402-13, 436-63, 465-75. 
16 Crawford to Cheves, April 6, 1819, Langdon Cheves Papers (South Carolina 
Historical Society): Crawford to Gallatin, July 24, 1819, Adams, Gallatin Writings, 
2:112-14. James G. Fisher, president pro tempore of the BUS, mentioned Crawford 
and Cheves as possible successors to Jones. He hoped harsh measures would not be 
taken because of the speculative actions revealed by the report and warned that 
the bank needed all the aid the government could give it. Fisher to Rufus King, 
Jan. 25, 1819, Charles R. King, ed., The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 
6 vols. (New York, 1894-1900), 6:198. Hereafter cited as King, King.  
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profitable and useful operations. He agreed with Crawford- 
whose public actions had "abundantly shown" his attitude-that 
at least the parent BUS should continue to meet the demands 
for gold and silver. But the bank had only about $720,000 in 
its vaults, little other specie under its control, and credit only 
with the Barings abroad. He asked several questions about the 
revenue, drafts, trade, and the debt, but said he sought only 
such information as Crawford was at liberty to confide.17 Craw- 
ford found Cheves' views deeply interesting to the government, 
noted that the bank must take the lead in correcting the derange- 
ment of the currency and the embarrassment of all the fiscal 
transactions of the government, questioned the expediency of 
the BUS continuing to import specie but indicated that naval 
vessels would help as much as possible in this matter, and said 
that not more than $3 million of the Louisiana debt would be 
redeemed ($2 million of which would be foreign-held). T o  help 
prevent exhausting the public funds in the Atlantic cities he 
had induced the secretary of war to spend a larger amount of 
the War Department funds in the western states than formerly. 
Crawford promised to help the bank in every way possible in 
support of specie payment.ls 
Cheves indicated it would be "utterly impossible" to support 
specie payment to June 1. Nor would it be possible, without a 
loan in Europe, to pay the $2 million of the Louisiana debt 
receivable by foreign stockholders. The  bank found itself under 
the necessity oE paying where appropriate funds had not ac- 
cumulated, and time was needed to get money to those places. 
The  problem was further complicated by a traffic in notes and 
bills which made them cash for all other purposes but at the 
same time kept them in reserve for the payment of public 
demands. The notes of the western and southern offices of the 
bank were running constantly to the East and North in payment 
of government dues, and capital was thus shifting to the West 
and South. This exchange could be controlled by the government 
declining to receive the branch notes in payment of dues except 
where the notes were made payable or by the BUS stopping 
the issue of western notes and greatly diminishing the issue of 
17 Cheves to Crawford, March 20, 1819, Monroe, NYP. This ten-page letter is 
marked private and confidential as are many others between these two individuals. 
18 Crawford to Cheves, March 27, 1819. Six pages of this letter are in the Monroe 
Papers, NYP; pages one and four are in the Cheves Papers. 
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southern notes. He asked the government to stop receiving 
branch notes in the eastern cities.lg 
This request triggered a lengthy discussion on section 14 of 
the charter, which stated "That the bills or notes of the said 
corporation originally made payable, or which shall become 
payable on demand, shall be receivable in all payments to the 
United States, unless otherwise directed by Congress." Crawford 
sent the letter from Cheves, and a copy of his reply, to Monroe, 
and in the covering letter he said there was no "necessary, much 
less legal relation between the limits within which the notes of 
one of the offices circulate, & the boundaries of a state." If the 
interpretation of the bank were accepted, the notes of the bank 
and its branches circulating in a state where there was no branch 
would not be receivable for government dues. He  thought 
specie payment would be suspended before the end of the 
summer and wondered what course could be adopted during 
the recess of Congress to preserve the public faith. I t  was more 
important to know whether the bills of the BUS could be 
refused in payment to the government because they are not 
payable at the place where they are tendered. He asked the 
attorney general for an opinion, sought the President's views, 
and believed that Calhoun might be able to give the ideas that 
prevailed at the time Congress chartered the BUS.20 
In the reply to Cheves-a well-reasoned twelve-page com- 
munication-Crawford said no difficulty would result from 
permitting time for the transfer of funds to meet the payment 
of treasury drafts, since decision on this matter rested entirely 
in his department, but he doubted that the BUS-in spite of all 
the exertions-would be able to continue specie payment through- 
out the year. The  safety of the bank could be effected only by 
withdrawing nearly all its paper from circulation, and he believed 
this action would compel all other solvent banks to do the same. 
Gold and silver would then be introduced and banking institu- 
tions could gradually resume their accustomed operations. Dur- 
ing this process the community in all its operations would be 
"greatly distressed," but it was highly desirable that some good 
19 Cheves to Crawford, April 2, 1819, Monroe, NYP. For further information on 
Cheves' administration of the bank see Catterall, Second Bank, 68-92. The loan in 
Europe was negotiated, and Cheves did curtail the notes of the southern and western 
branches. 
20 Crawford to Monroe, April 7, 1819, Monroe, MDLC. 
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come from the suffering which had already been experienced. 
Crawford saw no middle course and felt that palliatives might 
prolong the existing embarrassments and aggravate the existing 
evils by exciting the hopes and fears of the community-but they 
could not influence the final result. 
He would not consider the legality of government receipt of 
bills of the bank and its branches at any place other than where 
they were payable; rather he would examine the consequences 
of the adoption of such a measure. Much clamor against the 
BUS and the government would be raised, receipts would be 
insufficient to meet current expenses, the vital interests of the 
nation would be sacrificed, and complete fiscal derangement 
would result. The  BUS would gain nothing but a little time 
for transporting specie from one place to another, and the 
measure would have the effect of confining the circulation of 
the paper of the bank and its offices to the districts in which 
it is issued-much as that of the state institutions. Pressure on 
particular offices would be reduced while that on others would 
be increased. The  measure would be "simply palliative" and 
furnished nothing like a "radical remedy." Probably the treasury 
would be obliged to receive the bills of the bank and its offices 
without regard to the place where they were payable.21 
Another long letter went to Cheves on April 9. Crawford noted 
that Horace Binney's opinion that the bills of the bank and its 
branches were everywhere receivable corresponded in every 
respect with his own, and he proceeded to bolster with additional 
arguments the position he had taken in his earlier letter. Cheves, 
he felt, had connected too closely the obligation of the govern- 
ment to receive with its obligation to deposit the public money 
where received in the bank and its offices. The  obligation to 
receive depends in no degree upon the proximity of the bank 
or its offices to the place of receipt. The  sites of the bank and 
its offices are "mathematical points," but there is no connection 
between the bank and its offices and the limit of the state in 
which they are located. The  limit of the circulation of their 
paper is determined by the "commercial intercourse between the 
place of its establishment and the surrounding country, not by 
state boundaries." If the bills of the banks are considered as 
21 Crawford to Cheves, April 6, 1819, Cheves. See also Crawford to Cheves, n.d. 
(fragment), Library Company of Philadelphia. 
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current money-and section 14 of the charter binds the govern- 
- 
ment to this view-the proposal that the bank notes are receivable 
only where payable is untenable. "Current money must be 
current co-extensively as to place, with the authority which 
makes it current." He contended in this particular case that it 
may be "current beyond the jurisdiction of the law," and that 
a contract with the stipulation that the bills should not be 
received would be void, for it would be a contract against law. 
Crawford had not received the opinion of the attorney 
general, but even if Wirt thought it correct, he doubted whether 
he would feel authorized to adopt the rule Cheves believed 
necessary to the security of the bank.22 He felt sure, however, 
that the action of the board of directors would be dictated by 
honorable motives, and the Treasury Department would not 
oppose it unless "imperious interest" required it. Expediency 
of the measure, said Crawford, and not its legality should be 
the principal concern of the directors. He reiterated his con- 
viction that continuance of specie payment required the amount 
of notes in circulation be reduced to the amount of specie held 
by the bank.23 The  BUS, however, decided to adopt the pro- 
posed rule, and when its bills and those of its branches were 
tendered at places other than where payable they were termed 
special deposits until the BUS could transfer the specie from 
the issuing to the receiving office. 
The  financial position of the government seemed to become 
more difficult with each passing day, but Crawford never wavered 
in his desire to protect the interests of the bank and the govern- 
ment-as a matter of fact he seemed to feel they were inseparable. 
In writing and in person he suggested exempting the Washington 
office of the bank, insofar as it was the agent of the treasury, 
22 Binney, a director of the first BUS, was one of the finest legal minds of the 
first half of the nineteenth century. Wirt, maintaining his duty was to "construe" 
not to "make" the law, agreed with Binney and Crawford. Wirt to Secretary of 
Treasury, April 15, 1819, House Doc., No. 123 (serial 387), 26th Cong., 2d sess., 195. 
Diplomat, famous constitutional lawyer, and former attorney general of the United 
States William Pinkney, whose opinion Crawford also requested, held the same 
view. Adams, Memoirs, 4:344-45 (April 20, 1819). 
23 Crawford to Cheves, April 9, 1819, Cheves. Crawford emphasized to Gallatin 
that great distress had been caused by the export of specie to the East Indies and 
China and that the redemption of $5 million of the Louisiana debt (four fifths of 
which was held by foreigners) the preceding October 21 had contributed to the 
distress. Crawford to Gallatin, April 24, 1819, Gallatin: Crawford to Gallatin, April 
26, 1819, Adams, Gallatin Writings, 2:98. Samuel Smith, Baltimore merchant and 
senator from Maryland, was one of the largest exporters of specie to the Far East. 
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from the general rules prescribed for the conduct of the offices. 
The new rule on payment of notes might produce more em- 
barrassment than utility to the bank; the treasury, however, 
would try to "get along with it and give it a fair trial," for if it 
is "essential to the safety of the bank the public interest is 
intimately connected with it." Crawford could not see that 
the Washington bank would suffer by being permitted to issue 
its bills ad libitum in discharge of the checks of the treasury 
and could not understand how the BUS gained by the restriction 
on the Washington branch.24 
Crawford was criticized for permitting the bank regulation 
regarding receipt of its bills in violation of the charter, and 
opposition to the BUS was heightened by the revelation of 
fraud and mismanagement in some of the branches. Crawford 
was well aware that section 14 of the charter was not being 
honored, but strict legality could be temporarily abandoned to 
prevent the return of the earlier economic chaos.25 
Cheves wished Congress to sanction the April ruling of the 
BUS board by changing section 14 so that bank bills would be 
receivable by the government only where they were payable- 
except in states or territories where no office existed. Crawford 
maintained such a change would destroy the bank notes as bills 
of exchange by making their circulation local, but it would 
secure to the western states a sound local currency. It  would 
relieve the bank of certain expenses of transferring the public 
money and provide a better control over the bank officers and 
the issue of notes. Also it would enable the BUS to do more 
business and to circulate more notes on the same amount of 
specie-especially expanding their business in the cities of the 
middle and eastern states. On the other hand, the mercantile 
class would have to bear the burden of exchange, and travelers 
would have to carry specie or be shaved by the brokers in every 
state through which their pleasure or business carried them. He 
thought the first was not an evil, but the second objection was a 
serious one.26 
24 Crawford to Cheves, May 17, 1819, Etting; Crawford to Cheves, May 24, June 
11, 1819, Cheves. 
25 For a representative, if not typical, criticism see hriles' W e e k l y  Register 16 
(Aug. 21, 1819):416-18. On several other occasions Crawford disapproved or took 
exception to bank actions or proposed actions. See, for example, Crawford to 
Cheves, Aug. 31, 1819, Etting: Cheves Papers, passim. 
26 Crawford to James Barbour, Sept. 18, 1819, Barbour. 
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By the spring of 1820 several members of Congress were con- 
vinced that the requested charter change was necessary to the 
well-being of the bank but injurious to the government. With 
the suggested exemption of the bills of the parent bank and of 
the Washington branch Crawford thought there would be no 
objection to the measure-if it were not for the radical opposition 
in Congress to the institution. The entire Virginia delegation 
opposed the bank and the western members seized every op- 
portunity to attack it. Crawford analyzed the opinion in other 
parts of the country and concluded it would be imprudent to 
bring any proposition having as its object the interest or ad- 
vantage of the bank before the present session of Congress. 
However, something might be done at the next sessi0n.~7 
The  treasury remained in dire straits in 1820 and continued 
to borrow. Cheves, believing he had a solution to the govern- 
ment's problems, presented to Crawford a proposal for "deficit" 
financing: the government should permit the purchasers of 
public lands to pay their obligations in installments, with the 
first payments coming due on January 1, 1822. Each annual 
payment, he said, should include interest and would amount to 
10 percent of the original debt; sixteen payments would be 
necessary. The  government should meet its needs by borrowing 
against this fund and with the proceeds from it cancel the debt 
created by the loan. He thought the plan feasible, and in his 
"poor opinion, you could not adopt a measure which would 
more truly promote the best interests of the Country or make 
you more friends." The  plan, Cheves said, would in effect 
create no debt, taxes would not be necessary, the payment of a 
doubtful debt (for the land purchases) would be secured, the 
western country would be relieved, aid in restoring a sound 
currency to the western states would be provided, the law 
requiring cash for future land purchases would be sustained, 
the government would make a profit because it would get a 
premium on a loan which would bear the same rate of interest 
which the debtors would pay, dilapidating retrenchments would 
be avoided in the military and naval establishments, and the 
"elevated tone of feeling" (among the country's most valuable 
possessions) would be promoted.28 While there is a faint 
27 Crawford to Cheves, April 11, 1820, Cheves. 
28 Cheves to Crawford, Oct. 16, 1820, Monroe, MDLC. The "plan," which was 
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similarity between the plan and the relief act of 1821, the latter 
made no connection between land payments and government 
borrowing. And Cheves was much too sanguine about the collec- 
tion of money owed by land purchasers. 
Crawford and Cheves corresponded on many other matters 
of mutual interest, including the government directors of the 
BUS, possible stock conversions, the dividend which the bank 
paid to the government, and bank loans to the government 
during the period of its financial distress.29 The  BUS provided 
all the government loans authorized by Congress, and though 
objected to by some this policy did not result in a "holy alliance" 
between treasury and bank. 
Crawford and Cheves worked closely together,30 and their 
cooperation seems to have been beneficial in the long run to 
both bank and government. Cheves' contraction policy (which 
had been begun by Jones and which Crawford repeatedly ad- 
vocated) produced some hardship and ill will, but it placed the 
bank on a sound footing and helped to achieve a currency of 
some stability. The  ruling of the bank board on section 14 caused 
temporary inconvenience to the government; its ultimate effect 
was beneficial. By the time of Cheves' resignation the BUS was 
administratively and financially sound, and the government was 
no longer bedeviled by scarcity of revenue. The  routines of 
reporting, transfer, payment, and all other functions of the BUS 
as a "government agency" were well e~ tab l i shed .~~ The  relation- 
ship between Crawford and the new BUS president, Nicholas 
Biddle, was strictly a business one and contrasted sharply with 
that between Crawford and Cheves. 
originally enclosed with the letter, is in the Golding Collection. T h e  fact that 
several of the letters from Cheves to Crawford are in the Monroe papers seems to 
indicate close consultation between Crawford and Monroe on bank matters. 
29 See, for example, Crawford to Cheves, April 20, 24, 1819; April 13, 25, Nov. 7, 
17, 1820; March 12, 23, June 8, Dec. 12, 1821; Jan. 2, 1822, Cheves; Crawford to 
Cheves, June 21, 1820, Crawford, MDLC. On several occasions Crawford thought 
the government interest was adversely affected by the composition of the boards of 
some of the branch banks. 
30 Cheves' confidential revelation that he  would resign in late 1822 was followed 
by Crawford's suggestion that Gallatin consider the presidency of the BUS: Gallatin 
was not interested. Cheves' intention to resign was made public in  Niles' Weekly  
Register 22 (July 1, 1822):291. 
31 Crawford asked Cheves to correct some inaccuracies in materials that Cheves 
planned to submit to the stockholders a t  the time of his resignation. This 
"Exposition," or account of Cheves' presidency, is in Niles' Weekly  Register 23 
(Oct. 12, 1822):89-96. It was also published as a pamphlet by William Fry of 
Philadelphia in 1822. 
I42 T H E  SECOND BANK 
The adequacy of the legal tender in circulation was a subject 
of much discussion in this period, and the directors of the bank 
in 1818 requested the charter be changed so that notes other 
than those signed by the president and cashier could be issued. 
Crawford agreed, but he felt that all the larger bills should be 
signed by the authorized officials and opposed the issuing of 
bills by the cashier and president of the branches.32 Had the 
privilege been granted and the branch banks been refused the 
right to issue and overissue notes, the flow of specie to the West 
and South might have been prevented and a uniform national 
currency established. However, certain other early practices of 
the bank might well have prevented such a desirable develop- 
ment. 
The  investigation of the bank in early 1819 was followed by 
a House resolution of March 1 calling on the secretary of treasury 
to report, among other things, on the amount of capital, notes, 
and deposits, and requesting that he also report "such measures 
as in his opinion may be expedient to procure and retain a 
sufficient quantity of gold and silver coin in the United States, 
or to supply a circulating medium in place of specie, adapted 
to the exigencies of the country, and within the power of the 
G ~ v e r n m e n t . " ~ ~  In response to this resolution Crawford's so- 
called Currency Report was sent to the speaker of the House on 
February 12, 1 820.34 
32 Crawford to Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance, April 7, 1818, Senate 
Doc., No. 182 (serial 3), 15th Cong., 1st sess., 3-7. This privilege, several times 
requested, was never granted. Catterall, Second Bank, 116. 
33 Annals, 15th Cong., 2d sess., 1426. Adams thought the resolution had an 
"insidious aspect"; it was introduced by John C. Spencer, "shrewd and warm 
partisan" of DeWitt Clinton, who hoped to ensnare Crawford into disclosing some 
doctrine that would affect his popularity. But he thought the report showed 
awareness of the design, for it avoided commitment on every important aspect of 
the subject. The only merit Adams found in the report was its discouragement of 
paper money. Crawford expressed awareness of the political nature of the resolu- 
tion. Adams, Memoirs, 4:396 (June 24, 1819); 5:36-37 (March 25, 1820); Crawford 
to James Barbour, Sept. 18, 1819, Barbour. 
34 The original manuscript is in Series E, Vol. 6, pp. 253-305; printed "official" 
versions are in House Doc., No. 86 (serial 36), 16th Cong., 1st sess. and ASPF, 
3:494-508. It  may be more conveniently consulted in Niles' Weekly Register 18 
(March 11, 18, 25, 1820):34-40, 41-45, 70-79, and citations below are to this source. 
It  may also be found in the National Intelligencer, March 4, 7, 1820. Several news- 
papers commented on the report, and some pamphlets appeared. On this and 
related matters, see Murray N. Rothbard, T h e  Panic of 1819: Reactions and Policies 
(New York, 1962), esp. 112-35. An interesting undated document headed "Honble/ 
Henry Clay/Mr Laws System/& observations/WHC" is in the Golding Collection. 
Seven pages are devoted to the management mechanism ("metropolitan board" of 
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The report gave the condition of the BUS and its offices as 
of September 30, 1819, the amount of bank capital authorized 
by law for various years, the active bank capital of the United 
States (estimated at not more than $75 million), the conditions 
of the state banks from which returns had been received, a 
comparison of the amount of circulating bank notes and bank 
capital, and Crawford's analyses, opinions, and recommenda- 
tions. He set the amount of specie in the hands of the state 
banks at $12,250,000, with an additional $3,250,000 in the BUS. 
In circulation he thought there was not more than $4,500,000, 
bringing the whole "metallurgic" currency to $20,000,000. Notes 
in circulation were estimated at $40,000,000, making a total 
circulating medium of about $45,000,000-down from $1 10,000,- 
000 in 1815.35 
This great decrease in the currency had produced much 
distress, checked the ardor of enterprise, and seriously affected the 
productive energies of the nation. However, Crawford thought 
there must be further reduction before the currency became 
sound, and the nation would "continue to suffer until this is 
effected."" He described the exhilarating economic effects of 
credit and paper money in a period of prosperity and noted the 
inevitability of contraction in a time of adversity. If the public's 
confidence in the ability to redeem declined, there was an im- 
mediate demand for specie. If this demand was not promptly 
met, a depreciation would result. In the "circle" of specie and 
paper money thus established, Crawford said a "just proportion" 
between the paper circulation and the specie necessary to support 
it could be obtained only by reducing the amount of paper. 
Crawford believed that if the existence of banks depended 
upon the authority which regulated the currency, it might be 
"practicable to impose salutary checks upon excessive issues of 
five to seven members) of controlling and introducing small coins and $20 million 
of United States paper currency into the circulating medium. T h e  paper would 
provide a substitute for specie and deprive the BUS of every excuse for not 
"meeting" their notes with specie or government notes. T h e  proposal contains 
some elements of the National Banking System and some of the Federal Reserve 
System. There are nine pages of observations on the proposal. T h e  paper might 
well be Crawford's version of some of the proposals of Thomas Law, advocate of 
a national inconvertible paper money. For information on Law see Rothbard, Panic 
of 1819, 114-20. 
35 Niles' Weekly Register 18:34-36, 77-78. Considerable attention was given to the 
relationship of bank capital and bank notes. 
313 Ibid.. 36-37. 
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paper during suspension: and in some degree to guard against 
an excessive issue of the currency." Such was not the case in the 
United States, and he found it impossible to imagine a currency 
"more vicious than that which depends upon the will of nearly 
four hundred banks, entirely independent of each other, when 
released from all restraint against excessive issue."37 These banks, 
through the credit system, have produced a "fictitious state of 
things, extremely adverse to the sober, frugal, and industrious 
habits, which ought to be cherished in a republic." The  govern- 
ment was not without fault, for it had contributed to extrav- 
agance, idleness, and the spirit of gambling adventure through 
its credit system of land purchase. 
The  secretary discussed several reasons far the inadequate 
supply of gold and silver in the United States, offered some mild 
criticisms of Congress, and thought it important that the mint 
ratio of silver and gold be changed from 15 to 1 to 15.75 to 1- 
the approximate market ratio. This would cause the importa- 
tion and retention of gold but would not cause silver to be 
exported unless the state of the foreign trade warranted it. In 
addition, the copper coinage of the country could definitely be 
improved. Copper alone was too massive; coins of copper and 
silver from one- to ten-cent denominations would be "much 
more suitable." Change, or the fractional parts of the dollar, he 
considered "so indispensable to the community, that its ap- 
plicability to manufactures, and its exemption to exportation, 
instead of forming objections, are recommendations in its 
Crawford did not take kindly to the idea of issuing $5 million 
in treasury notes to relieve the distress: if these were receivable 
by the government, the revenue would be paid in them and the 
37 Ibid., 38-40. 
38 Ibid., 41-43. Apparently Crawford's coins were similar to the "billion pieces" 
or silver-center cents of France, which had caught Alexander Hamilton's fancy, and 
he clearly intended the pieces to be fiduciary. His proposals, says Carothers, repre- 
sented both sound principles and antiquated theory. Neil Carothers, Fractional 
Money: A History of the Small Coins and Fractional Paper Currency of the 
United States (New York, 1930), 65-66, 85-86; A. Barton Hepburn, History of 
Coinage and Currency in the United States and the Perennial Contest for Sound 
Money (New York, 1903), 29. The mint, operating under the nominal supervision 
of Crawford, did not produce a sufficient number of gold, silver, and copper coins 
to meet the demand. See Senate Doc., Nos. 67, 68 (serial 15), 15th Cong., 2d sess. 
A statement of the director of the mint accompanied the secretary's annual report 
to Congress. 
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United States would not have the specie to meet its obligations 
on the public debt. If section 14 of the charter were changed 
so that the notes of the BUS and its branches were receivable 
only at the point of issue, a small amount of treasury notes might 
be issued without depreciation. They would be used-and in 
constant demand-for the transmission of money. If they were 
redeemable at the treasury for specie, the amount put in circula- 
tion would probably exceed the sum demanded for the facile 
transmission of money; if not receivable, but redeemable at a 
fixed period, they would immediately depreciate unless they bore 
6 percent interest. Unless advanced as a loan, they would afford 
no substantial relief where the distress was greatest. He could 
justify the issue of treasury notes as a financial resource only where 
the deficiency they were intended to overcome was small and 
temporary. However, issue under the existing circumstances 
"would tend to increase this unnatural and forced state of things, 
and give it a duration which it would otherwise never obtain."39 
The last "member" of the resolution, said Crawford, assumes 
by implication the practicability of substituting a paper currency 
for that which now exists. Paper currency, whether issued by the 
governments, employed as a financial resource, or made the 
instrument of cupidity, had been a failure, and no one had 
attempted to determine the principles upon which a stable 
paper currency must be founded. He explored these and said 
to ensure the possibility of such a currency being used to 
advantage it was necessary that the power of the government 
over the currency be absolutely sovereign; the stability of the 
government be above suspicion; its justice, morality, and in- 
telligence be unquestioned; the issue of the currency be made 
not only to depend upon the demand for it but that an equivalent 
be actually received; an equivalent could be found only in the 
delivery of an equal amount of gold, silver, or public stock; and 
whenever from any cause the currency might become redundant, 
it might be funded at an interest rate a fraction below that 
surrendered at its issue. 
In discussing these points Crawford restated some of the 
positions he had taken in his correspondence with Cheves, and 
above all he made it clear that he believed in a national currency 
39 Niles' Weekly  Register 18:43-44. 
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of gold and silver over which he thought the government had 
absolute power. He was not certain that the Constitution gave 
the central government the power to create a national incon- 
vertible paper currency. Some, but not many, treasury notes 
might be beneficial. The  full cooperation of the central and state 
governments was essential to the success of any paper currency; 
such a currency should be put into circulation only upon receipt 
of "articles in exchange of equal value," and an uncontrolled, 
unregulated paper currency, issuing from many banks, was to be 
avoided at all costs. The  large amount of this nonredeemable 
currency that had been in circulation had deeply wounded the 
worthy characteristics of good republicans, and the body 
economic must suffer to recovery by continued withdrawal of 
the inflationary opiate. T h e  report contains several assertions, 
assumptions, and allegations used by bullionists and non- 
bullionists seventy-five years later, but Crawford was reasonably 
noncommittal except in his opposition to unsupported and 
unlimited paper money.40 
The  following year a select committee indicated general 
agreement with the report and pointed out that a gold coinage 
of approximately $6 million had practically disappeared from 
use-the difference between the market and the mint ratios being 
about sixty cents for every fifteen dollars. But no action was 
taken. Nor was there acceptance of the baser coinage proposal. 
Almost annually Congress passed laws to permit the continued 
circulation of foreign coins, the mint ratio of gold and silver 
was not changed until 1834, subsidiary coinage was not estab- 
lished until 1853, and the copper-nickel cent was not created 
until 1857, when all foreign coins were withdrawn as legal 
tender.41 
The  currency report was made in answer to a special resolu- 
tion of the House. More central to the duty of the secretary 
of treasury was the annual report on expenditures and receipts 
of the government. 
40 Ibid., 71-76. For some other materials of the time on the currency see Crawford 
to John W. Eppes, Dec. 29, 1818: Report of Senate Committee on Finance, Senate 
Doc., No. 68 (serial 15), 15th Cong., 2d sess.; Crawford to Speaker of the House, 
Dec. 1, 1820, House Doc., No. 9 (serial 48), 16th Cong., 2d sess. 
41  Hepburn, Coinage, 26, 27, 30: Carothers, Fractional Money, 83. Carothers, 84, 
believes that at any time from 1792 to 1834 the application of the subsidiary coin- 
age principle to quarters, dimes, and half-dimes would have revolutionized the 
currency situation. 
The Treasury Secretary 
and the Budget 
ANNUALLY THE secretary of treasury reported directly to Congress 
on the receipts and expenditures of the government and on 
the estimated income and expenses for the coming year, making 
such remarks as he saw fit on the tax structure, the economic 
conditions of the country, government proposals for reducing or 
increasing the revenue, and such other matters as he deemed 
pertinent. In  preparation for the report, the register of the 
treasury gathered projected expenditures and other materials 
for the secretary, who then furnished a brief statement for the 
President's annual message. Soon thereafter the treasury report 
(without general cabinet consideration) was sent to Congress. 
The secretary had virtually no control over expenditures, and in 
the early years only Albert Gallatin (with Jefferson's help) 
seemed able to bring any effective reductions in the estimates 
and to achieve considerable support for a balanced budget. The  
situation was to change little during Monroe's presidency, 
except that after 1820-1 82 1 the annual report received cabinet 
scrutiny prior to submittal to C0ngress.l 
During most of Crawford's tenure the budget consisted of two 
parts, the so-called permanent and temporary allocations. The  
former included the sinking fund for the retirement of the 
debt, money for the gradual increase of the navy, and appropria- 
tions for the militia and Indian annuities. T h e  temporary 
portion can be conveniently grouped into three main categories: 
civil list, miscellaneous, and foreign intercourse; military de- 
partment, including the Indian department and military pensions; 
and navy, including the Marine Corps. The  military department 
received approximately twice the amount of the other two com- 
bined, and after 1817 the sinking fund of $10,000,000 annually 
was the major item in the permanent appropriations. But the 
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decreasing revenue and the depression called for retrenchment 
which seriously affected the sinking fund and brought a decrease 
in military expenditures and an increase in political conf l i~ t .~  
At the time Crawford assumed the secretaryship of treasury 
the government was embarrassed by its surplus revenue. The  
public debt of about $75,000,000 in 1791 had been reduced 
to approximately $65,000,000 in 1812, in spite of the $15,000,000 
obligation for the Louisiana Purchase. The  War of 1812 had 
boosted the funded debt to a little less than $116,000,000 by 
1816. Revenue for the preceding year had been just under 
$50,000,000 and expenditures $38,000,000. But approximately 
three fourths of the income was derived from customs duties and 
thus subject to drastic fluctuations; proceeds from that source 
decreased from $36,000,000 in 1815 to $17,000,000 in 1817 but 
rose to nearly $20,000,000 in 18 18. Government expenditures 
were running about $20,000,000 per year. 
Crawford's first report of December 20, 1816, noted that the 
treasury was affluent; income had been almost $39,000,000 in 
the first three quarters of the year and the estimated total was 
$46,900,000. The  secretary pointed out the difficulty of making 
any reliable estimate of income with customs as the major 
source, but using the average of several years and assuming 
expenditures of $24,000,000 per year he predicted an annual 
excess of $8,400,000 for 1818, 1819, and 1820. He estimated 
temporary expenditures at $12,750,000 but reduced these by 
$300,000 in a message to the House early the next month.3 
The  President's message and the secretary's report stressed the 
need to restore a uniform circulating medium4 and to have 
available additional funds for the retirement of the national 
debt. Congress, by the act of March 3, 1817, authorized the 
secretary to add $9,000,000 to the sinking fund, and-if it was 
1 White, Jeflersonians, 68-69, 141-46. See also Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The Spend- 
ing Power: A History of the Eforts of Congress to Control Expenditures (New 
Haven, Conn., 1943). 
2 This, of course, is a great simplification of the report, which contained detailed 
information of all types of income, the public debt, and financial and economic 
conditions. 
3 ASPF, 3:140-44; Crawford to Speaker of the House, Jan. 4, 1817, ibid., 148. The 
reduction was all from the military estimates. The report of the secretary was 
always accompanied by several statistical documents, the most important of which 
was from the register of the treasury. Page references for those are not included in 
the citations. All figures in this chapter are to the nearest thousand. 
4 Resumption of specie payment and efforts to establish a uniform currency are 
discussed in the preceding chapter. 
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thought expedient-to add another $4,000,000 which would be 
considered an advance on the 1818 payment. And after 1817, 
whenever at any time after the adjournment of Congress there 
was a surplus of more than $2,000,000 above the sums ap- 
propriated, all above the $2,000,000 should go into the sinking 
fund. The  commissioners of the fund were authorized-if the 
President approved-to apply any surplus beyond the amount 
of interest and principal that was actually due and payable to 
purchase of the debt.5 
Few believed that the happy financial situation of 1816-1817 
was permanent, but it was considered unwise to add to the 
large surplus. With the defeat of the Bonus Bill (which com- 
mitted to internal improvements the money paid to the govern- 
ment by the BUS for its privileges) at the end of Madison's 
term and Monroe's known scruples against the use of central 
government funds for internal improvement purposes, with the 
army and the navy already spending nearly half the total 
government outlay, there seemed no solution to the over- 
abundance of funds other than the reduction of taxes. Con- 
gressional sentiment favored the repeal of the internal taxes in 
March 1817, but legislation for this purpose was initiated so 
late in the session that congressmen decided to postpone the 
measure until the fall. Then, too, Crawford thought the great 
number of new members at the next session might vote money 
with a "lavish hand" and greatly diminish the source of revenue. 
Only the strong hand of the President could prevent this action, 
he said.6 
During Monroe's administration the secretary of treasury did 
not operate as independently of the President as many writers 
have indicated. As a matter of fact, Monroe kept a rather tight 
rein on all his department heads-no mean feat when one con- 
siders the caliber of his cabinet. The secretary did not work in 
6 Annually, $10,000,000 from revenue from imports and tonnage duties, internal 
duties, and western lands were to go to the fund. T h e  secretary of treasury was 
given some discretion as to the date of payment so long as it was made in time to 
meet obligations. Ceilings were set on the prices that could be paid when the 
various stocks were purchased with the surplus, and the commissioners should 
prescribe the manner of cancellation or destruction of the purchased stock. 3 Stat. 
379-80. 
6 Crawford to Gallatin, March 17, 1817, Adams, Gallatin Writings, 2:23-29, esp. 
27-28. The  Compensation Act of 1816, substituting salaries for the per diem 
allowances of representatives and senators, had brought defeat in the fall of that 
year to many members of the Congress passing the act. 
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splendid isolation on his report and in preparing a statement for 
the President's message. For example, in October 18 17 Crawford 
detailed for Monroe the favorable condition of the revenue and 
treasury and noted that unless there were greatly increased 
demands by the War and Navy departments or for expenditures 
for a system of internal improvements, revenue would exceed 
the demands of the government. If the increased demands did 
not materialize, how should the revenue be reduced? Should the 
system of internal revenue be retained and the reduction effected 
in the customs? Should both systems be reduced and retained? 
Internal taxes, he observed, were already as low as was reasonable 
in relation to expenses of collection. If reduced-and the 
expenses of collection could not be-the impression might be 
created that such taxes were kept for the sake of patronage and 
not for revenue purposes. Crawford firmly believed these taxes 
must be wholly retained or abolished completely. When the 
President returned to Washington, Crawford hoped to be able 
to furnish him the facts necessary to a "correct decision of this 
delicate q~es t ion ."~  
 onr roe endorsed Crawford's recommendation that the internal 
taxes be abolished. The treasury report was made on December 
5, the House Committee on Ways and Means reacted favorably, 
and the measure repealing the act of March 3, 1815, became 
law on December 23, 1817. The  taxes were discontinued on 
December 31, 1817.8 The  internal revenue "establishment" did 
not immediately disappear; it exhibited the usual government 
tendency to creeping demise. Crawford took action in early 1819 
to speed final  settlement^,^ and a year later the office of com- 
missioner of the revenue was abolished and the duties were 
transferred to one of the auditors. 
Before the ending of the internal duties the House had re- 
quested Crawford's opinion on the expediency of repealing the 
7 Crawford to Monroe, Oct. 11, 1817, Monroe, MDLC. 
8 Monroe to Madison, Nov. 24, 1817, Hamilton, Monroe Writings, 6:33: 3 Stat. 
401-3. T h e  treasury had more than $11,000,000 at  the beginning of 1817, and with 
an  estimated expenditure for 1818 of $38,370,000 (including $10,000,000 on the 
debt) a balance of $8,500,000 was anticipated for Jan. 1, 1819. ASPF, 3:220-23. 
9 Joseph Anderson to Crawford, Jan. 19, 1819, Excise Letters, No. 5; Crawford to 
Samuel Smith, Jan. 21, 1819, Series E, Vol. 6. Internal duties, exclusive of the 
direct tax, brought in more than $17,000,000 from January 1, 1814, to December 
31, 1817, but the cost of collection was more than 5 percent greater than the cost 
of collecting import duties. 
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law laying a duty on imported salt, granting a bounty on exported 
pickled fish, and giving allowances to certain vessels employed 
in the fisheries. Crawford did not reply until after the internal 
duties were abolished; he then pointed out that for the three 
preceding years the duty on salt had amounted annually to 
slightly more than $900,000 and the bounty and allowances a 
little less than $100,000. Repeal of the internal taxes would 
reduce the revenue Eor 1818 from the estimated $24,500,000 to 
just over $22,000,000, or within $78,000 of the estimated expenses. 
If the salt duty were eliminated, there would be a deficit of more 
than $700,000, until the proceeds of the sale of lands in Missis- 
sippi and Alabama became available. He thought a "reduction 
of the balance in the Treasury, so as to prevent its application 
to this object [retiring the debt], ought to be carefully guarded 
against."1° 
While Crawford wrestled with the bank and currency prob- 
. - 
lems, a decline in revenue soon relieved the government of its 
burdensome surplus. The $26,000,000 income for 18 18 was 
slightly less than payments from the treasury; while this pre- 
sented no problems for that year, Crawford thought it might be 
necessary to resort to temporary loans or the issue of treasury 
notes in 1819 rather than impose new taxes. Loans, it appeared, 
would not be required for the year f ~ l l o w i n g . ~ ~  By then, how- 
ever, the full force of the panic was felt. 
In his report of December 10, 1819, Crawford gave the receipts 
and expenditures for several preceding years and estimated the 
10 Crawford to William Lowndes, Jan. 5, 1818, House Doc., No. 13 (serial lo), 
15th Cong., 1st sess.; ASPF, 3:260-61. T h e  estimates for 1818 expenditures had been 
submitted to the House on December 17, 1817. Congress appropriated $5,083,000 
for the military establishment and $2,509,000 for the navy, not including the 
annual $1,000,000 for the gradual increase of that arm. 3 Stat.  407-8, 463, 411. 
l l T h e  treasury report was made in late November 1818. ASPF, 3:273-75. 
Estimated income was a little more than $24,000,000 and probable demands about 
$25,500,000. Income actually was $21,435,000. Ibid., 548. T h e  military establishment 
appropriation for 1819 rose to $6,850,000, including more than $2,000,000 for 
pensions and half pensions-making the nonpension money available about the 
same as that of the year before. T h e  navy was voted $2,835,000. 3 Stat.  480-81, 
483-84, 540. T h e  department heads were well aware in the spring of 1819 of the 
economic distress which was at  that time confined chiefly to the South and West. 
Because of the nature of the system of revenue (the posting of bonds for future 
payment) government receipts had not been sensibly affected: upward or down- 
ward trends in the economy were reflected about six months later by the treasury 
receipts. See Adams' report of conversation with Crawford, Memoirs, 4:375 (May 
27, 1819), and periodic reports of treasury receipts which accompanied the annual 
reports of the secretary. 
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receipts of 1820 applicable to ordinary and current demands at 
just more than $22,000,000. T h e  1820 expense estimates were 
not yet complete, but those that had been received indicated 
not less than $27,000,000 would be required. T h e  deficit of 
$5,000,000 could not be supplied by ordinary sources. After legal 
obligations were discharged, there would be about $2,500,000 in 
the sinking fund which could not be used if the price of public 
stocks remained above the price at which the commissioners were 
authorized to purchase. During 1821, 1822, and 1823 an average 
of $5,000,000 would be in the fund if the existing price of the 
stocks continued. If legal, the use of this money would postpone 
the imposition of additional burdens to meet the public ex- 
penditures, but such use "would have the effect of ultimately 
retarding the redemption of the public debt." 
Public interest, said Crawford, required that the revenue be 
augmented or expenditures be decreased. Some import duties 
might be increased, but i t  was thought improbable that any 
modification of the tariff-which might result in a temporary 
decline of revenue-could prevent the necessity of internal taxes, 
unless expenses were reduced. Crawford maintained that 
Should Congress deem it expedient to modify the present rate 
of duties, with a view to afford that protection to our cotton, 
woollen, and iron manufactures, which is necessary to secure to 
them the domestic market, the necessity of resorting to a system 
of internal taxation will be augmented. I t  is believed that the 
present is a favorable moment for affording efficient protection 
to that increasing and important interest, if it can be done con- 
sistent with the general interest of the nation. The situation of 
the countries from whence our foreign manufactures have been 
principally drawn authorizes the expectation that, in the event of 
a monopoly of the home market being secured to our cotton and 
woollen manufactures, a considerable portion of the manufactur- 
ing skill and capital of those countries will be promptly trans- 
ferred to the United States, and incorporated into the domestic 
capital of the Union. Should this expectation be realized, the 
disadvantage resulting from such a monopoly would quickly dis- 
appear. In the mean time, it is believed that a system of internal 
taxation would be severely felt by the great mass of our citizens. 
T h e  secretary certainly was not inflexibly committed, but he 
was firm in his conviction that neither the increase of the 
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revenue nor the diminution of expenses could be accomplished 
in time to prevent the necessity of a loan. Since the 6 percent 
stock was considerably above par, he thought the sum required 
for government operations could be advantageously and con- 
veniently raised by the sale of that stock or the issue of treasury 
notes. If the revenue and expenses were equalized, the issue of 
noninterest-bearing treasury notes rather than the sale of stock 
was recommended, for in those circumstances the loan would be 
small and temporary.12 
The next month, January 1820, the House asked Crawford 
how much reduction in the revenue would result if the importa- 
tion of cotton and woolen goods and iron manufactures were 
prohibited and how any resulting deficit would be supplied. 
Fluctuations in duties on imports made it difficult to say how 
great the loss of revenue would be, but Crawford thought it 
would average $6,000,000 for several years. If an increase in duty 
rates would bring a proportionate increase in revenue, the 
deficiency might be easily supplied. But reason and experience 
denied this direct relationship; the importation of foreign mer- 
chandise was regulated by the capacity of the importing country 
to pay an equivalent; when duties are raised to an "extreme," 
importation may cease. When the duty "equals" the risk incurred 
by illicit introduction of the article, smuggling upon an extensive 
and systematic scale begins. He believed that the existing rates 
were contributing to increased smuggling. Small increases might 
be made in the duties on linens, coffee, brown sugar, teas, wines, 
molasses, spices, and other small articles. Deficiencies of revenue 
would have to be supplied by internal or direct taxes. If internal 
taxes were thought advisable, the importation of ardent spirits 
might be prohibited without material injury to the revenue and 
with "manifest advantage to the agricultural interest." Taxes on 
domestically produced spirits could replace the revenues collected 
from the importation of foreign spirits.13 
Meantime, the direct submittal to Congress of the secretary's 
12 ASPF, 3:423-26 (quotation on p. 426). In his communication to the speaker of 
the House on December 23, 1819, Crawford estimated the temporary and permanent 
expenses of 1820 at $15,418,000 and $11,857,000, respectively. 
13 Ibid., 468-69; House Doc., No. 62 (serial 35), 16th Cong., 1st sess. Accompany- 
ing statistics showed that the net revenue on merchandise (25 percent ad valorem), 
mostly woolens and cottons, had been $17,600,000 in 1815, $10,000,000 in 1816, 
$4,300,000 in 1817, and $6,200,000 in 1818. The revenue from duties on iron was 
just under $400,000 in 1818. 
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report had come under discussion; Monroe seemed not to like the 
practice; John Quincy Adams thought it against the spirit of 
the Constitution and felt the report should always be under 
cabinet and presidential scrutiny before being submitted. There 
was, however, no administrative agreement on what should be 
done to meet the financial needs of the government. Monroe 
and Adams believed use of the money in the sinking fund would 
be the best solution, but Samuel Smith of the Committee on 
Ways and Means had said his motion to that end had been 
rejected on January 7. The members of the House thought 
retrenchment the proper means, but retrenchment could not be 
carried out if the sinking fund were used to supply the deficiency. 
Adams thought retrenchment would be "fallaci~us."~~ 
But the House had asked for an accounting of expenses since 
the beginning of the government, and this was submitted by 
Crawford on February 7, 1820. Up to June 30, 1819, total 
receipts had been $517,704,000, including foreign and domestic 
loans of $143,315,000. Customs duties had brought in $318,- 
738,000 of the remaining $374,389,000. Of the $513,567,000 
expended, .$136,000,000 was chargeable to the military establish- 
ment, $66,000,000 to the navy, $19,382,000 to the civil list, and 
$16,353,000 to rniscellaneous activities. Perhaps a review of 
these figures helped Congress to decide where retrenchment 
should be effected. However, it would appear that the re- 
trenchment of 1820 was not absolute in relation to the ap- 
propriations of the preceding year; it seems to have been a 
reduction of the estimated expenditures rather than of the 
money actually voted by Congress. The  military appropriation 
for 1820 was $7,841,000 ($3,108,000 for pensions); an earlier 
appropriation amounted to $276,000, and an unexpended balance 
of $338,000 ($85,000 for pensions) was made available. Exclusive 
of pension money, the army had at least $310,000 more than for 
the year before. The navy was reduced $285,000 to $2,550,000.15 
Congress decided also that $2,000,000 from the sinking fund 
should be applied to normal expenditures and that $3,000,000 
1 4  Adams, Memoirs, 4:500-501 (Jan. 8, 1820). I t  seems that the treasury report was 
thereafter discussed by the cabinet before it went to Congress. Adams had recorded 
on April 5, 1819 (ibid., 324), that Smith had written Crawford saying the military 
establishment would certainly be reduced at the next session of Congress. 
15 ASPF, 3:485-90; 3 Stat. 562-63, 553-54. T h e  "item" figures which Crawford 
gave to the House included only the temporary, not the permanent, expenditures. 
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might be borrowed. The BUS offer for the $2,000,000 loan in 
late June-6 percent at 102 for 100 (a 2 percent premium)-was 
considered the best and was accepted. The premium of $40,000 
was $10,000 above the next best offer; some thought it might 
have been larger but for the uncertainty of the term of the 
loan; others felt a "little more frankness and precision" might 
have brought twice the premium since there was "so much 
money seeking a safe investment."16 
It  was the cutback in the military establishment and ap- 
propriations for 182 1 that brought a sharpening of political 
differences and the furor over appointments in 1822 that led 
to a near rupture of the long friendship between Crawford and 
Monroe. Perhaps this story will never really be told satisfac- 
torily, partly because of a lack of evidence on many points and 
partly because of a conflict of evidence. Then, too, the matter 
of historians' preferences cannot be discounted. There was no 
question that something needed to be done-as Crawford said, 
either increase the revenue or cut the ex~enditures. If ex- 
1 
penditures were to be cut, the military and naval establishments, 
which consumed such a large part of the budget, were the 
logical places for substantial savings. If the revenue was to be 
increased, internal taxes seemed the reasonable answer. But that 
system had just been liquidated, and the economic condition of 
the country boded ill for much success from this tack.17 No 
panacea was in sight, and many seemed to share the sentiments 
expressed in Crawford's currency report of February 12, 1820, 
that the economic malaise would just have to wear itself out. 
At any rate, congressional politicians thought economy and 
borrowing preferable to increased taxation. 
The senators and representatives who advocated retrenchment 
Iscrawford to Monroe, June 23, 1820, Monroe, NYP: 3 Stat., 582-83: National 
Intelligencer, June 23, 1820; Niles' Weekly Register 18:314, 315-16. The  other 
$1,000,000 authorized by Congress was not borrowed. T h e  BUS, by arrangement 
with the government, also met the October 1820 payment on the debt. For informa- 
tion on treasury loans during Crawford's tenure see William F. DeKnight, History 
of the Currency of the Country and the Loans of the United States from the 
earliest period to June 30, 1896 (Washington, D.C., 1897), 57-62; Rafael A. Bayley, 
T h e  National Loans of the United States, from July 4, 1776 to June 30, I880 
(Washington, D.C., 1881), 61-66. T h e  public debt a t  the beginning of 1820 was 
$89,000,000. 
17Crawford regretted the repeal of the internal taxes; he thought in 1817 he  
"saw years" before commerce would fail as a source of revenue, but he would not 
advocate reestablishment of the internal revenue system until it became indispens- 
able. Crawford to Tait, May 20, 1820, Tait. 
156 T H E  SECRETARY A N D  T H E  BUDGET 
came to be known as radicals and partisans of Crawford. No- 
where is this group defined-and they probably cannot be-but 
they are generally pictured, possibly unjustly, as negative ob- 
structionists. There is no point in denying that political position 
was involved in the legislative process; it is inherent in it. 
Crawford as head of the treasury and the leading contender as 
Monroe's successor was the cabinet member most likely to be 
attacked by other contenders-or their partisans. But the word 
radical had a variety of meanings depending on circumstances; 
it is a term of the period, stereotyped by later commentators. 
Excess attention to the word breeds difficulty as well as over- 
simplification while obscuring the reality of events. There simply 
was no fixed coalition, no coalescing of forces behind or for one 
individual. Partisans of Crawford, Clay, DeWitt Clinton, Jack- 
son, and Adams are to be found in the retrenchment and non- 
retrenchment camps. Crawford had the largest number of 
followers among congressmen-retrenchment or not-but they 
could not carry measures by themselves. Moreover, in 1820-1 82 1 
there was no .real political motive for Crawford partisans to 
"urge war" on Calhoun, who at that time was running a very 
distant second to William Lowndes, friend and sometime 
supporter of Crawford. That there was a fight for the "right 
to succeed" seems all too obvious (and hardly to be denounced 
unless one condemns the entire political system), but the troops 
united under subalterns, skirmished, fell back, regrouped, 
deserted, went awol, were cashiered by their constituents, were 
broken, or rose to officerdom as a result of the depletion of the 
ranks. The infighting of personal and one-party politics was 
probably as severe as in any period of United States history. A 
detailed accounting of congressional alignments on various 
measures is profitless; it leads one into a jungle of tortuous trails 
and covered  switchback^.^^ 
Whether blame should be attached to anyone in particular 
18 T h e  term "radical" has, of course, been used a t  many other times in United 
States history-and with just as little justification. I t  has even less validity and 
meaning in the 1820s than it has when applied to the Republicans in the recon- 
struction era. Adams and Ninian Edwards talked, in March 1821, about the 
"systematic" attack on the War Department and Calhoun in the two preceding 
sessions of Congress and seemed to conclude that most of the major leaders were 
anti-Jacksonians, that the partisans of Crawford and Clinton had "concurred," and 
so had those of Clay to some degree. Adams decided the views of the principals 
were discordant and Clay was too impatient to brook the delay incident to a full 
coalition with Crawford. Memoirs, 5:327 (March 10, 1821). 
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is debatable, but Samuel Smith of the House ways and means 
committee said in late 1819 that Calhoun had assured Crawford 
the War Department would require no greater appropriation 
for 1820 than it had in 1819. Estimates were prepared accord- 
ingly, and when Calhoun's figures came in on December 9-the 
day before Crawford submitted his annual report-they were 
$2,000,000 above those for the previous year. This increase 
completely "disjointed" the system of the preceding three years 
which had been based on an annual expenditure of $24,000,000. 
Crawford was in "great distress," thought internal taxes might 
have to be levied, and hinted that Richard M. Johnson (senator 
from Kentucky) and his brother had pressured Calhoun into the 
increased spending.19 
The decrease in the army appropriations involved the esti- 
mates, not the actual amount appropriated. But during the 
congressional debates some Crawford partisans, among them 
Thomas W. Cobb of Georgia, had attacked the War Department, 
and Eldred Simpkins, South Carolina representative and Calhoun 
follower, in speeches and letters to the papers accused Crawford 
of exaggerating the depleted state of the treasury and tried to 
convince the army that Crawford purposely sought to injure it. 
Crawford thought that both Simpkins and Calhoun knew Cobb 
well enough to realize that he permitted no one to influence 
him-and Cobb sought retrenchment in all  department^.^^ 
Actually Crawford had been too optimistic about the state of 
the treasury, but a mistake of nearly $3,000,000 in his report in 
the fall of 1820 opened the gates for further attacks. Pressures 
of office had kept Crawford in Washington in the summer of 
1819, so in 1820 he left for Georgia in early August and did 
not return until October 22. From Georgia he wrote his chief 
IsSmith to J. Spear Smith, Dec. 9, 1819, Carter-Smith Papers (University of 
Virginia). John W. Taylor of New York, discussing the speakership with Adams 
in late 1822, had said that he favored the reduction of the army and "understood" 
that Crawford did. He thought Calhoun had been unjust and ungrateful, for it 
was through Taylor's influence that Calhoun's plan was substituted for that of the 
House committee. Adams, Memoirs, 6:113-15 (Nov. 30, 1822). Taylor had also 
said he favored a northern man for the presidency, but if there was no chance of 
electing a northerner he  "should perhaps incline to favor" Crawford. By 1824 
Taylor was an Adams supporter. 
20 Crawford to Moses Waddel, Jan. 27, 1821, Gratz; Crawford to Allen Daniel, May 
2, 1821, Crawford Letterbook. Crawford understood that Simpkins acted against 
Calhoun's wishes and advice, but the two secretaries had not talked about the 
matter. Crawford was probably right in his estimate of Cobb, who on several 
occasions was sharply critical of Crawford. 
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clerk to ask the register and others to have the statements 
necessary to preparation of the report ready when he arrived. 
Two days after returning Crawford was stricken with influenza; 
he was confined to bed for a week and "affected by the illness" 
during all the month of November. He relied on the statements 
furnished by the register and warrant and appropriation clerks 
without "scrutinizing them with rigidity."21 
The  report was submitted on December 1; estimated receipts 
were $16,550,000 (of which not more than $1,600,000 would be 
from land); the total appropriation chargeable to the military 
was an expected $7,445,000 and that to the navy, $5,171,000. But 
other anticipated expenditures (including money for interest 
only on the debt) would bring the total to $21,363,000. This 
deficit added to the $2,638,000 expected "balance against" the 
treasury on January 1, 1821, would leave an unfavorable balance 
of $7,452,000 at the end of 1821. The  condition of the country 
made it inexpedient to add new taxes." Crawford discovered the 
error and on December 21, 1820, explained it to the speaker 
of the House. The mistake resulted principally, he said, from 
the different manner of keeping the warrant and appropriation 
accounts in the treasury. He meticulously detailed the dis- 
crepancies and indicated the deficit at the end of 1821 would be 
$4,658,000, or $2,794,000 less than shown in the annual report. 
He still asked for $7,000,000 in loans, for he thought the treasury 
should keep a favorable balance of at least ,$l,000,000.23 
The  major controversy in early 1821 concerned the reduction 
of the army from 10,000 to 6,000 men, though the number is 
given only in terms of regiments in the law of March 2. Gen- 
erally the advocates of reduction pointed to the rapid increase 
of army posts in the preceding three years, the distressed state 
of the revenue, the poor prospects for improved economic con- 
ditions, and the undesirability of continuing deficits. The  
21 Crawford to Edward Jones, Sept. 20, 1820, Gratz; Crawford to Tait, April 1, 
1821, Tait. 
22 ASPF, 3:547-53, esp. 550. 
23 Crawford to Speaker of the House, Dec. 21, 1820, ibid., 580-81; House Doc., 
No. 32 (serial 48), 16th Cong., 2d sess. The military and naval totals showed 
$6,798,000 and $3,428,000 in the "corrected" estimates. Crawford noted that after 
he had made the correction the original error was seized upon for the purpose of 
"producing mistrust of all the treasury statements." His opponents, he said, would 
"produce as many discords as skill goaded on by malignity can possibly effect." 
Crawford to Tait, April 1, 1821, Tait. 
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necessity for a standing army was recognized, and ad hominem 
arguments were avoided. In the House the vote on engrossing 
for a third reading was 109-47, and the measure passed, 109-48, 
on January 23. There is no recorded vote on Senate passage.24 
The  reduction of the army by 40 percent would result in a 
considerable saving. 
While the army reduction bill was under consideration the 
House ways and means committee seemed as confused as every- 
one else about the government income and expenditures for 
1821. In reports of February 6 and 28 it indicated incomes of 
slightly more than $1 7,000,000 and $1 6,355,000; expenses were 
estimated at $17,000,000 and then set at $15,457,000. Its 
recommendation for a $4,500,000 loan was later raised to 
$5,000,000. The  committee stressed retrenchments of $2,130,000 
in 1820, and $2,317,000 for 1821, or $4,447,000 for the Sixteenth 
Congress. The effect of the reduction of the army would con- 
tinue to be felt; the saving in 1821 of $561,000 was expected to 
reach $1,000,000 by 1822. The 1821 cut in the civil list was 
given as $116,508; in the military, $1,481,000; in the naval, 
$720,000 including $500,000 of the gradual increase fund.25 
The actual appropriation for the military establishment was 
$4,272,000 plus an earlier appropriated $320,000 and an un- 
expended balance of $450,000-a total of $5,042,000. The  
pension appropriation of $1,200,000 was also unexpended for 
the previous year, but when that was deducted the military 
establishment had only $3,842,000 for ordinary expenses. This 
was a cut of $1,318,000 from the previous year. The  naval 
appropriation was reduced $334,000 (not counting the gradual 
increase item) to $2,2 15,000.26 
24 Annals, 16th Cong., 2d sess., 933, 936-37, passim; 3 Stat. 615-16. T h e  peace- 
time military establishment had been set at  10,000 by the act of March 3, 
1815; important organizational changes had been made on April 24, 1816, and 
other minor ones on April 14, 1818. Ibid., 224-25, 297-99, 426-27. 
25 ASPF, 3:677-78. T h e  act of April 29, 1816, providing $1,000,000 per year for 
the gradual increase of the navy, was repealed on March 3, 1821. 3 Stat. 642. See 
also Niles' Weekly Register 20 (March 17, 1821):34-35, 37-38. 
26 3 Stat. 633-34, 634-35. These figures do not agree with the ones given above 
from the House ways and means committee report, and both differ from the figures 
given in House Doc., No. 33 (serial 48). 16th Cong., 2d sess. which purports to give 
the appropriations for 1821. One encounters a comparable situation for almost 
every year: additional appropriations were sometimes made after the regular 
appropriation bills were passed; obligations against departments had not always 
been met by the first of the year, so that some expenditures would show in the 
secretary's report of the following year; retrenchment sometimes seems to have been 
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Crawford had asked for $7,000,000 in loans to cover the deficit 
of the budget, but with the retrenchments of about $2,300,000 
(including the elimination of the gradual increase fund for the 
navy) and the $5,000,000 borrowing authorization, the treasury 
would have at least $300,000 more than required-if the ways 
and means committee was correct in its estimates. Crawford 
suspected the retrenchment was in fact less than $2,000,000, and 
thus the authorized loan would not meet the authorized ex- 
penditures. He hoped there would not be any considerable 
deficit for the year; if that were the case, there was good ground 
to believe no further retrenchment in the civil, military, or 
naval departments would be required or effected.27 About three 
months later he expressed the opinion that the defense estab- 
lishments were "very moderate," though much greater than in 
the prewar years. If the "general impression" of the war period 
that there had been overreduction was correct, they "cannot be 
too large now." But if the revenue did not increase, Congress 
would have to face cutting expenses again. He feared that an 
"executive reduction" would be preceded by much diversity 
of opinion but did not doubt such a recommendation would be 
made if the revenue was inadeq~ate.~8 Crawford seemed to have 
no desire to retrench for the sake of retrenchment; he wanted the 
government to operate as nearly as possible within its means 
and to proceed with the payment of the public debt as soon as 
circumstances permitted. 
The  secretary believed, however, that the "visionary reports" 
of the ways and means committee would not be realized, that his 
own calculation might be "too sanguine," and that he might 
again be charged with misrepresentations in order to break down 
the army. Should expenditures exceed income, Crawford would 
calculated on the reduction of estimates rather than on the appropriations of the 
preceding year, and unexpended balances seem not always to have been handled 
in the same way. The appropriation figures used in this chapter are taken directly 
from the appropriation laws, and the pension and gradual increase funds are 
deducted from what might be called the ordinary expenditures. Many writers have 
been careless about determining the actual appropriations. Total appropriations 
for 1821 were $15,457,000. 
27 Crawford to Tait, April 1, 1821, Tait. All of the $5 million loan was taken 
by the BUS at an average premium of 5.59 percent on 5 percent stock redeemable 
at the option of the government after January 1, 1835. 
28 Crawford to Thomas Spalding, July 9, 1821, Crawford, NYH. During and 
after the retrenchment period there was much cabinet, congressional, and newspaper 
discussion of army and defense contracts, commitments, and obligations. 
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propose measures to increase the revenue, but the responsibility 
for deciding whether the revenue should be increased or the 
expenses reduced rested with Congress. There was no indication 
that the revenue for the next year would be greater than that 
of the current one, and he thought an excise of "considerable 
extent, accompanied by the prohibition of foreign spirits" would 
be one of the measures adopted. He detailed some other possible 
internal taxes and noted the probability that woolen stuffs, 
worsted, and blankets would be placed in the same duty category 
as cotton goods. Such an alteration of the tariff, he said, would 
promote the growth of domestic manufactures without "nurtur- 
ing them in a hotbed." Industries would be indirectly encouraged 
while Congress would confine itself-as many believed it should 
-to levying duties for the raising of revenue. But if Congress 
should take a different view, its measures would be fairly executed 
and tested by e ~ p e r i e n c e . ~ ~  
The  revenue had taken an upswing in the second and third 
quarters of 1821, and in October Calhoun had indicated he would 
exercise every possible economy, feeling it was of the highest 
importance that no loan be authorized at the next session of 
Congress. The  estimates, he said, would be regulated by the 
state of the treasury.30 
Monroe, who had told Crawford he would recommend internal 
taxes if the state of the revenue demanded such, reported on 
December 5 that the "extreme point of depression" of the revenue 
had occurred in the first quarter of 1821 ; since that time income 
from duties had exceeded that of the corresponding quarters 
of the preceding year, and the improvement was expected to 
continue. The  existing tariff, he believed, afforded sufficient 
protection to strengthen the bonds of union by promoting manu- 
factures. He did not advocate internal taxation, and his remarks 
that a moderate additional duty on certain articles would increase 
the revenue "without being liable to any serious objection" were 
an echo of Crawford's of the previous month.31 
By December Crawford's pessimism had changed to closely 
reined optimism. His report of December 10 reviewed the 
29 Crawford to Charles Jared Ingersoll, Nov. 3, 1821, Ingersoll. 
30 Calhoun to Monroe, Oct. 14, 1821, AHA Annual Report, 1899, 2199-201. 
31 Adams, Memoirs, 5:452, says that at Monroe's request the paragraph in the 
President's message dealing with economic matters had been drafted by Crawford. 
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receipts of 1819, 1820, and 1821, showed the substantial im- 
provement of the revenue, and indicated that the treasury on 
January 1, 1822, would have $490,000 more than had been 
anticipated. The income for 1822 was estimated at $16,110,000 
and expenditures at $14,947,000; after satisfying existing charges 
the balance on January 1, 1823, should be slightly more than 
$671,000. The $300,000 deficiency in the appropriation for the 
gradual increase of the navy would be provided by the more 
than $300,000 in the War Department estimates for arrearages 
of revolutionary pensions and of the Indian department estimates 
which would not be included in the projected expenditures for 
1823.32 
Much attention was devoted to the public debt, which was 
estimated at $93,400,000 on January 1, 1822. No part (except 
for interest and reimbursement on the 6 percent deferred stock) 
of the annual $10,000,000 for the sinking fund was included in 
the estimates. On January 1, 1825, and the three succeeding 
years sums due would greatly exceed the amount in the fund 
applicable to redemption. Since the 5 percent stock was higher 
than the 6 and 7 percent, he proposed a stock conversion plan 
£or the $24,000,000 redeemable in 1825 and 1826 which would 
save more than $2,000,000 in interest. If this was thought in- 
expedient or impractical, an equal or greater saving could be 
effected from 1825 to 1828 by borrowing on the first of each of 
those years a sum equal to the difference between the amount 
redeemable and the portion of the sinking fund applicable to 
redemption. The  5 percent stock so created would be redeemable 
as would the 5 percent "exchange" stock, and if it was-as at 
present-5 percent above par there would be an additional saving. 
If the expected revenue increase did not materialize and 
expenses should exceed income, then existing impositions should 
be increased or the sinking fund should be reduced. Many 
articles which paid 15 percent ad valorem duty ought, in justice 
as well as policy, to pay 25 percent-the cotton duty. The  change 
would probably add $1,000,000 to the customs duties. If the 
32 He pointed out that his previous report had estimated revenue for 1821 from 
land sales at $1,600,000, while the ways and means committee had thought only half 
that amount would come in from that source. The  relief act had cut the amount, 
which in the first three quarters reached $900,000 and was estimated at $1,300,000 
for the year. ASPF, 3:682-84. The  factory system of trading with the Indians was 
abolished on May 6, 1822. 3 Stat. 679-80. 
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sinking fund was cut, it might be satisfactory to know that an 
annual appropriation of $8,000,000 would extinguish all but a 
very small fraction of the debt by 1839. If the fund was reduced, 
an exchange of the $36,000,000 of 6 percent stock for 5 percent 
might be effected in 1822-if the current price continued. This 
exchange would mean an annual saving in interest of $360,000.33 
The ways and means committee considered the proposed stock 
exchange advantageous to the government and to stockholders; 
the act of April 20, 1822, authorized the exchange of $12,000,000 
of the 7 percent and $14,000,000 of the 6 percent. But hopes 
for exchange were far too sanguine: by December only $56,705 
of the sixes and sevens had been exchanged for fives. Crawford 
thought the increased demands for capital for commercial enter- 
prise and the rise in interest rates had prevented success of the 
project. He doubted, correctly, that the program would be 
any more successful the next year.34 
The secretary's estimate of military expenditures for 1822 was 
$5,108,000; those for the navy would amount to $2,452,000. The  
Senate was in a drawn-out controversy with the President over 
appointment problems stemming from the army reduction of 
1821, and the original appropriation for the military was 
$3,642,000 plus an unexpended balance of $419,000. Nearly 
$220,000 of the balance was in the pension item, and the total 
pension money amounted to $2,174,000, leaving only $1,887,000 
for ordinary army allocation. The total naval appropriation 
was increased about $50,000 to $2,265,000.35 Almost immediately 
after the appointment squabble was ended Congress voted an ad- 
ditional $1,286,000 for the military, bringing the total for 1822 
to $3,175,000 or about $669,000 less than for 1821.36 
The revenue improved far beyond expectations, and Crawford, 
giving his annual report on December 23, 1822, reviewed the 
revenue and expenses for 1821 and 1822 and made his estimates 
for 1823. In this instance he projected the estimates into 1824, 
33 ASPF, 3:684-85; Niles' Weekly Register 21 (Dec. 15, 1821):249-52. 
34 House Doc., No. 12 (serial 76), 17th Cong., 2d sess.: 3 Stat. 663-65. 
35 ASPF, 3:684, 807, 808; 3 Stat. 652-53, 676-77. As often happened, the inaccuracy 
of revenue estimates received some attention. T h e  chairman of the House ways and 
means committee said no secretary had been accurate but that Crawford had come 
closer than his immediate predecessors. Crawford was, however, less accurate than 
the committee estimates of 1821. ASPF, 3:809. 
36 3 Stat. 686-88 (May 7 ,  1822). T h e  army appointments are discussed in the 
following chapter. 
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1825, and 1826.37 The  actual receipts for 1821, including the 
$5,000,000 loan, had been $19,574,000; for the first three quarters 
of 1822 they had been $14,700,000; with the expected receipts 
of the last quarter the total would be $19,745,000 or $3,600,000 
more than anticipated. With the balance carryover and expenses 
at $18,279,000 the treasury would have $3,148,000 on January 
1, 1823. Commitments would reduce this to $1,916,000. The  
estimated expenditures of $15,060,000 for 1823 were $7,957,000 
less than the estimated income. The  expenditures included 
$5,602,000 for the public debt (interest), $2,723,000 for the navy, 
$5,134,000 for the military, and $1,599,000 for the civil list.38 
The  projections for the succeeding three years showed there 
would be small deficits for 1825 and 1826. T o  meet these extra- 
ordinary demands on the treasury it was believed "expedient 
that the revenue should be increased." This could be done by 
a "judicious revision" of the tariff. Present difficulties resulting 
from different duties on woolen, cotton, flax, and hemp articles 
might be overcome by making those articles (and those of silk) 
or articles "of which any of these materials is a component part" 
subject to a 25 percent ad valorem duty. In addition, the duties 
on glass, paper, iron, lead, and articles of iron and lead could 
be increased. Crawford believed such an increase would lead to 
ample domestic production of those articles, except silken goods. 
These increased duties should be continued until the public debt 
of $91,000,000 was paid; then, in time of peace, the revenue 
should be decreased by $10,000,000, the amount that went annual- 
ly to the sinking fund.39 
The  receipts for 1822 and the treasury balance of January 1 
of that year had meant $21,914,000 for use in 1822; the expenses 
of $17,677,000 had left a $4,327,000 balance on January 1, 1823. 
The  report of the last day of the year showed almost identical 
receipts for 1823 ($20,444,000), expenditures of only $1 5,3 17,000, 
and a balance after commitments yet to be met of $6,467,000. 
Projected expenses for 1824 were approximately those of 1823, 
37There had been some discussion of making this projection in the financial 
portion of the President's message, but it was thought to be more appropriate to 
the secretary's report. Adams, Memoirs, 6:107-9 (Nov. 27, 1822). 
38 ASPF, 4:6-8. Actual appropriations were: $3,009,000 for the military (plus 
$1,874,000 for pensions) and $2,317,000 for the navy. 3 Stat. 748-49, 749-50, 783-84, 
763-64. 
39 ASPF, 4:9; House Doc., No. 12 (serial 76), 17th Cong., 2d sess. 
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thus permitting an anticipated balance of $9,793,000 on January 
1, 1825. Authorization to purchase the 7 percent stock was re- 
quested, and all estimates assumed no extraordinary expenses. 
If Congress deemed it advisable to give increased expansion to 
the navy or to aid in internal improvement projects, means to 
that end could be found by carrying out a "judicious revision" 
of the tariff which had been recommended by the preceding 
annual report. Crawford said that further consideration of that 
proposal had strengthened his opinion that such duties would 
not be "onerous to the community, would be advantageous to 
the revenue, salutary to commerce, and beneficial to the manu- 
factures of the country."40 
In 1824 Crawford again made his report on the last day of 
the year. Normal receipts for 1824 remained about the same 
as those of 1823, but the total income had been greatly increased 
by the $5,000,000 loan to satisfy demands stemming from the 
Adams-Onis treaty and another $5,000,000 authorization for 
purchasing 6 percent 18 12 stocks.41 Ordinary expenditures were 
reasonably stationary and the treasury could once again carry 
out the program, established just after Crawford took office, for 
retiring the debt. Crawford thought the tariff of May 22, 1824, 
would increase the revenue and his projection for the 1825 
income was close to the mark. He recommended for 1825 nearly 
$12,000,000 (including more than $7,650,000 for payment of the 
principal) for retiring the debt and noted that with a continued 
annual payment of $10,000,000 the nation would be debt free 
by the end of 1835. In this last report as secretary Crawford 
reviewed the treasury's handling of the debt since he took office. 
On January 1, 1817, the nation owed $123,492,000 of which 
$115,258,000 was funded at an average interest rate of 5.565 
percent. On January 1, 1825, the debt would be $86,045,000 and 
the average interest rate 5.2325 percent. The principal had been 
reduced $37,447,000 and the interest rate 0.3325 percent-an 
.ko ASPF, 4:374-77 (quotation on p. 377). Funds allocated to the army were no 
longer the subject of controversy. Appropriations for 1824 were: military, $3,114,000 
(plus $1,505,000 for pensions), and navy, $2,469,000. 4 Stat. 8-9, 22, 36-37, 20-22. The 
tariff was changed by the act of May 22, 1824. Ibid., 25-30. 
41The first loan was sanctioned on May 24, 1824, the second two days later. 
4 Stat. 33-34, 73-75. Slightly more than half of the second loan was receivable by 
the treasury in 1824. Both loans were taken by the BUS at par and 4.5 percent 
interest. 
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annual saving of more than $275,000 based on the existing debt.42 
Crawford also summarized the monetary income and outlay 
for the eight years since January 1, 1817. In that time, he said, 
the treasury had a "total means" of $210,276,000 (including the 
January 1, 1817, balance of $22,000,000 and subsequent loans of 
a little more than $16,000,000) and total expenditures had been 
$205,769,000. Major categories of expenses had been: public 
debt, $101,366,000; revolutionary pensions, $9,400,000; fortifica- 
tions, $4,200,000; navy increase, $6,000,000; claims from the War 
of 18 12, $4,500,000; Florida treaty claims, $4,89 1,000; and all 
others-the temporary expenses-$75,400,000 or $9,425,000 per 
year.43 
Most of the eight years had been troublesome ones, troubled 
either by a scarcity of revenue or political acrimony. Crawford's 
record in "getting and spending" operations was a creditable 
one, but it perhaps laclzed the distinction of his administrative 
and organizational efforts. Whether his occasional lack of force- 
fulness was rooted in a deep-seated belief of the coordinate nature 
of the three branches of the government or whether alleged 
primacy of Congress in monetary matters was rationalization for 
his unwillingness to assume stronger leadership cannot be def- 
initely determined. This might well be the dilemma of many 
politicians-and the wellspring of much political philosophy- 
but statements by Crawford prior to his tenure as secretary of 
treasury indicate his actions were shaped by his beliefs, not 
his beliefs by his actions. 
Three of the most important issues before the country during 
Crawford's secretaryship were the BUS, the tariff, and internal 
improvements, all of which touched rather directly the intake 
and outgo of the treasury or the conduct of the fiscal operations 
of the government. There is no disagreement concerning Craw- 
ford's favorable attitude toward the BUS, but most writers on 
the period seem uncertain about Crawford's position on the 
tariff and internal improvements or declare him opposed to both. 
42 ASPF, 5:151-55. Military appropriations for 1825 were $3,386,000 (plus 
$1,248,000 for pensions and $549,000 for carrying out treaties with the Indians); the 
navy received $2,585,000. 4 Stat. 82-83, 92, 92-94, 83-85. Joseph Nourse, in one of 
the documents accompanying Richard Rush's first report as secretary of treasury, 
indicated the public debt on January 1, 1825, was $83,711,000. ASPF, 5:255-56. For 
Rush's report, dated December 22, 1825, see ibid., 240-47. 
43 ASPF, 5:156. 
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Crawford's annual and special reports as secretary of treasury, 
his recommendations, and his letters indicate that he did not 
look with disfavor on the tariff as a means of revenue-though 
he and many others recognized the uncertainty of the source 
and the consequent difficulty of making reasonably accurate 
estimates of the return from such duties. Nor did he object to 
a degree of protection, incidental or otherwise, which would 
permit and promote the development of domestic manufactur- 
ing. On several occasions he recommended a change in the 
duties both for revenue and protection purposes. He was later 
vigorously opposed to protectionism for its own sake, but while 
he was in the national government he would classify as an 
economic n a t i ~ n a l i s t . ~ ~  
Crawford did, however, oppose the system of drawbacks, or 
the refunding of import duties on goods which were later re- 
exported, and as a senator he had prevailed on a colleague to 
introduce a bill for the repeal of drawbacks. Crawford's op- 
position was based on the relationship of drawbacks to wartime 
commerce; he thought they provided an increased incentive to 
engage in such trade and that the trade jeopardized the United 
States' chances of remaining free of European  entanglement^.^^ 
Jefferson agreed with Crawford, denounced the American trans- 
plantation of the British system, attached great importance to 
repeal as a means of preserving peace, and hoped Crawford might 
be able to effect repeal.46 But the system continued, and the 
sums payable fluctuated rather erratically, from 12 percent of 
the accrued duties in 1822 to 20 percent in 1823 and 16 percent 
in 1824.47 Such variations simply added to the problem of 
making accurate estimates of the amount of revenue available 
from the customs. 
That Crawford was opposed to internal improvements at 
44 Crawford had written in 1816 to the consul at  Bordeaux that he thought the 
manufacturing interests were sufficiently protected to secure their growth and 
ultimate maturity. "Perhaps," he said, "we have gone too far but it was erring on 
the safe side." Crawford to William Lee, May 19, 1816, Gallatin. 
46 Crawford to Jefferson, May 31, 1816, Jefferson, MDLC. 
46 Jefferson to Crawford, June 20, 1816, ibid. In  correspondence with Crawford 
concerning Virginia claims growing out of the War of 1812 Jefferson said the 
money was needed to carry on the work at  the University of Virginia. Jefferson 
to Crawford, April 8, 1821, ibid.; Crawford to Jefferson, April 16, 1821, Jefferson 
(University of Virginia). 
47 Richard Rush to Speaker of the House, March 15, 1826, House Doc., No. 132 
(serial 138), 19th Cong., 1st sess. 
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national expense is open to serious question, if not outright 
denial. He believed that the question might be "easily settled 
by precedent" and that a system would be introduced "gradually, 
if not directly at once."48 During his tenure as secretary he 
thought it the function of the administrative branch to execute 
the will of Congress in this matter, showed keen awareness of 
Monroe's sensitivity on the issue, and was fully cognizant of the 
political maneuvering involved even in the locating of any 
important improvement. 
Crawford's reference to precedent doubtless concerned the 
activities of the government in connection with the National 
Road. Most of the decisions on the road as far as Wheeling, 
Virginia, were made before Crawford took office. However, he 
did have some discretionary authority, and the location, building, 
and maintenance of the section between Cumberland, Maryland, 
and Wheeling presented some lingering problems. Crawford 
himself rode over alternate routes for the road between Browns- 
ville on the Monongahela River and Washington, Pennsylvania, 
and established a three-stage procedure for resolving the differ- 
ences between the superintendents east and west of the river; 
he ordered expenditures for sidewalls and masonry work reduced 
or eliminated; he directed steps be taken to prevent people from 
damaging the road by dragging logs, pulling down sidewalls 
over bridges, digging down banks, stopping drainage ditches, 
leaving parts of trees on the road, and building fences and houses 
on the right of way. After considerable delay contracts for the 
Brownsville-Washington segment were let for approximately two 
thirds of the estimated $9,500 per mile. Half of the costs were 
to be paid in western funds; if Congress at the next session should 
provide for an extension of the road, "western funds may be 
applied with the utmost propriety to that great object," thus 
affording relief to the public debtors in that area. The  secretary 
indicated it was already difficult for Monroe to avoid giving 
approval to any law appropriating money for a road or canal, 
but it might be more difficult to induce him to sign a bill 
embracing a system. No matter, he said, "a few years in the 
age of nations is nothing. A system will be introduced gradually, 
if not directly at once."49 
48 Crawford to James Tallmadge, July 12, 1819, enclosure in Tallmadge to John 
W. Taylor, July 17, 1819, John W. Taylor Papers (NYH). 
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The next session of Congress did provide for an extension of 
the road, granting authority to proceed with the location of the 
main road and some branches as far as the capital of Illinois. 
Crawford believed location of the road would probably increase 
the value of the lands in the area by an amount equal to the 
cost of the road and would make possible government reservation 
of the land necessary for the road without collision with in- 
dividual rights. Though the law required the road to be run 
as straight as possible, Crawford said "he would see to make 
it run so as to pass through the seats of government of the three 
States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illin0is."5~ A year later Crawford 
suggested to Monroe that the road not be located beyond Zanes- 
ville even if the appropriation was available; a bill directing that 
the road pass through the three capitals had passed the last 
session of the Senate but had not been acted on by the House 
because of lack of time. Then, too, the people of Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and Mississippi favored giving the road a southerly 
direction from Zanesville; pressures for the western and southern 
directions he thought "nearly in equipoise." If he was right, 
would it not be better to ask no funds for location beyond 
Zanesville? The  measure had originated with Congress without 
any recommendation from the executive; would it not be 
prudent to avoid all interference with the legislative will? He 
was inclined to this opinion on general principles and the "par- 
ticular relation in which you stand to the subject, furnishes an 
additional motive in its favor."6l 
Crawford apparently had no difficulty persuading the President, 
for five days later he informed Abner Lacock that even though 
the commissioners had the authority to proceed with the location 
of the road the President did not see any point in continuing 
49 Crawford to Thomas Worthington, Nov. 23, 1816, Worthington: Crawford to 
Henry St. George Tucker (House Committee on Roads and Canals), March 20, 1818, 
Series E, Vol. 6: Crawford to David Shriver, June 22, 1819, Read: Crawford to 
Monroe, July 2, 1819, Monroe, MDLC; Crawford to James Tallmadge, July 12, 1819: 
ASPM, 2:586, 798. Henry Clay, in keeping with his promise, wrote Crawford a 
detailed letter about construction and other problems connected with the road 
after he had traveled over it on his way home. Clay to Crawford, May 15, 1818, 
Golding. 
50 Crawford to Henry Storrs (House Committee on Roads and Canals), April 6, 
1820, Series E, Vol. 6; Adams, Memoirs, 5:155-56 (June 20, 1820). Crawford noted 
that the exemption from toll of carriages with broad tires might be l~seful in 
reducing the expense of repair and tend to the gradual reduction of the cost of 
transportation on the National Road. 
61 Crawford to Monroe, Aug. 3, 1821, Gratz. 
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the location to Zanesville-if this meant asking Congress for an 
additional appropriation for work already done. The  propriety 
of making the three state capitals fixed points in the location was 
"so manifest" that no reasonable doubt could be entertained of 
its being done at the next session of Congress. Thus, location 
should certainly not proceed beyond Zanesville. He emphasized 
Monroe's previous indisposition toward appropriations for in- 
ternal improvements, thought it better to avoid the necessity 
of asking Congress for such money, and felt the appropriation 
would be made with "better grace" if left entirely to Congress. 
Although the President had "convinced himself" of the con- 
stitutionality of such appropriations, there was still no doubt 
that he would rather avoid the necessity of asking for the money.52 
Crawford may not have been an advocate of internal improve- 
ments, but nothing indicates he was opposed to using federal 
funds for the building of roads and canals. He would throw all 
the initiative for such projects on Congress; he saw the significant 
political implications of the problem; he recognized the economic 
value of the roads; he expected a system of internal improve- 
ments to come; and he was well attuned to Monroe's sensitivities 
on the subject-and at times he may have attuned Monroe to 
his position. 
On April 4, 18 18, House resolutions had called on the secretary 
of war and the secretary of treasury to prepare a plan of opening 
and improving roads and making canals, to submit a statement 
of works that had been begun by states, private companies, and 
corporations to which government aid might be subscribed, and 
to supply all pertinent information that might be valuable in 
the determination of congressional policy. Wide publicity was 
given to the resolutions so that materials could be sent to the 
treasury for preparing the report. And Crawford asked Gallatin, 
when selecting books in France for the treasury library, to include 
books on canals. Such works might be useful when a "system of 
internal improvements shall be commenced upon national 
principles." He expected nothing of the kind from the present 
Congress but thought such action was not distant: "Every new 
State will add to the number of advocates of the mea~ure."~" 
52 Crawford to Abner Lacock, Aug. 8, 1821, Miscellaneous, HSP. 
53 Annals, 15th Cong., 1st sess., 1649-50, 1678-79: Niles' Weekly  Register 14 (May 
30, 1818):240 (for treasury communication of May 26, 1818): Crawford to Joseph 
Brooks, Jan. 21, 1819, Autograph File, Houghton; Edward Tiffin to Secretary of 
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Apparently Calhoun drafted the report, and when Crawford 
returned it to Monroe he noted that Calhoun had used "very 
strong expressions." Further, when the delicacy of the President's 
position on internal improvements was considered, the general 
tenor of the report might be termed "exceptionable." The  
resolutions required a plan-a designation of roads and canals, 
already begun or which would be useful to begin-not arguments 
proving any duty of the government or the usefulness of internal 
improvements generally. These grounds, said Crawford, were 
assumed in the resolutions and needed no argument in their 
favor. The offending remarks were removed before the final 
report (January 7, 1819) was sent to the House, though the 
secretary of war did discuss the general utility of a good system 
of military roads and canals-they were militarily indispensable 
as well as being important to commerce, manufacturing, agricul- 
ture, and "political prosperity." He thought discussion of the 
constitutional question improper under the resolution but sug- 
gested Congress direct that a survey and estimate be made.54 
The  survey bill did not come until 1824, and Crawford seems 
to have been little involved with the question after 1819. 
Besides, the government already had too many financial problems. 
Whether an abundance of funds would have led Crawford to 
increasingly stronger support of internal improvements can only 
be conjectured, but at no time did he actively oppose the federal 
government's participation in this area. He never raised-in this 
period-the question of constitutionality; he accepted the con- 
gressional sentiment on the issue and felt certain that a national 
system would be instituted. After he left Washington he thought 
the Constitution should be amended, either to deny the power 
or to expressly grant it. He did not wish powers to be usurped, 
for there was no limit to usurped p0wers.~5 
Crawford's record in connection with national finances is 
indeed creditable, particularly in light of the unprecedented 
problems faced by the federal government, and in the performance 
of his primary duties his stand on the major issues before the 
nation became reasonably clear and he seemed to act so as not 
Treasury, June 25, 1818 (draft), ISH; Crawford to Gallatin, May 2, 1818, Adams, 
Gallatin Writings, 2:65-66. 
54 Crawford to Monroe, [Dec. 18181, Monroe Microfilm, Series 2; ASPM, 2:533-37. 
The report bore only Calhoun's name. 
55 See final chapter. 
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to injure unnecessarily the sensibilities of his chief, Monroe. 
The  fifth President used his department heads, individually and 
collectively, more effectively than any of his predecessors to 
hammer out decisions of the executive branch. There was no 
strict departmentalization of advisory functions-or even ad- 
ministrative functions, since one secretary might act for one or 
two others during the summer months-and cabinet discussions 
might be long and sometimes heated. Monroe always made and 
assumed responsibility for the decisions, and it was not always 
easy to reconcile the views of such able and strong-willed men 
as John Quincy Adams, John C. Calhoun, William H. Crawford, 
and William Wirt. The  so-called major issues led to little 
difficulty; lesser matters-often correctly or incorrectly linked to 
the political ambitions of the cabinet members-brought division 
and acrimony among the presidential advisers. 
Presidential Adviser 
CRAWFORD HAD been uncertain about remaining in the govern- 
ment beyond Madison's term until Monroe visited him in 
January 18 17. The President-elect wanted Crawford to continue 
in the treasury and advanced political reasons (unspecified by 
Monroe or Crawford) for not moving the Georgian to the State 
Department, which was then thought of as the heir-apparent 
position. Crawford decided then to sacrifice personal interests, 
but he conditioned his remaining as secretary of treasury on 
congressional acceptance of the recommendations of the four 
secretaries concerning accounts and accounting procedures and 
on compensation to Georgia for claims connected with cession 
of her western lands under the 1802 agreement with the central 
government. There is no doubt that Monroe was anxious for 
Crawford to be in the cabinet; on March 3 he expressed to 
James Barbour the hope that the legislation would be approved 
and noted, "You know that the continuation of Mr. C .  in the 
admn. depends upon it. I trust you will not fail to carry it 
through. Intimate this to Mr Macon & other friends." The  
following day he informed Crawford of the passage of the law; 
this, he said, will "avail your country of your services in the 
administration to which I shall nominate you tomorrow."l 
Monroe sent Crawford's nomination to the Senate on March 
5, and, in keeping with his expressed desire to make the govern- 
ment more national than it had been under Madison, he 
nominated John Quincy Adams (then minister to England) as 
secretary of state and Isaac Shelby (Kentucky) as secretary of 
war. Henry Clay, no more interested in the secretaryship of war 
than he had been earlier, could not be considered for secretary 
of state without the loss of Crawford's services, for as Crawford 
said "every reason assigned against my going into the State De- 
partment operated stronger against Mr. Clay than against me." 
The Senate approved all nominations, but Crawford was the 
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only regular cabinet member in Washington for several months, 
and he thought Monroe was "not likely to repose on a bed of 
roses" during his presidential term.2 
Filling the cabinet was a slow process. There were serious 
doubts about Shelby's acceptance, but Crawford had said nothing 
when Richard M. Johnson, also of Kentucky, was mentioned for 
the war post. Near the end of April Crawford knew nothing 
about progress toward making that appointment, though he 
thought George W. Campbell (former secretary of treasury) 
would be a better choice than Johnson, William Henry Harrison, 
Return J.  Meigs, or Lewis Cass, all westerners. He had deter- 
mined, however, never to obtrude his sentiments upon any matter 
unconnected with the treasury and had avoided introducing any 
subject that might cause Monroe to express his views on the 
principal appointments still to be made. But on May 26 
Monroe called at Crawford's office and they discussed appoint- 
ments. Shelby had declined the War Department, John Quincy 
Adams had agreed to become secretary of state, and Harrison 
would be appointed secretary of war-if that official was to come 
from the West. Crawford, when asked, said the people of the 
country were unconcerned about the place of residence of 
cabinet members; they expected the President to appoint men 
qualified to discharge the duties assigned to them. Already the 
War Department had been offered to two westerners, and 
certainly Crawford would not appoint Harrison. With the hero 
of Tippecanoe as secretary, "excessive vanity and inordinate 
love of noisy, empty popularity" would influence every action 
of the office. Flatterers would be favored and "every meritorious 
and independent officer" would be driven from the service. 
Monroe assented to Crawford's views; he would lay aside geo- 
graphical considerations. Crawford then mentioned David R. 
1 Crawford to Gallatin, March 12, 1817, Adams, Gallatin Writings, 223-25: Mon- 
roe to Barbour, March 3, 1817, Barbour; Monroe to Crawford, March 4, 1817, 
Golding. T h e  laws are both dated March 3, 1817; the one on organization and 
accounts is discussed in chapter 6. T h e  other, 3 Stat. 359-60, provided for paying 
Georgia a sum equal to the amount of the Mississippi stock sold or received in  
payment for public lands in Mississippi until payment totaled $1,250,000. Not 
more than $335,000 was to be paid until some Mississippi stock was redeemed. 
Payments to Georgia began the next month. William Rabun to Legislature of 
Georgia, Nov. 3, 1817, Niles' Weekly  Register 13 (Nov. 29, Dec. 13, 1817):217, 243. 
2 Monroe to Jackson, March 1, 1817, Hamilton, Monroe Writings, 6:4-5; Crawford 
to Gallatin, March 12, 1817, Adams, Gallatin Writings, 2:26-27; Senate Executive 
Journal, 3:89, 91; Crawford to Gallatin, Oct. 27, 1817, Gallatin. 
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Williams, William Lowndes, and John C. Calhoun-all South 
Carolinians. While all of these might decline the post, offers 
to them would remove any blame from Monroe if the office was 
not filled by a good man. Crawford hoped the offer would be 
made first to Williams and then to Calhoun, but he did not 
know the order Monroe might decide upon.3 Whether Monroe 
consulted further with Crawford is not known; Lowndes de- 
clined, but Calhoun accepted. Ten years later Monroe did not 
remember the conversations with members of the administration 
concerning Calhoun's choice, but "It is probable that I conferred 
with all of them, and my impression is strong that none made 
any objection to it. I am satisfied that Mr. Crawford made 
none."4 
In November, a month after Calhoun's appointment, the 
cabinet was completed with William Wirt's acceptance of the 
attorney generalship. Wirt, who had a large family, found it 
difficult to live in Washington on his salary-government service 
meant a great decrease of income from his private practice. 
Wirt's hints of resigning led Monroe to ask Crawford and Adams 
whether he should, by special message, recommend an increase 
for all heads of departments. Both agreed he should not; any 
such measure should be spontaneous on the part of Congress. 
Wirt remained and seems to have had a high regard for his 
fellow cabinet members; especially did he praise Crawford and 
President Monroe.5 
Monroe had not nationalized his cabinet, but he had secured 
an extremely able group of advisers and administrators. Only 
the secretaryship of navy was held by a man of second-rate 
abilities, and only that position changed hands during Monroe's 
presidency. Benjamin W. Crowninshield (Massachusetts), ap- 
pointed by Madison in 1814, was replaced by Smith Thompson 
of New York in 1818. Samuel L. Southard (New Jersey) accepted 
3 Crawford to Gallatin, April 23, 1817, Adams, Gallatin Writings, 2:35: Crawford 
to Bartlett Yancey, May 27, 1817, Bartlett Yancey Papers (UNC). Crawford had no 
objection to Richard Rush succeeding Adams as minister to England. 
4 Monroe to Calhoun, Dec. 16, 1827, Hamilton, Monroe Writings, 7:137. 
5 Adams, Memoirs, 4:83 (April 28, 1818); Wirt to Dabney Carr, Oct. 12, 1819, 
John P. Kennedy, Memoirs of the Life of Wil l iam Wir t  . . . , 2 vols. in 1 (Phila- 
delphia, 1860), 2:84. By the act of February 20, 1819 (3 Stat. 484), salaries were 
set as follows: each of the four secretaries, $6,000; attorney general, $3,500; post- 
master general, $4,000; chief justice, $5,000; and each associate justice, $4,500. T h e  
raises were retroactive to January 1. 
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the post after Thompson's elevation to the Supreme Court in 
1823. Thompson was the most able of the three, but his role 
as presidential adviser was far less important than those of 
Adams, Calhoun, Crawford, and Wirt. 
The  President and department heads often left Washington 
during the hot summer season, and nearly every year one of 
the secretaries would fill in for another who was away from the 
city. In 1818 Crawford acted for Calhoun, and the following 
summer Adams doubled for the South Carolinian. No problems 
seem to have stemmed from this arrangement, since each secretary 
availed himself of the counsel of other members of the govern- 
ment whenever they were available. In consulting others, they 
were simply following Monroe's practice; he made unprecedented 
collective use of his department heads. Naturally there were 
differences of opinion and maneuvering for political advantage, 
but not even the dispute over Jackson's invasion of Florida 
generated, at the time, any real animosity among the cabinet 
members. 
Relations with other nations were the most frequently dis- 
cussed topics of cabinet deliberations; continental and hemi- 
spheric matters were first priority, with problems arising from 
the revolt of the Spanish American colonies and from ineffective- 
ness of Spanish administration in Florida being most persistent 
and in the final analysis most disruptive of party solidarity. By 
1817 adventurers, freebooters, pirates, slave traders, and others 
of numerous nationalities were using the flags of the revolting 
colonies-as well as those of other countries-to shield their 
extralegal and illegal actions under the pretext of helping the 
"patriots" to discard Spanish rule. In 1817 a filibustering group, 
under the leadership of Gregor MacGregor, seized Amelia Island, 
a move that appeared preliminary to the occupation of Florida. 
T o  prevent Fernandina, the island port, from becoming a center 
for smuggling slaves into the United States, to protect the 
apprehensive citizens of southern Georgia, and to secure the 
southern border of the country, United States naval forces were 
sent to the island in the latter part of the year.6 The  action was 
6 Many contemporary letters dealing with this incident are no longer available 
in the originals, but a rather large number of them are in Niles' Weekly  Register 
13, esp. July 16, Dec. 27, 1817; Jan. 3, 17, 1818. In this chapter, since primary 
emphasis is upon positions of the cabinet members (especially those of Crawford), 
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justified by the provisions of the act prohibiting the slave trade 
and by the joint resolution of the Senate and House of January 
5, 181 1 (and the act of the same date) authorizing the President 
to occupy any part or the whole of the territory east of the 
Perdido River and south of Georgia to counteract any attempted 
occupation by a foreign power. 
Don Luis de Onis, Spanish minister to the United States, 
protested the Amelia Island action in a style which Monroe 
termed "outrageously insulting" and which seemed to coun- 
tenance the idea that Spain was desirous of pushing a quarrel 
with the United States in hope of drawing the European allies 
into it on the Spanish side. Crawford feared the United States 
would be charged with duplicity, since the MacGregor "army" 
had been organized in Baltimore, and in December he agreed 
with the President that the United States should withdraw from 
the island. But he soon moved to the position, originally held 
by Adams and Calhoun, which Monroe stated in a special message 
to Congress on January 13, 1818: the island will be held, 
subject to negotiations with Spain. The cabinet unanimously 
rejected the British offer of mediation on the grounds, suggested 
by Crawford and Monroe, that differences between the United 
States and Spain did not threaten war. Meanwhile, Henry Clay 
-who seemed to want to embarrass the administration whenever 
possible-was goading John Forsyth (Georgia), chairman of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to sponsor a motion 
authorizing Monroe to take possession of East Florida. Crawford 
thought the possibility of Forsyth's proposing a resolution "con- 
trary to the policy of the nation" was "so ridiculous" that he had 
dismissed it until Monroe asked him to confer with Forsyth. He 
was unable to dissuade Forsyth from presenting the motion; he 
then talked with committee member James Barbour-also at 
Monroe's request-and estimated correctly that the committee 
would not support its ~hairrnan.~ 
few references will be given to the presidential messages, treaties, laws, and con- 
gressional action. Documentation on these matters may be found at  the appropriate 
places in James D. Richardson, ed., A Compilation of  the Messages and Papers of 
the Presidents, 1789-1902, 10 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1903); Hunter Miller, ed., 
Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States, 8 vols. (Washington, 
D.C., 1931-1948); ASPFA; Annals; Statutes; and the congressional documents series. 
7Adams. Afemoirs, 4:31-32, 51, 57-60, 66-67: Monroe to Crawford, Jan. 29, 1818, 
Crawford, MDLC; Crawford to Monroe, March 23, 1818, Monroe, MDLC. 
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The seizure of Amelia Island was but prelude. Several times, 
in December 18 17, the cabinet had discussed the border situation, 
and on the day after Christmas it was decided to order Major 
General Edmund P. Gaines to assemble all the regular troops 
he could gather, as well as the Georgia militia, for the purpose 
of reducing the Seminole, pursuing them into East Florida if 
they should take refuge there. Andrew Jackson was then ordered 
to move immediately to the seat of war and take command. By 
early March 1818 Jackson had pursued the Indians into Florida 
and before the end of April he had taken Pensacola and put 
to death two British citizens. Cabinet discussions of Jackson's 
actions-especially the taking of Pensacola-began in July, with 
all except Adams thinking the general had acted not only without 
instructions, but against them. Adams thought Jackson's actions 
justified by the necessity of the case: he had been authorized to 
cross into Spanish Florida in pursuit of the Indians; all other 
matters were incidental, for the object of the military operation 
was termination of Indian warfare, not hostility to Spain. Craw- 
ford believed that if Pensacola were not returned to Spain the 
administration would be held responsible for Jackson's actions 
and for having started a war in violation of the Constitution. 
The  people, he said, would not support such a war, United States 
shipping and commerce would be destroyed by privateers from 
all parts of the world, and the administration would "sink under 
it." Calhoun insisted that Jackson's actions were a violation of 
the Constitution and an act of war against Spain, that Jackson 
had really resolved beforehand to take Pensacola, that he had 
violated his orders, and upon his own arbitrary will set all 
authority at defiance. And in private correspondence the war 
secretary wrote of the diversity of opinion in the cabinet, the 
misconduct of the Spanish authority in Florida, and the pop- 
ularity of Jaclison as factors contributing to the conclusion that 
no proceedings should be instituted against the general.8 Craw- 
BAdams, Memoirs, 4:108-9, 113; Calhoun to Dear Sir [Charles Tait], July 20, 
Sept. 5, 1818, Tait. There are few Calhoun-Tait letters. If, as Charles H. Wiltse, 
John C. Calhoun, 3 vols. (New York, 1944-1951), 1:115, says, Calhoun's influence had 
been important in nominating Monroe in 1816 and Crawford could not easily 
overlook the fact, it seems strange that the secretary of war should write these 
letters disclosing supposedly secret cabinet discussions to a man who had been an 
intimate friend of Crawford for more than twenty years. Wiltse's statement and 
its implications are totally unacceptable. 
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ford apparently talked, in August 1818, with a Georgia editor 
about cabinet discussions and division and later was denounced 
for revealing secret conversations. 
It  was October 1818 before an oficial communication went to 
Jackson, and certainly Monroe's letter shaded the truth about 
the attitudes of some of his advisers. He  was sorry Jackson had 
understood his orders differently from what was intended; since 
he had, "it remains only to do justice to you on that ground." 
The general should state his position to the War Department, 
and he would be answered in a "friendly manner" by Calhoun 
"who has very just and liberal sentiments on the subject." 
Jackson, in his reply of November 15, said he was convinced 
of the "honorable and liberal sentiments" of Calhoun, but he 
was not "insensible to the implacable hostility" of Crawford. 
Whatever Jackson may have heard concerning Crawford's view 
of the Florida invasion, the relations between the general and 
Crawford when the latter was secretary of war seem to have 
created in him a lasting dislike for the Georgian: "I have for 
several years viewed him as a base and unprincipled man," whose 
desire to injure Monroe and Jackson was so strong that the 
"injury nay the ruin of his country would interpose no barrier."9 
Jackson and his friends soon began concerted action against 
Crawford, apparently feeling Crawford was the general's enemy 
in the administration. Adams, however, said Crawford had "been 
less so in appearance" than Wirt or Calhoun, but the Georgian's 
attitude was not improved by a letter, printed in a Nashville 
paper, which violently attacked him. And when Congress dis- 
cussed the Florida affair in the winter of 1818-1819 Jackson 
imputed all actions concerning this incident to Crawford's re- 
sentment of Jackson's support of Monroe for the presidency in 
1816, said the matter had become a party question and must 
become the touchstone of the election of the next President, and 
saw numerous political combinations involving Crawford. Espe- 
cially did he denounce the supposed coalition of Crawford and 
Clay whom he "despised" and castigated for his "hypocrisy and 
baseness."1° Jackson, in Washington during this time, was told 
9Monroe to Jackson, Oct. 20, 1818, Hamilton, Monroe Writings, 6:74-75; Jackson 
to Monroe, Nov. 15, 1818, Monroe, NYP. 
10 Adams, Memoirs, 4:194 (Dec. 17, 1818); Jackson to William B. Lewis, Jan. 30, 
1819, Jackson-Lewis Correspondence (NYP). 
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by Adams that Crawford had never said a word indicating "any 
feeling" against Jackson (though less than a month before the 
secretary of state had recorded that Crawford had shown hostility 
to the general), but Jackson seemed in a "great passion" because 
of the attack made upon him by Representative Thomas W. 
Cobb, a Crawford supporter whose actions apparently were 
neither influenced nor determined by anyone but himself. Craw- 
ford thought the general had "conjured up other causes of 
animosity, which had no existence but in his own imagination."ll 
The defense in Congress of Jackson had been as vigorous as 
the attack on him, but nothing happened to let Jackson know 
that he had chosen the wrong target for his hostility. Crawford 
was well aware of this, and he was concerned about the meetings 
that would take place between Jackson and Monroe on the 
latter's southern tour in the spring and summer of 1819. Various 
problems, stemming primarily from economic conditions, kept 
Crawford from joining Monroe at Augusta. He said he had no 
enrnity for Jackson, thought the general's services should "shield 
him from attack" but "ought not to serve as a shield for unjustly 
attacking others," and said he especially wanted to prevent Jack- 
son from doing injury to Monroe. Crawford listed several of 
his friends the President would be meeting. 
Monroe assured Crawford that Jackson knew (when he was in 
Washington) of the President's entire confidence in the integrity, 
honor, and friendship of his secretary, and after the conference 
with Monroe he had never attempted to shake it-nor did he 
again mention the subject. He knew Jackson would be attentive 
to his intercourse with Crawford's friends, and it was probable 
that the natural ardor of the general's feelings would lead him 
by "light circumstance to draw hasty and improper conclusions." 
The President would, therefore, confine his relations with Craw- 
ford's friends to their own neighborhoods, and he hoped to con- 
trol all meetings for the good of all involved, of the country and 
11 Adams, Memoirs, 4:207, 213-14, 239-42; Crawford to John O'Connor, April 24, 
1819, John O'Connor Papers (Clements). It was at this time that Adams recorded 
that the success or failure of the administration would be most conspicuous in 
foreign relations and that Crawford, perhaps unconscious of his motives, would 
create obstacles to bring public dissatisfaction with the state department. It is 
difficult to follow Adams' "logic" that Crawford-such an important member of 
the executive branch-would reap gain from the failures of the Monroe administra- 
tion, no matter what the area of deficiency. 
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government, and his own "personal fame and satisfaction."12 He 
seems to have done so. 
Crawford's correspondence contains only occasional reference 
to the Florida affair and the enmity of Jackson, but Jackson's 
avoiding unfavorable mention of Crawford was short-lived. 
Several times later in 1819 Jackson, in letters to Monroe, de- 
nounced Crawford; the following year communications of this 
kind were less frequent. The general accepted the governorship 
of Florida for a short, stormy period and seemed almost in a 
hurry to make recommendations to Monroe for appointive 
positions, which positions-even those connected with the Trea- 
sury Department-Crawford said were filled without his consent 
or even knowledge of his wishes.13 The Crawford-Jackson feud 
grew less intense after 1820-1821 and was nearly over by 1825. 
After that date the two men seemed more or less to ignore each 
other, but Jackson could not ignore the Crawford wing of the 
party. 
In the two years after January 1818 nearly all the major 
participants in the controversy over Jackson's Florida actions 
were guilty of some indiscretion or fabrication. Monroe's 
October 20, 1818, letter to Jackson was not an accurate descrip- 
tion of Calhoun's position; both Calhoun and Crawford seem 
to have been guilty of divulging the cabinet division-but division 
had been revealed before, especially in connection with Robert 
Smith during Madison's first term; Jackson seized upon rumor 
and half-truth to seek revenge against one whom he mistakenly 
thought had tried to injure him; the general schemed with John 
Clark of Georgia to seek incriminating evidence against Crawford; 
Adams' own words indict him with falsehood; and Calhoun, the 
chief prosecutor of Jackson in the cabinet-and probably jus- 
tifiably so-remained relatively silent and reaped the political 
rewards of Jackson's misplaced hatred. The extant materials 
give much support to the assertion that Jackson was the chief 
instigator of party dissension; in his actions he used Crawford 
quite effectively as a whipping boy. 
12 Crawford to Monroe, April 27, 1819, Monroe, NYP; Monroe to Crawford, May 
19, 1819, Golding. Crawford hoped to meet Monroe in Ohio (perhaps Cincinnati) 
on his return, hut he had to go west in connection with problems of the national 
road and said he could not stand the trip twice in so short a time. 
13 See, for example, Crawford to Gallatin, July 24, 1819, May 13, 1822, Adams, 
Gallatin Writings, 2116-17, 241-43; Jackson to Monroe, Sept. 29, Nov. 22, 29, 1819; 
Jan. 15, 1820; Feb. 11, 1821, Monroe, NYP. 
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Meanwhile, Adams and the Spanish minister Onis had finally 
concluded, in February 1819, the treaty for the cession of Florida 
to the United States and the settlement of the boundaries of 
the Louisiana Purchase. Crawford continued to show the strong 
interest for the acquisition of Florida which he had revealed by 
his role before, and during the early days of, the War of 1812, 
and all other members of the government were in favor of 
acquiring the area. The presence of United States troops in 
Florida, inadequate geographical knowledge, the validity of 
Spanish land grants in Florida, and personality clashes between 
the two chief negotiators were troublesome factors during the 
negotiating period, but cabinet discussions were amicable, gen- 
erally constructive, and all clearly pointed toward the achieve- 
ment of the goal.14 
The Spanish king withheld approval of the treaty (in large 
measure to forestall United States recognition of the new govern- 
ments in South America), and the secretaries differed as to the 
best method of forcing Spanish ratification. Crawford thought 
John Forsyth, appointed minister to Spain just before the treaty 
was concluded, should be instructed to demand immediate ratifi- 
cation, but neither he nor Calhoun was prepared to support the 
"strict measures" Adams advocated. It  was decided, however, that 
Forsyth should simply offer to receive and transmit the Spanish 
approval; if favorable action had not been taken by the fall of 
1819, the President should make a full communication to Con- 
gress.15 
Crawford considered the Spanish failure to ratify to be an act 
of bad faith and hoped his friend, Baron Hyde de Neuville, the 
French minister whose tact had done much to smooth the relations 
between Adams and Onis and who was returning to France, 
could convince his own government that Onis had not exceeded 
his instructions by agreeing to cede Florida and that Spain had 
no reasonable grounds for withholding ratification. Speaking as 
an individual rather than as a member of the government, Craw- 
ford believed the administration would hear what the new 
Spanish minister, Francisco Dionisio Vives, had to say about 
14 See Adams, Memoirs, 4: passim, esp. 145-46, 171-73, 204-7, 251-52. 
16 [bid., 405-7 (Aug. 5, 8, 1819). For an account of Forsyth's ministership see 
Alvin Laroy Duckett, John Forsyth: Political Tactician (Athens, Ga., 1962), 42-64. 
See also Crawford to Jacob Brown, Aug. 4, 1819, Brown, MHS. 
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his government's position, but no new negotiations on the treaty 
would be opened. He thought Congress would grant the Pres- 
ident's expected request for authorization to occupy Florida with 
the declaration that nothing would be done that would not have 
been done had the treaty been ratified.16 
A few weeks later, at a cabinet meeting, Crawford recom- 
mended the action which he told Neuville he expected and 
then temporarily backed away from this position. Perhaps he 
thought it left no room for maneuvering or that it would so 
antagonize the Spanish minister that nothing could be accom- 
plished amicably. At any rate, he said that in all discussions and 
communications concerning the treaty he preferred the "general 
expression." He illustrated his point by telling a story about 
Governor Edward Telfair of Georgia: the governor had engaged 
in a sharp correspondence with some officer; looking over a 
secretary's draft of a letter to the officer, Telfair pointed to a 
high-toned paragraph and said he would thank his secretary to 
make it a "little more mysterious."17 Before the end of November 
Crawford was decidedly in favor of taking possession of Florida, 
whereas Adams-the only other department head then in Wash- 
ington-thought they should recommend to Congress that action 
be delayed and explanations demanded of the new minister. 
Crawford thought the government would "lose character" by 
delay, and the enemies of the administration would charge it 
with lack of vigor and energy; Adams believed there would be 
dissatisfaction with the government's course, no matter what it 
was. The President was hesitant, expressing the belief that oc- 
cupation would be an act of war. The next day Crawford 
was more inclined to concur in the plan for delaying occupa- 
tion.ls 
16Crawford to Neuville, Oct. 18, 1819, Crawford, Duke. Crawford hoped 
Neuville would return to the United States and "give his friends in this place the 
pleasure once more of enjoying your society." 
17Adams, Memoirs, 4:437-38 (Nov. 13, 1819). All present had laughed very 
heartily at  the story, and a pleased Crawford repeated it in detail. But, said Adams, 
i t  was good upon repetition. Earlier that year Crawford had told the story of 
the Georgian who was much dissatisfied with his sons. Upon hearing that a court 
case was to be referred to two indifferent men, this man said it ought to be 
referred to his sons, for they were two of the "d--dest indifferent men in the state." 
Ibid., 244 (Feb. 5, 1819). Arthur Styron, T h e  Last of the Cocked Hats: James 
Monroe Q the Virginia Dynasty (Norman, Okla., 1945), 347, describes Crawford as 
a "shrewd and witty man." 
18 Adams, Memoirs, 4:448-50 (Nov. 25, 26, 1819). 
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Monroe, patient and cautious, in March 1819 presented to the 
cabinet a draft of a special message to Congress recommending 
postponement of proceedings relative to Florida until the next 
session. He noted, among other things, favorable developments 
indicated by the dispatches of United States ministers in Europe 
and the good offices of the French and the British to induce Spain 
to ratify. Only Calhoun objected to delay. Crawford, maintain- 
ing that it was not good policy to set the opinions and wishes 
of other nations at defiance, thought the condition of the Spanish 
government-which had just experienced revolution-urged for- 
bearance on the part of the United States, and he knew this to 
be the feeling of a number of congressmen. There was general 
agreement with this point of view. Another factor against asking 
Congress to sanction occupation, Crawford thought, was ap- 
prehension among department heads that Congress might not 
favor such a policy. Should this be the case, the expression of 
such a congressional posture would disarm the executive in 
any future efforts.19 
A message was not to go to Congress for two months, though 
the cabinet was frequently concerned with the Florida treaty. 
When the draft of a communication to Vives was under con- 
sideration, Crawford objected to some of the language because 
it assented to Vives' proposal for a new negotiation, which would 
be fruitless and endless. His suggestion that the communication 
preclude any such possibility was approved. Adams was to 
inquire if Vives had authority-if the United States gave satis- 
factory explanations-to consent to the occupation of Florida as 
a pledge for the ratification of the treaty. The  offer to give 
explanations would involve no discussion of them. Gallatin 
(minister to France) said Vives had such authority, but the 
Spaniard denied it. There were various speculations as to what 
had happened, recognition of the new republics became more 
ticklish, and the question of legality of Spanish grants continued 
IsIbid., 5:28-30 (March 21, 1820); Crawford to C. A. Rodney, March 27, 1820, 
Miscellaneous, Clements. On March 29 Monroe presented a proposal from Manuel 
Torres that 20,000 stands of arms be sold on credit to Colombia to assist in 
spreading the revolution to Peru and Mexico. Crawford supported the proposal, 
Calhoun and Smith Thompson were favorably inclined toward it, but Adams 
thought such a sale would be unneutral, impolitic, and an act of war. Crawford 
intimated that he did not think it would be an act of war, but when asked by 
Thompson what he would say to the same application if made by Spain, "he 
replied, laughing, that he should certainly reject it." Adams, Memoirs, 5:46-47. 
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as a major issue for several months. Smith Thompson (secretary 
of navy) and Crawford definitely differed on this matter, but 
Adams noted that "Crawford did not press his observations in 
reply to Mr. Thompson. He presses nothing further than it 
will bear." It was agreed that all grants made after January 
24, 1818, be declared null and void.20 
On May 2, 1820, the portion of the letter to Vives dealing 
with grants-he had been shown the unsigned letter and wanted 
to know why all grants prior to January 24, 1818, had not been 
confirmedz1-received cabinet approval, but Crawford expressed 
apprehension that the removal of so many of the differences 
between the two countries might incline Congress to less vigorous 
measures and feared that unless the "present moment were seized" 
Florida would be secured only by war. With this Adams agreed, 
but he thought that there could no longer be any grounds for 
charging the United States with "precipitate and premeditated 
aggression" and that by reducing differences to a single point the 
best case could be made for Congress to act with energy.22 
Crawford, in correspondence, had written "If we get the 
Floridas we must take them," and at the cabinet meeting of 
May 6 he maintained that immediate occupation was the last 
chance to obtain the ratification of the treaty. If delay occurred, 
the provision of the Spanish constitution-to which the king had 
now sworn-prohibiting alienation of any portion of the Spanish 
territory would prevent getting the region except by war. How- 
ever, if the United States was in possession of Florida when the 
Cortes met, that body would be glad to seize upon occupancy 
to decide the whole matter settled and out of their competency. 
If the Cortes felt otherwise, they would be too much engaged 
in affairs of more interest to them to go to war over Florida. 
The United States could indulge Spain's scruples as to the right 
of negotiation as long as they pleased-meanwhile holding the 
area. Adams believed it indispensable that Congress authorize 
the President to occupy Florida. Calhoun recommended post- 
ponement until the next session of Congress and thought the 
message should say something favorable about the revolution 
20 Adams, Memoirs, 5:73, 84-86 (April 20, May 1, 1820). 
21 Some grants had been falsely predated before January 24, 1818. The Cortes 
annulled the grants in the fall of 1820 and opened the road to ratification. 
22 Adams, Memoirs, 5:92. 
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which would bespeak the good will of those newly come to power. 
This immediately became a leading idea, which the President 
said he would take into consideration." Two days later Monroe 
read the draft of his message, closing with the recommendation 
that action be delayed until the next session. No objections 
were made, but Crawford and Adams reiterated their beliefs that 
such delay was giving up the last chance for ratification. The  
former still thought occupancy best and the latter believed Con- 
gress should authorize occupation and give Spain a chance to 
ratify during the summer.24 
In the fifteen months following the signing of the treaty the 
cabinet members had shifted positions a number of times. Such 
shifts seem in no way to have been determined by the position 
of a colleague; each department head appeared to advocate what 
he considered the best means of acquiring Florida in light of 
changing domestic, Spanish, and international politics. Crawford 
appeared the most frequent advocate of the bolder action, but the 
patience and the waiting policy of the President were finally 
rewarded. In February 182 1 Spain ratified the Adams-Onis 
treaty. Unfortunately, a gap in Adams' diary removes the most 
fruitful source for determining the stands of the cabinet members 
during the preceding fall and winter months. 
The  question of United States recognition of the new govern- 
ments in the former Spanish American colonies was present from 
the beginning of the Monroe administration and very early 
Crawford had recommended sending two commissioners to 
Buenos Aires to investigate the capacity and determination of 
that region for independence. He was unhappy in September 
1817 that the commissioners had not departed the United States; 
he felt it important that the administration have full information 
in this area since Clay seemed determined to raise the issue of 
recognition at the next session of Congress. He regretted that 
the speaker should so involve the House, which he would "rather 
see . . . employed upon subjects which are strictly within their 
constitutional powers." Crawford believed there was a difference 
between recognition of a change of government in an already 
established nation and recognition of a new nation, and even 
23 Crawford to Cheves, April 25, 1820, Cheves; Adams, Memoirs, 5:99-101 (May 
6, 1820). 
24 Adams, Memoirs, 5: 105. 
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though he thought the power of recognition rested exclusively 
with the executi~e,~%e would involve the Senate in the recogni- 
tion of new governments. 
His position became clear in early 1819 when the recognition 
of Buenos Aires was before the cabinet. He maintained there 
was no reason for further delay since the commissioners had 
returned with full and favorable information. He would send 
a minister, rather than grant an exequatur to a consul, because 
the Senate would have to consent to the nomination of a minister. 
Their granting or withholding of consent would commit them 
on the issue of recognition." After February 1821 recognition 
was discussed several times, with Crawford again advocating 
the bolder action. He favored appointing ministers without an 
agreement for reciprocal ex~hange.'~ In May 1822 Congress 
responded favorably to Monroe's suggestion by appropriating 
$100,000 for diplomatic missions to five Latin American coun- 
tries. 
When the Monroe Doctrine was in the process of formulation 
Cratvford was convalescing from his most serious illness. He had 
been confined at the home of James Barbour in Virginia for 
eight weeks with what he called the "most distressing attack of 
inflammatory rheumatism." Soon after his return to Washington 
on November 14, 1823, he feared there was "danger of some 
embarrassment" in foreign affairs from the activities of the 
Russian naval squadron in the Pacific and from the possible 
attempt of France to restore the former Spanish colonies to the 
control of the mother country. His apprehensions regarding 
Russia were nearly dissipated, and he believed England would 
oppose French action in Latin America. The  United States 
might be compelled to cooperate in defeating the measures of 
France, for he believed it "our duty, if practicable, to arrest the 
iniquitous career of the holy alliance on this side of the At- 
l a n t i ~ . " ~ ~  Crawford was obviously behind in his knowledge of 
events-he had not attended a cabinet meeting for more than 
two months-but it  appears that he would have offered no 
opposition to the Monroe Doctrine. Whether he would have 
25 Crawford to Bartlett Yancey, May 27, 1817, Yancey: Crawford to Gallatin, Oct. 
27, 1817, Gallatin; Adams, Memoirs, 4:11 (Sept. 29, 1817), 204-7 (Jan. 2, 1819). 
26 Adams, Memoirs, 4:204-7. 
27 Ibid., 5:492-93: 623-26, 63. 
28 Crawford to Tait, Nov. 23, 1823, Tait. 
188 PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER 
originally decided with Adams on a unilateral declaration cannot 
be determined. One other bit of evidence on Latin American 
affairs affords an insight into Crawford's thinking-and perhaps 
his espousal of the Monroe Doctrine. The  issue was the reception 
of Silvestro Rebello as chargk d'affaires from the emperor of 
Brazil, who was reputed to have taken an oath to support the 
constitution. Wirt, principal objector earlier, was absent; Craw- 
ford, absent earlier, was for immediate reception. He said, "we 
had nothing to do with their forms of government. It  is our 
principle not to intermeddle with them, and we could not justify 
delaying the recognition of the Brazilian government on that 
account." But Adams thought it "might be well to reflect upon 
the most prudent course of proceeding in this case."29 
Many other matters of foreign relations, including such 
relatively insignificant items as the conduct of individuals during 
Adams' ministership to Russia and the appointment of a secret 
agent to Cuba, were discussed, but only those dealing with the 
slave trade and trade with Britain and France will be treated 
here. 
On March 3, 1819, Congress passed the slave trade act, and 
soon section 2 became the subject of much discussion. At issue 
was the extent of the President's authority in connection with 
Africans who were to be removed from the country after being 
taken from persons attempting illegally to import them as slaves. 
Initially the cabinet agreed that the chief executive had no 
authority to purchase territory or establish a colony in Africa, 
though the act "did authorize him to take measures for removing 
beyond the limits of the United States the negroes who may be 
taken, as imported contrary to law, and to appoint an agent to 
receive them in Africa."30 
Crawford, a vice president and a member of the Board of 
Managers of the American Colonization Society from its organiza- 
tion in January 1817, played a major role in reinterpreting the 
act to permit much greater authority to the President. Georgia 
legislation stipulated that slaves illegally imported and captured 
would be sold at auction, or they could be turned over to the 
colonization society if that group would agree to transport them 
29 Adams, hIemoirs, 6:328-29 (May 13, 1824). 
30 Early Lee Fox, The American Colonization Society, 1817-1840 (Baltimore, Md., 
1919), 53; 3 Stat. 532-34; Adams, Memoirs, 4298-99 (March 16, 1819). 
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER 189 
to a foreign colony. Presiding over the Board of Managers in 
April 1819, Crawford called attention to an advertisement in a 
Georgia paper for the auction of illegally imported Africans. The  
Reverend William Meade, the first important general agent of 
the society, was sent to Georgia to "make an effort to save the 
negroes from slavery." Crawford informed the Georgia governor 
of the act of Congress, which he said provided for the establish- 
ment of a colony of free blacks on the coast of Africa and noted 
that the society was to make the first attempt to carry this act 
into effect by receiving from the agent of Georgia the Africans 
advertised for sale at Milledgeville on May 4. The  governor 
agreed to postpone sale of the Africans, and by June arrangements 
had been made for the Negroes to be turned over to the society.31 
Attorney General Wirt, however, said no part of the $100,000 
appropriated to carry out the act of 1819 could be used to 
purchase land on the coast of Africa or anywhere else for settle- 
ment purposes, to transport either freedmen or illegally imported 
persons, to buy carpenter's tools or other materials for making a 
settlement, or to transport or pay the salary of an agent because 
the second section limits the appointment expressly to a "proper 
person or persons residing on the coast of Africa." But a con- 
ference with Crawford apparently changed Wirt's view. Craw- 
ford thought the President, from the general grant of the act, 
had power to provide a place to which the persons were to be 
removed, to send over carpenters and tools to prepare a shelter 
against the weather, to provide for support and safety of the 
persons removed, to organize a government for them, and-if 
deemed essential-to send over and intermix with them a portion 
of the more intelligent free population of color of this country 
(though Crawford seemed not to think this expedient). Wirt said 
that Crawford felt the grant of power to remove would "pass" 
all the incidental powers to give it effect; but the incidental 
powers were also so expressly granted-to make all arrangements 
31 Fox, Colonization Society, 50-51, 57-58; P. J. Staudenraus, The African Coloni- 
zation Movement, 1815-1865 (New York, 1961), 30; Adams, Memoirs, 4:356 (April 
20, 1819); Crawford to William Rabun, April 15, 1819, Georgia Portfolio, Vol. 2, 
Duke. Staudenraus, 174, says that after 1825 Clay succeeded Crawford as the 
Colonization Society's most influential friend in Washington. Some of the other 
vice presidents were Andrew Jackson, Richard Rush, John Taylor (of Caroline), 
Samuel Smith, and Robert Finley. Crawford contributed fifty dollars to the society 
in 1819. 
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deemed expedient to removal, to appoint an agent on the coast 
of Africa to receive them, and so on-that the issue seemed beyond 
doubt. Congress could never have intended so barbarous a pro- 
cedure as receiving the immigrants and turning them loose; if the 
act were interpreted so as to limit action to mere removal, it 
could not be carried into effect. So large a grant of power forbids 
so narrow a construction; since the language of the act permits, 
the construction that would give the law effect should be pre- 
ferred to one that would defeat it. Wirt said Crawford's is a 
"very strong view of the case, and is, very probably, the correct 
one." He regretted that this was so, for he thought Congress 
could have made things clear and that Congress passed the law 
under the impression the colonization society would have taken 
all the preparatory steps. 
Crawford also thought the agent could be appointed here and 
sent to Africa, for Congress "could not but have known" there 
was no person already there who was qualified to act as agent. 
"Residing" was unguardedly used in the haste accompanying 
the close of Congress. "This has great force in it, too," said 
Wirt, "but I fear it would be rather too bold a construction, 
to execute what we may conjecture they intended, and not what 
they said. This difficulty, however, Mr. Crawford suggests, may 
be surmounted by the colonization society sending out an agent 
to be there commissioned by the P re~ iden t . "~~  
Adams termed the colonization society indefatigable in its 
efforts to get hold of the funds appropriated by the act; it had 
secured the ear of the President and Crawford (for "purposes 
of his own") and had its fingers in the purse. He indicated that 
Crawford, who was "ready to make a colony" out of the act, had 
won Wirt over to his interpretation and had urged the "most 
liberal construction, because the object of the Act is beneficent 
and affects no rights." The  President decided to pay $1,500 for 
half the freight of a vessel about to go to Africa. He would 
inform Congress of the interpretation of the law; if that body 
made no explanation of the law, "it will give the sanction of 
their tacit assent to the liberal construction and the discretionary 
32 Wirt to Benjamin Homans, Oct. 14, 16, 1819, House Doc., No. 123 (serial 387), 
26th Cong., 2d sess. This document contains the opinions of the attorneys general 
from the beginning of the federal government to March 1, 1841. The second letter 
by Wirt was shown to Crawford and to the President before being sent to Homans, 
who was in the navy department. 
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expenditure."33 Wirt apparently was not particularly interested 
in the legislative intent, but Crawford was. And perhaps Liberia 
owes more to Crawford than seems to be realized. 
Little else is known of Crawford's activities with the society, 
but he was present at the June 2, 1823, meeting in Washington 
when the decision was made to establish a periodical publication. 
Five days later he presided over the session of the board of 
officers and managers who engaged in several hours of "serious 
debate on the interest" of the Liberian colony.34 The  rising 
heat of the presidential contest and Crawford's serious illness 
a few months later probably brought to an end his active par- 
ticipation in society matters, but some of his actions as a Georgia 
judge indicate that he perhaps continued to subscribe to its aims.35 
The slave trade act of 1819 also permitted the use of armed 
vessels on the coasts of the United States and Africa for sup- 
pression of this trade, and the following year anyone convicted 
of engaging in this traffic was declared guilty of piracy.36 England 
was aggressively involved in suppressing commerce in human 
beings, but it was more than two decades before the United 
States reached an agreement with England to make the acts of 
1819 and 1820 effective. During negotiations with Britain in 
1823 Crawford objected to the arguments against the right of 
search in Adams' proposed letter to the British minister as a 
"mere declamation against the practice which the projet 
essentially conceded," while Adams believed them justified by 
the traditional position of the United States against search. 
Much of the letter was struck in accord with Crawford's ob- 
jection. Crawford had no general objection to the convention 
but suggested several detailed alterations, some of which Monroe 
approved. All members of the cabinet favored the convention, 
but the following summer-when the instrument was before the 
Senate-Crawford said he had not seen the paper. His memory 
probably had been affected by his illness, and Senate objections 
to granting the right of search may have been partially responsible 
for the Georgian's position in the fall of 1824. He spoke against 
33 Adams, Memoirs, 4:475-77 (Dec. 10, 1819). 
34National Intelligencer, June 7, 1823; Montgomery Advertiser, July 21, 1823. 
The position of vice president was considered honorary and few vice presidents 
attended meetings. 
35 See final chapter. 
36 3 Stat. 532-34. 600-601. 
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conceding the right: the very proposal of doing so was an 
insult because it implied that the United States was not competent 
or trustworthy to execute its own laws." Though the Senate 
made several important amendments before ratifying the agree- 
ment, the United States would not agree to a new negotiation, 
and cooperation between Britain and the United States in force- 
fully suppressing the slave traffic was not achieved until the 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842. 
An agreement with Britain regarding the important West 
Indian trade was not reached until the 1830s, but the matter 
was often under discussion. Crawford believed that if inde- 
pendence of Spanish America did not break up Britain's am- 
bitious, monopolizing, and "huckstering West Indian empire," 
it will "at least serve to render us more independent of it." 
He thought that intercourse with Bermuda and the Bahamas 
should have been cut off in the winter of 1818-1819 so that 
the United States system of countervailing duties could be fairly 
tried.38 More important, in trade matters, than the cabinet 
talks which did not bring results were the secretary's interpreta- 
tions-for administrative purposes-of acts of navigation, tonnage, 
trade, and revenue, and the implementing of decisions which 
were reached on treaties of commerce. In arriving at his inter- 
pretations Crawford often conferred with members of the con- 
gressional committees which had considered the measures, with 
members of the cabinet, the President, and the United States 
minister to England. Crawford endeavored to determine the 
intent of Congress, thought the laws should be liberally executed, 
believed in removing as many restrictions on commerce as 
possible, and sought the best possible arrangements for American 
shippers and traders.39 
As a former minister to France, Crawford was well acquainted 
with the difficulties between the United States and France over 
commerce and shipping. He favored the provisions of the act of 
37 Adams, Memoirs, 6:148-49, 165, 328, 345, 426-28; Martin Van Buren to [Rufus 
King], May 26, 1824 (draft); King to Van Buren, May 30, 1824, Van Buren. 
38 Richard Rush to Crawford, Nov. 24, 1818, Crawford, MDLC; Adams, Memoirs, 
4:322-23 (April 2, 1819). See also F. Lee Benns, T h e  American Struggle for t h e  
British West  India Carry ing-Trade, 1815-1830 fBloomington, Ind., 1923). 
39 See, for example, Samuel Smith to Crawford, July 3, 1817, May 7, 1818, Smith 
Letter Book (film), MdHS; Crawford to Monroe, Oct. 1 ,  1817, Monroe, MDLC; 
Monroe to Crawford, Oct. 3, 1817, Golding; Treasury Circulars, May 25, July 24, 
Aug. 31, Oct. 1,  1818; Sept. 14, 1822; March 26, 1823. 
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May 3, 18 15, which contemplated extending reciprocity on proof 
of nonexistence of discriminating duties in the ports of a foreign 
nation, and France maintained that Article VIII of the Louisiana 
Purchase Treaty (guaranteeing most-favored-nation treatment) 
was inseparable from the discussion of discriminating duties.40 
Gallatin, minister to France, gave qualif ed support to the French 
proposal of unequal duties-heavier on United States vessels in 
French ports than on French vessels in American ports-but he 
could reach no agreement by the summer of 1820. 
All relations with France were somewhat colored by the failure 
of Spain to ratify the Florida treaty and were strained by 
American seizure of the Apollon and Jeune Euge'nie for alleged 
involvement in the slave trade. Crawford, keenly aware of the 
role Neuville had played in smoothing negotiations between 
Adams and Onis and personally acquainted with several members 
of the French government, in January 1820 declared a "strong 
aversion" to any act of Congress which would further damage 
relations with France. Congress, however, passed the discrim- 
inatory French Tonnage Act of May 15, 1820; the French re- 
taliated with an ordinance of July 26, and commerce between 
the two nations was virtually i n t e r d i ~ t e d . ~ ~  
Negotiations to restore "amicable" commerce were transferred 
to the United States in the fall of 1820. Crawford soon came to 
favor discriminating duties which would operate unequally on 
the United States, said France would agree to nothing else, and 
thought more restrictive laws would be necessary if the existing 
commercial situation were not corrected. Adams could see 
neither reason nor justice in the French position, and the cabinet 
decided to propose mutual abolition of all discriminating duties. 
Two days later, April 14, 1821, they decided to "agree" to the 
principle of unequal discrimination at least to the point of 
determining the degree of disproportion that France would 
insist upon.42 
Crawford feared the effort to remove the commercial difficulties 
would fail and that an extremely embarrassing commercial war- 
fare might result. He was concerned that a personal altercation 
between the negotiators might develop a spirit of hostility and 
40 A good discussion of reciprocity is in Setser, Commercial Reciprocity, 184-206. 
41 Adams, Memoirs, 4:505 (Ian. 15. 1820): Setser, Commercial Reciprocity, 200. 
42 Adams, Memoirs, 5:287, 337, 344-45, 353-54. 
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widen the breach produced by each individual's efforts to protect 
the navigation interests of his but he was especially 
perturbed by Adams' draft letter to Neuville on the Apollon 
and Jeune Euge'nie. He wrote Monroe at Oak Hill that if the 
letter were sent in the form in which he had received it from 
Adams, a rupture between the two countries would be inevitable 
-if the influence of Neuville could effect it. There were many 
specific points to which objection might be taken, but Craw- 
ford thought that the sarcastic vein of the entire communica- 
tion would make it difficult to infuse into it the conciliatory 
spirit that should be preserved in such correspondence. No 
acrimony should be manifested in refusing redress for an alleged 
wrong. "The refusal when clothed in decorous, or even soothing, 
& conciliatory language, can hardly fail to produce dissatisfaction. 
What then will be the reception it will meet with, when, a sneer, 
a sarcasm, an insult is met with in every paragraph?" Monroe 
agreed there should be infused into the communication the 
"greatest degree of moderation" and the means of conciliating 
the French government through its minister. He had so written 
to ad am^.^^ 
The  rewritten letter caused no offense, and Adams' proposals 
of early 1822 were accepted by Neuville, who made some alter- 
native suggestions that seemed to look to an ultimate aban- 
donment of all discriminating duties. A pleased Crawford 
explicitly concurred with Adams that an exception should be 
made for articles imported for reexportation, and it was agreed 
that an alternative duty of $4.00 per laden ton be accepted. Later 
there was a warm discussion between Adams and Crawford, 
particularly on Neuville's proposals to repeal the May 15, 1820, 
and the French July 1820 acts and for refunding of duties. 
Crawford favored such action as conciliatory, but Adams thought 
it would give the appearance of retreat. Later they discussed 
which country should do the "first retreating" and how far the 
two nations should "retreat," but Crawford believed they should 
not lose the opportunity to put an end to discrimination. 
43 Crawford to G.  W. Campbell, May 16, 1821, Campbell, MDLC; Crawford to 
Lowndes, June 18, 1821, Lowndes; Crawford to James Barbour, July 25, 1821, 
Barbour. Setser, Commercial Recifirocity, 204, says Adams was "extremely uncon- 
ciliatory" during the discussions. 
44 Crawford to Monroe, July 20, 1821, Monroe, MDLC: Monroe to Crawford, 
July 24, 1821, Crawford, MDLC. Monroe approved the "delicate manner" in which 
Crawford proposed to handle an appointment. 
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Actually the decision to accept as much as $4.00 per ton duty 
was the crucial one, and only details remained to be settled. 
Perhaps Adams was not happy about this, for Crawford noted 
near the end of May that Adams "has certainly not been very 
sane when I have been with him since the adjournment of Con- 
gress. He is still in a passion about something. Nothing has 
been effected with the French minister tho I presume the nego- 
tiation can hardly fail. I t  might have been concluded a fortnight 
ago, as well as a fortnight hence."45 The  last obstacle to the 
treaty was removed by federal court decisions, satisfactory to 
France, on the Apollon and Jeune Euge'nie, and the convention 
was concluded on June 24, 1822. It  not only repealed the 
discriminatory duties imposed in 1820 but reduced those levied 
and collected in the ports of the two nations prior to that time. 
Literal interpretation in some instances would have increased 
some of those duties, so it was agreed that administrative inter- 
pretation should avoid doing this. As a climax to these long 
discussions and final agreement the act of March 3, 1823, for 
carrying the convention into effect permitted the refunding of 
the discriminatory duties collected from French vessels between 
May 15, 1820, and June 24, 1822.46 
Crawford's influence in the diplomatic sphere seems to have 
been greatest in the areas where he had the most experience 
and interest-the French and Spanish Florida. He was unflagging 
in his determination to secure Florida and advised a tougher 
course there than he did in connection with the French. How- 
ever, it is worthy of note that Crawford, often described as 
outspoken, brusque, and tactless, was quite sensitive to the feel- 
ings of nations with whom negotiations were being conducted 
and on a number of occasions counseled the softening of language 
and lowering of tone of diplomatic communications. He was 
firm in his convictions, but he did not wish uselessly to irritate. 
Crawford's attitude toward France seems not to have been ad- 
versely affected by the failure of his ministry to France from 1813 
to 1815, and it is possible that he was more conciliatory toward 
that country than toward England because he saw in France a 
45 Crawford to Monroe, Aug. 1, 1821, Monroe, MDLC: Adams, Memoirs, 5:511, 
529-32 (May 1, 21, 1822): Crawford to John O'Connor, May 28, 1822, Crawford, Rice. 
It is possible that Adams was still brooding about the Senate rejection of the 
military appointments. 
46 Setser, Commercial Reciprocity, 206; Treasury Circulars, March 23, May 12, 
1823. 
I g6 PRESIDENTIAL ADVISER 
less serious competitor in commercial activities in Latin America. 
Be that as it may, he must have gained considerable satisfaction 
in playing a rather significant role in restoring Franco-American 
commerce to a friendly and mutually beneficial course. 
Cabinet discussions prior to the reelection of Monroe had 
revealed sharp differences of opinion among the members, but a 
prevailing spirit of mutual confidence and respect permitted a 
harmonious resolution of those differences. After 1820 a growing 
suspicion and mistrust, a side effect perhaps of presidential fever, 
strained the relations anlong the department heads, and by the 
summer of 1821 Crawford was thinking of retiring from the 
government. A year later there was a possibility that he would 
be dismissed. 
Congressional discussion in 1820-1 82 1 of retrenchment, in- 
volving primarily reduction of the peacetime army, seems to 
have been the foundation cause of the tension between Crawford 
and Calhoun. Partisans of each, probably without the sanction 
of either, bitterly attacked the other, and many soon believed 
that an unfriendly, even hostile, feeling existed between the two 
secretaries. Crawford, troubled by this development, talked 
with Calhoun. He did not believe the secretary of war had any 
role in the attack on Crawford, but Calhoun was not explicit in 
his reply about Crawford's role in the attack on Calhoun. 
The  South Carolinian denied presidential ambitions, could not 
understand why Crawford's friends were hostile to him, and 
implied that unless he was assailed by Crawford's friends or a 
difference on great political questions should arise between them 
(and he saw little possibility of this) he favored Crawford's 
candidacy. Shortly thereafter, in conversation with others, Cal- 
houn seemed to say the opposite of the ab0ve.~7 
Crawford was not pleased with the congressional attacks on 
the executive departments, seemed astonished by some of the 
political combinations (unspecified) which had been formed, 
believed the remainder of Monroe's term would be "stormy and 
excessively disagreeable," and in August 182 1 was "strongly 
tempted" to "retire at once from the scenes of turmoil and cabal, 
which will fill up the next three years." He would make a 
decision before the end of the next session of Congress; if he 
did quit, he would leave office in September 1822. Before Con- 
47 Crawford to Tait, Aug. 11, Nov. 13, 1821, Tait. 
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gress met again, Crawford was "strongly disposed" to resign his 
post at the end of the next session and "leave to those who have 
more talents, more claim to the public confidence, or more con- 
fidence in themselves and stronger desire to govern, whether for 
their own or the public good the road to promotion entirely 
un~bs t ruc ted ."~~ 
During the next session of Congress controversy over removals 
and appointments necessitated by the army reduction act of 
March 2, 1821, caused serious division in the cabinet, brought 
charges that Crawford was sabotaging the administration, and 
almost led to a break between Monroe and his ~ec re t a ry .~~  The  
act provided for four regiments of artillery and seven of infantry 
(plus various services), with no rank higher than lieutenant 
colonel in the artillery units except for the colonel of the light 
artillery regiment. On June 1, 1821, while Congress was not 
in session, Monroe had appointed Brigadier General Daniel 
Parker (whose office of adjutant and inspector general had been 
abolished) to be paymaster general, vice Nathan Towson, who 
was nominated to be colonel of light artillery. Several super- 
numerary officers had to be discharged, but by the provisions of 
the act they received three months' pay. On January 17, 1822, 
Monroe communicated with the Senate, noting that three of the 
four places in the artillery regiments were considered original 
vacancies to be filled, as the good of the service might dictate, 
from the army corps. The paymaster department he considered 
one of the corps, so Towson, formerly in artillery, was appointed. 
T o  limit his choice to officers of the line, said Monroe, would 
have excluded all other branches of the service, as well as the 
paymaster department. Several officers of distinction had to be 
reduced in grade, but Monroe had nominated them to brevet 
in their old ranks.50 
Towson, brevet lieutenant colonel of light artillery with a 
4s Ibid. 
49 Before these appointments were sent to the Senate, the opportunity for frayed 
tempers had been afforded by the selection of Solomon Van Rensselaer to replace 
Solomon Southwick, delinquent in his postmaster accounts a t  Albany, New York. 
See Adams, Memoirs, 5:479, 480-82 (Jan. 4, 5, 1822): Solomon Van Rensselaer to 
William Bay, Jan. 7, 1822; R. J. Meigs to Solomon Southwick, Jan. 7, 1822; Van 
Buren to Charles E. Dudley, Jan. 10, 1822, Catharina V[an] R[ensselaer] Bonney, 
comp., A Legacy of Historical Gleanings . . . , 2 vols. (Albany, N.Y., 1875), 1:378-79, 
383-84; Nathan Ulshoeffer to Van Buren, Jan. 13, 1822, Van Buren; King, King, 6, 
early Jan. 1822; Crawford to Thomas Worthington, Jan. 17, 1822, Worthington. 
50 Senate Executive Journal, 3265-66. 
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permanent rank of captain, had been paymaster general since 
August 1819; his nomination as colonel of light artillery-to 
the prejudice of officers who outranked him-probably provides 
the root answer to the difficulties between the President and the 
Senate. The  Committee on Military Affairs reported that 
Towson's appointment was not authorized by law and the Senate 
rejected him, 25-19.51 
Monroe, on March 26, withdrew all nominations on which 
the Senate had not acted until he could make a fuller communica- 
tion and explanation of his views of the law and the principles 
on which he had acted.52 On April 8 the President discussed 
with the cabinet a message he proposed to send to both houses. 
Crawford was decidedly against sending it while the matter was 
in the balance; he maintained doing so would be a breach of 
privilege and would be offensive to the legislative branch. 
Besides, he believed the appointment of Towson not warranted 
and had so told Wirt in the summer of 1821. Crawford thought 
the Constitution authorized the President to fill by temporary 
appointment vacancies that "happened" during the recess of 
Congress but not to fill newly created positions or those which 
occurred while Congress was in session. Adams recorded that 
Crawford maintained his position with "great pertinacity" against 
the President and Calhoun, and at the end of two hours the 
cabinet had reached no decision. Four days later Monroe decided 
to send a modified message to the Senate only; he considered 
this proper since Towson and James Gadsden were to be re- 
nominated. Crawford, however, expressed doubts of the ex- 
pediency of the action, fearing it might cause irritation which 
would bring a second disapproval. He had communicated with 
no member of the Senate and did not know the grounds on 
which the nominees had been rejected.53 
51 Ibid., 193, 197, 267, 269, 276-77, 278, 279; Annals, 17th Cong., 1st sess., 475. 
Mernbers of the Senate Committee on Military AKairs were John Williarns (Tenn.), 
Waller Taylor (Tnd.), Richard Johnson (Ky.), John Elliott (Ga.), and Iohn Chandler 
(Me.). In  January the committee chairman had written that the "difficulties created 
by the Executive are almost insurmountable. . . . If embarrassment & confusion 
grow out of it, the President must blame himself and take more care hereafter." 
Williams to [Samuel] Dana, Jan. 27, 1822, C. E. French Papers (MHS). 
52 Senate Executive Journal, 3:283. James Gadsden had been turned down as 
adjutant general by a vote of 23-20 on March 21: the following day a reconsideration 
resulted in his approval, 23-21. His name, however, was also withdrawn. T h e  
House had passed a resolution to censure the appointments as not conformable to 
law. 
53 Adams, Memoirs, 5:487, 488 (April 8, 12, 1822). See also Wirt to Monroe, Oct. 
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Monroe's renominations were accompanied by a longer and 
more detailed analysis of his interpretation of the act of March 
2, 1821. This message, the message of withdrawal, and the one 
of January were referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, 
which called for the proceedings and all correspondence of the 
Board of General Officers responsible for the reduction and called 
for other materials. All were sent, and on April 25 the committee 
report emphasized that the law forbade an individual being 
transferred into a regiment to the prejudice of the officers of 
that regiment. Towson's appointment was considered to be 
in violation of that prohibition. The  Senate again rejected 
Towson and Gadsden-as Crawford had feared. The  vote in 
each case was 25-17.54 Parker was then removed from considera- 
tion, and on May 4 Towson was renominated to his earlier 
position. He and the other appointees were approved a few 
days later, but the Senate did not consent to the proposed brevet 
ranks of three of the artillery  lieutenant^.^^ 
The  appointments controversy, in and of itself, probably 
would not have engendered much animosity, but those opposing 
Crawford's presidential candidacy-and this included partisans 
of nearly all aspirants since Crawford was front runner at the 
time-seized upon the incident as another indication of Craw- 
ford's direct and indirect efforts to embarrass and sabotage the 
administration for his own political advantage. Especially did 
they emphasize the attack by his partisans in the spring of 1821 
on the War Department and the unfavorable contrast of the 
Monroe with the Jefferson administration by "Trio" in July 
1821. Other factors that probably tended to "blow up" the 
appointments controversy were the nomination for the presidency 
of William Lowndes (not Calhoun) by the South Carolina 
legislature, the newspaper quarrel between Adams and Jonathan 
Russell over the "duplicate letters,"56 and the unpleasantness 
resulting from the attempts to ameliorate the Franco-American 
commercial difficulties. 
22, 1823, Gratz. On April 22, 1822, Adams recorded Calhoun's "great bitterness" 
toward Crawford, and on July 8 he noted that his own personal intercourse with 
Calhoun had become one of "civility and not of confidence." Memoirs, 5:498: 6:43. 
54 Senate Executive Journal, 3:286-92, 293, 295-96, 297-98: Annals, 17th Cong., 
1st sess., 489-503. T h e  votes were identical except that Talhot voted for Towson 
and against Gadsden, while Williams of Mississippi switched the other way. 
55 Senate Executive Journal, 3:304, 305, 308, 309. 
56 For treatment of several of these issues see the following chapter. 
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It  is not at all clear how any presidential candidate-especially 
one who was a member of the government-would profit by the 
Senate rejection of the military nominations, and nothing has 
been discovered to contradict Crawford's statement that he had 
contacted no member of the Senate on them. He certainly 
sought to dissuade Monroe from sending his second message to 
the Senate. He had disavowed any connection with the 1821 
attack on the War Department and he also had shown Monroe 
a letter replying to his communication disapproving the articles 
by "Trio." It  is true that there were more Crawford supporters 
than followers of any other candidate among the nay voters, but 
Crawford had a larger congressional following than any other 
candidate. Actually, both the yea and nay votes contain the 
names of uncommitted senators as well as partisans of every 
presidential hopeful. 
Crawford, by May 1822, seemed indifferent about remaining in 
office. He did not like and was discouraged by the tenor of 
negotiations in foreign affairs, and he was sensitive to the em- 
barrassment to Monroe caused by the rejection of the nomina- 
tions. For these rejections and the embarrassment he blamed 
Calhoun, but he had done nothing to counteract the impression 
that his own influence had been responsible for the rejection. I t  
would not be injurious to him, he thought, to leave matters as 
they were or even be removed from office-but he did not solicit 
the latter.57 
Crawford's removal was indeed predicted by some, and by 
others advocated, although it was thought that his dismissal 
would improve his chances for the presidency. Joel R. Poinsett 
of South Carolina urged that course on the President. I t  might 
result in the "elevation of the man," but it would be honorable 
to Monroe. In Poinsett's view, it did not matter whether Craw- 
ford encouraged the systematic opposition of his friends or 
whether he was unable to control them; either circumstance 
made him equally unfit for the office he held. If the opposition 
had originated in the current session, it might be a "more doubt- 
ful policy," but he had no hesitation in assuring Monroe that 
Crawford's friends, in and out of the House, had systematically 
opposed the adminis t ra t i~n .~~ 
67 Crawford to Gallatin, May 13, 1822, Adams, Gallatin Writings, 2241-43. 
58 Poinsett to Monroe, May 12, 1822, Monroe, MDLC. See also Rufus King to 
Christopher Gore, June 5, 1822, King, King, 6:474-75. 
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It  is rather strange that Crawford and Monroe did not discuss 
the dissension, but apparently Crawford was unwilling to take 
the initiative because he had no direct evidence of charges con- 
cerning his actions. Monroe was greatly embarrassed by the 
Senate rejection of his appointments, and in the spring he was 
worried about the growing division among his advisers.59 On 
July 4, the day before he left for Georgia, Crawford wrote Mon- 
roe concerning some appointments and enclosed a letter from 
the collector at Pensacola, dealing with affairs of the Florida 
Territory, in which the hostility of Jackson and his associates 
in Florida to Crawford was said to be "without bounds." Further, 
a recent arrival in Florida had "delighted" the Crawford op- 
ponents with the "absurd story" that the Georgian was about 
to be removed from the treasury. Crawford thought the informa- 
tion on Florida might be useful to Monroe and said of the 
portion of the letter dealing with himself, "I have no comments 
to offer, except to assure you, that as my principal object in 
consenting to become a member of your administration was to 
be useEul to you, I have no inducement to continue in it, 
after it is ascertained, that, that object, cannot be effected."'jO 
Monroe received the letter at Albemarle on July 24 but delayed 
answering for almost a month. All members of the executive 
branch, he said, had been asked to serve in their respective 
positions in the full confidence that so long as they remained in 
office they would give their fullest support to the administration 
-as the most effectual way of promoting the public welfare. 
The  President had been friends with them all and had asked of 
them nothing incompatible with what they owed themselves 
and their country. But toward Crawford he said he had "motives 
of a personal nature, to indulge this feeling, which I am not 
conscious of having departed from in a single instance." He 
refuted the idea (not mentioned in Crawford's letter) that there 
was a difference between the principles and policies of the ad- 
ministration in 1802 and his own-none in principle, and in 
policy only in the measures of the latter intended to provide 
for the common defense at the end of the war with Britain. 
Even if the present policy was questionable, and allowing the 
heads of the departments that "freedom of sentiment without 
59 See Hamilton, Monroe Writings, 6, esp. May 1822. 
60 Crawford to Monroe, July 4, 1822: Alexander Scott to Crawford, June 10, 1822 
(copy), Monroe, NYP. 
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which their advice would be useless," he pointed out the necessity 
of support by all once the policy had been determined. He owed 
it to the country and to himself that the powers of his office 
"should not be paralized in my hands, but be preserved in their 
full force" to the last day of his term. A "painful" reference to 
Crawford's comment on the Scott letter said that had he "formed 
the resolution therein stated it would not have been so long 
suppressed." Monroe concluded, "Knowing as you do, the em- 
barrassment to which, I have been, & may continue to be exposed, 
you can best decide, whether it comports with your own view 
to render me, the aid, which is desired and expected, and I refer 
it to your own candour to take the course which may be the most 
consistent with the sentiment, which you have expressed in 
your letter."61 
The  sensations excited by Monroe's letter were of the "most 
painful character," for Crawford had hoped his conduct toward 
Monroe for nearly fifteen years would have shielded him from 
the misrepresentations of men wholly unworthy of the President's 
confidence. Toward the latter part of the last session of Con- 
gress he had frequently heard of efforts to injure him in Monroe's 
esti~nation, but the only means he had of counteracting them was 
the "faithful discharge of my duty to you, both as an officer and 
a friend." T2'ithout evidence of misrepresentations, Crawford 
could not talk with Monroe about the matter, and since the 
President had not been impressed by the charge that Crawford's 
influence was responsible for the Senate rejection of the nomina- 
tions, the secretary saw no need to mention it. "Your letter 
however convinces me that you were then either mistaken as 
to the state of your feelings or that the same efforts have been 
continued since that time, 8c with better success." Crawford was 
aavare that the newspapers and perhaps the retrenchment com- 
mittee of the House in the last session of Congress had attempted 
to make unfavorable comparisons of the Monroe administration 
with the Jefferson administration, but he knew of no attempt 
in or out of Congress to "take advantage of my standing . . . 
to promote that object." He then accused (without naming) 
Calhoun and his partisans of laboring for two or three years, 
by letters and publications, to produce the impression that 
Crawford was unfriendly to the Monroe administration. He 
61 Monroe to Crawford, Aug. 22, 1822 (copy), ibid. 
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went into some detail, insisted he had given (and still gave) full 
support to the policy of fortifying the maritime and war islands, 
and noted that the fortification system then in a "state of pro- 
gressive execution was devised before the present administration 
came in." 
CrawEord agreed that when the President had decided upon 
a measure the department heads were duty bound to carry it 
out. However, once the administration's reasons for adopting 
a measure had been revealed to Congress, any further inter- 
ference or any attempt to "bias its decision by any other appeal 
than to the understanding of the members, ought to be con- 
sidered an attack upon its independence." After such counsel, 
he said, he had made no efforts to obtain legislative approval 
unless invited to do so by the committee considering the proposal. 
He had never declined to reveal to individual members (who 
brought the subject into conversation) the administration's 
reasons for a measure-whether connected with the treasury or 
not; nor had he failed to try to "remove such objections as 
were made by them." He thought these were Monroe's ideas 
on the proper relations between the executive and legislative 
branches. 
The army nominations had never been the occasion for the 
interchange of an idea between Crawford and any member of 
the Senate until long after they had been acted on. He claimed 
ignorance of the reasons that governed Monroe's actions until 
the publication of the secretary of war's letter to the Committee 
on Military Affairs; he could not have explained them if the 
opportunity had occurred. He did not even know the opinion 
of the Georgia senators until after they had voted; consequently, 
any insinuation that he had any influence on Senate rejection 
was utterly false. 
Crawford knew embarrassments had occurred, but he main- 
tained they had not resulted from either his action or inaction. 
Should he remain a member of the administration, it would 
"comport strictly not only with my views, but my feelings, to 
render you the aid which you desire & expect, if I have distinctly 
understood what is expected by you." But, he added, if it were 
expected that he be responsible for the imputation his enemies 
think the interest of their favorites requires them to cast upon 
him, then it "will be impossible for me to remain in the adminis- 
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tration with advantage to you, or reputation to myself." At the 
moment, if he understood the spirit of Monroe's letter, he might 
by implication be subject to the charge of "having been deficient 
in my duty towards the President, & of practically declaring, that 
if I should continue in the administration, the aid which is 
desired & expected of me would not be rendered." T o  neither 
of these would he consent to subject himself because such an 
admission would be "wholly inconsistent with my past conduct, 
& future intentions." He would leave Georgia about October 1 
unless a communication from the President would make the 
journey with his family unnecessary. But whatever the President's 
decision, Crawford would continue to cherish the recollections 
of the long friendship between them and should always regret if 
the "intrigues of unprincipled men" have deprived him of that 
friendship without his having the means or the opportunity of 
defending himself against their attacks.62 
On September 14 Crawford indicated he would not leave 
Georgia until October 9; the delay would allow ample time for 
him to receive the President's reply. Monroe found great satis- 
faction in Crawford's remarks about support of the administration, 
but he denied intimating that any of Crawford's actions had been 
incompatible with the conduct expected of department heads. 
Crawford was mistaken about the conduct of "certain persons 
to whom I presume you allude." In one case there had been 
"uninterrupted silence"; in the other there had been no allusion 
to Crawford except casually in conversation and always in the 
"most delicate and guarded" manner. But Monroe would not 
deal in minor matters since there was agreement on principle 
and assurance of Crawford's friendly feeling. The  President had 
full confidence in his secretary's integrity and expressed the desire 
for Crawford to continue in the adminis t ra t i~n .~~ 
Crawford was writing to the President when he received 
Monroe's letter; he found its sentiments highly gratifying. He 
told the President of a number of deaths in central Georgia 
from the fever, the fatal burning of his eldest brother in a "most 
distressing accident," and the recovery of his family, all of whom 
had been ill when they left Washington. They planned to leave 
Georgia on October 9 and arrive in Washington about the end 
62 Crawford to Monroe, Sept. 3, 1822, ibid. 
63 Crawford to Monroe, Sept. 14, 1822; Monroe to Crawford, Sept. 17, 1822, ibid. 
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of the month.e4 The  following day he told a friend that Monroe's 
letter was "entirely conciliatory and satisfactory." Though touch- 
ing lightly upon the relations of others, the President's remarks 
were calculated to remove existing impressions and to quiet 
suspicions about those persons.66 The  summer had probably 
seemed unusually long to both Crawford and Monroe. 
Crawford was to remain in the treasury post, but from this 
time on he had increasing reason to doubt his influence in the 
administration, particularly in the matter of appointments. After 
the summer of 1822 Crawford's recommendations for appoint- 
ments seemed almost always designed simply to bring the person 
' 4 .  Into view." Upon hearing of the death of Josiah Meigs, com- 
missioner of the General Land Office, Crawford wrote Samuel 
Harrison Smith that he had recommended him as Meigs' suc- 
cessor. Crawford was not sure his support would be useful, but 
he thought it proper for Smith to know what he had done, and 
Smith could then advance his cause as he thought best. By the 
time Crawford wrote, the position had been filled, but Crawford 
had not received Monroe's letter telling him of the choice of 
John McLean.OG 
The General Land Office was under the supervision of Craw- 
ford, and there is some indication that McLean was not happy 
in his position,07 which was probably gained primarily through 
the influence of Calhoun. But McLean's term as commissioner 
was short. On June 10, 1823, Crawford informed Thomas Worth- 
ington that Return J.  Meigs had tendered his resignation as 
postmaster general, indicated that Richard M. Johnson had been 
mentioned as his successor, and believed that the statement in 
the New York Advocate sanctioning the possible appointment of 
McLean was inserted to sound public opinion. But Crawford 
was going to see Monroe that day and tell him Worthington had 
his support for any office to which he might be appointed. This 
contact would probably be of no help to Worthington; it might 
64 Crawford to Monroe, Sept. 28, 1822, Gratz. 
65 Crawford to David B. Mitchell, Sept. 29, 1822, Moses Tyler Pyne-Joseph Henry 
Collection (Princeton University). 
66 Crawford to Smith, Sept. 19, 1822, J. Henley Smith Papers (MDLC); Monroe 
to Crawford, Sept. 7, 1822, Monroe, MDLC. Monroe said he would have been 
glad to have had Crawford's counsel if he  had been near enough to promise early 
arrival. 
67 Thomas L. M'Kenney, Memoirs, Oficial and Personal . . . , 2 vols. i n  1 (New 
York, 1846), 1:50, 52. 
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even be to his disadvantage. Crawford was not indifferent about 
- 
the matter, but he confessed that "in my position I can do very 
little." His letter was prompted by friendship and public interest, 
and he thought Worthington might have some means of promoting 
his own interest. Within two weeks McLean was a p p ~ i n t e d . ~ ~  
At this very time an appointment of far greater political impli- 
cations was under consideration. There were several aspirants, 
including Martin Van Buren, for the associate justiceship of the 
Supreme Court, a vacancy caused by the death of Brockholst 
Livingston. Benjamin F. Butler, long associated with Van Buren 
in New York and visiting in Washington in May 1823, apparently 
in connection with this appointment, met with the secretaries of 
navy and treasury and the commissioner of the General Land 
Office; he was to see three or four others, including Joseph 
Anderson, who he had discovered was Crawford's righthand man. 
Crawford was described as a "plain giant of a man-very affable 
and talkative-seems to be a man of good sense & sound judgment, 
though I should not think, (and his friends do not present him 
as such) a man of brilliant talents. He  was (of course) very civil 
&c &c." Butler reported that Van Buren probably would not 
be appointed to the Court.69 
Butler had discovered something that Crawford, apparently, 
did not know, for the latter said he had no clue by which he 
could "offer a rational conjecture" of the decision the President 
would make. The  only mention of the appointment in Crawford's 
presence had been Monroe's statement that "motives of delicacy" 
had induced him not to consult any of the department heads in 
this case. In denying a report that he had advocated the appoint- 
ment of Nathan Sanford, Crawford said he was so well aware of 
his position relative to appointments that he had made it a rule 
to "manifest no preference for any individual applicant." When 
Monroe had introduced the Supreme Court vacancy into a con- 
versation, Crawford had indicated his belief that Sanford would 
be as acceptable to New York as any other person-unless Van 
Buren was disposed to accept the position. He was neither recom- 
mending Sanford nor attempting to secure his appointment; if 
he were interested in securing the appointment of any person, 
68 Crawford to Worthington, June 10, 1823, Worthington; J. B. Mower to C. K. 
Gardner, June 25, 1823, Charles K. Gardner Papers (New York State Library); 
White, Jeffersonians, 315. 
69 Butler to Harriet [Mrs. Butler], May 7, 1823, Benjamin F. Butler Papers (NYS). 
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he would act by "indirect means, i.e. thro' other persons."70 
There seems to have been general agreement that the President 
would not elevate the political friends of the secretary of the 
treasury.71 
Monroe played well his role of impartiality toward all the 
presidential candidates by choosing Smith Thompson, secretary 
of the navy, for the Court vacancy. Crawford was surprised by 
the choice and thought there must be a secret history of the case.72 
Certainly Crawford had no influence in this appointment. After 
the latter part of 1822 Monroe considered appointments his own 
province. His determination to control nominations was admit- 
tedly influenced by the "scramble for office," but the keen embar- 
rassment from the rejection of the army nominations was also 
probably a factor in setting this course. 
Crawford's participation in cabinet discussions and affairs of 
government other than those of the treasury was very limited 
after the Thompson elevation. His serious illness of September 
1823 was followed by a relapse in May 1824, at which time 
Monroe raised the possibility of appointing a temporary replace- 
ment for him. In a June 22 cabinet session, lasting from 8 a.m. 
until 9:30 p.m. and devoted primarily to discussing whether 
Ninian Edwards should relinquish his ministership to Mexico,73 
Adams was asked if he would assume Crawford's duties. The  
secretary of state thought it would be found that the business of 
the treasury had been transacted with as "much accuracy and 
fidelity as was compatible with Mr. Crawford's indisposition"; if 
no material inconvenience had occurred or was likely to occur, 
he felt it best not to make a temporary appointment. Discussion 
ranged over the whole history of the Monroe administration and 
the opposition of Crawford partisans from the Seminole debate to 
the slave trade convention. Monroe thought Crawford had not 
"sufficiently discountenanced" the activity of his partisans but 
the treasury secretary had shown Monroe Thomas W. Cobb's 
reply to Crawford's letter disapproving the "Trio" attack of 1821. 
Several months later the President noted that Crawford had 
often spoken severely of Jackson's character and Jackson had done 
70 Crawford to Van Buren, May 9, 1823, Van Buren. 
71 Jacob Brown to C. K. Gardner, May 22, 1823, Gardner; Calhoun to J. D. 
Erben, June 29, 1823, Andre DeCoppett Collection (Princeton University). 
72 Crawford to Van Buren, Aug. 1, 1823 (confidential), Van Buren. 
73 See following chapter. 
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the same of Crawford. Jackson had urged the removal of Craw- 
ford, but he was told that Crawford had claims on Monroe's 
forbearance and friendship which probably no other man had. 
These were explained to Jackson, who admitted the force of 
them and had not mentioned the subject since.74 One can only 
conjecture what "claims" Crawford had, for at no place are 
they spelled out. Perhaps they related to their long friendship, to 
Crawford's support of Monroe in 1808, to Monroe's secretaryship 
of war and state, to their membership in Madison's cabinet, to 
Crawford's declining to be a candidate for the presidency against 
Monroe in 18 16, to Crawford's opposition to any presidential 
nominating caucus in 1820, or to all these things collectively. 
Crawford had refused to enter the Monroe cabinet unless the 
government provided payment for some of Georgia's claims; this 
was done, but the problems arising from the Indians remaining 
in Georgia obtruded into the national councils throughout the 
Monroe administration-and for many years after. Crawford 
believed the government was bound by the compact of 1802 to 
obtain cession of the Indian lands as soon as possible, and by 
1823 the Indians had given up  vast stretches of their holdings in 
Georgia. In that year, however, the Creek and Cherokee indicated 
that the several million acres they still held were not subject to 
further cession. The  Georgians considered the Indians dependent 
tenants and were embittered that the central government had 
not fully executed the 1802 agreement. Governor George M. 
Troup, sharply critical of the national government, wanted the 
compact carried out immediately; the legislature drafted a "memo- 
rial and remonstrance," which was forwarded to Monroe on De- 
cember 20, 1823, and to the Georgia senators and representatives, 
who were urged to carry out the purpose of the remonstrance. 
Senator John Forsyth became very active, as did Thomas W. 
Cobb, but the latter (a representative) pointed out that he derived 
the right to his seat directly from the people of Georgia and thus 
doubted the power of any department of the state government 
to instruct him on how to discharge his duty. At the same time 
he expressed hearty concurrence in the sentiments of the memo- 
rial and the governor's letter and assured Troup he would do 
everything possible to obtain the object of the memorial.7B 
74 Adams, Memoirs, 6:391-95, 485-86 (June 22, 1824; Jan. 31, 1825). 
75 Cobb to George M. Troup, Jan. 14, 1824, Cobb Folder (GDAH). 
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Forsyth and Senator John Elliott saw Monroe; he had received 
the memorial, but he would make no recommendation to Con- 
gress-he had already made his views known and all he would do 
was sign whatever measure Congress might pass. At Monroe's 
request the two called later; they were read materials that would 
serve as a basis for negotiations with the Cherokee. Shortly 
thereafter they were angered and surprised by the correspondence 
between the War Department and the Cherokee chiefs, which 
Monroe sent in accord with his earlier promise. Forsyth then 
drafted the communication (generally called the "protest") of 
the Georgia delegation in Congress to Monroe. This letter, 
signed by the two senators and six representatives from Georgia, 
blamed the government for the refusal of the Indians to migrate, 
criticized the methods of negotiating with the Indians, and de- 
manded government use of force against the Indians if peaceful 
removal could not be immediately effected. 
The  more Monroe reflected on the "extraordinary character" 
of the paper the greater surprise it excited. He had pressed for 
cessions from the Indians since he had come into office, but this 
paper caused him to change his mind about sending a special 
message to Congress on March 15. He was satisfied Crawford 
knew nothing of the proceedings, but since the character of the 
state as well as the nation was involved he would not send the 
document to Congress without the secretary's having seen it. He  
had given the letter to Crawford, and he asked James Barbour 
to call on Crawford (whose eyesight was then severely impaired) 
and read the papers with him. Monroe did not think it proper 
for him to propose withdrawing the unprovoked and unexpected 
protest, but if it were not withdrawn he would communicate it 
to Congress with the other materials. Two days later Monroe 
again wrote Barbour and emphasized that the letter to Crawford 
stated explicitly that if the paper were withdrawn it would be 
by action of the Georgians and not by "any suggestion of mine 
other than to permit it." Monroe, convinced the matter was a 
"painful subject" to Crawford, wished to trouble the indisposed 
secretary as little as possible. He asked Barbour to see Crawford 
and then communicate with the President.TB 
76 Monroe to Barbour, March 14, 16, 1824, Barbour. Monroe later described the 
letter as "Such an one as I never received either in my public or private character." 
Monroe to Madison, April [n.d.] 1524, Hamilton, Monroe Writings, 7:18. 
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Adams thought the letter would be withdrawn through Craw- 
- - 
ford's intercession, and he suspected it had been written with 
that intention. Crawford, much mortified by the letter, saw 
Elliott, indicated his disapproval, and intimated his wish that 
the communication be withdrawn. The  delegation decided they 
would not withdraw the letter nor "communicate with him on 
the subje~t."~7 In a special message transmitting the materials to 
Congress Monroe reviewed the actions of the government. He 
noted the unwillingness of the Indians to exchange their Georgia 
lands for land west of the Mississippi, said the Indians could be 
removed immediately only by force, and asserted that under the 
compact of 1802 the government was not obliged to force their 
removal. The  special committee report was followed by an 
appropriation on May 26 of only $50,000 for extinguishing Creek 
titles to land in G e ~ r g i a . ~ ~  I t  is interesting, but in character, that 
Adams should suspect a contrived plot to permit Crawford's influ- 
ence to be felt. Crawford, in this instance, as in several others, 
obviously had no control over the actions of Cobb and some of 
his other followers-though their actions were often ascribed 
to his promptings. 
During the period from the selection of the presidential electors 
in November 1824 and the choice of the President by the House 
in February 1825 there was much visiting between and among 
the partisans of the candidates and some among the candidates 
themselves. Much earlier in the Monroe administration the 
cabinet had several times discussed the etiquette of visiting; their 
practices varied considerably, and they were unable to standardize 
them. But the dinners, balls, and social gatherings continued. 
Some were gala events; others rather routine, and at times the 
President and Crawford (or one of the other secretaries) would 
exchange guest lists in order to avoid duplication of  invitation^.^^ 
77 Monroe to Jefferson, April [n.d.] 1824, Hamilton, Monroe Writings, 7:20-21; 
Adams, Menzoirs, 6:258, 262 (March 15, 1824). Barbour thought the letter had been 
written by Forsyth and copied by Cobb. Monroe thought the act of the Georgians 
was motivated by eagerness for popularity in their state, the passion of the people 
for land, and party ambition of the Crawford faction to outdo the Clark faction. 
7s Annals, 18th Cong., 1st sess., 462-64, 469-71, 2348-57; ASPIA, 2:495-98; House 
Doc., No. 115 (serial 98), 18th Cong., 1st sess.; 4 Stat. 36. This story, with emphasis 
on Forsyth's role, may be followed in Duckett, Forsyth, 105-8. 
79 Adams, Memoirs, 4:311, 480-81, 483-86, 487-91; Crawford to Madison, Feb. 20, 
1816, Madison Papers (University of Virginia); Rufus King to Christopher Gore, 
Feb. 19, 1818, King, King, 6:59; Crawford to Monroe, Jan. 4, 1818, Monroe, MDLC. 
P R E S I D E N T I A L  ADVISER 2 1 1  
Not a great deal of information is available on the social and 
family life of the Crawfords, but one would infer from Adams' 
comments that Mrs. Crawford was sufficiently active in the social 
sphere. And an occasional glimpse is given by others. Margaret 
Bayard (Mrs. Samuel Harrison) Smith paints a warm picture of 
the Crawford family life-with an infrequent touch of the social 
-and Crawford seems to have become a favorite of the Smiths 
after Jefferson retired from the pre~idency .~~ Louis McLane of 
Delaware, often in Washington without his family, attended many 
social affairs and frequently wrote rather frankly about them to 
his wife. In one instance he told of a Sunday at the Crawfords'. 
Crawford was exceedingly fond of his children and in the "old 
style had them playing about us all day." Mrs. Crawford had 
"none of the aire" of Mrs. Adams, but she was a lzind, excellent 
woman whom he hoped one day to see "receiving bows at the 
palace." McLane was delighted with and complimentary of the 
children, noted especially the brightness of Macon, and said his 
day with the Crawfords was the most pleasant since he came to 
Washington. Reporting on a dinner at the President's on Decem- 
ber 11, 1822, McLane said that Calhoun and his wife looked 
"as if they hoped to be settled there soon themselves." Crawford, 
who sat next to McLane, was no longer wearing a wig and "looks 
much better than I ever saw him."s1 
McLane's is the only discovered mention of Crawford's wig, and 
until recently the only published picture of Crawford-from the 
portrait by John Wesley Jarvis-shows him wigless, with only a 
few wisps of hair on the top of his head but with a plentiful 
supply elsewhere. In  1959 the portrait done by Charles Willson 
Peale in 1818 was discovered in Washington; it shows Crawford 
with a wig. The  portrait was begun on December 8 and finished 
five days later, with Mrs. Crawford and the children present 
during the last sitting. Though the Crawfords were pleased with 
so Gaillard Hunt, ed., The First Forty Years of Washington Society . . . (New 
York, 1906), 170-205 passim. I t  will be recalled that there are no extant letters 
from Crawford to his family, and no letter by Mrs. Crawford is known to exist. 
T h e  Hunt item consists of letters to and from Margaret Bayard (Mrs. Samuel H.) 
Smith and members of her family. Mrs. Smith said, on January 14, 1825, Crawford's 
happiness "depends chiefly if not entirely on his family-he is the fondest father 
and one of the best husbands I ever knew." Ibid., 171. 
81 McLane to Dear Kitty, n.d.; Mc1,ane to Col. Allen M'Lane, Dec. 12, 1822, 
McLane Papers (University of Delaware). Most of the McLane papers are on 
microfilm. 
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the work, they must not have bought a copy, for there is no evi- 
dence that the artist made one.82 
The  "wigless" cabinet years must have been much less satisfying 
to Crawford than the earlier ones. Congenial atmosphere gave 
way to considerable suspicion and discord, nurtured in large 
measure by presidential ambitions of the cabinet members. 
Monroe, in an effort to preserve his neutrality in the presidential 
contest and probably also to try to avoid embarrassment such as 
he had suffered in the spring of 1822, reduced the influence of 
all department heads by assuming almost exclusive control over 
appointments. Crawford's role was further reduced by his serious 
illness in the fall of 1823 and his relapse in May 1824. By the 
latter date the presidential campaign had long been in full swing 
and the Georgian had been nominated by the congressional 
caucus. 
82 Washington Post, July 15, 1959; Peale to Rembrandt Peale, Dec. 5, 1818; 
Peale to Rubens Peale, Dec. 9, 1818, Charles Willson Peale Letter Book XV; Charles 
Willson Peale Diary, Dec. 13, 1818 (American Philosophical Society Library). 
Peale did not part with originals. On December 7 Crawford remarked that he 
thought Peale was pursuing a "very unprofitable business." Peale answered that 
he "did not think so, as I expected to carry great treasure with me." 
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Presidential Politics 
CRAWFORD'S RECORD as senator from 1807 to 1813 had placed him 
high in the party hierarchy, and his appointment as secretary of 
war, upon his return from France, had again called him to public 
attention. Few people, however, thought of him in 1815 as 
Madison's successor, though he was sometimes linked, as the vice- 
presidential candidate, with Governor Daniel Tompkins of New 
York. James Monroe, secretary of state since 1811 and also 
secretary of war at the end of the conflict with England, was 
most often mentioned as heir apparent. Though Monroe had 
opposed Madison's election in 1808, the key Republican leaders 
quickly forgave his temporary disaffection and quietly gave sup- 
port to his selection in 1816. His Revolutionary service and long, 
though not always illustrious, career were factors in his fav0r.l 
Crawford favored Monroe's candidacy, but he hoped to use the 
nominating caucus of 1816 to improve his chances for succeeding 
Monroe in 1825. 
By early 1816, when the presidential election became a topic 
of general disc~ssion,~ many were advocating the election of the 
Georgian, but extant materials reveal nothing as to Crawford's 
presidential hopes and ambition until he took steps to withdraw 
his name from caucus consideration. Support for Crawford ap- 
pears to have been rooted to a considerable degree in a deep-seated 
resentment-in the New England area, in New York, and to a 
lesser degree in the South-against Virginia's continued domina- 
tion of the presidential olfice. This might well have resulted in 
party division in 18 16 had Craw ford been willing to be a candidate 
for the congressional caucus nomination. He probably would 
have been successful, but it is by no means sure that he would 
have defeated Monroe-who most certainly would have been his 
opponent in the election. But Crawford was not a candidate and 
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the reemergence of parties was delayed until after the election ot 
1824. 
T h e  feeling prevailed among many politicians that Virginia, 
in maintaining her supremacy, "bought off  serious challengers 
from Massachusetts and New York by giving them the second 
place on the tickets. New York had seen its earlier favorites, 
Aaron Burr and George Clinton, relegated to the vice presidency 
under the Virginia dynasty; in 1816 New York had another 
favorite son, Governor Tompkins, and the major maneuvering 
on the caucus nomination was centered in the New York con- 
gressional delegation and among prominent persons in New York 
state. There was some confusion as to the exact purpose of their 
actions, and there remains some difference of interpretation as 
to who was responsible for what. 
The New York dilemma is revealed in a letter from Jabez D. 
Hammond to Martin Van Buren on January 23, 18 16. Hammond, 
unable to see Van Buren when the latter visited Washington, 
wanted the "little fox" to know that the New York delegation 
intended to support Tompltins for the presidential nomination. 
The  way to achieve their goal was not so easily determined, but 
it was clearly necessary to divide the southern interests if Tomp- 
kins were to be successful. Hammond had thought the "true 
policy" was to support the pretensions of Crawford in preference 
to Monroe if Crawford and his friends could be persuaded to pit 
themselves against Monroe and his friends. Then a situation 
might be produced that would bring the nomination of Tompkins. 
If not, then the next best thing-nomination of Crawford-might 
1)e a~hieved .~  
Samuel R. Betts, another member of the New York congres- 
sional delegation, reported that some of those opposed to another 
President from Virginia had a high regard for Tompkins and 
acltnowledged the weight of the New York claims, but they 
1)elieved Tompkins was not sufficiently well known by people of 
1 See Josiah Meigs to Oliver \Yolcott, Nov. 13, 1813, Oliver Wolcotl I'apers (Con- 
necticut Historical Society); Nathaniel Macon LO Crawford, Jan. 30, 1814, Crawcord, 
MDLC; John Norvelle to George W. Campbell, Feb. 18, March 3, 1815, Campbell, 
MDLC. Christopher Gore to Rufus King, Aug. 20, 1815, King, King, 5:486; Jabez D. 
Hamrnond, The  History of Political Parties in the State of New York, 2 vols. 
(Cooperstown, N.Y., 1847), I :395. 
:! Scc, -.. for example, llul/alo Gazelle, Jan. 30, 1816; Boston Patriot, Jan. 13,  20, Feb. 
7, 21,24, 1816. 
Van 1)uren Papers. 
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other states. If the New York claims were pressed, other anti- 
Virginians would make common cause with the Virginians. Betts 
knew this to be the case with members from North Carolina and 
Georgia, two from South Carolina and Tennessee, and a majority 
of the Kentucky delegation. The last group, maintaining the 
inlpossibility of r~orninating Tompltins, expressed a willingness 
to join New York in support of some candidate against Monroe. 
Further, Betts said the statement in the New York National 
Advocale ~ h a l  Crawiord did not wish to be a candidate was pub- 
lished without Crawford's Itnowledge; he would serve as President 
if elected. However, Crawford's closest friends said he would not 
permil his name to be presented unless he was certain of New 
York's support. These friends believed Crawford's career would 
be injured greatly if he were proposed for the nomination without 
a strong possibility of success-or enough votes to make his failure 
respectable. Only Crawford, Betts thought, could be a real com- 
petitor against Monroe, but unity among the anti-Monroe people 
was necessary to bring about ilomination of the Georgian. If 
there was no possibility of carrying Tompkins in Washington, 
Betts suggested that Van Buren might prefer to nominate Craw- 
ford for President and Tompkins (if he would consent) for Vice 
President in "your legislature" thus starting the ticltet with a 
"high ~haracter."~ 
The statement, derived apparently from conversations, that 
Crawford did not wish to be a candidate had been widely dis- 
seminated, though he intended it for circulation only among his 
partisans who should prevent his name from being placed in 
candidacy against Monroe. But Van Buren wanted to Itnow 
definitely whether Crawford was a candidate. Van Buren had 
accepted the word of William W. Bibb, Crawford's successor in 
the Senate and spokesman for the former minister, that Crawford's 
name would not be presented to the caucus, and Van Buren had 
so informed his friends in Albany. However, "numerous letters" 
had indicated that the declaration in one of the papers was not 
authorized, and if New York would support Crawford his friends 
would bring him out against Monroe. Would Bibb enlighten 
him?6 
4 netts to Van Buren, Jan. 19, 1816, ibid. See also Robert V. Remini, "New York 
and the Presidential Election of 1816," New York History 31 (1950):316. 
a Val1 Burell Lo Uibb, Jan. 29, 1816, Van Uuren. 
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Bibb then took "oflicial" action designed to withdraw Craw- 
ford's name from further consideration. On February l ,  1816, 
he wrote the National Intelligencer: "In consequence of repeated 
enquiries . . . whether Mr. Crawford was to be considered anlong 
the competi~ors, accompanied with the desire that his views 
should be ascertained, I communicated to him what liad passed. 
He replied, without reserve, that he did not consider lii~nself 
among the iiumber of those from whom the selection ought to be 
made, and that he was unwilling to be held up as a con~petitor 
for that offi~e."~ Not even the wide republication of this statement 
deterred many Crawford supporters from continuing to advocate 
liis nomination. 
The  Monroe papers contain an eight-page memo, apparently 
written about this time, which shows that he was fully aware of 
events and that he was determined to be a candidate for the presi- 
dency. In this paper, which may well have served as a guide for 
his followers, Monroe noted the opposition to him because he was a 
Virginian and because of the friendship of some for Clay, Craw- 
ford, and Tompkins. He detailed the possible combinations that 
involved Crawford as presidential nominee and Tompkins as 
second choice (and the reverse), spoke of the Bibb declaration 
and the "denial," and hinted at Federalist machinations. The  
Monroe supporters, he maintained, had a right to ask whether 
Crawford was a candidate, and his answer should decide the matter. 
For him to say he was not a candidate and for his friends to con- 
tinue to advance his candidacy would be absurd, since everyone 
would believe that he could stop the negotiations if he chose. If 
Crawford's friends proposed a caucus, it might be inferred that they 
had ascertained how the Republican members of Congress would 
vote and on which side the majority was. Monroe's friends, he 
concluded, should not attend the caucus; they should say that 
the great republican body of voters should d e ~ i d e . ~  
This paper could have been written before the publication of 
Bibb's letter of February 1, with the denial reference being to 
6 National Intelligencer, Feb. 3, 1816. Remini, "New York and the Presidential 
Election of 1816," 316, maintains that Crawford made "one of the greatest mistakes 
of Ilis life. Reset with doul~ts as to his own adequacy, of the possil)iliry of Rlonroe's 
victory and its ell'ect ~ l p o r ~  liis future career, to say no t l~ i t~g  of 1.1ie rirnitlity he found 
elsewliere tlisplayed by liis s~lpposeclly ardent partisans, Ile utis~rcccssfully attempted 
lo withtlraw from the race. Foolish though it was, lie autl~orized his close friend 
and advisor . . . to make his decision known." 
7 Monroe Papers, MDLC. 
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the assertion that Crawford had not authorized the first notice, 
which appeared in the Nalio?lal Aduocate and other papers. Such 
probably was the case. There is no indication that Monroe sent 
this piece LO anyone; perhaps he was just thinking things through 
so that he could better plan with his followers. However, it is 
possible-and even probable-that  here is a connection between 
Monroe's memo and a communication of February 9, 1816. In  
the latter, several Monroe stalwarts noted that when Congress 
assembled they thought Monroe had the undivided support of 
the Republican party; the caucus had been delayed, and now 
the friends of Crawford were claiming a congressional majority 
for their favorite. T h e  function of the caucus, the writers held, 
was merely to "give concert to public opinion" and not to attempt 
to influence it-if the people were left to themselves they would 
be disposed to elect Monroe. If Crawford's claims were pressed, 
and unless circumstances dictated a change in the "course agreed 
upon," Monroe's friends would refuse a caucus lest a majority 
be procured against what was considered the public sentiment. 
I t  was a "delicate business"; as little "eclat" as possible should be 
given to the communication which was intended for the use of 
"our republican friends only."s 
Meanwhile, Bibb had informed Van Buren that from the begin- 
ning of  he presidential discussions he had been convinced that 
Crawford did not wish to have his name presented to the caucus, 
and Bihb continued to oppose Crawford's candida<:y.Vome, how- 
ever, thought Crawford not especially sincere in his withdrawal; 
others took direct steps to remove their uncertainty. Among the 
latter was Abner Lacock, senator from Pennsylvania, who talked 
with BiRb and then with Crawford, who confirmed what Bibb 
had said. Crawford had asked Bibb to assure every man (who 
asked) that he was not a candidate; he never intended there 
should be any public notice of this action and regretted that a 
declaration, "made in the sincerity of my heart," had not been 
sufficient to end discussion of his possible candidacy. T o  Lacock's 
statement that Monroe's claims to the nomination were stronger 
than Crawford's and that Crawford could be President after 
Monroe's death, the Georgian responded, "True. If Monroe be- 
8 James ~ar l )our ,  A.  1'. Mason, James I'leasanls, 'rl~otnas Newton, \Villiatu Koane, 
and I l u g l ~  Nelson lo GenLlenien, Feb. 9, 1816, Barbour. 
9 Bi l~b  lo Van Uuren, Feb. 5, 1816, Van Buren. 
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longed to any other state . . . there would be no other candidate 
spoken of." The  day before the meeting with Lacock, Crawford 
told Erastus Root of New York that he would not serve if elected. 
He had authorized Bibb to say that he was not a candidate; how 
could he act now with such duplicity as to say that he was? 
Further, his feelings would not permit him to oppose Monroe: 
their friendship, the manner of Crawford's coming into the 
cabinet, the effect on that body, and "every principle of honor, 
justice and propriety forbid me, if I can help it, allowing my 
name to be entered in opposition to him."1° 
Nevertheless, Crawford's "candidacy" continued to be discussed. 
Editors and individuals who accepted his withdrawal often praised 
him for his fine qualities and his unwillingness to promote party 
dissension; others insisted that he must be a candidate, for only 
he could overcome the effects of the sectional differences shown 
during the War of 1812; still others, especially those favoring 
Monroe, saw Federalist influence behind Crawford's support and 
compared Crawford unfavorably with Monroe.ll 
Crawford remained the chief pivot of the maneuvers going on 
among New Yorkers. Betts informed Van Buren on February 5 
that some of the New York congressional delegation, seeing no 
chance to nominate Tompkins, ~vould vote for Monroe rather 
than Crawford. The  uncertainty of the goal of the New Yorkers 
was again revealed. If Van Buren wished Crawford pushed, he 
would have to be nominated at Albany; the division in the New 
York delegation would destroy the practicability of nominating 
him in caucus.12 
The  Van Buren-Tompkins forces controlled the New York 
legislature, and even though it was obvious by the second week 
of February that Tompkins had no chance for the nomination, 
Van Buren was not willing to risk his control at Albany by making 
an all-out effort to nominate Crawford. Then, too, the "vindictive 
10 Abner 1,acock to John Binns, Feb. 7, 8, 1816, in Savannah Republican, J a n .  10, 
1824. The  originals of these letters have not been located. 
11 See, for example, Atlzens Journal, Feb. 22, 1816; Albany Register, Feb. 20, March 
12, 1816: New Huntfishire Patriot, Feb. 20, 1816; hlational Zntelligencer, Feb. 6, 22, 
1816: Richmond Enquirer, Feb. 10, 15, 1816, Philadelphia Democratic Presc, Feb. 8, 
1816, nnltimore Patriot, Feb. 14, 1816; Spencer Roane to James Barbour, Feb. 12, 
1816, Uarbour; Jeremiah Morrow to Thomas Worthington, Feb. 12, 1816, Worthing- 
ton; Iohn McI.ean to Ethan A. Blown, March 4, 1816, Ethan A. Brown I'apers 
(OH?), Amb~ose Spencer to Jacob Brown, March 2, 1816, Brown, MHS; "No. 3-The 
Next President and Public Opinion," by "An Independent Citizen," Monroe, NYP. 
12 BetLs to Van B u ~ e n ,  Feb. 5, 1816, Van 15u1en. 
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and arrogant" Judge Ambrose Spencer was strongly in favor of 
Crawford; if Van Buren supported Crawford this meant "su1)- 
mitting" to Spencer-and the possible undermining of Van Uuren 
in New York. I t  is entirely possible that after the trip to Wash- 
ington in January Van Buren worked secretly for the choice 
of Monroe-a choice that wo~xld be ensured by adhering to 
Tompltins. T h e  result was that on February 14 the New York 
legislature resolved that the state's congressional delegation be 
instructed to support Tompkins, and the resolutions warned that 
tlie ascendency of the Republican party would be jeopardized 
by the nomination of another Virgiiiian.l3 
T h e  Albany action did not end tlie disagreement in 11ie New 
York delegation. On  February 23 and 26 they met to corlsider 
their ir~struclions. Neither the friends of Monroe nor the friends 
of Crawford would yield, so it was coricluded the nomination of: 
Tompkins was impossible. T h e  delegation could not unite on 
one man, and the meeting was broken up before a niotion For 
unanimous support of the candidate of the majority could I)e 
adopted.14 
Anonymously, [he friends of Crawford called for a caucris to 
meet on March 12, but this caucus did nothing more than author- 
ize another. T h e  friends of Monroe were said to he in "great 
consternation," and those who pretended to know believed the 
votes for Crawford arid Tompkins would exceed those for Monroe 
and all or nearly all of Tompkins' friends would unite against 
Monroe. On March 15 the Monroe partisans met and clecided 
to attend the caucus and attempt to prevent a nomination. 
As soon as the meeting organized the next evening, Ilenry 
Clay moved that it was inexpedient to make a nomination. After 
much discussion the motion was lost. Balloting proceeded, with 
Monroe defeating Crawford 65-54 and Tompkins defeating Simon 
Snyder 85-30 for the vice-presidential post. According to Betts, 
Among llle writers on the New J'orlc scene there is not colnl)lcle iIgl.eclnent ;IS 
to what happened and who supported wlloni. For accounts see IIcAlva Sl;lnwootl 
Alexander, A Polilicnl History of Nert~ York,  3 vols. (New York, 1906.1009), 1:237-40. 
FIarnrnontl, 1'olilic.nl Pnrlies, 1:405-12; Ren~ini,  "New York and the I'resitler~lial 
I?lection of 1816," 311-17. A copy of the resolutions of the New York assem1)ly is in 
lhe T;~ylor Papers. 
14 S;LIIIIICI K. Ilells to Van I%~rl.en, Feb. 24, 181(i, Van Ilnren: Hi~n~niontl ,  I'olili~111 
Pnrlies, 1:409; Remini, "New York and the Presidential Election of 1816," 318-10: 
101111 TY. Taylor to Jolln Tayler, Feb. 28, 1816, Taylor. Peter B. I'ortcr, ,John \Y. 
Taylor, and Enos 'T. Throop were said to have been responsible for the 1r;lsty 
adjournment. 
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Monroe's friends had had cause for alarm, for William T .  Barry 
and Micah Tau1 of Kentucky, Bennett H. Henderson, Samuel 
Powell, and Isaac Thomas of Tennessee, James J.  Wilson and 
one other from New Jersey, Thomas Wilson of Pennsylvania, 
and one (Bartlett Yancey?) from North Carolina who had 
always declared their decided preference for Crawford voted for 
Monroe. Four sick members voted by proxy for Monroe; four of 
Crawford's friends refused to attend, as did two of Monroe's. 
Four, said Betts, of. the New York delegation voted for Monroe.]" 
Crawford certainly was not pleased with the caucus action. He 
felt he had "serious cause of complaint against my partirt~lar 
friends. They would not consent, when the declarations of Dr. 
Bibb were not sufficient, that I should put an end to the contest 
by declaring that I would not serve if elected." Their plan, as 
Crawford understood it, was to attend the caucus, vote for Monroe, 
and state their position in a communication to the Nutiotlal 
Intelligencer. This procedure, they believed, would "place rrie 
on higher ground than could be occupied in any other way, as 
I did not wish to be elected. This plan was eventually abandoned, 
without any explanation ever having been given. Bibb, Tait, 
Macon, and Hall all absented themselves, with several others, 
and of course, deprived themselves of the right to make the 
proposed statement." He foresaw charges of intrigue and double- 
dealing.16 
Crawford declined Madison's offer to shift to the treasury, 
15 Jahez 1). Han~mond to Van Bnren, Rlarcl~ 10, 1816, Otis Norcross Collecrion 
(MHS): Nathan Sanford to Van Buren, March 14, 1816; Betts to Van Buren, March 
17, 1816, Van Boren: Ralti~?lore American & Comnlercial Ilaily Advertiser, March 19, 
1816: Nnlio~zctl Intelligencer, March 19, 1816. Of the twenty-four Republican mem- 
bers of Congress absent, nine were out of the city ant1 fifteen were "scrnpulous in 
regard to the propriety" of such nleetings or for other reasons were not disposed 
to attend. Niles' Weekly Register 10 (March 23, 1816):59-60. Certainly three of 
the New York delegation voted for Monroe. Ibiti., 25 (Dec. 20, 1823): 245; H;~mmontl. 
Political Parlies, 1:412. Hammond believed that only William Irving, Enos Throop. 
and Victory 13irdseye voted for Monroe. Earlier he had thought Taylor was in this 
group, but Taylor told Hammond this was not the case. Betts probably includetl 
Taylor in his count. Van Buren's brief account of the 1816 nomination is sornewhal 
less Lhan candid. John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., T h e  Autobiography of Martin Val1 Ilz~re~r,  
vol. 2 of Annual l l e f~or t  of the i\merican E-Iistorical Association for 1918 (WashingLon. 
D.C., 1920), 122. 
16 William W. Bibb, Charles 'Tait, and Bolling Hall of Georgia and Nathaniel 
Macon of North Carolina. Crawford should probably have known that Macon 
would not attend. Macon had an abiding hatred of caucuses; sustained and almost 
desperate efforts could not persuade him to attend the one in 1824 in spite of his 
enduring and devoted support of Crawford. 
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indicating that i t  might be better to have the next President 
"less shackled" in forming his cabinet. He  did not know what 
would be the best course: "I have some doubts whether, under 
the particular circumstances in which I have been placed, it will 
not be my duty to remain some time as a member of his [Monroe's] 
Cabinet, if he should wish it, and at least give him an opportunity 
of manifesting his displeasure, if I have incurred it." Tha t  he 
had temporarily lost faith in the judgment of his friends is clear; 
in deciding whether to remain in the government, he would not 
consult them, "as the chances are two to one that their advice 
will be wrong."l7 
In late October Crawford did move to the treasury in "obedi- 
ence to the earnest solicitations of the President," but he remained 
unhappy about what he called the obstinacy of a part of the 
Republican party in running his name at the caucus " in  opko.rition 
to my wishes" and those of his friends. This had resulted in his 
being sul~jected to "torrents of abuse" from all parts of the 
country. He  indicated he might retire at the end of Madison's 
term; he wolild leave public service with more relish than he 
entered it, hoping he would take with him the esteem of all good 
men who were acquainted with him.18 
Crawford and his supporters certainly were denount ed for the 
caucus actions, but the sharpest criticism was prompted by the 
Expo~ i t i on ,  a pamphlet of undetermined authorship which pur- 
ported to explain the motives of those who opposed Monroe, 
and which praised C r a w f o r d . l T h e  Expo.~ition, which seems to 
have been distributed in the latter part of May, attacked Monroe 
as the representative of the dominant Virginia group which seemed 
to have a "systematic design of perpetually governing the cotintry." 
Further, the pamphlet asserted, Monroe was not especially quali- 
fied for the presidency; even his friends considered him of but 
moderate talents and "slow of comprehension." Admittedly, he 
was urhane, but this quality simply made him more acce5silde 
and more open to "artifices of imposture." Such a nlan would 
17 Crawford to Albert Gallatin, May 10, 1816, (:allali~~: Ai l ;~~ns ,  Ctrllalir~ Il'~i1irlg.r. 
1:702-4. 
18 <:r;~wford to l'lionias Wortliington. Nov. 23, IXlfi, \Val-tl~i~~gton. 
19 Copies of the pamphlet, Ex~)o.sili011 of I \ lo l io~s  for O l ~ / ~ o ~ i i l g  l l ~ e  Norrlii,nliorl of 
Mr. A4onroe for the Of ice  o f  President o f  the lillitrrl States (TVasllington, I).C., 1816) 
are in the New York Stale 1.ibrary and in the .4l(lerman Lil~rary of the 1Jniversity 
o f  Virginia. 
2 2 2  ONE-PARTY PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS 
keep talent at a distance and surround himself with "co~npliant 
mediocrity, and hypocritical dullness"-an estimate made absurd 
by the caliber of Monroe's cabinet. Monroe's "blunders" in 
France were recounted, his opposition to Madison's election re- 
called, and his stockjobbing, government by patronage, and 
" 
entangling intercommunications with Europe" denounced. 
Even at the time of its publication, no one seemed to know 
rvlio the authors of the Exposition were. There is no indication 
that Crawford had foreknowledge of, sanctioned, or had any 
hand in it. Papers still supporting him printed it in full or in 
part, while others took uncomplimentary notice of it or said the 
owner might have all copies back by letting the editors know 
where to send them. The  Exposition was one of several such 
items, said the National Intelligencer; the paper believed the 
Expo~ i t i on  as unauthorized as it was ill advised. The  Intelligencer 
supported Monroe and maintained that the measures of Crawford's 
department and his own political views were fair subjects for 
discussion, but it entertained too high a respect for Crawford's 
personal and public character to suppose him capakle of sub- 
mi~t ing the public interest to personal or interested fee1ingsa2O 
Crawford's report on Indian affairs was made the subject of a 
systematic attack by "Americanus" of Washington, D.C., between 
April 10 and the end of the month. The  five letters, each begin- 
ning with the quotation dealing with intermarriage of whites 
and Indians and the "volunteered" comment on immigrants, 
appeared in several papers and later were printed as Stricttlre~ 
Addressed to lames  Madison o n  the Celebrated Report of Wi l l iam 
H .  Cmwford Recommending the lntermnrringe of Americans 
with the Indian Tribes. . . .*I In his remarks about foreigners 
Crawford -was said to exhibit a spirit of aristocracy, bigotry, and 
proscription that was in keeping with the principles and opinions 
which impelled him in 1798 to "mount the Black cockade, and 
volunteer in the proscription of Democracy, and the denunciation 
of the Rights of Man . "2The  letters rambled from one topic to 
20 .!f!bfln)> Register, May 28, 1816: Arntionnl Intellige~icer, May 23, luly 16, 18115. 
21 Jasper Ilarding of I'l~iladell~llia 1)rinletl 111e p;~nlplllet ill 182-1. 11 S~CIIIS,  t11011gh 
is not certain, that these may 1)e the letters which Crawford, in his letter to 
C,all;ttin on May 10, 1816, said "are rernarltable only for the grossest ignorance of 
the s ~ ~ b j c c t  w l~ ic l~  they treat, and asperity of abnse." 
%,Y/r.ic!~~r.es, iii. l ' h i s  is a reference to Crawford's signing the letter from the 
young rnen of Augusta lo President John Adams. 
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the other, but in their course they charged that Crawford despised 
the French as a "capering nation" whose language it was beneath 
his dignity to learn; that the gravity with which his proposals 
were made was a "coverslut"; that Crawford was a "mere theorist, 
and a very wild one"; and that it was not surprising that Crawford, 
who lived so long in the neighborhood of the Creek and other 
Indians, should make the suggestion of intermarriage. The  gov- 
ernment, however, had no means of encouraging his proposal 
except by some direct or indirect methods of paying the males 
and females who prostitute themselves to the wild schemes, and 
by comparison the prostitution of white women to white men 
was "virtue itself." Crawford was termed a "bigoted calumniator" 
of more than half the American people and nine tenths of their 
ancestors; it was implied that he was a British tool; and his return 
from France was ascribed to "total unfitness." 
The Philadelphia Demo~ratic Press carried the letters in April 
and continued to copy from other papers or make comments of 
its own until the end of July. From the Baltimore Pntriot it 
reprinted a story maintaining that intermarriage would not civilize 
 he Indians; rather it would tend to render the Americans more 
savage. A few issues later the Democratic Press asserted that Craw- 
ford had displayed in his report a "most illiberal" disposition 
and put the most offensive opinions in the most offensive words; 
he had thus forfeited whatever portion he possessed of the con- 
fidence of the great Republican family of the nation and placed 
himself in the "bosom of faction."23 
The  degree of Federalist involvement in denouncing Crawford 
-and in supporting him in order to create division to their 
own benefit-is impossil~le to ascertain; such tactics were not alien 
to American political parties." The  Federalists did not nominate 
a candidate in 1816, but Rufus King received the thirty-four votes 
from Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Delaware; the other 183 
went to Monroe. Whatever the schismatic efforts of the Federalists 
and others, Crawford in 1816 had no desire to split the Republican 
party. It  seems clear that he genuinely did not want to be a 
candidate for the nomination-and certainly not a candidate for 
23 Ilemocmtic Press, June 15, July 2, 19, 1816. 
24 N e u ~  flontf,dzire Patriot, April 16, 1816. Crawford observed that the Federalists 
were too weak to put up  a candidate and wcre unable to produce a schism in the 
Republitan ranks. Crawford to \Yilliam Lee, hfay 19, 1816, Gallatin. 
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election. He was well known, his abilities were well respected 
until political faction began to berate them, and he did want to 
stand on "higher ground" so far as the succession is concerned. 
He became a victim of his "friends"; he was the most logical 
rallying point for the anti-Virginia group; and his failure to take 
a completely unambiguous and unequivocal stand-either for or 
against securing the nomination-probably cost him his chalice 
to be President. But the events surrounding the caucus action 
and the election of 1816 foretold the splitting of the party, and 
all too soon the "bosom of faction" was evident.25 
The  election of 1820 was the subject of practically no comment 
in the years following the election of 18 16, though there was some 
discussion-and apparently some difference of opinion-on the 
propriety of a caucus to nominate Monroe for reelection. Craw- 
ford's attitude-that the call for a caucus was unfriendly to 
Monroe-prevailed; no nomination was made, and Monroe's 
election without opposition was assured.2B 
By that time several men had shown a desire to succeed Monroe 
in 1825. Three of his cabinet members, Adams, Calhoun, and 
Crawford, had presidential hopes; DeWitt Clinton of New York 
cherished lingering ambitions; Henry Clay was encouraged by 
the lack of united support for a cabinet member; Andrew Jackson 
had been "pushed" into the national picture before 1820; and 
William I,. Lowndes was in strong contention until his death in 
1822. Crawford, choice of a large minority in 1816, stood as the 
most prominent candidate to succeed Monroe, and as a native 
Virginian he might expect the support of that state, which for 
the first time in the history of the republic had no candidate 
for the office. Some expected Monroe to favor him, but the 
President maintained a strict neutrality among his cabinet mem- 
25 No evidence whatever has been found to support the statement of  \\'iltse, 
Calllozl~z, I:]  15, that "Monroe's margin of vicloly was in no small degree attril)ulal)le 
to the efforts of Calhoun, a point the unsncce~sful contestant was not likely to 
overlook." Calhoun, r i d ~ n g  with John Quincy Adams on May 22, 1820, aslted about 
transactions at  Glient and the project said to have been formed there, or imriietlialely 
after a t  I'aris, to have Crawford run for the presidencv in 1816. Ada~ns loltl him, 
"I have never heard anything of this either at  Ghent or at  I'aris, and if any projects 
upon the Presidency had been there formed, I had not been plivy to lheni." 
Memoirs, 5:129. 
26 Crawford to Charles Tait, Sept. 15, 1820, Tait. See also William Plumer, Jr. to 
William Plumer, Sr., April 24, 1820, Everett 5. Brown, ed., T h e  lliitrouri Co11lpro- 
mises and Preridential Politics, 1820-1825 ( S t .  Louis, 1926). 49, 51, 54. Cited here- 
after as Brown, Missouri Conzfiromises. 
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hers." At the same time, Crawford realized the importance of 
the support of New York; he followed closely, and revealed an 
intimate knowledge of, events in that state, and by 1820 it was 
clear he still had many followers thereez8 
Before the reelection of Monroe some newspapers had begun 
to discuss the election of 1824, but most of them were fighting 
local battles that might or might not relate to the natiollal cam- 
paign. There had also been anti-Crawford activity, much of 
which seems to have been inspired by Andrew Jackson, who had 
mistakenly judged Crawford as his chief "prosecutor" in con- 
nection with his Florida invasion. T h e  publication of Con- 
siderations by John Clark, dueling opponent and long political 
rival in Georgia of Crawford, and the attempt to link Crawford 
directly with the alleged illegal introduction and David 13. 
Mitchell's subsequent sale of Africans as slaves in Georgia repre- 
sent the first peak of the efforts of the Crawford opponents to 
bring down the "king of the mountain." 'These activities seem 
to have temporarily hurt Crawford within his state,Y0 but, their 
effect on the presidential election of 1824 cannot be assessed with 
any assurance. 
By 1820 the activities of the presidential hopefuls increased, 
and Crawford, as the frontrunner until his serious illness in the 
fall of 1823, was more frequently attacked than was any other 
candidate. Between 1821 and 182.3 Calhoun and his partisans 
replaced the Jackson forces as the most persistent Crawford 
detractors, and at the same time the abusiveness of the entire 
campaign became more noticeable. T h e  sentiment against a 
"Virginia" candidate increased; the caucus was subjected to bitter 
attack; and possible coalition between various candidates was 
frequently discussed, with Clay's partisans usually being careful 
not to create irreparable breaches between their favorite and the 
other aspirants. 
27 Adanis, Mernoir.~, 4:239-43, 297-98 (Feb. 3, March 13, 1819). 
28 II>i(l., 359, 361 (May 6, 1819); Ambrose Spencer to lacob Brown, Nov. 15, 181!): 
Brown to Crawford, Nov. 28, 1819; [Spencer] to [Brown], Jan. 27, 1820, Brown, MHS. 
29See chapter 1; Clark, Considerations, esp. 130-54; Thomas Henry Rentz, "The 
Public 1.ife of David E. hlitchell" (M.A. thesis, IJniversity of Georgia, 1955), 87-113: 
David 1%. Mitchell file (GDAH): Honse Doc., No. 123 (serial 387), 26th Cong., 2 ~ 1  
sess.; Senate Doc., No. 93 (serial 60), 17th Cong., 1st sess.: [David 1%. R.iitcllell], ,472 
Expo.tilion of the  Case of the African.$, taken to the Creek Agency Oy C n f ~ t n i n  
ITTilliurrr. Bowen o n  or about the 1st December I817 (Milledgeville, Ga.. 1822): ilSI-'i\.I, 
2:957-75. 
3.3 T'holnas W. Cobb to Charles Tait, Oct. 20, 1820, Tait. 
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The political campaign gained momentum as the economic 
problems stemming from the Panic of 1819 increased. Crawford's 
mistake in the treasury estimates gave ammunition to his oppo- 
nents; the paper money deposits in the western banks became 
a divisive issue; the acrimonious debate between Crawford and 
Calhoun partisans over the retrenchment legislation strained 
relations between the two secretaries and led some to charge that 
Crawford was responsible for enfilading the administration; and 
an event in the latter part of 1821 was viewed as little less than a 
clash between Crawford and Calhoun. 
In July 1821 a Georgia paper, the Milledgeville Gazette, pub- 
lished a series of articles by "Trio" championing Crawford and 
state rights and comparing the Monroe administration unfavor- 
ably with the first Jefferson administration. In answering these 
in the Az.lgusta Advertiser George McDuffie, a South Carolina 
partisan of Calhoun, charged that the denunciation of the Monroe 
adnliriistration resulted from Trio's being the "humble instru- 
ments of a certain magician, who stands behind the curtain and 
moves you by wires." Crawford was identified as the magician. 
On demand of William Cumming, one of Trio, McDuIfie was 
identified by the editor and a challenge was issued. The  affair 
dragged for some time: MrDuffie was wounded in the first 
meeting; Cumming assumed a stooped or crouched position in 
the second and McDuffie refused to fire; a board of honor was 
held; and a final meeting on November 80, 1821, left McDuffie 
with a broken left arm." Certainly honor must have been hard 
put to find satisfaction in these encounters. 
Whether the Trio attack might have been inspired by a 
warning that Crawford's friends were not sufficiently active, that 
the Georgian's supporters were not increasing as were his oppo- 
nents, and that his opponents were beconling better known 
and more active in their efforts to prevent Crawford's rise is 
not k n o ~ n . 3 ~  13ut editors and others thought it "highly inexpedi- 
ent" and "disrespectful" to tlie incumbent that the presidential 
question should be so much discussed; they feared the public 
31 Coli~rnns of newspapers were filled with Illis farcical episode. For a h i e f  
account see lidwin L. Green, Grorge McDulfze (Columbia, S.C., I936), 28, 33-36. 
I'erl~aps t l ~ i s  was anotl~er instance in whicl~ C:rawford snpporters did not exercise 
proper discretion. Crawfortl said he was glad the duel was over without loss of life. 
Crawford to John O'Connor, June 25, 1822, Crawford, Ilice. 
32 Natlianiel Macon to Cha~les  Tait, Jan. 7, 1821, Tait. 
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interest might suffer from differences among the cabinet members 
and from the partisans carrying their animosities into the councils 
of the nation.33 
Nor did Crawford appear pleased with the growing factionalism 
and attacks. Though he expected his qualifications for office to 
be reviewed-to "run the gaun1et"-Crawford said, "I shall not 
degrade myself by importunity, or suffer it to be done by others. 
I shall avoid the contamination of faction and intrigue. If I am 
placed in oflice, I will be free to follow tile dictates of my own 
conscience and judgment. I am, however, under no more appre- 
hensions now of being forced into oflice, than I was in 1816, 
when office was clearly in my reach if I had been ambitious for 
it." I-lle felt that all aspirants, or at least the ones in Washington, 
would unite in any attack on him under the imputation that 
when he was out of the way "each one believes that his address, 
or that of his friends, will enable him to put down his present 
coadjutors in the work of detraction." He thought if a south- 
erner were not elected in 1824, Adams would be. Crawford's 
estimate of the campaign is given much support by ne~vspaper 
materials, but Hezekiah Niles analyzed tllings quite differently: 
Ada~ns and Cratvford were "running at" Callloun, Adams and 
Calhoun were "running at" Crawford, and Crawford and Calhoun 
were "running at" ad am^.^^ 
Whereas Crawford felt that some of his snpporters in Congress 
(lid not always act discreetly and one partisan wished that Crarv- 
ford had some "prudent men" ol his own party to provide leader- 
ship, one of the Georgian's most devoted followers, Representative 
Thomas W. Cobb, thought Crawford did "much to injure him- 
self with his friends" and would not wonder if Crawford's exer- 
tions in this regard were "crowned with success." Cobb seemed 
piqued; he attributed his failure to be chosen senator from 
Georgia to portions of a Crawford letter that had been interpreted 
as disapproving his seeking that office. He was far from sanguine 
about Crawford's success in the presidential race, Ilut he had 
succeeded in bringing all but two of the Georgia papers to Craw- 
ford's side. As a Southron and Republican the Georgia repre- 
33 See, for example, Alexander S~rlylh to  Dear Sir, Jan. 18, 1822, Alexa~~tler S ~ r ~ y t l ~  
I'apers (Duke); Montgonrery Reptlblicnn, Jan. 26, March 2, 1822; Hu?zl.sville Rep~lbli-  
can, Fell. 8, 1822. 
34 Cr;lwfo~.tl LO Tait, Sept. 4 ,  1821, Tail;  Crawford to Tl~ornas Worthing~on, Jan. 17 ,  
1822, Worthington; Niles' Week ly  Register 22 (June 1, 1822): 220. 
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sentative had "determined to suffer much from his iorgetfulness, 
his pride, his irritability, (and shall I say) diclalorial inclinalion, 
before I will lose the advantages of his really splendid mind. In 
truth he has 'many winning ways to make me hate him.' "35 
The heat engendered in Congress and in the cabinet over the 
army appointments brought an intensification of newspaper dis- 
cussion of the candidates and affairs of government. Either sap- 
porting Crawford or attacking the administration, and thus 
thought by opponents of Crawford to be Crawford supporters, 
were the National Zntelligencer, Riclzmond Enquirer, Boston 
Statesman, Portland Argus, New York National Advocate, Phil- 
adelphia Free Press, and Wasl~ington Guzette. Before the summer 
of 1822 was over the "warfare" between Crawford and Calhoun 
raged, and several newspapers had been established in various 
parts of the country to support one or another aspirant to the 
presidency. Perhaps tlie warmest battle took place in the capital 
city between the Gazette, published by Jonathan Elliot, and the 
Repz~blican, which began publication under the editorship of 
Thomas L. McKenney on August 7.3'3 
The Gazette did not declare for Crawford until the latter part 
of 1822, but the paper left little doubt about the position i t  
would take. It  discussed the problems the War Department was 
having with contracts and contractors, protested against the polit- 
ical persecution of Crawford for appointing Senator Jesse B. 
Thomas to inspect the land offices and charged (correctly) this 
persecution to the friends of Calhoun. I t  also carried articles 
from other papers in support of the various candidates, but could 
not see the case for elevating Calhoun to the presidency. Accused 
by others of supporting Crawford, the Gazette said in September 
it had no candidate, but it did pay tribute to Crawford's services. 
On November 1 the paper began a series of articles on the quali- 
fications of the various candidates which ran for the better part 
of the next two weeks. Before this series ended the Gmzette tnade 
its position clear: it had opposed the nomination of Monroe in 
1816, had favored Crawford at that time, and supported him 
for the presidency in 1824.37 
35Louis McLane to Dear Kitty, April 21, 1822, McLane; Cobb to Tait, March 8, 
1822, Tait. Cobb was chosen senator in December 1824 (replacing Nicholas Ware, 
deceased); he resigned his seat in 1828 and died on February 1 ,  1830. 
36McKenney had been head of the tlnited States establishment for trading with 
the Indians. He strongly opposed abolition of that office on May 6, 1822. 
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The Republ i can  was not shrinking from the fray. Its opposi~ior~ 
to Crawford was at first indirect,38 but it became explicit allout 
the middle of September when nearly every issue deriou~lced tile 
secretary of treasury. Among other things it said that on the 
grounds of public services or political merit Crawford's claims 
would not bear examination. It  contended that the cost of 
collecting  he revenue was greater than in 1802, maintained 
Crawford had built a patronage machine, examined the question 
of a political leader's responsibility for the attacks of his friends, 
and declared Crawford unqualified to be the reform candidate. 
The Guzette, wondering who had heard of hostility between 
Crawford arid Monroe before the establishmerlt of the R e p l b l i c a n ,  
asserted the founding of its capital city rival was rooted in the 
friendship between Calhoun and McKenney and the desire to 
injure Crawford's chances for the presidency. Calhoun and his 
friends had tried to prevent the abolition of t.he Indian trading 
system (cvl~ich McKenriey headed) in May 1822, but they had 
not even been able to save McKenney from the "disgrace" of 
being l~arred frotn participa~ing in the final adjustment of the 
affairs of his superintendency. The  paper was then established 
to attack Crawford, some of whose followers had approved the 
change in the conduct of Indian affairs as well as much of the 
retrenchment legi~lation.~"t should not be forgotten that the 
army appointments controversy occurred during this same sessiorl 
of Congress. 
While the K e p ~ l b l i c a n  and the Gazette were vigororlsly engaged, 
other papers tliroughout the country timidly or boldly declared 
their preferences, vowed they had none, objected to t.he national 
issue being inserted into the local ones, continued to bemoan 
the early agitation of the contest, or recorded varying degrees of 
praise for one or another candidate.40 And the activities of the 
other candidates varied. Adams, seemingly agreeing cvi1.h the 
belief of Crawford and others that the election of 1824 would be 
decided in the House, observed in early 1821 that a single repre- 
37 Washington Gazette, Feb. 11, March 20, May 15, June 5, Sept. 22, Nov. 1, 6, 
1822. 
38 See esp. i s s~~es  of Aug. 17, 24, Sept. 4, 1822. 
39 Cccze!te, Nov. 22, 1822. See also Hunt, First Forty Years, 160-61. 
40 For examples see the Augusta Chronicle and State Gazette, Jan. 14, 22, 31, Aug. 
29, 1822: Frankfort (Ky.) Conzmentator, March 6, Sept. 25, Oct. 9, 1822: Vantlalia 
(Ill.) Intelligencer, Sept. 14, 1822: Natchez (Miss.) Republican, Dec. 12, 1822; Niles' 
Weekly Register 23 (Oct. 5 ,  1822):80. 
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sentative from Illinois would balance the whole delegation from 
- 
New York or Pennsylvania and subsequelltly recorded an increas- 
ing number of visitors from one-representative states.41 Clay still 
lield to his "conciliatory" position. His friends were active in 
the several states, counseling first one course and then ano~lier, 
advising ~11at his cause be advanced by "rnurdy support" of the 
Kentuckian rather than by attacking his competi~ors and their 
friends, indicating that the contest was between him, Crawford, 
and Adams but wishing him success, or agreeing with or attempting 
to correct Clay's estimate of the situation in a given area.42 
One of Clay's friends, Jonathan Russell, broke out of the 
nonantagonizing mold by making public materials purporting to 
show that Adams, in contrast to Clay's position in the Glient 
negotiations, would have bargained away the right to navigate 
the Mississippi River in order to retain Atlantic fishing rights. 
Adams vigorously refuted the charges, and the "duplicate letters" 
controversy attracted much attention in the late spring and 
summer of 1822. Crawford took no part in the skirmish, though 
correspondence indicates that Russell may have tried to involve 
him. Russell's primary purpose seems to have been injury to 
Adams, but he also hoped to advance Clay's standing. By year's 
end he was pointing out that Crawford and Clay were personal 
friends, that eventually they might join forces, and that only 
they among the candidates had the great common objective of 
preserving the old Republican party and true republican prin- 
ciples. In light of what finally happened, Adams' evaluation of 
the incident is more interesting. He thought Clay was "behind" 
Russell's attack and that it was a part of Clay's plan to get sup- 
port wherever he could, prevent a choice by the electors, and 
make his bargain in the House. If Clay had nine western states, 
he would either make Crawford's friends join him and thus 
become President, or, if Crawford should be strongest in the 
House, he would consent to Crawford's becoming President on 
condic.ion that Clay be appointed secretary of state and thus 
become heir apparent.43 
41 Adams, Memoirs, 5:303-4, passim; ibid., 6: passim. 
42 See, for example, letLers in Clay Papers, 3:185, 196-98, 200, 202, 290-91, 292, 
314-17, 321, 325, 335, 337. 
43 House Iloc., Nos. 75 (serial 67) and 131 (serial G9), 17th Cong., 1st sess.: Russell 
to Crawford, Tune 2, 1822, Golding Hezekiah Niles to John Bailey, June 4, 1822, 
Mellen Chamberlain Collection (BPL); Clay to Russell, Sept. 4, 1822; Russell to 
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Crawlord, who said in the summer of 1821 that he had "never 
been so silly as to expect anything in relation to myself" from New 
York, continued to keep in close touch with events in that state. 
There seemed to be a partial understanding and commitment to 
Crawford in the summer of 1821, but by early 1822 even some 
of the more zealous Crawford supporters were willing to remain 
silent and await clearer indications of public sentiment. By that 
time Crawford had seen Van Buren several times; they were on 
friendly terms, but he thought Van Buren would endeavor to 
"niake a New York President. When he finds that impracticable 
he will then be governed by circ~mstance."~~ This was probably 
a fair estimate of the position of the key figure in New York 
politics, but many ottier powerful persons in that state were 
jockeying to improve their political stature. At the end of 1822, 
Crawford's support in New York was probably less than it tiad 
been a year earlier.45 
The year 1823 was one of almost frantic maneuvering, and the 
situation in New York was perhaps more frenzied than that in 
any other state. Van Buren seems to have made up his mind- 
sorrie oE his intimates were sure he had-but he had not definitely 
committed himself to Crawford. He was told by coadjutors that 
ttie responsibilily for pursuing a course leading to the election of 
it Republican President was his, but only Crawford, among the 
candidates from the eastern part of the country, could rightfully 
l)e called a "democrat." The fact that Crawford had been called 
radical by the same sort of people who called Jefferson the demo- 
tralic or jacobinical candidate was not disturbing. Continued 
James Fenner, Dec. 26, 1822, Russell; Rich O'Brien to Tohn Bailey, Aug. 22, 1822, 
John Bailey Papers (NYH). William Plumer, Jr. to William Plumer, Sr., Dec. 21, 
1822, Brown, Missouri Con~promises ,  81 (Adams' evaluation). Russell apparently 
w.1~ a peeviqh, petulant, pestering, carping type who never seemed satisfied with 
the actions of an individual against whom he had a pique. 
44Crawford to John O'Connor, Aug. 21, 1821, Jan. 11, 1822, Crawford, Rice; 
Peter B. Porter to Clay, Jan. 29, 1822, Calvin E. Colton, T h e  Li fe ,  Corres$oildr,izce 
and Sperches of Henry Clay, 6 vols. (New York, 1857), 4:62-63. Hereafter cited as 
Colton, Works.  
45 FOI comments on the New York scene, see Porter to Clay, Sept. 30, 1822, 
Henry Clay Papers (Lilly Library, Indiana IJniversity) Rufus King to J. A. King, 
Jan. 1, 1822; Robert Goldsborough to Rufus King, April 7, 1822: Van B u ~ e n  to 
Rufus King, Sept. 21, 1822, memo by Rufus King, Feb 2, 1823, King, Icing, 6.435, 
468-69, 481-82, 509-10, Goldsborough to King, Jan. 31, April 17, 1822, Nathan 
Ulshoeffer to John A. King, Feb. 6, 1822, Rufus King Papers ( N Y H )  Sam A. Talcott 
to Van Buren, Feb. 7, 1822; Rufus King to Van Buren, Sept. 24, 1822, Jesse Hoyt to 
Van Iluren, Dec. 5, 1822, Van Buren; R. H. Walworth to A. C. Flagg, Jan. 27, 1822, 
Azariah C. Flagg Papers (NYH). 
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use of the term might make it as popular an epithet as yankee, 
democrat, and b ~ c k t a i l . ~ ~  Many wanted to know where Van Buren 
stood, but he kept his own counsel. 
Anti-Virginia sentiment was soon sacrificed on  he altar of 
party unity. New York had vigorously objected in 1516 to Virginia 
influence, but two elections later the near monopoly of the 
presidency by the Old Dominion was of less import. There was 
some discussion of the slavery influence, but this also was held 
lightly by most, for the parties had not realigned on slavery and 
antislavery as Adams thought in 1820 would be the case. Among 
others, Smith Thompson, Azariah C. Flagg, and Silas Wright 
stressed that New York should not bind or pledge the party to 
any man, but it would be "fit and proper" to express an opinion 
in favor of a congressional caucus nomination. New York should 
then support the person "fairly nominated." The  new President 
would thus feel indebted to New York and the state's interests 
would be served, no matter what section of the country the 
candidate came from.47 
Almost immediately the Albany Argus, mouthpiece of the 
Regency, began to deprecate premature committals and asserted 
that New York Republicans would give undivided and effectual 
support to the candidate regularly nominated by the congres- 
sional caucus. It  also lamented the gross personal abuse of the 
candidates: "The candidates for the presidency are the property 
of the nation, and they are identified with its character. I t  is 
degrading to us as a people, to obtrude our petty feelings and 
resentments, into the consideration of a question of the highest 
import and concern."48 Van Buren, before leaving Washington, 
may have committed himself to Crawford, but apparently some 
members of the famed Richmond Junto were not aware of this.49 
40Erast11s Root to Van Buren, Jan. 3, 1823; Nathan IJlshoeffer to Van Ruren, 
J an .  27, 31, 1823, Van Ruren. 
47 Rufus King to Harrison Gray Otis, ,]an. 24, 1823, Harrison Gray Otis I'apers 
(MHS); memos by Rufus King, Feb. 2, 24, [n.d.], 1823, King, King, 6:507-8, 509, 510; 
'I'hompson to Van Buren, March 17, 21, 1823; Flagg to Van Ruren, Nov. 12, 1823, 
Van Rr~ren: Flagg to Wright, Oct. 28, 1823: Wright to Flagg, Nov. 12, 1823, Flagg. 
48 Albany Argus, March 25, April 11, 1823. 
49 Memo by Rufus King, April 7, 1823; King to John A.  King, April 20, 1823, King, 
King, 6:518, 521. Various New Yorkers expressed preferences or denonncetl indi- 
viduals they opposed, but one New Yorker was quite indifferent: "In short I carc 
not a d-n what party is in power, for I find the leaders are all scoundrels a t  I,otlon~." 
J. W. Clark to Thurlow Weed, June 6, 1823, Thurlow Weed Papers (University of 
Rochester). 
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The Argus had prepared the way, and Van Buren, staunch advo- 
cate of party discipline and unity and fully aware of the division 
that would result from any nomination by the New York legis- 
lature or caucus, moved according to advice. On April 22 the 
Republicans at Albany unanimously approved, and called for 
support of, a congressional nomination. Admitting there were 
objections to this method of selection, the New Yorkers main~ained 
that a national meeting was less susceptible to sectional jealousies 
than state caucuses and state legislatures whose nominations were 
condemned for their "tendency to disturb the harmony" of the 
great Republican family.60 
Almost as if it were footnoting the caucus action, the Argus 
on that very day took notice of the newspaper controversy that 
had been raging for some time over Crawford's part in the 
Augusta address of 1798. Following a vigorous and lengthy 
defense of Crawford's action and his unswerving Republicanism, 
the editor said that had Crawford been a real supporter of the 
Federalists the Argus would have been content to "whistle him 
off, and let him down to the wind of fortune"; it owed him 
nothing and had nothing to expect from him.51 
Opponents of Crawford realized the power of the Crawford 
press in New York; as one of them put it, for one man to expose 
himself to their "battery without any press to which he could 
resort for protection would be madness." This person, Charles K. 
Gardner, in cooperation with Winfield Scott, Samuel Gouverneur, 
Henry Wheaton, and John C. Calhoun, was at the time attempting 
to set up a paper in New York City to combat the denunciation 
50 Erastris Root was one of the drafters of the resolution, and on llle copy Ile sent 
to Samuel Smith he underlined the portion "one who is not only a sound Democratic 
I l ep~~ l~ l i can  in principle and practice" and wrote in the margin "This is against 
Adams." Root to Smith, April 24, 1823, Carter-Smith. Ambrose Spencer, whose 
snpport shifted from Crawford to Calhoun to advocacy of the reelection of Atlan~s, 
said New York would throw her weight to the side that would be victorious with 
that addetl weight, for "politics here use a trade, not matters of principle." He 
thought Crawford had a majority in the legislative caucus, but his partisans dicl not 
nominate him because they realized the "general odium" that legislature had 
incnrred. Governor Joseph C. Yates, a Crawford supporter, was said to have lost 
all respect and consideration. Spencer to Jacob Brown, April 2, 22, May 5, 1823, 
Jacob Drown I'apers (Clements). 
51 *The I~nlti~tiore Art~ericcl?i & Corrlrrlercinl Daily Advertiser on Jnne 10, 1823. 
took note of the New York caucus action, indicated that the large states dl.eaded 
the possibility of the election going to the House, and said a congressional nomina- 
tion might make election by the people certain and prevent the great evil of 
election by the House. See also Van Buren to Thompson, May 16, 1823, DeCoppett; 
John Taylor (of Caroline) to Van Buren, May 12, 1823, Van Buren. 
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of various Republicans by Mordecai M. Noah's National Ad -  
vocate, to try to destroy the Van Buren influence, and to prevent 
the choice of Crawford by New York. The  Putriot began publi- 
cation in May 1823; Selleck Osborn was associated with Gardner 
in the editorial capacity, but much of the most trenchant writing 
was done by Henry Wheaton. The  Patriot gained subscribers 
at Noah's expense, but the enthusiastic support of Gardner's 
paper was short-lived. The  subscribers did not return to Noah, 
wl~om many felt had done much injury to the Republican cause 
by his vanity and want of judgment.52 
Crawford kept in close touch with his long-time correspondents, 
especially O'Connor, Tait, and Van Buren. He believed the 
New York support of a national caucus would have a "permanent 
influence upon the general question," and in the summer of 1823 
he again observed that all aspirants to the presidency seemed to 
think it necessary to assail him. Calhoun appeared to think that 
4' success can be secured by importunity, as heaven itself can be 
obtained by violence," but Crawford thought the secretary of 
war had made little progress toward his goal. Calhoun's calcula- 
tion that he would be the "general residuary legatee of the others 
who may become politically defunct" Crawford termed without 
foundation except in Calhoun's imagination, which is "as fervid 
as Etna, and as wild as the storms of winter." He did believe 
Adams had gained strength in the preceding twelve months and 
considered the secretary of state the only one whose conduct 
during that period had been such as to "deserve commendation, 
or rather to be exempt from censure."53 
Throughout the remainder of 1823 the Argus shrewdly avoided 
a commitment to Crawford, but its preference was clear. I t  spoke 
of the absurdity of the charge that Crawford was going to be 
forced upon the Republicans of the state, of the "common 
52 Scott to Gardner, April 8, May 2, Aug. 7, 1823; Gardner to Noah, July [n.d.], 
1823, Ga~,dncr;  Calhoun to Gooverneur, April 28, May 25, June 6, 1823: Scott to 
Gouverneur, April 8, 1823, Samuel Gouverneur I'apers (NYP): G. W. Erving to 
Crawford, July 14-15, 1823, Crawford, MDLC; Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren 
ant1 llte Afaking of the De~nocrotic Party (New York, 1959), 39; Hammond, History, 
2:130; Elizabeth Feaster Baker, Henry Whenton,  1785-1848 (Philadelphia, 1937), 
44-54. Samuel Gouverneur was Monroe's son-in-law. For other irlforma~ion on 
Calhoun's maneuvering in New York in 1823 see Thomas R. Hay, ed., "John C. 
Calhoun and the Presidential Campaign of 1824: Some IJnpublished Calhoun Let- 
ters," American Historical Review 40 (1934-1935):82-96, 286-300. 
53 Crawford lo Van Buren, May 9, 1823, Van Buren; Crawford lo O'Connor, &lay 
16, 1823, Crawford, Rice; Crawford to Tait, July 12, 1823, Tait. 
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privilege" of Crawford's friends to believe him fitted by talent 
and experience for the presidency, of its lack of concern about 
Virginia influence and southern domination-those "phantoms" 
that "political jugglers have conjured up to subserve he i r  tempo- 
rary purposes," and asked why the calumiiies, slanders, and venom 
had been directed against Crawford alnlost exclusively. It copied 
wit11 approval material from non-Crawford papers that spoke 
of the binding nature of the nomination and a free discussion 
of the presidential question. Some of these other papers could 
see no excuse for the slander and said the discussion would not 
be "less free, if some slight regard were paid to truth and 
decency."54 
Beginning in 1820 the selection of a certain person as spealzer 
of the House was considered by some as favorable or unfavora1)le 
to the candidacy of a particular presidential aspirant, but con- 
gressional alignments shifted so rapidly and so many repre- 
sentatives and senators changed their allegiances by 1824 that 
most claims concerning these selections must be viewed as little 
more than political rhetoric.55 Especially in 1823 did many relate 
the choice of the speaker to the presidential contest, since they 
expected the election to be decided by the House of Repre- 
sentatives. Philip P. Barbour, friend of Crawford and speaker 
during the Seventeenth Congress, was to oppose Henry Clay 
for the posi~ion, but it was said that many of Crawford's friends 
would vote for Clay. After the election of Clay by a vote of 139 
to 42, some of the Kentuckian's friends thought the defeat of 
Crawford's supporter had made the Georgian's friends realize 
Crawford was not as strong as they had supposed, whereas some 
of Crawford's partisans were pleased that the election had not 
been placed on presidential grounds and thought Clay's Eriends 
would join with Crawford if Clay could not win the p re s iden~y .~~  
54 See esp. iss~lcs of July 1, Sept. 16, Oct. 24, Nov. 18, 25, 1)ec. 2, 23, 1823. 011 
Septetnl)er 9 subscribers were informed that copies of the "splenditl" engraving of 
Crawford had been left at  the A r g i ~ s  office for delivery. On northern rcsentment and 
southern influence see also William P. Duval to James Barbour, Aug. 12, 1823, 
Barbour. 
55 See, for example, Annnls, 16th Cong., 2d sess., 437-38: ibid., 17111 Cong., 1st sess., 
514-17; Adams, Memoirs, 5:201-3, 429, 431-32, 437-40, 450, 451: M. P. Follett, T h e  
Speaker of t h e  House of Re$resentatives (New York, 1896), 50, 51, 83; I'lunier, Ir. 
to Plnmer, Sr., Dec. 3, 1821, Brown, Misso~cri Cofnpro17iise.s, 65: Niles' Week ly  
Register 21 (Dec. 15, 1821):242-43; John Taylor to William D. Ford, Jan. 18, 1822, 
Taylor. 
56See Lewis Williams to Bartlett Yancey, Nov. 30, 1823, James G .  deRou1hac 
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Partisans of the candidates often interpreted state election re- 
sults as they did the contest for House speaker; if those elected 
favored their candidate, there was a direct association between 
the local and national contests; if the elections were against them, 
there was little or no r e l a t i~nsh ip .~~  The  elections for congress- 
men and senators in 1822 and 1825 were of significance for the 
presidential hopefuls, for they would have a bearing on the caucus 
nomination and-if the election went to the House-on the choice 
of the President. In retrospect, the close gubernatorial contest in 
Georgia and the selection of a Tennessee senator might be viewed 
as indicators of Crawford's chances. In Georgia it took the 
legislature three days to choose Crawford supporter George M. 
Troup over Matthew Talbot by a vote of 83 to 81, and in Ten- 
nessee John Williams, ardent Crawford follower and senator until 
March 4, 1823, was defeated for reelection by Andrew Jackson. 
Williams believed that the weight of Monroe, Adams, and Cal- 
houn had been exerted against him. He also thought the "advance 
object" of Jackson's friends in sending him to Washington was 
to place him on the same footing with the other presidential 
candidates and to give him an opportunity for testing his civil 
qualifications for the 
Williams may have had to contend with an unusual combination 
of forces-as well as the general's popularity-but his defeat was 
a localized manifestation of Crawford's lack of widespread support 
in any of the country west of the mountains. Nathaniel Macon, 
much earlier that year, had pointed out that events in the 
assemblies of several of the western states showing a preference 
for Clay and the presence of a party in Illinois recommending 
the election of Adams were indications unfavorable to Crawford. 
Exertion by Crawford's supporters was necessary; the Georgian's 
Hamilton, ed., "Letters to Bartlett Yancey," lames Sprunt Historical Pz~blicntions 
10 (2): 36 (hereafter cited as Hamilton, "Letters to Yancey"); W. B. Rochester to 
Clay, Dec. 20, 1823, Colton, Works, 4:85-86; Jonathan Russell to Jonas Sibley, Dec. 
23, 1823: Samuel Smith to Russell, Dec. 15, 1823, Russell. 
57 For comments by several newspapers and by Niles on these elections see Niles' 
Weekly Register 25 (Oct. 25, Nov. 22, 29, 1823):114, 178, 195, 203. 
58 Williams to Jesse B. Thomas, Nov. 2, 1823, 'I'hornas. Earlier another 'Tennessean 
had noted Crawford's weakness in Tennessee and Alabama and stressed the objec- 
tions of the Alabamans to the influence of the Georgia group in that stale. He 
called the government of Georgia "provincial" and said the state was a "hot bed 
of faction and violence of the most damnable mobo~racy that ever cursed any state 
in the union." James Campbell to David Campbell, April 21, 1823, David Camphell 
Papers (Duke). 
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chances seemed best at the beginning of the session of Congress, 
but he had probably not gained any support during the session. 
T h e  outcome had become more u n ~ e r r d i n . ~ ~  
Clay was aware of his and Adams' strength in the upper west 
and of his weakness in the southeast, where Crawford appeared 
strong. T h e  long friendship of Clay and Crawford and the 
moderateness of the attacks by Clay partisans on Crawford led 
some to believe that the two w o ~ ~ l d  ullirnately join forces. Ottiers 
thought Clay's popularity may have suffered in some areas because 
of a belief that an understanding existed between the two. Clay, 
who either honestly or for politic.al reasons thought there was 
little difference among his, Adams', and Crawford's views on the 
tariff and internal improvements, considered it highly important 
to impress on Crawford's friends the sentiment of the western 
states. Even if only Adarns were matched against Crawford in 
that area, Clay believed Adams wo~ild receive all, or  nearly all, 
the electoral votes. Clay's popular support was somewhat offset 
1)y the "active and managing politic.ians" who favored Crawford, 
but the Kentuckian thought Crawford's chances were declining 
in 1823. There might be "other phases exhibited before the 
question is settled," Clay said, and he cautioned that his friends 
maintain "respectful relations with the other gentlemen and their 
friends. Tha t  is the best course under all  circumstance^."^^ 
Newspaper comment became more heated and unreasonable 
in 1823. T h e  Washington Gazette continued its support of Craw- 
ford, and the Republican continued its unconditional condemna- 
tion. When the matter of the Augusta address was before the 
public-and the Republican had denounced Crawford as a Fed- 
eralist-the paper said if he were not a Federalist and in "good 
faith and sincerity a supporter" of the Adams administration, 
then he must be viewed as a "shameless parasite, a base dis- 
sem1,ler." Crawford was said to have blundered and failed in 
public business of importance and was in fact a "ginnt i n  intrigue, 
but a dwarf i n  public service." T h e  Republican was single- 
minded in denouncing the Georgian but did not print anything 
59 Macon to Bartlett Yancey, Tan. 27, 1823, Yanrey. 
6oSee Clay to Charles Hammond, Oct. 29, 1823, Clay, Lilly; Washington Re- 
t~z~blicnn,  July 5 ,  1823, citing Louisville Advertiser, h'nshville Advocatp, Florence 
(Ala.) Cazettr; William Carroll to Clay, Feb. 1 ,  1823, Clay to Peter Ii. Porter, Feb. 2, 
1823; Clay to Amos Kendall, Feb. 16, 1823; Porter to Clay, Mav 26, 1823: Clay to 
Francis T. Brooke, Aug. 28, 1823, Clay Pnfiers, 3:361, 365, 382, 421, 480. 
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uncomplimentary about any of the other presidential hopefuls.B1 
Perhaps tlie cleverest bit of political writing of 1823 was called 
"Political Horse Racing and Presidential Contest," which ap- 
peared originally in the h ~ a s h v i l l e  Gaze t te  and was copied, [re- 
quently with some variations, by many papers. In this piece all 
the horses were given the names of the candidates. The  Crawford 
was a 
tall, majestic figure, with wonderful bone, muscle, and sinew. His 
tread was firm and indicative of great strength and activity. He 
sprung from the old Virginia stock of racers; one of the best 
strains in these United States. . . . When young, he was taken to 
Georgia and occasionally run a few cider races successfully, when 
his owners emboldened by his success, ventured to enter him in 
the State jockey club, where he defeated the favorite horse ol' 
Georgia, although often opposed by that scare-devil, John Clark, 
a nag of some distinction in that quarter, who had lately, however, 
become spavined, splintered and stringlialted. J t  is singular that 
supporters of all the other nags vied in their abuse of this horse 
and his performances. 
He was first managed by some Georgians but was then taken 
to the Old Dominion and again looked after by some of the "old 
grooms of ninety-eight.'' In the Crawford "dress" were blended 
the fashions of the white man and the Indian; his flag bore in 
capital letters the words "states rights," "economy," and "republi- 
canism of ninety-eight." In the background the bow of cupid 
overcame the scalping knife of the savage, an emblem of the 
"new mode of inculcating civilization by means of the pleasant 
process of intermarriage." Neither goad nor scourge was carried, 
but the enemies had thrust under the saddle large bundles of 
suppressed documents which the rider "with the slight [sic] of 
hocus pocus" got rid of. A speck of federalism was bedizened 
by the "resplendent dapples of Republicanism which pervaded 
the whole body." 
The  race began in Maine where there was a Missouri Tract 
and a Maine Tract; the Crawford selected the Missouri and at 
first ran far ahead of the Adams but lost ground by temporizing. 
The race was run through all the eastern states in this manner 
until the Calhoun was turned back at Georgia by a Colonel 
Re~)uBlican, April 5,  May 14, July 2, Aug. 9, Oct. 25, Dec. 23, 1823. 
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Cumming. The Crawford had great support in going from 
Georgia to the west for there he crossed the Indian territory 
and was greeted with "yells of victory." The  judges awarded the 
prize to the Crawford and in "all due form" he was installed as 
P r e ~ i d e n t . ~ ~  
On a different level and characterized by better writing was 
the Na~huille Whig sketch of several distinguished members of 
the Woodbee family, published on July 28, 1823. William H. 
Woodbee received favorable treatment though obviously some of 
the phrases were worded to cut two ways. It  was said that as a 
financier his talents were known and deservedly celebrated: his 
fame depended upon mathematical niceties; it rises "superior to 
ordinary calculation; lives in the aggregate, and soars above and 
beyond the addition or disposition of a cypher." He affected the 
"tribune rather than the consul" and emulated the Gracchi rather 
than the Caesars, and in domestic policy he presented a new and 
fertile field for conjecture and experiment. Though this may 
have been an error and in opposition to public sentiment, it 
should be remembered that the proposition was "humane, prac- 
ticable and full of gallantry. It was hut for substituting the torch 
of Hymen for that of Mars, and the syren song of love for that 
of savage war, of victory and of death." This essay was followed 
Ily similar ones on John Q., Henry, and John C. In addition 
brief attention was given to the Hasbeens, the Cantbees, the 
Mightbees, and the Woodabeen~ .~~  
Many of the papers withheld endorsement of any single candi- 
date and opened their columns to communications from Tell, 
A Farmer, A Friend of the People, Publius, Cato, Consistency, 
62 T h e  five-column original has not been located. Among the many copies are 
those in the Illinois Intelligencer, June 14, 1823; Kentucky Gazette, July 10, 1823; 
hlobile Conrinercial Advertiser, July 17, 1823: Pit tsbz~rgh Gazette, July 18, 1823; 
TVcrsl~i~rgton Gazette, June 19, 1823. The  Washington paper concluded with a 
paragraph saying that some would think i t  strange that a horse should reign over 
intellectual beings. "Reader, rather rejoice that it is not our fate to be governed 
by an As.s! It is the lot of hnndreds of nations to be ruled by the latter." The  
Doslon Galoxy had earlier run a horse race. There was a $25,000 purse (the I'resi- 
der~t's salary) and the race ended diR'erently. The  paper said this contest might 
"serve to render those who have the direction of colts and half bloods to be more 
cautious how they hazard their reputation, against steeds of tried, approved, and 
establislled character." Montgo~ri,ery Republ ican,  Feh. 1, 1823. 
63TIlere were also boat races, balloon races, and accounts of the "singular 
wonlan" w l ~ o  according to the laws of the land was entitled to a new husbantl every 
four years. For examples see Moiztgornery Republ ican,  Nov. 22, 29, 1823; Nasl~vi l la  
W h i g ,  Dec. 29, 1823. 
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Truth, A Militia Man, and dozens of others. As in comparable 
communications of later years, passion and bias far outweighed 
reason and balance, and opinion was far more in evidence than 
fact. Independence Day celebrations were cluttered with toasts 
to the favorites of those assembled and frequently were more 
extravagant in their claims than the letter writers.G4 
Two of the papers outstanding in their support of Crawford 
late in 1823 and in 1821 were not absolutely committed in early 
1823. The  Richmond Enquirer, under Thomas Ritchie, pub- 
lished much pro-Crawford material in 1823, but its columns 
remained open for anti-Crawford matter, including the "Pendle- 
ton" and "Roanoke" series by Winfield Scott. The Nutional 
Intelligencer aided the Washington Gazette in the running battle 
with the Republican in 1822 and 1823, and in the latter part of 
the campaign it definitely was the front line. 
Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey wrote an anti-Calhoun 
pamphlet, Economy, Mister Calhoun, which was reprinted in the 
Raleigh Register; letters appeared against the Richmond Junto 
which created a great deal of contemporary excitement; George 
Hay (Monroe's son-in-law) published materials against Crawford 
that led some to charge that Monroe opposed Crawford's election; 
and before the end of the year some of Crawford's closest sup- 
porters decided that if the election went to the House of Repre- 
sentatives Crawford had no chance.G5 
None of these political battles, however, had as much effect 
on the election of 1824 as did Crawford's prolonged illness, which 
began in September 1823. In May Crawford planned to remain 
in the district throughout the summer, but should fever return 
to the capital city, he might take a short excursion into the 
mountains of Virginia. He sarcastically noted that perhaps he 
could visit his relatives without being suspected of electioneering 
64 See Albnny Argus, Jnly 11, 1823, and .%oonnnh Republican, Ang. 2, 1823, for 
toasts from parts of New York and from Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia. 
66 For Illc planling of some of these materials ant1 contemporary spct:ul;~liolh o n  
autllorship and effects, see David Campl~ell to James Campbell, Dec. 5, 1823, ,Jan. 27, 
1824: David Campbell to Edward Campbell, Dec. 10, 1823, Campbell, Duke: Lewis 
\Villiams to nartlett Yancey, Dec. 15, 1823, Hamilton, "Letters to Yancey," 38-39; 
Romulus Saunders to Yancey, Dec. 7, 1823, Clark. Adams continued to write for the 
paixrs, an"donatt~an Russell continned to gratify his pique by dragging out the 
John Adanis-Cunningham letters. H e  wrote several long letters, private and 
confitlential, to Crawford on this matter, but Crawford's only known reply was very 
circr~ntspect. Russell to Crawford, June  23, July 20, Nov. 30, 1823; Crawford to 
Russcll, Aug. 7, 1823, Russell. 
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maneuvers. By early August Mrs. Crawford had a "pretty severe 
atlack of bilious fever," the fourth Crawford son was confined 
to bed, and President hlonroe was recovering from a violent 
- 
attack of "spasms in his stomach." Crawford hoped to leave soon 
for Virginia, where en p a ~ s a n t  he would visit with JefTerson and 
Madison and "breathe a little of my native mountain air."G6 
But Crawford did not leave the capital until September 2. 
Three weeks later he was desperately ill at the home of James 
Barbour in Orange County. Crawford called his illness "inflam- 
matory rheumatism"; others have termed it bilious fever and 
erysipelas; he may well have suffered a stroke, but the major 
problems seem to have developed from the i~nproper ministration 
of medicines-digitalis (foxglove), perhaps laudarium and calomel, 
and maybe lobeline. For nearly eight weeks he remained at 
Barbour's home in a virtually helpless condition: practically 
blind, hands and feet paralyzed, tongue thickened, and speech 
stumbling and nearly inarticulate. He was bled more than twenty 
times-"a depletion an ignoramus like myself wd think nearly 
sufficient to kill a giant." A much reduced Crawford returned to 
Washington on November 14 and imprudently devoted all the 
next ten days to business. The  left, and then the right, eye 
became painfully inflamed. An application of leeches on Decem- 
ber 30 brought some relief, but for nearly three months his vision 
was seriously impaired. He remained in a darkened room and 
conducted treasury business with the aid of his daughter Caroline 
and clerk Asbury Dickins, who came daily to his home. He 
returned to cabinet meetings in April 1824, suffered a relapse 
the next month, and did not attend another cabinet meeting until 
after the election in N o ~ e m b e r . ~ ~  
GGCrawford to ,john O'Connor, Rlay 16, 1823, Crawford, Rice; Cra\vfol.tl to 
Russell, Aug. 7, 1823, Russell. JelFerson expressed great pleasure when he learned 
of the possibility of seeing Crawford. Jell'erson to Crawford, .4ug. 23, 1823, lell'erson, 
MDLC. On September 18, 1823, the Washington Republican termcd Crawford's trip 
to Virginia and his proposed visits to Madison and Jefferson a part of the manage- 
rncnt ant1 intrigue to secure the presidency. 
67 Noliontll Inlelligencer, Sept. 3, Oct. 8, 20, 1823; Bollir~rore iltr1e7.iccln d. C O I I I  
mercial Daily Advertiser, Sept. 29, Oct. 21, 1823; [James Lloyd] to William Eustis, 
Nov. 19, 1823, Antograp11 File, Noughton; Rornnlus Sarlnders LO Yancey, 1)ec. 31, 
1823, Clark (quote); Crawford to Tait, Nov. 23, 1823, Tait; Crawford third person 
note to Monroe, Nov. 17, 1823, hlonroe, NYP; Margaret Bayard Smith to Mrs. Samuel 
I%oytl, 1)ec. 19, [1823], Hunt, First Forty Years, 162-63; John Forsyth lo ,loll11 
<)'Cor~nor, Dee. 31, 1823, O'Connor, Clements. On October 14 Jefl'erson . I I J ~ V C ~  . .' at 
Bar1)onr's for a visit with Crawford. John Floyd aitribrlted Crawford's eye 
dilliculties to an  overdose of digitalis. Floyd to O'Connor, Jan. 6, 1824, ibitl. 
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Crawford wrote little during his serious illness, but just over 
a week after his return to Washington he took note of some of 
the newspaper writing of General Winfield Scott and George 
Hay and said that Scott was about to be sent to the West. Whether 
he was going to "marshal1 the white allies or chastise the red 
enemies of the army candidate cannot at this time be ascertained, 
except by the initiated." This remark is especially interesting in 
light of a letter from General Jacob Brown to General Edmund 
P. Gaines in which there is reference to the "extreme political 
excitement" and the "strenuous exertion" that would probably 
be made at the next session of Congress to break down Calhoun's 
increasing influence. One of the instruments for this would be 
the rising Indian wars. I t  was important, therefore, to throw the 
"whole burden of censure on the savages by manifesting toward 
them all the lenity which is consistent with the outrages which it 
is our t~usiness to redress." The  matter was mentioned only be- 
cause of the "personal political relations of our se~re ta ry ."~~ 
Illness lost for Crawford such advantage as he may have enjoyed 
over his rivals, and his health was much discussed until the day 
Adams was chosen by the House." Crawford's friends were con- 
tinually disturbed by his physical condition, but in the summer 
of 1824 some maintained his affliction was not as great as that of 
Madison in 1813-1814 when he discharged the duties of the presi- 
dency. One of his most ardent journalistic supporters noted 
almost a year after the onset of his illness that when one remem- 
bered that Crawford had been for twelve months in the hands of 
doctors, "l~led to the verge of death, digitalized into fits, and 
ptyialized to infantine helplessness, we have reason to be more 
than satisfied with his recovery."70 
Crawford had been assailed on many fronts, but perhaps the 
most politically damaging attack on him opened in the columns 
of the Ref~ublican in January 1823. Between January and April 
fifteen letters signed "A.B." accused Crawford of mismanaging 
the public funds and of suppressing information damaging to 
himself when he sent to Congress on February 15, 1822, a report 
and documents concerning the relations between the treasury 
and the western banks. The  "A.B." letters raised an immediate 
6sCrawford lo Tait, Nov. 23, 1823, Tail; Brown to Gaines, Sept. 24, 1823 (private). 
 brow^^, MHS. 
69 See following chapter for adclitional discussion. 
70 Josepli Gales Lo Van Suren, Sept. 14, 1824, Van Buren. 
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public storm, and it was more than a year later that their author- 
ship was publicly admitted by Ninian Edwards-a revelation that 
shed considerable light on the political motivation of the attack.?' 
Edwards, former governor of the Illinois Territory, a director 
of the Edwardsville, Illinois, bank in which deposits of "unsound" 
money had been made as payment to the lJnited States government 
for land purchases, and one of the first senators from that state, 
was opposed in Illinois by Jesse B. Thomas, the other senator 
and a Crawford partisan. Tied by marriage to John Pope, for 
several years the chief rival of Clay in Kentucky, Edwards was 
an early supporter of Adams' candidacy, switched to Calhoun, 
and later returned to Adams' camp when Calhoun withdrew 
from the presidential race. Edwards' son-in-law, Representative 
Daniel Pope Cook of Illinois, was deeply involved in the mach- 
inations of Edwards and in 1825 cast the vote of Illinois for Adams. 
Following the first letter, which was addressed to Joseph Gales 
and William W. Seaton, printers to Congress and publishers 
of the Nutionul Intelligencer, a special committee of the House 
made an investigation. Crawford partisans on the committee, 
though directing many questions to Cook, were unsuccessfnl 
in determining the authorship of the letters. Crawford himself 
was certain that an "insidious conspiracy" had been formed 
against him by "Ninian Edwards & Co. of which Cook has again 
been made the cat's paw." He listed Hugh Nelson, confidential 
friend of the President, as among "this reputable group of con- 
spirators" and others as "working coadjutors." The  committee's 
report satisfied no one and a new committee was appointed.T2 
71 FIoi~se Doc., No. 66 (serial 66), 17th Cong., 1st sess. Some of the materials 
dealing with Edwards nlay be found in Washburne, Edward.~, but Inany more-often 
less favorable to Edwards' image-are in the Ninian Edwards I'apers ant1 the 
Daniel 1'. Cook I'apers, both in the Chicago Historical Society. T h e  latest scholarly 
treatment of the episode, perhaps minimizing too much the complicity of Calhoun, is 
Charles M. Wiltse, "John C. Calhoun and the 'A.B. Plot,'" Journal of Southern 
History 13 (Feb. 1947):46-61. Wiltse gives no evidence of having used the unpub- 
lished Edwards and Cook papers or any other unpublished materials. Wayne Cu~ler ,  
"The A.B. Controversy," Mid-America 51 (Jan. 1969):24-37, uses only printed 
materials and makes no mention of Mriltse's article. 
72 Crawford to Tait, Feb. 16, 1823, Tait; Niles' Weekly Register 23 (Feb. 8, 1823): 
esp. 360-62 (report). I'erhaps one of the most interesting comments of the period 
came from the pen of Samuel L. Southard, a Calhoun supporter and soon to 
succeed Smith 'Thompson as secretary of navy. He said, "I look, with some 
curiosity, for A.B. He is a troublesome fellow. I wish we could find him out. I 
would write more, but am pressed for time. Write frequently; I shall be pleased 
to hear from you often and freely." Southard to Ninian Edwards, March 26, 1823, 
Washburne, Edwards, 206. 
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Crawford, indicating that when he prepared his report of 
February 1822 he thought the House wanted the correspondence 
he considered relevant (not the entire correspondence), supplied 
twenty-eight additional documents to the committee, which took 
testimony from a number of individuals, including Cook, Dickins, 
and Edwards, who continued to write the letters during the 
investigation. The  committee report did not establish authorship 
of the letters or attach guilt to anyone. The  committee seemed 
to accept Crawford's statements that treasury practices and poli- 
cies toward the western banks were justified because-among other 
things-they prevented an increase of the already great distress 
of the western country. There was never any question but that 
the government lost money and that the western country was 
"ind~lged."7~ 
The "A.B." letters were designed to injure Crawford-and 
apparently they did adversely affect his popularity-not to recover 
money due the government. But in late March the fifth auditor 
transmitted the letter of the secretary of treasury to the district 
attorney in Illinois requesting him forthwith to institute suit 
against the Bank of Edwardsville for the public monies deposited 
there. The  suit should be for the sum due on January 3 1, 1821, 
and for a later deposit, a total of $141,238.90.74 
The suppressed documents were repeatedly referred to by the 
newspapers, but before the issue was rejoined Calhoun had with- 
drawn from the presidential race, Crawford had been nominated 
by the congressional caucus, and Edwards had been appointed 
minister to Mexico. The  animosity between Edwards and Craw- 
ford seethed in the background, and apparently Monroe got 
little help from his cabinet in the matter of selecting the ~ninister. 
Edwards was approved by a large vote of the Senate on March 4, 
1824, and less than three weeks later he departed for Mexico. 
Almost on the eve of his departure, Crawford sent to the House 
a detailed report of the correspondence between the treaslrry 
and the banks in which public monies were deposited. The  late- 
ness of the report, called for by Cook's resolution of May 8, 1822, 
can be partially explained by its length (more than 1,200 printed 
73 Flouse Doc., No. 119 (serial 69), 1 7 ~ h  Cong., 1st sess. See also Nr~lional Iutel- 
l ig~itcer ,  March 8, 1823. 
71 Slepl~en l'leabanton to jepthah Hardin, March 24, 1823, Teptl~ah FIa~ditt I'apels 
(ISH). The bank had not kept current on its reports to the treasury. Crawford 
to fienjaniin Stepllenson, Nov. 19, 1821, Edwards. 
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pages) and Crawford's illness, but its transmittal on March 22, 
1824, seems to have been deliberately timed to interfere with 
Edwards' departure. Crawford reopened the "A.B." matter by 
reference to Edwards' testimony of February 1823 in connection 
with a letter from the Edwardsville bank to the treasury in 1819.75 
Edwards delayed his departure by one day to collect sonie docu- 
ments, wrote his reply while enroute to Wheeling, and on April 
6 addressed it to Clay, speaker of the House. It  was sent, however, 
in care of Calhoun, from whom Cook got it on April 17. Cook 
also secured from Calhoun's files those "A.B." letters which had 
appeared between March 29 and April 9 of the previous year. 
He planned to show the papers to some of his friends before 
giving them to Clay and noted that Calhoun thought they should 
not be printed in the Republican until the committee had released 
them through its report.76 
Edwards' communication, sent to the House on April 19, 
specifically charged that Crawford had mismanaged the national 
funds, had received a large amount of uncurrent notes from cer- 
tain banks in partial discharge of their debts to the United States 
contrary to a resolution of Congress in 1816, had misstated the 
amount of such notes in a communication to the House, had 
acted illegally in a variety of instances by making and continuing 
deposits of public money in certain banks without reporting 
thereon to Congress, and had withheld information and letters 
called for by the House. Edwards admitted writing the "A.B." 
letters, said he would not charge Crawford with bad intentions 
in any of the acts mentioned, and would not ask for an investi- 
gation. "Such a request ought more naturally to be looked for 
from himself."77 
Monroe was "highly exasperated" by Edwards' memorial, which 
he thought might give the impression-because it followed so 
closely on the President's nomination of Edwards as minister- 
75 Senate Executive Journal, 3:364; House Doc., No. 140 (serial 102), 18th Cong., 
1st sess., 3. Edwards was all but accused of perjury. Evidence about the letter from 
Betijamin Stephenson to Crawford is conflicting, and it is possible the letter was not 
sent to the Treasury Department. See Edward Coles to Crawford, July 1, 1824, 
IZtlwartl Coles Papers (Chicago Historical Society). 
713 Cook to Edwards, April 17, 1824, Edwards; Washburne, Edwn~ds,  223-24; 
Duckett, I'orsyth, 29-31. 
77 House Doc., No. 139 (serial 102), 18th Cong., 1st sess., 21-22. Tl~ere  were fifty 
pages of supporting documents. For the charges, testimony, Crawford's answer, and 
the committee report see also ASPF, 5:l-146. 
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that he was acting in concert with Edwards against Crawford.78 
Apparently he was dissuaded from immediately suspending Ed- 
wards' trip only by the unanimous opinion of the cabinet that 
such action should await the report of the investigating com- 
mittee. This committee, appointed by Clay, consisted of John 
Floyd (Virginia), John Randolph (Virginia), John W. Taylor 
(New York), Daniel Webster (Massachusetts), Duncan McArthur 
(Ohio), George W. Owen (Alabama), and Edward Livingston 
(Louisiana). The  first two were Crawford supporters; Taylor 
favored Adams; Webster was uncommitted; McArthur was for 
Clay; and the last two supported Jackson. Taylor thought Edwards 
should be sent for, and so did Adams. Crawford's friends seemed 
anxious that this be done and thought postponement of an investi- 
gation would be unfavorable to Crawford's presidential ambi- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~  The House sent its sergeant at arms to bring Edwards 
back to Washington. 
- 
Excitement was widespread and the opinion prevailed that 
Crawford or Edwards must "go down." Some non-Crawford 
men thought Edwards' conduct was "strongly marked with knav- 
ery" and that his memorial was a "plausible, Jesuitical impudent 
production." I t  was argued that the men of the West-and Edwards 
was one of them-not only claimed but urged the aid to the 
western banks; it was possible to reason that the government 
gained rather than lost by these arrangements, for otherwise the 
sale of public lands would have come to a standstill, thousands 
would have been ruined, the paper money would have perished 
in the hands of the community, and the debt to the government 
would have remained unpaid; impoverishment would have fallen 
on 
Crawford's reply to Edwards was prepared by Asbury Dickins 
and sent to the committee on May 11. Two weeks later a com- 
mittee report, written by Livingston and revised by Webster, 
78111 a report of March 1823 Crawford claimed Monroe had sanctioned the 
rneasures taken in connection with the weslern banks. Monroe adrni~ted this and 
since that time had considered any attack on Crawford for these actiorls as an 
attack on him also. Therefore, he had not viewed his appointment of Edwards 
as unfriendly to Crawford. Adams, Memoirs, 6:299 (April 20, 1824); Monroe to FYirt, 
Sept. 27, 1824, Hamilton, AIonroe Writings, 7:36-40. 
79 Adams, Memoirs, 6:297-98 (April 20, 1824). 
80 D. P. Cook to Henry Eddy, April 24, 1824 (typescript), Henry Eddy Papers (TSH); 
James Strong to William Woodbridge, April 5, 1824; Duncan McArthur to Wood- 
bridge, April 23, 1824, Woodbridge; Charles Hammond to J. C. Wright, May 3, 7, 
9, 1824, Charles Hammond Papers (OHS): Adams, Memoirs, 6:309-10. 
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admitted the facts charged by Edwards but acquitted Crawford 
of any evil intentions. Nor did it express any opinion against 
Edwards. Just a day or two before, Crawford had suffered a 
relapse and was confined to bed.81 
With the return of Edwards to Washington on May 31 the 
investigation was resumed by a partial c ~ m r n i t t e e . ~ ~  The  exami- 
nation and cross-examination continued for three weeks, with 
Cook questioning for Edwards and Forsyth for Crawford. Testi- 
mony damaging to Edwards was given by Senator James Noble 
of Indiana, who steadfastly maintained that on February 21 or 
22, 1824, he had heard Edwards deny authorship of the "A.B." 
letters and believed Edwards' purpose in doing so was to over- 
come the opposition of Crawford's friends to his appointment as 
minister. Noble's testimony had nothing to do with the charges 
themselves, but it threw a cloud over Edwards' character-and 
Edwards had no satisfactory reply. The  committee thought noth- 
ing had been proved to "impeach the integrity of the secretary" 
or cast doubt on the "general correctness and ability of his 
administration of the public finances." The Crawford papers 
and partisans rejoiced in the report, and some of the opposition 
papers were also pleased-they thought the attack on Crawford 
had been unfair.83 
The cabinet on June 21 again discussed the matter at length; 
Monroe had already drafted a revocation of Edwards' commission, 
and all thought Edwards should be removed if he did not resign.s4 
81 Drafl of an answer prepared by Arsbury] D[icltins], May 8, 1824, Asbllry 
Dickins Papers (MDLC): House Doc., No. 145 (serial 102), 18th Cong., 1st sess.; 
ASPF, 5:41-67, 69-74. Clawford's reply was accompanied by folly-six documents. 
82 Ildr~dolph llatl left for England on May 13: McArthur and Owen were no  longer 
in a~tentlance. Before leaving, Randolph informed the "Freeholders of the Counties 
of Charlotle, Ruckingham, Prince Edward, and Cumberland, and the Common- 
wealth of Virginia" that it was at  his instance that the committee had given Crawford 
the chance to answer Edwards' charges. IJntil Crawford's answer, Randolph said 
he  had litLle interest in the election of 1824, but he  now had a keen desire that 
Crawford be elected. Baltiinore American 6 Commercial Daily Advertiser, May 29, 
1824, citing Richnlond Enquirer. 
83 ASPF, 5.80 146 (lesti~noliy), 79-80 (report); Nashville Wltig, July I!), .41rg. 30, 
1824 (quoting Boston Statesman); Argus of Wrstern America, July 7, 1824 Joseph 
Gibson to Louis McLane, July 25, 1824, McLane: Van Buren to Jelfe~son, July 13, 
1824 (draft), Van Buren; Richard Rush to Crawford, Aug. 4, 1824, Crawford, MD1.C. 
The  Boston Slatesman noted, "It is said that the degree of A.B. i.e. Absolutely Bad, 
has been conferred on Ninian Ed7clards by the Committee of Investigation at  \Vash- 
ington." A duel between Cook and Forsyth, expected by many, did not take place. 
84 A d a m  kept in close touch with the hearings, saw Edwards and some of the 
committee members several times during the hearings, said Taylor and Livingston 
moderated Webster's proposed panegyric on Crawford's management of the treasury, 
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The  following day the cabinet resumed their discussion at 8 a.m. 
and continued until 9:30 p.m. Edwards' resignation was sub- 
mitted, and Wirt, who the day before had thought Edwards should 
resign, said that if there was no reason to remove the minister 
there was no sufficient reason to accept the resignation. They 
decided to wait on this decision until the next day, but the issue 
was resolved in the evening by the Republican's announcement 
of the resignation.85 
This episode of the campaign faded away, but Edwards' na- 
tional career was ended. He was elected governor of Illinois by 
a small margin in 1826, but Cook was not returned to the House. 
For several years Edwards seemed to be trying to play against 
Crawford the role Crawford later played against Calhoun. The  
coalescing of the Crawford and Jackson forces in Illinois was too 
much for Edwards to overcome.86 
In the second phase of the "A.B." affair Crawford regained 
some of the ground he had lost in the first, but this gain was 
probably offset by increasing opposition to a caucus-nominated 
candidate and by Crawford's protracted illness after his relapse 
in May 1824. 
and was concerned that his own candidacy might be hurt  by cabinet involvement 
in  the affair. Memoirs, 6: esp. 371, 374, 384, 387, 388-91. 
85 Edwards to Monroe, June 22, 1824, Edwards; Adams, Mentoirs, 6:391-94. 
Edwards said that Crawford knew all the accusations made against him were true, 
but he was resigning because he  did not want LO cause Monroe any embarrassment. 
86 Theodore Calvin Pease, The Story of Illinois (Chicago, 1925), 114-15; Duff Green 
to Edwards, Sept. 6, 1826; Hugh Nelson to Edwards, Oct. 8, 1828, Washburne, 
Edwards, 256-58, 372-74; Green to Edwards, July 14, 1828, Duff Green Letter Rook 
(MDLC). 
The Last Congressional 
Nominating Caucus 
IN THE LATTER stages of the campaign of 1824 Crawford's candi- 
dacy was adversely affected by the rather general revolt against 
the caucus method of nomination, by the allegation that he was 
the candidate of the "managing" politicians rather than the 
candidate of the people, and by contradictory reports concerning 
the state of his health. 'The emphasis placed upon the will and 
the sovereignty of the people indicated widespread dissatisfaction 
with existing political processes and methods, and the caucus 
had for years been denounced as an infringement on the people's 
rights and as an attempt to lead rather than reflect public opinion. 
Though most politicians would not hesitate to use the caucus 
if they felt it beneficial to their political fortunes, there was 
anything but unanimity on how the will of the people should 
be expressed. Crawford-oriented politicians preferred retention 
and use of time-honored machinery, believing this would be 
advantageous to their favorite, but many others advocated the 
type of political organization that became prevalent in the 1830s, 
the popular and democratized party. 
This difference in orientation doubtless helps to account for 
Crawford's lack of popularity, an impression which was assid- 
uously disseminated by those who courted the sovereigns. The  
caucus bore the brunt of the attack, but the procedure by which 
some states chose the presidential electors was also sharply 
criticized as being inconsistent with the democratic principles of 
the country. The  cleavage between proponents of the old and 
advocates of the new was sometimes narrowed, sometimes widened, 
by reports or rumors about the health of the candidate from 
Georgia. 
The congressional caucus (sometimes also referred to as con- 
vention) had been under severe indictment since 1816 and was 
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generally discredited by 1824. Numerous charges were made 
against the caucus, but perhaps the remark of William Plumer, 
Sr., expressed the basic dissatisfaction of many. He said there 
had been too much management and intrigue in the caucuses 
with "too much regard for private & too little respect for the 
public interest.'I1 In various parts of the republic the use of the 
caucus at any level was a t t a~ked ,~  but it was not until 1822 that 
Hezekiah Niles opened his "final war." When principle was 
involved, he said, the caucus could be tolerated as a means of 
extinguishing personal views and promoting union. But in 
caucuses where only personality, management, intrigue, and bar- 
gain were concerned, "truth is kicked out of doors and decency 
trampled under foot." He would rather the halls of Congress 
be "converted into common brothels" than be used for such 
caucus meetings and vowed to oppose the reelection or future 
advancement of any member of Congress who participated in 
such gatherings. Niles periodically continued his opposition, but 
in the fall of 1823 he devoted much space to this subject and 
seemed to delight in reminding caucus supporters Gales and 
Seaton of the National Zntelligencer and Ritchie of the Richmond 
Enquirer that they had opposed the caucus in 1816.3 
Niles was definitely captain of the anticaucus writers and 
Ritchie, Gales, and Seaton were co-captains of the procaucus 
group; l ~ y  early 1823 many had already taken up their positions. 
The  Washington Gazette thought that nomination by the states 
was not a good thing, that the necessity of a national caucus was 
more apparent each day, that it was requisite to adjust the 
"opposite state claims" set up for the presidency and to prevent 
the election from going to the House, and indispensably requisite 
to prevent intrigue in the electoral college. On the other hand, 
the Maryland Repzlblican held the claim of necessity was only 
a pretext for the caucus supporters. Niles continued to say that 
the choice must be left to the p e ~ p l e . ~  
1 Plomer, Sr., to Pluliler, Jr., April 24. 1820, Brown, Alirrouri Coniprotriites, 51. 
2 See for early examples the Pilt\burgh (;(1z~/le,  whi~11 in Llle summer of 1818 
carried numerous condemrlatiol~s of caucus nomillations of candidates for Con- 
gress. 
3 Niles' Weekly Register 21 (Jan. 22, 1822):339: 25 (Sept. 20, Oct. 18, Dec. 27, 1823): 
40-41, 99-101, 257; Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 7, 1823. 
4 Washington Gazette, Jan. 27, 1823; Maryland Republican . . . , Jan. 7 ,  Feb. 1 ,  
March 15, 29, 1823; Niles' Weekly Register 24 (June 28, 1823):258. See also National 
Republicun avid Ohio Political Register (Cincinnati) during 1823, especially the 
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Newspapers, through editorial comment, news stories, and 
communications were the major antagonists, but on occasion 
others committed their opinions to writing. Calhoun seemed to 
approve a caucus among those holding similar principles and 
policies but thought a caucus unnatural and to a "great degree 
indefensible" if it involved compromise or if it was held to elevate 
a candidate who must be governed by men "wholly opposed to 
our views" of the nation's interest. Adams was unequivocally 
opposed to his being nominated by a caucus, while Clay felt he 
had nothing to fear from a caucus of all Republican congressmen. 
Another observer believed a caucus would help to keep the 
Federalists "in their  hole^."^ 
Jonathan Russell, who had carried on his vendetta against 
Adams and had transferred his support from Clay to Crawford, 
defended the caucus at great length. Such a meeting, he main- 
tained, was neither provided for nor prohibited by the Con- 
stitution; at a congressional caucus there was no self-constituted 
cabal; every member admitted to the meeting had been con- 
stitutionally elected; all sections of the country were represented; 
and a caucus was essential to bring about compromise. He 
ridiculed the newer methods of nomination by state legislatures 
and mass meetings. The  President should be the President of 
the whole people and not just a part of the United Stateso 
Hugh Lawson White of Tennessee, long a supporter of Jackson, 
thought the general's nomination by the Tennessee legislature 
"highly improper" and a precedent "dangerous in the extreme." 
He had been opposed to a nomination by a congressional caucus 
but had no doubt that nominations by state legislatures were 
"much worse." The  making of a President was the business of 
the whole people through the medium of the electors: the state 
legislature had nothing to do with it; nor was it the concern of 
Congress. It was the people's business to select electors, and 
October 24 issue which carried a quite lucid condemnation of the caucus and 
reprinted the resolutions of the Tennessee legislature against that method of 
nomination. 
5 Call1o1111 to J.  D. Erbeu, June 25, 1823, 1)eCoppett; Adarns, Memoirs, 6:235-37, 
241-44; Clay to Charles Hammond, Jan. 3, 1824, Clay, Lilly; H. G. Balch to N. G.  
Howard, Jan. 25, 1824, N. G. Howard Papers (Mississippi State Library and 
Archives). Call~oun's remarks seem to indicate that he thought he could not be 
the nominee of a caucus. 
a Congressional Caucus, 18-page manuscript, Russell. This 1823 paper was pub- 
lished in the Boston Stnt~sman over the name Hancock. 
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the legislative nomination was an unwarranted usurpation of 
power which should not be co~ntenanced.~ 
Several states followed the example of Tennessee-and of South 
Carolina-by placing their favorites in nomination, but the Ten- 
nessee resolutions against a congressional caucus nomination 
as a violation of the principles of the Constitution perhaps 
caused more discussion than any other single item. These 
resolutions were sent to the various states and were widely 
reprinted in the papers. New York rejected the proposals; Rhode 
Island tabled them; a committee of the Virginia legislature 
reported that it was both "politic and expedient" to have a 
caucus which was the only practicable means whereby the wishes 
of the majority of the nation were likely to be obtained. This 
report was indefinitely postponed, 77-76, but about two weeks 
later 157 of the 236 members of the legislature, acting in their 
"individual capacities," approved the action of the New York 
caucus and recommended that the Republican members from 
Virginia in Congress endeavor to procure the nomination of 
fit persons to fill the offices of President and Vice President.8 
In North Carolina, incorrectly thought to be certain for Craw- 
ford, sentiment against Virginia domination brought a heated 
three-day debate on the caucus and on the postponement, 82-46, 
of the anticaucus resolution introduced in the House of Commons 
by Charles Fisher, former congressman. In the discussion, Fisher 
verbalized North Carolinians' dissatisfaction with the number 
of appointments to office the state had received during thirty-six 
years of following Virginia, and thought it "time for North- 
Carolina to stand alone-time to break the charm of Virginia 
influence-and think and act for our~elves."~ 
When Georgia Governor George M. Troup, Crawford partisan, 
submitted the Tennessee anticaucus resolutions to his assembly, 
he could not conceive what precise and definite meaning the 
legislature intended to attach to "caucus," a word not in the 
dictionary or in the constitution or laws of Tennessee. Appar- 
7 White to David Campbell. June 10, 1823, Campbell, Duke. 
8 Niles' Weekly Register 25 (Jan. 3, 10, 24, 31, 1824):281-84 288, 292, 323, 340. 
'The Tennessee resolutions are conveniently available in ibid., 137-39. 
9 Ibid. (Dec. 20, 1823):243; Raleigh Register and North-Carolina Gazette, May 21, 
1824. A Crawford supporter thooght (incorrectly) the defeat of the resolutions 
by so decisive a vote had blasted the hopes of the Calhoun group in North 
Carolina. Romulus Saunders to Bartlett Yancey, Dec. 17, 1823, Hamilton, "Letters 
to Yancey," 39. 
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ently, the Tennessee body was referring to a contemplated meet- 
ing of members of Congress to influence a decision on a "certain 
question," over which a state legislature had no jurisdiction. 
Although the members of Congress stood in both a public and 
private relation to society, they forfeited none of their rights as 
individuals by assuming public duties. The  
most arbitrary despotism could not prevent their assembly for 
purposes not inhibited by the laws. Such an assembly for convivial 
or social purposes might intermingle with its amusements the 
gravest discussions, and among those the very question, the discus- 
sion of which, by that assembly, the Legislature of Tennessee so 
ardently denounces:-it would give to itsell a name other than that 
of Caucus, and then the vain unprofitable resolution of the Legis- 
lature of Tennessee would not have even a shadow on which to 
fix itself.10 
The resolutions were tabled for the remainder of the session. 
Not all state legislatures acted on the Tennessee resolutions, 
but of those that did only Maryland (with eleven electoral votes) 
approved them; Maine, New York, Virginia, and Georgia (with 
seventy-six votes) specifically approved a caucus nomination; North 
Carolina, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, and Ohio (with sixty-eight 
votes) postponed action; and one house of the South Carolina 
legislature concurred in the Tennessee statement. Thus, legisla- 
tures of states with 144 electoral votes, or a majority of the 261 
total, had declared for a caucus nomination or postponed action 
on a statement against such a nomination. 
Discussion of a caucus quickened as the time approached for 
the convening of Congress. At the end of the last session of 
Congress many Crawford supporters had expected a caucus in 
the early days of the next session, but Crawford's illness made 
them hesitant to commit themselves until the recovery of their 
candidate seemed more certain, and the caucus was delayed. 
Jonathan Russell, however, was not deterred from his unremitting 
advocacy of a caucus nomination. Without a caucus, he said, the 
Republican party would be fragmented, love of persons or dis- 
tricts would predominate over love of republic and destroy the 
sentiments of freedom and patriotism, and delay of a caucus 
would provide time for disciplining and rendering more formi- 
lOTroup to Senate of Georgia, Dec. 16, 1823, Cuyler. 
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dable its adversaries, since all other candidates seemed to think 
Crawford their most serious rival. Other Crawford friends, such 
as Jesse B. Thomas, continued to support a congressional caucus, 
as did some of the established and newly founded papers. Other 
papers, as well as county and local meetings, did not lessen their 
opposition.ll 
In late 1823 Adams believed Crawford's friends intended to 
precipitate a caucus to forestall the movements of the state legisla- 
tures and of the people in Adams' favor. He expected a caucus 
to be held and apparently thought Crawford would be elected, 
for he said "if his Administration should prove an unpopular one, 
the caucus appointment will eventually recoil upon him." Former 
Secretary of Navy Crowninshield did not see how the caucus 
would be held, since only Crawford's friends favored it. Each 
candidate, though, was doing all he could to make friends: Jackson 
was patching up private quarrels, the friends of Crawford were 
similarly engaged, Calhoun and his followers were playing "deep 
and rather impudently" and laughing at Adams, and Adams alone 
was "still &: firm as Atlas, waiting the result of public movement." 
Jackson felt opinion in Washington was against a caucus-there 
were not more than forty-two people in favor of it-and without a 
caucus the treasury candidate had but little chance.12 
The  Crawfordites' support of a caucus brought accusations 
that Crawford had Federalist backers, but his friends vigorously 
maintained that he trod the beaten Republican path of Jefferson, 
Madison, and Monroe, that he did not seek to elevate himself by 
"new-fangled inventions," and that he left it to the people alone 
to judge him. Some pro-Crawford papers said a comparison of 
those favoring and opposing the caucus showed the former held 
"old republican standards" and had invited confidence by their 
steadfast adherence to principle, while the latter were a "new 
race of politicians, in a great measure unknown, or not long 
known, to the nation; and if known, remarkable only for their 
11 Russell to Samuel Eddy, Nov. 24, 1823, Russell: Thomas to Gov. S[hadrack] 
Bond, Dec. 8, 1823, Thomas. See also Albany Argus and Taunton (Mass.) Free Press 
for November and December 1823; Niles' Weekly Register 25 (Nov. 15, 29, Dec. 20, 
1823): 166, 194, 242. 
12 Adams, Memoirs, 6:191 (Nov. 19, 1823): B. W. Crowninshield to Genl [H. A. 
Dearborn ?I, Dec. 19, 1823, Crowninshield Personal Miscellany (MDLC); Jackson to 
William B. Lewis, Dec. 22, 1823, lackson-Lewis. Jackson said he was clear of both 
intrigue and caucus mongers and intended to stay that way. Philip Barbour had 
received forty-two votes in his contest with Clay for the speakership of the House. 
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abandonment of principle and pursuit of office and emolument, 
by attaching themselves to the skirts of other candidates." Ex- 
cepted from this evaluation were those who had always declined 
attending a caucus; their consistency attested their principles. 
The voice of the Republica~i party and the national interest called 
for a caucus; if a majority was against a nomination after a fair 
trial, something would be gained by ascertaining that fact. Rather 
than hold an anticaucus meeting, opponents of this method of 
nomination should go into caucus and vote down the "radicals"-- 
thus making the country safe. If they were not sure of their 
ability to do this, they should stay away and let it die a natural 
death. On the other hand, why should they voluntarily absent 
themselves and "suffer the scheme of such tremendous wickedness 
to be carried on in open defiance of them?"13 
It  was apparent the friends of Crawford wanted a caucus in 
the hope that endorsement by such a gathering would give a boost 
to their candidate. The  friends of the other candidates did not 
want a caucus: no two groups (including Crawford's) had heen 
able to effect a coalition, and no other single group had the 
congressional strength and cohesion of the Crawford forces. Craw- 
ford's illness and the known anticaucus attitude of some of his 
staunchest supporters constituted problems of some magnitude, 
but James Barbour and Thomas W. Cobb worked valiantly for 
his nomination and election. Early in 1824 Cob11 wrote that the 
"precarious" state of Crawford's health had been a "great draw- 
back," but arrangements for a caucus were being speedily made. 
Crawford, he thought, would receive the votes of 70 to 80 of the 
100 to 120 who would attend. New York was described as firm, 
but he believed they would lose Pennsylvania and that Calhoun 
was throwing his weight to Jackson, whose prospects were improv- 
ing more rapidly than those of any other candidate. A few days 
later Cobb was not so sanguine about the caucus prospects: if all 
Crawford friends would attend, there would be about ninety, but 
probably only about eighty would go into caucus. No other 
candidate had more than twenty or thirty, and they were trying 
to unite in an anticaucus association. He thought he saw some 
signs of a coalition between Clay and Calhoun; Jackson had 
13 Washington Gazette, Feb. 4, 1 1 ,  1824: Savannah Republican, Feb. 20, 1824; CW 
to Samuel Gouverneur, Feb. 3, 1824, Gouverneur; Milledgeville Georgiu Journal, 
Feb. 17, 24, 1824. 
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reconciled himself with all but Crawford; and Adains had "also 
conducted himself like a gentleman at last." He named ten 
Crawford men who he thought would not caucus; there were 
others he did not remember. At the moment he thought they 
could count on the votes of seven states but indicated that no 
doubt "great changes will be made by  circumstance^."^^ 
Crawford supporters, hoping to substantiate the assertion that 
Crawford trod the path of Jefferson and other illustrious Republi- 
cans, tried to devise some way to persuade Jefferson to declare 
himself, but apparently they never got beyond the "planning" 
stage. They did, however, make special efforts to get Nathaniel 
Macon to attend a caucus and to induce Gallatin to come to 
Washington to use his influence with the Pennsylvania delegation. 
Macon, more than thirty years a member of the House and Senate, 
a strong supporter of Crawford, and considered one of the few 
remaining Old Republicans, had not attended a caucus since 1800. 
He thought nomination by a congressional caucus preferable to 
nomination by state legislatures, but he objected to a caucus 
because it was not provided for by the Constitution, produced 
electioneering among members of Congress that bordered on 
intrigue and bargain, and forced the minority to yield their 
opinion. 
Macon was convinced his attending a caucus would do no good 
to Crawford's cause and might do harm. He was not in favor of 
the new tariff, he did not advocate internal improvements, and 
he was not a member of the colonization society. His stand- 
opposite to that of Crawford-on each of these wodd have weight 
in the election, and his attendance would raise the suspicion of 
bargain. These differences did not trouble Macon, who had a 
high regard for Crawford's abilities and remembered only Craw- 
ford's vote on the first Bank of the United States as being at 
variance with Republican principles. By the end of January 1824 
14 Col)b to Dear Sir, Jan. 24, 1824, Gratz; Cobl, to Charles Tait ,  Fel). 2, 1824, ' h i t .  
Among the persons named were Willie P. Mangum and Nathaniel Macon of North 
Carolina, John Randolph of Vilginia, Josepl~ McKim of Maryland, and Louis 
Mc1,ane of Delaware. In his "Dear Sir" letter Cobb said the doctors indicatetl the 
quantities of digitalis administered in Virginia had caused Crawford's eye t~ouble .  
Recently there had been improvement in one eye but very little change in the other. 
See also Willie Mangum to Seth Jones, Feb. 11, 1824, Henry Thomas Shanks, ed., 
The Papers of Willie Person Manguln, 6 vols. (Raleigh, N.C., 1950-1956), 1 :115-16 
(hereafter cited as Shanks, M a n g ~ i m ) ;  Benjamin Ruggles to Thomas Worthington, 
Feb. 5, 1824, Worthing~on. Ruggles was the only Ohio representative to go into 
caucus. 
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he had "not decided to attend." (It would appear from the 
context and from all previous statements of his position that 
Macon really meant "decided not to attend.") However, he 
advised caucus advocates to convene-if they intended to do so. 
The meeting should have been held in December, since the strong 
side rarely gains by delay.15 
Crawford and his friends wanted Gallatin to come to Washing- 
ton, for they believed he could unite the Pennsylvania delegation 
in support of a caucus. In the course of their efforts Macon sent 
Gallatin a note he had received from Cobb, in which Cobb relayed 
Crawford's request for Macon to write Gallatin that it was neces- 
sary for him to come to the capital for "his interests and interests 
of others were suffering in consequence of his absence." Macon's 
comment was: "I know not to what it relates."lG Macon's influence 
did not get Gallatin to Washington, nor was Gallatin's to per- 
suade Macon to go into caucus. Several letters were exchanged. 
Macon thought he did not have the influence Gallatin supposed, 
reported he had vowed in 1800 never again to attend a caucus, 
and said "I cannot go." Should he attend, the charge of intrigue 
would be renewed against Crawford who would be said to be the 
only man who could "touch the chord that moved me," and prob- 
ably the wicked and false adage that every man has his price 
would be revived. Time would prove them false, but the election 
would be over and the injury done.17 
On February 7 caucus advocates had agreed to a meeting on 
February 14, the obvious purpose of which was nomination of 
Crawford. The  Baltimore Morning Chronicle derided the action: 
T h e  Question Settled.-The poor little political bird of ominous 
note and plumage, denominated a CAUCUS, was hatched at 
Washington on Saturday last. It is now running around like a 
pullet, in a forlorn and sickly state. Reader, have you ever seen 
15 Macon to Van Ruren, May 9, 1823, Van Buren: Macon to Bartlett Yancey, Ikc.  
12, 1823, Yancey; Macon to Yancey, Jan. 31, Feb. 1, 1824, Hamilton, "Letters to 
Yancey," 42, 43. 
Ieresse 13. Thomas to Gallatin, Jan. 5, 1824: Macon to Gallatin, ,\an. 16, 1824, 
Gallatin. This could well be a bit of Macon humor; he sometimes ribbed and teased 
his correspondents and displayed a disarming boyishness. On other occasions Macon 
does appear surprisingly naive. 
17 Walter I.owrie to Gallatin, Feb. 10, 1824; Macon to Gallatin, Feb. 13, 14, 1824, 
ibid. Macon would have preferred to talk with Gallatin about the caucus. Lowrie 
later said of Macon: he is "an honest & good man: but he is so entirely made up  of 
negatives, that we can expect nothing positively active from him." Lowrie to 
Gallatin, Feb. 20, 1824, ibid. 
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a chicken directly after it was hatched, creeping about with a bit 
of egg shell sticking to its back? This is a just representation of 
this poor forlorn Congressional caucus. The sickly thing is to 
be fed, cherished, pampered for a week, when it is fondly hoped 
it will be enabled to cry the name of Crawford, Crawford, Craw- 
ford.18 
Benjamin Ruggles was chairman and Ela Collins of New York 
was secretary of the caucus meeting. An attempt to postpone 
action until March 20, when a "more full assemblage of members 
might be expected," was opposed by Martin Van Buren and failed. 
Van Buren thought it impossible to fix a time convenient and 
agreeable for all to attend and asserted that the people were 
anxiously awaiting the nomination. Sixty-six-just more than one 
third of the Republicans in Congress-attended and two others 
voted by proxy. The  result was not unexpected: Crawford 64, 
Adams 2, Macon 1, and Jackson 1. Tompkins, Van Buren told 
the gathering, had declined reelection; Albert Gallatin received 
57 votes for the vice-presidential nomination, and eight others 
garnered a total of nine votes.19 
The  sixty-six attending consisted of eight (of nine) from 
Georgia, ten (of fifteen) from North Carolina, fourteen (of 
twenty-five) from Virginia, sixteen (of thirty-six) from New 
York, three each from Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Mary- 
land, two from Maine and South Carolina, and one each from 
Rhode Island, New Jersey, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Thus, 
only Georgia, North Carolina, and Virginia showed a majority 
of their delegations in caucus, and only three people from west 
of the mountains attended. 
The  maneuverings of the anti-Crawfordites had not prevented 
the caucus, but the Crawford supporters were not able to lure 
to the meeting some of the Old Republicans. And the attendance 
fell some dozen or more short of the estimates of the "managers." 
For some time the supporters and opponents of the caucus played 
a numbers game, with the opponents having a little better of the 
18 Quoted in National Journal, Feb. 11, 1824. 
19Ualtimore American Q Conlmercial Daily Advertiser, Feb. 16, 1824. A thousand 
or more spectators attended the meeting: on the "annunciation of the name of Mr. 
Crawford for President, some approbation was expressed from the galleries, which 
was followed by a slight murmur or hiss, proceeding, among others, from a clerk 
in the War Department." With this "trifling exception," the "utmost harmony" 
was said to have prevailed. 
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contest since a smaller percentage of Republicans in Congress 
attended the 1824 gathering than had attended any previous 
caucus. Crawford's opponents never let the public forget that the 
Georgian had been nominated by a minority of the Republicans 
in C o n g r e ~ s . ~ ~  
The  caucus nomination certainly seems not to have advanced 
Crawford in the standings, and it is highly probable that the 
caucus apologia, "Address to the Republicans in the United 
States," was a serious political mistake. The Address justified 
the meeting by the usual reasoning of the caucus advocates and 
called attention to the twenty-four years of Republican control 
of the central government, the danger of division within the 
party, and the disruptive mischief that might have been done 
by the Tennessee resolutions." The  absence of so many Republi- 
cans was regrettable, but it was said to be "neither our privilege 
nor disposition to exercise any right of judgment on their 
conduct." The  caucus participants did not conceal their anxiety 
that the "course of recent events points to the entire dismem- 
bern~ent of the party to which it is our pride to be attached" 
and spolte of the "unalleviated mischiefs" of an election by the 
House of Representatives. The  conclusion was a reference to 
Crawford's refusal to stand for caucus nomination in 1816: 
Without intending to derogate from the merits of others, for 
whom your confidence might be solicited, it is just to remind 
you that the candidate we recommend Eor the first office in your 
government, has established a peculiar claim to the esteem of 
the republican party, by his manly and disinterested conduct upon 
a lormer occasion, uncler the strongest temptation to become the 
iristrument of compromising his integrity.2" 
The statement was accusing in tone, partisan in approach, and 
pessimistic in outlook. 
If the Address was intended to placate the anticaucus people 
zollarnabas [?I to John Holmes, March 4, 1824, John Holmes I'apers (Maine 
Historical Society). For examples of the numbers game and comments thereon see 
Rnleigh Register and North-Carolina Gazette, Feb. 17, March 5, 1824; Constitutional 
W h i g ,  Feb. 20, 1824: Washington Gazette, March 4, 1824; Niles' Weekly Register 25 
(Dec. 20, 1823):244, and many subsequent issues. 
fl Since only Maryland had approved the Tennessee resolutions, the Address was 
creating its own straw man to tear down. 
22 Niles' Weekly Register 25 (Feb. 21, 1824):390-91; Nashville W h i g ,  March 15, 
1824. 
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and to soothe the feelings of various factions of the party, it was 
apparently couched in the wrong terms. William King, governor 
of Maine, was "greatly chagrined" by the paper and said it was 
all the work of John Holmes of his state and of Van Bmen, was 
against the opinions and wishes of a great majority of Crawford's 
best friends and supporters in and out of the caucus, and mis- 
represented the sentiments of the one it was intended to serve. 
It had placed King in the most unpleasant predicament since his 
administration had know11 no distinction in politics and he had 
consistently asserted that Crawford would be tolerant of all sects 
and parties in the conduct of the government. He believed that 
only New York and Pennsylvania would respond to the doctrine 
of party contained in the Address."Many others felt that no 
statement should have been made. The  Address recalls the 
Exposition published by Crawford supporters in 18 16; the 1824 
statement might well have been another case where Crawford's 
best friends were his worst enemies. 
The  journalistic war over the caucus did not subside. Oppo- 
nents thought the Crawfordites' "forcing" the caucus would have 
a fatal reaction, Crawford would not be the next President, and 
there would be no more caucuses. Some "reflective and candid" 
friends of Crawford were said to review the caucus with chagrin 
and regret, but the friends of Clay viewed the meeting as the 
herald of Crawford's fall and the harbinger of Clay's elevation. 
Clay himself thonght the nomination would destroy whatever 
prospects Crawford ever had. At least one Crawford paper saw an 
insidious design in the contir~ued opposition to the caucus nomi- 
nation: al l  the hue and cry came from those who were determined 
that no election should be made by the people.24 
That a selection might be made by the people-or that greater 
control be given to the people-seems to have been the major 
23 John A.  King to Rufus King, March 5, 1824, King, King, 6:353. The publisher 
of l11e Soston Statesnl~tn thought the caucus wo111ti help in "this quarter" and those 
New England Republicans who were afraid to attend would have much to repent 
of later. Nathaniel Greene to John Holnles, March 2, 1824, Holmes. 
24 Iior example see A~lgtrsla Cl~ronicle a d  Georgia Advertiser, Feb. 28, Marcli LO, 
13, April 3, 14, 24, 1824; Krntr~cky Gazette, Feb. 26, March 18, 1824; Pitt.rhto.gld 
Gclrelle, Feb. 27, 1824; Portsr~rortllr ,Journal, Feb. 14, 28, 1824; Colullzbin~~ Centinel, 
Feb. 18, 1824; Charles Harnmond to [J. C. Wright?], Feb. 23, 1824, Hammond, 013s; 
Coitslittllional Whig ,  Feb. 20, 1824; Clay to Francis Brooke, Feb. 23, 1824, Henry 
Clay I'apers (IJniversity of lientucky Library); Western Argus reprinted in Albany 
Argus, Feb. 17, 1824. 
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objective of numerous proposals to change the manner of choosing 
the electors and to establish a new procedure for selecting the 
President. A measure introduced by Senator John Taylor of 
Virginia provided that the states should choose, by districts, as 
many electors as they had representatives; those electors should 
then choose an additional two to represent the senators. If, in the 
electoral college, no candidate received a majority, the electors 
would vote again. As reported by one committee, the second 
vote would be between the two highest candidates; if no ~najority 
was attained, the matter would be referred to the representatives 
and senators, meeting jointly but voting individually. A majority 
of the whole number present would elect, but in case two candi- 
dates had the same number of votes the person having the highest 
number at the earlier meeting should be declared President. If 
tied both times, the balloting should continue u n ~ i l  a choice was 
made. The same procedure would be followed in choosing a 
Vice President. This measure was twice read to the Senate com- 
mittee of the whole on December 22, 1823. A similar proposal 
Ily Thonias Hart Benton was also before the Senate, and on 
January 8, 1824, a select committee recommended that the sena- 
tors and representatives should choose among the three candidates 
with the highest number of votes, and a majority would be 
necessary for a choice on the first ballot. Thereafter only a plu- 
rality would be required for election. Further, no person twice 
elected to the office should again be eligible. No change was 
recommended in the manner of choosing the Vice P r e ~ i d e n t . ~ ~  
Neither of these measures-nor any of the others-so much as 
passed the house in which they were introduced. 
The  Taylor bill would have required choice of presidential 
electors by the congressional districts, thus bringing the election 
considerably closer to the people, but giving the individual voter 
less "power" than he would have if all the electors of a state were 
chosen by the general ticket. Actually, in the spring of 1823 the 
district method was used by five states with a total of sixty electoral 
votes. Electors were also chosen by the general ticket (nine states 
with 114 votes) and by the legislature (ten states with 87 votes). 
Criticism of the last method was sharp, and especially was the 
25 See Annals of appropriate dates and Niles' Weekly Register 25 (Dec. 13, 27, 
1823, Jan. 3, 17, 1824):240, 270-71, 273, 317. 
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practice denounced because it too often involved managing, in- 
trigue, manipulation, and usurpation of the people's rights. Many 
newspapers and letter writers attacked this method of selecting 
the electors who would choose the President, but one article 
reprinted by Hezekiah Niles will suffice to indicate the tenor of 
the discussion. 
The  lengthy article, originally published in the New York 
Patriot and probably written by Henry Wheaton, was obviously 
opposed to the legislative choice of electors in New York. The  
people, it said, were not merely the "source of power" but were 
the "sovereignty of the country": there was no political authority 
above or beside them, no bound or limit to their power except 
natural right, justice, and the fundamental principles on which 
the government was founded. "State," as used in the constitutional 
provision that the state appoint electors, by common sense and 
usage means the people, not the land, the trees, the court, the 
legislature, or the executive. Further, the fact that "elect," 
" appoint," and "choose" were and had been used indiscrim- 
inately was substantiated by examples drawn from the Federalist 
papers and from discussions in the conventions called to consider 
ratification of the Constitution. James Monroe, George Mason, 
Edmund Randolph, and James Madison were cited, and the con- 
viction was expressed that the Constitution would never have 
1)een ratified if it had been believed or imagined that the legis- 
latures of the states would take the appointment of the electors 
from the people.26 
The  group in power were most often the advocates of existing 
practice. On occasion they openly defended the status quo; at 
other times they resorted to delaying tactics or sanctioned a new 
system that would have made matters worse (as in New York), 
but between the spring of 1823 and the fall of 1824 five states 
in which the legislatures had chosen the electors had transferred 
that power to the voters. Only in Vermont, New York, Delaware, 
Georgia, and Louisiana (60 votes total) did the legislatures still 
choose the electors, and Georgia had authorized the polling of 
the voters to see whether they wanted the choice of electors 
transferred to them. Three of the five states that abandoned the 
choice-by-legislature method adopted the general ticket, bringing 
26 Niles' Weekly Register 24 (July 19, 1823): 317-20. 
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to thirteen (with 150 votes) the number using the means many 
considered the fairest and best. The  other two states joined the 
four already using the dis~rict system; the electoral vote of those 
six was 5 1 .27 Clearly, a democratizing process had been operative; 
in all but one of the states retaining the choice of electors in 
the legislature, the legislators were chosen only a short time before 
the presidential elections. In New York the time span was 
twelve months, and there the infighting was bitter.28 
Crawford's poor health and the lack of completely reassuring 
statements on his degree of recovery was a most important factor 
in the presidential campaign from September 1823 to February 
1825. The Georgian's illness unquestionably delayed the caucus, 
prevented or curtailed personal contact with new members of 
Congress, precluded his keeping in close touch with electioneering 
activities, permitted a greater freedom of action for some of his 
not-always-discreet partisans, and-because of confinement to his 
home-gave greater credence to the stories that the secretary was 
near death or at least would be withdrawn from the race. On the 
other hand, uncertainty about Crawford's condition seemed to 
induce many to assume a noncommittal position on a caucus 
nomination and might well have contributed to softening some 
of the acerbities of the campaign, for no matter what happened 
to Crawford, his wing of the party was a powerful force in 
national politics. 
Unlike some other prominent public figures, Adams seemed 
genuinely to wish for the recovery of Crawford and several times 
addressed his diary in this vein. In the early spring of 1824 
Crawford seemed well on the road to recovery; he returned to 
cabinet meetings, walked over the grounds of his new place in 
the country, appeared to be regaining his strength, and was in 
"fine spirits." He could not yet use his "own eyes & pen" for 
~riting.~"y this time his friends had decided he would regain 
27 For convenient tal~nlations of the methods of choosing electors see Illinois 
Intelligencer, Sept. 24, 1824; Niles' Weekly Register 24 (May 17, 1823):lGl. See also 
ibid., 25 (Dec. 20, 1823):242; 26 (June 5, 1824):221; 27 (Sept. 4, 1824):3. Niles 
tho t~g l~ t  (June 5, 1824, p. 221) the general ticket "may prevent much dirty intrigue 
b y  the people-mongers." In  1842 Congress provided that all electors be cl~osen by 
Lhe general-ticket method. 
28 'I he choice of the New York electors is discussed in the following t l ~ a p r e ~ .  
29 Atlarns, Afetlloirs, 6:267, 275: Crawford to Richard Rush, April 26, 1824, Rush 
Family Papers (Princeton University); Mrs. S. H.  Smith to Mrs. Boyd, April 11, 1824, 
Hunt, First Forty Years, 164. On June 28, a little more than a month after Craw- 
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his health, the long-delayed nominating caucus had been held, 
and Crawford had reopened the "A.B." affair when he presented 
his lengthy report to the House. Then near the end of May he 
suffered a relapse. He was distressed that he could not confer 
with his friends during the questioning of Edwards and later 
wrote that he was "deranged" just after the adjournment of Con- 
gress and that he spoke of Edwards' "stealing" his horses and of 
his "shooting" Edwards.30 
In late May and early June 1824 death or incapacitation for 
office seemed probable. Troup expressed the fear of "our friends" 
that Crawford's illness might prove fatal or otherwise disqualify 
him, and Clay thought the Georgian's friends "begin to own 
that his death is now but too probable, and that in any event 
he can no longer be held up" for the presidency. Clay reported 
that Crawford had suffered a paralytic stroke and conjectured 
that a proposed visit to Virginia by Van Buren and Dickerson 
involved measures for a new campaign.31 The  Washington Gazette, 
whose attacks on the administration had prompted Crawford 
to withdraw the federal patronage from it only two months before, 
was not so pessimistic: Crawford was "progressing" and his bodily 
affliction was not "near so great" as that of Madison in 181 3-1814. 
And an ardent Adams paper reported Crawford's improving 
health, noting that as Adams' prospects of election increased 
daily "his friends, in addition to their sympathies as men, are 
gratified in hearing the above tidings. The  triumph over a 
sound and healthy rival will be a ~ g m e n t e d . " ~ ~  
There were many other reports and rumors, favorable and 
unfavorable. Niles took note of the irreconcilability of these, 
said he could not discover the truth, but could find no reason 
why there should be any misrepresentation of Crawford's true 
state. He thought it probable that Crawford was much better, 
ford's relapse, Mrs. Smith noted that Crawford proposed walking to their home to 
spent1 part of the day, but her lrusband had persuaded him to ride. She thought 
Crawford "so venturesome that 11e will make himself sick again." Tbid., l6G. 'The 
Crawfords had lived at  the corner of Massachusetts Avenue and 14th Street; (heir 
new rented home, to which they moved in May or Tune, was a Captain Doughty's 
farm, which was separated from the Smith place "only by the road." Catholic Uni- 
versity is situated on land that formerly was a part of the Smith place. 
Ron~ulus Sanntlers to llartlett l'alr~ey, Ilec. 10, 1824, Clalk. 
31 George M. Troup to John Randolph, lune 15, 1824 (typed copy), Iohn Ran- 
dolph Letter Book (1JVa); Clay to Francis Brooke, May 24, 1824, Clay, lJKy. 
32 Washington Gazette as quoted by Albany Argus, June 8,  1824: Columbian 
Centinel, June 12, 1824. 
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and the restoration of his health and reestablishment of all his 
faculties must be the wish of every liberal-minded man-even 
though he might utterly reject the arguments advanced for Craw- 
ford's elevation to the presidency. Apparently Crawford was 
much improved by the end of June, and the Albany Argus said 
readers were not likely to forget that the editor of the Colurnbian 
Observer had said Crawford's illness was the ''retributive justice 
of Providence" for his crimes.33 
Crawford, still weak, was advised by his physicians to avoid 
the seacoast and take a journey into the interior of Pennsylvania 
and New Jersey. Near the end of July Adams found him "con- 
valescent, in cheerful spirits," and intending to start on his trip 
the next week. He noted that Crawford's articulation was still 
affected, "but he appears otherwise quite well." On August 4 
Crawford spent about an hour with Monroe and five days later 
left the 
Crawford did not go into Pennsylvania and New Jersey; instead 
he took part of his family with him to Berkeley Springs (or Bath), 
Virginia, where he arrived on August 13. He described himself 
as "at least as well as when 1 set out from Home" and asked that 
he be written to three times a week while he was away." Whether 
the faithful Dickins met this request is not known; little cor- 
respondence for this period remains. It  can only he guessed that 
Crawford made such contacts as were possible at the Springs. 
Ile remained there for the entire period of his absence from 
Washington, to which he returned on September IZ.3C 
33 Niles' Week ly  Register 26 (June 12, 1824):240: Albany Argus, July 2, 1824. 
34 Crawford to Mahlon Dickerson, July 6, 1824, Dickerson; Adams, Memoirs, 6: 
402, 405, 408 (,July 29, Aug. 4, 9, 1824). Two days before Crawford's departure Joseph 
ilnderson said he  would send Monroe a copy of the attending and consulting 
physicians' report on Crawford's health. Apparently at least three doctors were 
involved and they declared that froru the standpoint of physical as well as mental 
health Crawford was fully competent to discharge the duties of his oficial station. 
Anderson to Monroe, Aug. 7, 1824, hlonroe, MDLC; Ricl~nzond Enquirer, Aug. 10, 
1824. 
:la Nation/tl Intelligencer, Ang. 10, 1824; Crawford to [l>ickins?], Aug. 15, 1524, 
Alexautler Calvin wash burr^ Papers (MHS). It was reported that before Crawford 
left for his trip he  walked about, took a long ride, and saw all who came to visit him 
eacll clay-sometimes as many as twenty. Also it was stated that Callloun and Craw- 
ford were in the same neighborhood while Crawford was in the "upper country," 
lltat Calhouri condescended to visit Crawford, ant1 that the visit was returned. 
Federt~l Gazette crnd Baltiinore Daily Advertise?; Aug. 13, 1824, citing h'ationel Ad-  
voctrle; Richnzond Enquirer, Sept. 17, 1824. 
36 Henry St. George Tucker to David Campbell, Aug. 29, 1824, Campbell, Duke; 
.Valionul Intelligencer, Sept. 14, 1824. 
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Two days after his return Gales and Seaton wrote Van Uuren 
fully about Crawford's condition. The  "prostration" of his system 
had been so extreme that "without a personal linowledge of it, 
no one can properly even judge his present condition." They 
had not seen him at his worst; but when they did see him, every 
function of his body-except perhaps his hearing-was impaired. 
After a week they could see a visible improvement, and there 
had not been the slightest retrogradation. On his return to 
Washington he traveled through rain over the "worst roads in 
the world" at the rate of ~hirty miles a day. A half-hour interview 
on September 13 (the day after his return) had convinced the 
editors that in all essentials Crawford was his former self. The  
distortion of his niouth had wholly disappeared; this had been 
the most distressing to look at, "though the effect merely of 
mercurial affection." They had seen Crawford at his office and 
considered him competent for any "description of Executive 
business." His eyesight and the use of his pen hand were not 
perfect, but "sufficiently so." Using glasses he was able to read 
the small print of a newspaper. "His m.ind & memory are per- 
fectly sound, vigorous, 8i: active." Considering the change that 
had taken place in six weeks, it was thought that by or before 
the meeting of Congress he "will be in a fit state to be exhibited 
with pride as the President of the United States." In frankness, 
they thought they should state what was unfavorable about 
Crawford's condition: his limbs had not "regained all their flexi- 
bility, nor his speech all its distinctness." He walked for miles 
with firmness. He spoke intelligibly enough, but his utterance 
was not as clear as it usually had been. But there had been so much 
improvement in his speech that "we trust the impediment will 
soon altogether disappear." A few days later John Forsyth, who 
saw Crawford on September 18, said he "looks uncommonly well. 
The  only difficulty with him now is a thick tongue."37 
His friends continued to say that he was recovering and his 
political opponents continued to represent him as incapacitated. 
Just before the election an anti-Crawford journal published a 
letter saying information obtained from medical gentlemen, from 
others, and from the writer's observations indicated Crawford's 
"disease" had "entirely disqualified him from adequate attention 
37 Gales and Seaton to Van Buren, Sept. 14, 1824; Forsyth to Van Buren, Sept. 20, 
1824, Van Buren. 
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to any business that requires ordinary mental and bodily exertion." 
The physicians considered his last attack apoplectic rather than 
paralytic. Soon after the election a pro-Crawford paper thought 
no well-informed man could believe that Crawford would not 
have received a majority-or at least the largest number-of the 
electoral votes if he had not been ill, and it charged that if his 
health had not been misrepresented with the "most assiduous 
industry" he would have gained a plurality of the votes.38 
Perhaps the most accurate statement of Crawford's health in 
late 1824 came from Thomas W. Cobb, as frank and outspoken 
as the man he supported. He said Crawford's cheeks were full 
and florid and his spirits admirable. The  speech impediment 
remained and gave him considerable trouble with articulation. 
His imperfect vision was improving: he could read about half a 
page and then the letters became indistinct and he had to stop. 
His doctors had prohibited his reading. He could easily dis- 
tinguish those with whom he had been acquainted but had 
difficulty recognizing those whom he seldom saw. His feet and 
hands were in a "state of great debility," and the stiffness and 
"extreme weakness" of his fingers was the cause of his bad writing. 
Cobb had never known his mind to be more active or strong; his 
memory appeared as correct as ever; and he reasoned with the 
same rapidity. Another partisan corroborated the view that 
Crawford's health in general was restored but indicated he was 
no longer the "commanding man" he once was in conver~at ion.~~ 
This then was probably Crawford's condition on the eve of the 
casting of the electoral votes. His mind was functioning well 
and clearly, but his stammering or defective articulation might 
have led some to believe otherwise. He had not regained his 
38 Conslitt~tional W h i g ,  Oct. 29, 1824; National I~ztellige~zcer, Nov. 23, 1824. 
Slightly later an  Adams supporter said that since there was no chance for Crawford's 
election his friends began to confess his mind was affected by disease. He said Crawford 
put his hat on when Lafayette was at  the President's, would not drink wine a t  the 
dinner because it "injured" him, and then drank freely after inviting olhers to drink 
with him. There were many other "proofs" of "mental alienation" which he had 
heard in such a way that he would not doubt them. George Tichnor to George 
Bancroft, Dec. 1, 1824, George Bancrofl Papers (MHS). Tichnor wanted to see 
Jackson and Mrs. Jackson; if what he had heard was true, "she has few co1:lpeers 
for vulgarity and ignorance." 
39 Cobb to Bartlett Yancey, Dec. 8, 1824, Yancey; Saunders to Yancey, Dec. 10, 
1824, Clark. Saunders had seen Crawford on December 9. Lewis Williams wrote 
Yancey on December 2 (Yancey) that Crawford looked as well in the face as he ever 
saw him, but his "strength is not yet perfectly regained." 
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weight, and this deficiency-coupled with the feebleness of his 
hands and feet-must have created an impression that contrasted 
sharply with the Crawford image prior to September 1823. He 
was on the road to recovery, but he was not yet a really healthy 
man.40 
40 Tha t  Crawford had been very ill and that his recovery was rather slow no one 
should deny, but Parton, Jackson, 3:24, 58, is not quite fair when he  says, "Piteous 
attempts were made to show the afflicted man, by driving him, propped with 
cushions, about the streets of \Yashington9' and describes Crawford as a "tottering, 
imbecile old man-old prematurely." 
The Election of 1824 
LONG BEFORE Crawford was nominated by the caucus it was appar- 
ent that each of the candidates had a sectional backing cor- 
responding to his place of residence, but since there were two 
hopefuls from the Southeast and two from the West, support was 
divided in those areas. The middle area was uncommitted, with 
"managing," continued control of state political machinery, per- 
sonalities, and the slight divergencies of the candidates' views on 
the supposed issues playing roles in the outcome. Crawford's 
greatest strength was known to be in the Southeast, and the long 
established political machinery was expected to bring him rewards 
in the middle area, especially in the key state of New York. 
Only the most sanguine supporters held much hope for Craw- 
ford in New England, where his active workers were primarily 
people who had been associated with him in public service. The 
most vigorous of these in Rhode Island was Jonathan Russell. 
He had fenced for Clay in 1822 and against Adams in 1823; for 
the rest of the campaign he dipped his pen where he could find 
the most vitriol, not hesitating to touch upon what he called 
Monroe's double-dea1ing.l James Fenner also supported Crawford 
in Rhode Island; he and his co-workers were unable to postpone 
legislative action, and Adams was nominated prior to the meeting 
of the congressional c a ~ c u s . ~  
In Massachusetts the Georgian's backers were numerous; some 
were Federalists, and others were accused of being such. They 
were assisted in their efforts by several newspapers, notably the 
Taunton Free Press and the Boston Courier. The latter paper 
carried pro-Crawford articles by the old Federalist Timothy Pick- 
ering, brought out the "connection" between John Quincy Adams 
and John Bailey's election as representative from Massachusetts, 
emphasized the relation between Benjamin W. Crowninshield 
and political patronage, praised Crawford for reducing the salaries 
of weighers, gaugers, and inspectors, said Adams had long lived 
in Europe where "frauds and corruptions are countetianced and 
protected by the governments," and gave encouragement to the 
unsuccessful move to choose an unpledged set of electors." 
The New Hurn,pshir Pulriol supported Crawford, and C. P. 
Van Ness, elected governor of Vermont in the fall of 1824, seems 
not to have been impaired in popularity by his imputed Craw- 
fordism, 1 x 1 ~  in those two states the Crawford loyalists were few. 
111 Maine, Crawford partisans stressed the division of seriti~nent 
among the legislators, proposed that John Holmes send frequent 
messages to influential friends, and suggested that the Methodists 
and the Baptists be courted. The  optimism of Holmes, most 
ardent in the Crawford cause, far outstripped his ability at political 
analysis (he thought it probable that Crawford would carry nine 
states), but he said "We must engage this summer with all zeal." 
Engage they did, but zeal was not enough. All fifty-one New 
England votes went to ad am^.^ 
New York was the key state in the election of 1824. Van Buren, 
taking no chances in 1823 and waiting for the congressional 
caucus to act, might well have lost the opportunity for New 
York to play the decisive role in the election. While the Clay, 
Adams, Clint.on, Crawford, Regency, and anti-Regency factions 
were maneuvering for advantage, there was a great ground swell 
in favor of the electors being chosen by the people rather than 
l ~ y  the legislature. Clinton would be the chief beneficiary of 
such a change, but many members of the assembly thought refusal 
to yield to the people's wishes would expose the party to over- 
~ .hrow.~  
The three leading presidential candidates in New York-Adams, 
Clay, and Crawford-appeared to have little or nothing to gain 
by giving the choice of electors to the people, but in early 
1 See, for example, Russell to Smith, May 3, 1824, Russell. 
2 Wheeler Martin to John Bailey, Jan. 24, 1824; D. J. Pearce to Bailey, Jan. 31, 
1824 (copy), Ilailey; ,Jol~n Adams Lo Ilailey, March 18, 1824, Wasliburn. 
3 fio.\lulr Coicrier, Set)[. 8, 9, 14, 22: Oct. 7, 12, 19, 20, 21, 2.3, 25, 27, 29, 1824; 
Columbian Centinel, Aug. 28, 1824. Bailey, a clerk in the State Department, was not 
sealed hy the House. 
4 See for some aspects of Maine activity, Barnabas [?I to Holmes, March 4, 1824, 
II. , ~o l~ t~so t t  t  Holmes, Marcli 9, 1824, Holmes; Holtnes to N. G. I-loward, April 4, 
1824, Cl~an~l)erlain. It should 11e noted that New England was setting so t r~e~ l~ ing  
o l  a voting pallern for a favorite son or the candidate of the Noriheast. 
6 Williat~t 1.. Marcy lo \/a11 Iluren, J a n .  11. 1824, Van Il~c~.ett. hlalcy 11;lcl received 
four letters saying Van Buren had abandoned Crawford for Clay, arid according to 
;I letter read LO him Crawford must lose his eyes or his life. 
February the lower house made its gesture toward public demand 
and opinion by passing a bill giving the people this right. The  
bill required the electors to have a majority of the votes cast, an 
impossibility given the number of slates and the division in the 
state. The  senate, however, accepted the report of its nine-man 
committee that it was not expedient to consider the bill froni 
the lower house, or any other bill, until efforts in Congress to 
establish a uniform mode of selection had either failed or suc- 
ceeded. The measure was postponed until the first Monday in 
No~emljer .~ 
Just at this time the Regency was having problems with its 
mouthpiece, the Albany Argus. Marcy complained that Isaac Q. 
Leake, then running the paper, had for some time been hostile, 
had mutilated many articles, favored the election law, opposed 
a national caucus, regaled visitors with anticaucus and pro-Clay 
sentiments, and had lately discovered it was "highly improper" 
for the state paper to be a party paper. Van Buren related the 
circumstances of his treating for the purchase of the Argus, indi- 
cating that Leake, a "millstone around our necks good for nothing 
. . . except to excite prejudice agt. the establishment," had not 
been in his original plans. Van Buren hoped his correspondent 
would open Leake's eyes to the disgrace his course would cause 
him.7 Leake soon withdrew and harmony was restored. 
Van Buren thought he saw the way to get Clay to retire from 
the contest in New York and throw his support to Crawford. If 
the electoral law was not changed, and the caucus nomination 
was supported, and if Clay could not secure the vote of Penn- 
sylvania and thus be excluded from consideration by the Nouse, 
he would make an "early and comparatively honorable retreat" 
Gl'he pro~~osal  for a cornmiltee lo study ltte c~ltestion was a ltegency trlove lo 
forestall a stated intention of a I'eople's party nwnber. T h e  committee was 6-3 in 
favor of Crawford. Hammond, Polilicul Parties, 2:142-47, 153. On activi~ies in rhe 
New York legislafure in 1824 and the election in New York see also Harriet A. 
Weed, ed., Autobiography of Thurlow Weed, 2 vols. (Boston, 1884), 1:102-38; 
Alexander, Political History, 1:323-43; Hay, "John C. Calhoun and the l'residential 
Election of 1824," 83-96, 287-300; C. H. Rammelkamp, "The Campaign of 1824 in 
New York," Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1904 (Washing- 
Lon, D.C., 1905), 177-201; Remini, Ban Buren, 30-92, esp. 58-92. Remini, 72-84, 
deals with the choice of the presidential electors in November; for Weed's accourlr 
of the same event see Autohiogm$hy, 1:123-28. 
7 Marcy to Van Buren, Feb. 15, 1824; Van Buren to G .  A. Worth, Feb. 22, 1824, 
Van Buren. In 1820 Moses Cantine (Van Buren's brother-in-law) and Leake ac- 
quired Jesse Buel's interest in the Argus. Upon Cantine's death Edwin Croswell 
had become editor. 
~~nless  letters from New York raised his hopes for the vote of that 
state. Van Buren said such hopes could never be realized and 
advised his correspondent to "Get some of the most prudent & 
confidential men together at your home & read them this letter- 
But for Strong reasons enjoin zipon thern not to speak of n7y name 
in  connection with it."8 
But Clay was receiving letters that raised his hopes, and some 
of them he sent on to friends in other states. These indicated 
that Crawford could not get the vote of New York, that there was 
much dissatisfaction with the caucus and especially with the nomi- 
nation of Gallatin, and that the contest was between Clay and 
Adams. Clay believed Pennsylvania would go to Jackson, and 
Crawford would not come before the House because he had 
nothing to add to the votes of Virginia, North Carolina, and 
Georgia. If the Georgian should get into the House with Jackson 
and Adams, Adams would be chosen; if the House had to choose 
among Crawford, Adams, and Clay, Crawford would not be 
chosen. Slightly later Clay thought the defeat of the electoral bill 
had removed Clinton, the "principal object of the majority," 
as a candidate: the Kentuckian would be relieved of "collision" 
with him in Ohi0.9 
Failure to act on the bill for popular choice of electors was 
followed by two other serious miscalculations by the Regency 
men. Late in March it seemed doubtful that the legislature would 
endorse the caucus nomination or renominate Joseph C. Yates 
for governor. It  was believed that election of the Regency candi- 
date as governor would make the state "safe" for Crawford; 
"present interests" would be best promoted by the nomination 
of Yates, but the "ultimate safety of the party" called for other 
action.1° The other action, nomination of Samuel Young for 
governor and Erastus Root as lieutenant governor, was taken by 
legislative caucus on April 6.11 
8 Van Buren to Benjamin F. Uutler, Feb. 17, 1824, Van I31rren. 
9 Clay Lo Francis Brooke, Feb. 26, hlarcl~ 16, 1824, Clay, I l l < y .  
l o  l$enjarr~i~~ F. liuller lo Van Iir~ren, Marc11 27, 1824, \'an Uuren. Butler tnis- 
takenly thought Nathan Sanford would be the gubernatorial nominee. 
11 'l'l~ere were vario~rs specnlations on llle significance alld 1,ossil)le cll'ecls of 
!.Iris aclion. Adams thought it an  indication of the decay of Van Buren's inlluence: 
, jo l~n W. l'aylor said Adams' friends lnight be coinpelled to support Young (said 
t o  I)e friendly to Clay) and Crawford Lo keep Jackson out; Clinton Lhonght l;~cltson 
1nigIi1 tlllimately prevail in the legislature. Adams, hleinoirs, 6:284, 290, 340 (April 
8, 11, May 19, 1824); Niles' Weekly Register 26 (April 10, 1824):85. 
The nomination of Young was doubtless in keeping with the 
time-honored doctrine of equivalents which was basic to New 
York politics. But the removal of Clinton from the board of 
canal commissioners seems to have been Roger Skinner's scheme 
for ernbarrassing the People's party and venting his spleen on 
Clinton. Clinton was politically dead in early 1824; he had no 
intention of offering himself for governor that year, and served 
with efficiency on the board. In its last meeting the legislature 
removed hirn; public indignation was quick and widespread, and 
Clinton was politically revived, much to the detriment of the 
Regency group. 
Yates, apparently stung by not being renominated, decided to 
call the legislature into special session to consider the electoral 
law. A Van Buren lieutenant thought such a meeting might 
"induce doubt whether our state is settled for Crawford," but 
John Quincy Adams felt the call and recommendation of a new 
electoral law would "instantly kill" Crawford and Clay.12 The  
special session met on August 3 with the galleries and lobbies 
overflowing. The next day the senate resolved that the call was 
~lnconstitutional and it would entertain no measure from the 
lower house-not even the one saying that it was not expedient 
to pass a law giving the choice of electors to the people. After 
its resolution, the conduct of any business would have been out 
of order for the senate. The  three-day session accomplished 
nothing.13 
Although partisans of every major candidate were involved in 
the choice-of-electors farce, with anti-Clintonism as the common 
denominator, the control of the senate by the pro-Crawford forces 
brought on that group a large share of public indignation. The 
Regency had made too many mistakes and flouted too strongly 
the popular will; the key to the errors probably lies in Van Bmen's 
belief in the efficacy of a firm centralized party control. The 
people showed him otherwise: the "popular" convention, men- 
tioned as a possibility in April, met at Utica on September 22 and 
nominated Clinton for governor and James Tallmadge (who had 
voted for Clinton's removal from the canal board) as lieutenant 
12 J. A. Hamilton to Van Buren, May 19, 1824 (two letters), Van Buren; Adams, 
Atemoirs, 6:340 (May 19, 1824). Ambrose Spencer, in late April, thought the contest 
to be between Adams and Jackson. He had never seen a party so ruined by its own 
acts of desperation. Spencer to Jacob Brown, April 24, 1824, Brown, Clements. 
13 1<an11nelkan1p, '"l'l~e Can~paigl~ of 1824," 193-94. 
governor. Both were elected by large majorities in November.14 
The  newspapers throughout the state continued their partisan 
activities, and the Microscope and Argus conducted their own 
logomachy in Albany. In late June the Microscope said, "Since 
the Governor had turned People's man, and the People have 
hauled around into Bucktailism, or something like it, and all 
the Crawfordites, by some 'secret process,' have become real 
prime-bang-up Republicans, we have . . . been . . . at a stand, not 
knowing exactly where to strike or what to say; and at one time 
we had so far lost our reckoning as to entertain serious doubts 
of which side we were on." The  paper also directed frequent 
gibes at the Argus editor, Edwin Croswell.l6 The  two Albany 
papers reflected in full measure the name-calling going on 
throughout the country, but with special vigor in the mid-Atlantic 
and New England states. 
The Microscope rebuked the Argus and other Crawford papers 
for calling Crawford opponents Federalists, while the Argus ques- 
tioned the assertion that the "ultra Federalists" and "ultra derno- 
crats" were the supporters of Crawford. It  contended the Post 
was the only Federalist paper in the state favoring Crawford and 
asked if the N e w  York Daily Advertiser, edited by the secretary 
of the Hartford Convention was not ultra? And the Commercial 
Ad-uerliser? the American? These and twenty-four others, equally 
ultra, were all supporters of Adams. In Vermont every Federalist 
paper supported the New Englander. Further, the Microscope 
was asked if it would designate Jefferson, Madison, Langdon, 
Macon, Gallatin, Gerry, and others ultra democrats. In dis- 
tributing the stigma of Federalist support the Argus was in 
effect extending its earlier efforts to relieve Crawford of the 
stigma of sectionalism. It contended his claims to the presidency 
had been built on neither a southern nor northern ground.16 
In September and October the ilrgzcs published six articles on 
rhe life of Crawford. These seemed designed to counteract the 
efforts of the opposition to condemn the Georgian for certain 
actions during his career. They dealt, among other things, with 
the Augusta Address, Crawford's duels, the embargo, the BUS, 
14 Hammond, History, 2:173-75. Before adjournment the convention passed resolu- 
tions declaring legislative caucuses improper. 
15 Albany Microscope, June 26, July 31, Aug. 6, Oct. 9, 1824. 
16 Albany Argus, Aug. 27, July 9, 1824: July 11, 29, 1823. I t  is only fair to state that 
every candidate had some ardent supporters among Federalists or former Federalists. 
the report in which Crawford proposed intermarriage of whites 
and Indians, and the charge that Crawford was a radical. T h e  
treatment of each topic was systematic and dispassionate and took 
less liberty with the facts than most of the other campaign 
literat ure.l7 
T h e  New York leaders, especially Van Buren, were deeply 
involved in the removal of Gallatin from the Crawford ticket 
and in seeking an understanding with one of the other candidates, 
meaning, of course, agreement by that candidate to replace 
Gallatin. Individuals from North Carolina, Virginia, and espe- 
cially Pennsylvania also played important parts in pushing Gal- 
latin out. Crawfordites had initially pulled Gallatin in on the 
assumption that his presence on the ticket might turn pivotal 
Pennsylvania to the support of Crawford. Apparently or~ly Gal- 
latin's friendship and high regard for Crawford and his deep 
devotion to repul>licanism induced him to accept. Almost im- 
mediately after the caucus nomination Gallatin's eligibility was 
questioned because of his Swiss birth (with the anti-Crawfordites 
who had attacked the Georgian's 1816 remark on foreigners 
playing into the hands of the pro-Crawford men); within less 
than a montll the Harrisburg convention had decl;~red for Jackson, 
and Calhoun cast his lot with the general; Gallatin's candidacy 
engendered no enthusiasm in New York, and there was talk of his 
withdrawal .la 
1 7  ll,id., Sepr. 3, 14, 28, Oct. 5, 19, 22, 1824. The  widely reprinted :~r~ic les  were 
also pul~lished as a pamphlet: Americanus [Ilenjarnin F. Butler], Sketches of  the 
I.ifc ritltl Character of Williafn H .  Crawford (Albany, N.Y., 1824). 
I~Ga l l a t in  had w~.iileu llis wife o n  , j a n ~ ~ a r y  24, 1821, that he (lid 11ol wanl the 
ofice hut would dislike to be proposed and not elected. Adams, Galltrti?t, 594. Cor- 
respondence on his citizenship and his statement of February 19, 1824, are in the 
Gallatin T'apers. An account of the Harrisbnrg convention, inclrrtling the resolnlions, 
is in Niles' Weekly Register 26 (March 13, 1824):19-20. On July 29, 1824, Gallatin 
wrote his life-long friend John Badollet (Gallatin) his estimate of the candidates. 
l>uring his twelve years in  he treasury he had looked for someone to take his 
place and to take "general direction" of national concerns-to replace Jefferson, 
Madison, and himself. At last one man appeared who filled Gallatin's expeclations. 
This was Crawford who "united to a powerful mind a most correct jndgment 
and inflexible integrity; which last quality, not suficiently tempered by indulgence 
and civility, has prevented his acquiring general popularity; but nolwithstanding 
this defect (for it is one), I know so well his vast superiority over the other candi- 
dates for the office of President that I was anxious for his election and  openly 
expressed my opinion." Jefl'erson and Madison felt as Gallatin did about Crawfortl, 
but they too were aware that he was not popular. Gallatin thought his nomination 
as Vice I'resident was a mistake: but the bonds of party were nearly dislnissetl, none 
of the candidates for President would withdraw, and they were at  a loss wlrorn to 
nominate. 
Walter Lowrie of Pennsylvania, primary contact with Gallatin, 
sought without success to secure from Jefferson, via Gallatin, 
support for his conviction that the Harrisburg convention did 
not represent the democracy of Pennsylvania. He did the Craw- 
ford cause more harm than good by foolishly becoming involved 
in a newspaper controversy with the President about Jackson's 
1816 letter encouraging Monroe to disregard party affiliation 
when making appointments. Lowrie wrote that Crawford had a 
"deep cordial and sincere" regard for Gallatin, but Lowrie would 
act on Gallatin's authorization for withdrawal, if such would aid 
the cause. I-Ie did not expect a situation that would make this 
necessary, and he optimistically thought the vice-presidential con- 
test might be decided by the Senate, where twenty-one senators 
would vote for Gallatin in preference to anyone else, thirteen 
were doubtful, and twelve against. Four, perhaps six, of the 
doubtful would vote for him in opposition to Calhoun or if 
Crawford were suc~essfu l .~~  
After Crawford's relapse in May and while his recovery still 
seemed uncertain, less attention was given to Gallatin's possible 
withdrawal; in August, while Crawford was at Berkeley Springs, 
Joseph Gales indicated he was anxious for Gallatin's election 
because Crawford's health, though improved, was not certain. 
Another, however, took a different view and asked whether the 
people were prepared to see Gallatin the acting President, an 
occurrence he knew some of the caucus men had calculated on.20 
Apparently Crawford's improvement at the Springs removed 
any possibility of withdrawing him from the race and revitalized 
the desire to remove Gallatin. In early September word from 
Richmond indicated Gallatin could not be elected and was a 
"weight" on Crawford; his withdrawal in a "proper manner" 
would help the cause and make possible the move to get Clay 
19 1,owrie to Gallatin, March 10, April 29, 1824, Gallatin. I.owrie used an X to 
denote senators opposed to Gallatin; Rufus King of New York was marked 
XXXXXX. On May 22 Gallatin wrote that Jackson was due a debt of gratitude 
for his military successes but had "most dangerous opinions on the subject of 
military and Executive power" and was unfit to be president of a republic. Lowrie 
had these remarks copied and gave them to a paper for publication. He hoped 
Gallatin would review the correspondence and conduct of Jackson and send it to 
him for publication. Gallatin to Lowrie, May 22, 1824; 1,owrie to Gallatin, June 17, 
1824, ibid. 
20 Gales to Gallatin, Aug. 24, 1824, ibid.; Niles' Weekly  Register 27 (Sept. 4, 1824): 
4. Niles' comments were in the first of a series called "The Sovereignty of the 
People." 
to take the vice presidency. It  was thought injudicious to consult 
Clay on the matter; rather the New York electors for Crawford 
(the writer seemed sure New York would be for Crawford) should 
nominate Clay for Vice President. A plan, apparently outlined 
by Van Buren, called for Lowrie and Abner Lacoclc of Pennsyl- 
vania to meet with Gallatin at New Geneva and for Lacock then 
to go to Tennessee to contact Clay. There would be no more 
than twenty days between the Lacocli-Clay interview and the 
selection of the New York electors. Lowrie, who had earlier 
expressed displeasure over Van Buren's silence, felt a "miscalcu- 
lation has been made somewhere" and chafed at the burden 
placed on him and La~ock.~ l  
The original plan was modified in several ways: only Lacock 
saw Gallatin, Gallatin did not condition his withdrawal on Clay's 
acceptance of the vice-presidential nomination, and-in keeping 
with Gallatin's opinion (supported by C. W. Gooch of the Rich- 
mond Junto) that direct negotiation with Clay would encourage 
him to advise his friends in New York to make no compromise- 
1,acock did not visit Clay. On September 25 1,acock delivered 
Lowrie's letter, written with the "greatest pain of embarrassment," 
indicating to Gallatin that his chances for election were "almost 
hopeless" and expressing the desire for an "arrangement" with 
Clay. Gallatin was perplexed by a lack of information but thought 
withdrawal proper if his remaining a candidate would be injurious 
to Crawford or prevent the choice of a proper person as Vice 
President. He preferred Nathan Sanford of New York, who had 
already been nominated by Clay's friends in the West. Gallatin 
was satisfied that his nomination was a "misfortune founded on 
miscalculation" and he was "anxious to do no act that might 
aggravate the evil, to omit none that might have a tendency to 
remedy it." He was most disturbed by the growing Jackson mania 
in North Carolina and Pennsylvania and required that publication 
of his withdrawal take place before choice of the New York 
electors.22 
Gales and Seaton of the National Intelligencer, in the front 
21 C. W. Gooch to Van Buren, Sept. 11, 1824; Lowrie to Van Buren, Sept. 14, 24, 
1824, Ifan Buren. 
22 I .ow~ie  Lo Gallatin, Sept 25, 1824; Gallatin to I.owrie, to st even so^^, to \'an 
Ihren, Oct. 2, 1824; Gallatin to (;ooch, to L.owrie, Oct. 7, 1824, Gallatin. Several 
of these lclters are also in Adams, Callatin Writings, 2294-300, and the Van Buren 
letter is in the Van Buren Papers. 
rank of Crawford supporters, wrote Van Buren that Gallatin's 
letter of withdrawal had "every appearance of having been dis- 
torted [sic] from him." Gales, who like Gallatin favored Sanford 
for the vice presidency, let Van Buren know that whereas his 
views of party discipline might be correct for state politics, they 
did not appear applicable to the national scene; Gales "must be 
allowed to follow as far as it is practicable the dictates of my own 
judgment with respect and deference to the opinions of others, 
but obedience to none."23 The  Intelligencer planned to withdraw 
Gallatin's name as soon as they heard from Richmond on the 
subject of a substitute. But Richmond exercised the discretion 
allowed by Gallatin, and on October 19 the Enquirer published 
Gallatin's statement of withdrawal, the object of which, it said, 
was "to promote union among the friends of the republican cause." 
An accompanying statement by the Central Corresponding Com- 
mittee, formed for the express purpose of promoting the election 
of Crawford and Gallatin, disclaimed the right to substitute 
another as vice-presidential candidate. 
Some Crawford supporters were not sure Gallatin's resignation 
would produce much good or much harm. They had no confi- 
dence in Clay, feared the whole scheme might be turned to 
Crawford's disadvantage, favored Van Buren as Vice President 
but considered it unwise to risk the attempt to elect anyone other 
than Clay, and thought the vice-presidential nomination could 
be acted on after the choice of electors. They emphasized to Van 
Buren that the selection of a Vice President was entirely secondary 
and should be "regulated" by the major objective, the election 
of Crawford. Since Clay and crawford were both born in Vir- 
ginia, a nomination of Clay by New York would be preferable 
to one by Virginia. Virginia might follow suit, but the electors 
were free to act for themselves. One Virginian thought the best 
chance to prevent the election of Calhoun, who had the support 
of the friends of Adams and Jackson, was to support Clay-a 
stance that might help Van Buren in New York and took cog- 
nizance of the importance of Clay's strength in the House. If 
Crawford's friends in New York favored such a plan, they should 
23 I.owrie to Gallatin, Oct. 8, 1824, Gallatin: Gales and Sealon lo Van Buren, 
Oct. 14, 1824; Gales to Van Duren, ( k t .  17, 1824, Van B u ~ e n .  Gales said Ile had 
accj~~ainted Crawfortl with the substance of his letter and tl~ought their judg~r~ents 
cor~esponded on the matter. 
let it be known immedia t e l~ .~~  What happened in New York was 
not worth communicating to Crawford's supporters in Virginia; 
the Old Dominion electors acted for themselves, casting a unani- 
mous vote for Crawford and Nathaniel Macon.25 
Van Buren and his Bucktails bungled matters almost beyond 
belief in the legislature, which met on November 2 to choose 
New York's thirty-six electors. Decisively beaten in the elections, 
they caucused on November 5 to make their choices. A number 
of Clay partisans who were leaning toward Crawford as their 
second choice participated. On November 10 the senate nomi- 
nated the Crawford ticket-with seven places reserved for the 
Clay people-as it had been drawn up in caucus. The Crawford- 
Adams-Clay division in the lower house prevented a majority, 
so Van Buren advised the Bucktails to vote for the Adams ticket, 
thinking that if the candidates for each electoral position were 
reduced to two the Clay people would vote for the Crawford 
men-this they had assured him they would do once Clay was 
excluded. For this support he was prepared to give the Clay men 
as many as fifteen votes. The  Clay men, uninformed of Van 
Buren's contemplated "generosity," were shocked on November 
12 by Azariah C. Flagg's announcement that the Crawfordites 
would support the Adams slate. They moved adjournment. That 
evening the promise of fifteen votes was conveyed, and the next 
day the Adams ticket was nominated, the Clay and Crawford 
men voting with the majority. 
The joint session, however, was delayed until after the weekend. 
The  Clay men, feeling betrayed, met with the Adams supporters 
and formed a third slate on which Clay people replaced seven 
of the Adams men on the house ticket. Regulations prevented 
voting for anyone not on one of the tickets, but the Regency 
knew nothing of this extralegal third slate (printed by Thurlow 
Weed) until after the beginning of the joint session on November 
15. Much controversy ensued, Root and some of the Regency 
group walked out, but it was decided that seven Clay and twenty- 
five Adams electors had been chosen. The next day the Clay men 
crossed back to help elect four Crawford electors, supposedly as 
24 Mc1,ane to Van lluren, n.d. and Oct. 27, 1824; Asbury 1)ickins to Van Iluren, 
Oct. 28, 1824, Van Buren; Gales and Seaton to James Barbour, Oct. 17, 1821, Bar- 
b o o r  P. N. Nicholas Lo Van Buren, Oct. 19, 31, 1824, Van Buren. 
25 Ralbour to Gales and Seaton, Dec. 1, 1824, Barbour. 
insurance that the election ~vould go to the House of Representa- 
tives. The  Van Buren tactics had been faulty and poorly com- 
municated; mistake after mistalte had followed on the heels of 
miscalculation; the results could scarcely be interpreted as effecting 
a Crawford-Clay coalition, for the Bucktails had taken an almost 
unbelievable beating.26 
Van Buren-in not quite complete candor-wrote Crawford of 
these events, insisting that the Clay men had deceived them. He 
regretted only the results but said if a different course had been 
adopted "our men" would in the end have gone over to Clay. 
If Clay had been accepted as the antagonist, the Adams men 
would have gone against the Crawfordites and the sixteen "honest" 
Clayites would not have gone with the Crawfordi te~.~~ In whatever 
way Van Buren might interpret events in New York, Crawford's 
cause had suffered a severe setback: he needed a greater number 
of the New York votes to ensure getting into the House and 
to improve his chances of having the New York delegation vote 
for him once he got there. That he might get more of the votes 
in the electoral college appeared possible; there seemed little 
expectation that the New York vote would be the same as the 
joint ticket would indicate: Adams twenty-five, Clay seven, and 
Crawford 
The  Crawford-Clay combination was the one most talked about 
before and after the congressional caucus, and in some areas the 
friendliness of the favorites of these two was apparent. In the 
West the support for Crawford was slim-in Ohio there was not 
even a Crawford ticket-and his supporters generally joined the 
Clay cause. They were ~velcome, but it led to the charge that this 
2eSee Remini, Van Buren, 72-81: Hammond, Political Parties, 2:176-79; T. S. 
S~nirh to Samuel Gouverneur, Nov. 15, 1824, Gouverueur. 
27 Van I$urerl to Crawford, Nov. 17, 1824 (draft), Van Buren. Van Buren thought 
his letter should be shown only to friends and that he should not be quoted. James 
'I'allmatlge and Henry Wheaton had heen among the chief n~aniprllators against 
Van 13ure11. See also Jacob Barker to Van Buren, Nov. 7, 1824, Van Bnren; Henry 
llaldwin to James l'allmadge, Nov. 14, 1824, Chamberlain: John C. Spencer to 
Albert Tracy, Nov. 15, 21, 1824, Albert Tracy Papers (NYS). 
28 McI.ane LO James A. Bayard, Nov. 18, 20, 1824, hlcl~.ane; Gales lo \fa11 Iluren, 
Nov. 22, 1824, Van Buren; NnLio71al 17ttelligeilcer, Nov. 23, 1824. \Tan Buren led 
some Crawford people to believe Clay woultl get no votes, and though Gales t l i o~~gh t  
"everything was done for the 1)es~" and hoped it would turn out that way, he was 
c:ritical. He said if Crawford had 11ot been ill and his recovery misrepresented he 
would have received at least the largesl number of votes. Further, if "an imposition 
I ~ a d  not been practised upon the country by the decision in the Legislature of New 
York, he  would now be second in the list of candidates." 
union was part of the general plan whereby in the end one or the 
other was to receive the combined support. This was most often 
taken to mean that Clay's support from the West would be 
thrown to Crawford. But since Crawford was considered less 
enthusiastic in his advocacy of internal improvements than some 
of the other candidates, the Adams and Jackson followers cir- 
culated the charge of coalition industriously. The  Westerners were 
often told that a vote for Clay would really mean a vote for 
C r a w f ~ r d . ~ ~  
Ruggles of Ohio, one of the most zealous Crawfordites in the 
West, was anxious to promote a coalition with Clay and was 
encouraged by Van Buren, whose comments of July and August 
on Crawford's strength and the sureness of the New York vote 
appear absurd in light of the early November events in that state. 
In early October, when Gallatin's possible withdratval was being 
much talked about, Ruggles broached the matter to Charles 
Nammond, editor of the Cincinnuti Gazette and Clay partisan, 
painting a rather bright picture of Crawford's chances and a 
gloomy one of Clay's. Hammond, noting no marked differences 
between the two that would make union impracticable, had 
always kept the possibility of such a coalition in view and believed 
most other Clay friends had done likewise. Friends of the other 
candidates had been so attentive to the activities of the Clay 
people that no effective cooperative measures could be taken. It 
had even been necessary for Hammond to deny publicly the 
existence of a Clay-Crawford coalition; he could, therefore, not 
I~ecome a party to the arrangement suggested by Ruggles. He 
disagreed with Ruggles on several points: Clay's friends did not 
concede New York to Crawford; he did not think the votes of 
the western states would go directly to Crawford, and was not 
sure the Ohio electors would vote for Crawford even if Clay 
withdrew, for the Adams and Jackson men working together 
would resort to any arrangement to defeat Clay and Crawford. 
Even if Clay should turn to Crawford, Hammond believed he 
should stay in the House rather than become Vice President. 
Some Clay men did not overlook the possibility that the death 
of Crawford, if elected, would elevate the Vice President, but 
29 For a disc~jssion of the election in O l~ io  and some observations on the \Vest 
ill genela], see Eugene H. Roseboom, "Ohio in the P~widential  Election of 1824," 
Ohio Archaeological and Historical Publications 26 (1917):153-224, esp. 196-200. 
most Clay supporters held firm to their choice.30 Clay would not 
commit himself, and the managers continued to maneuver. 
Every possible combination was considered, but the probability 
of a Crawford-Adams ticket had died early. Adams had said he 
could not accept the second position without "inverting the 
natural order of things and placing the North in a position of 
inferiority to the South."31 Apparently Crawford partisans realized 
that Adams was firm in this conviction. At various times, how- 
ever, there was speculation of the Adams vote going to Crawford, 
and vice versa. Much of this seemed occasioned by the belief 
that Crawford was the second choice in New England and that 
Adams was the second choice of Virginia.32 
The  first combination consisted of all the other hopefuls run- 
ning against Crawford. Some felt this necessary to stop Crawford, 
hut they noted the several noncaucus candidates were "remarkably 
obstinate" and "refuse all overtures from one another each expect- 
ing to profit by the confusion their conduct has created in the 
Union."33 After Crawford's illness the other candidates engaged 
in less anti-Crawford activity, and the fusion of the Jackson- 
Calhoun forces in early 1824 decreased enormously the number 
of combinations spoken of. Actually, any possibility of union 
between Adams and Calhoun backers had ended long before; in 
1822 Adams had terminated confidential intercourse with the 
South Carolinian. However, the possibility of an Adams-Jacltson 
ticket, spoken of early in 1824, persisted until the eve of voting in 
the electoral college. Adams thought his friends' support of 
30Ruggles to Van Buren, July 31, 1824; Van Buren to Ruggles, Aug. 26, 1824, 
Van Buren; Ruggles to Hammond, Oct. 9, 1824; Hammond to Ruggles, Oct. 11, 
1824, Hamn~ond, 011s: Johnston to Clay, Aug. 9, 25, 30, Sept. 4, 11, 1824, Clay, 
Lilly; Clay Papers, 3:819R. T h e  statement in the Gazette, denying a coalition, 
was signed by Hanlmond and Jacob Uurnet; in the same issue William Henry 
Harrison had a note to the same effect. Both are reproduced in Niles' Weekly Reg- 
ister 27 (Oct. 23, 1824):113. See also Elijah Hayward to John Larwill, Aug. 30, 
Sept. 29, Oct. 4, 1824, John Larwill Collection (OHS); Romulus M. Saurlders to 
Bartlett Yancey, Dec. 4, 1823, Clark; Hammond to J. C. Wright, Aug. 30, 1824; 
Wright to Hammond, Sept. 10, 1824, Charles Hammond Papers (OSL); Clay Papers, 
3, for the latter part of 1824 and early 1825. 
31 Adams, Memoirs, 6:245-47 (Feb. 4, 1824). 
32 See, for exanlple, ~Valional Joz~rnal, April 21, 1824, citing Charleslo~t Courier; 
Ruggles to WorthingLon, Feb. 23, 1824. Worthington; Benjamin Crowninshield to 
l o l ~ n  Crowninshield, Dec. 13, 1824, J. C. Warren Papers (MHS). 
35 ,joseplr I .  Spragtre to John Bailey, Feb. 2, 1824, Bailey; George A .  Shufeld~ to 
William Wilson, Feb. 15, 1824, William Wilson Papers (Clements); Benjamin 
Crowninshield to Henry A .  Dearborn, April 10, 1824, Crowninshield Miscellany, 
MDLC. 
Jackson advisable until something from the general's friends 
indicated his unwillingness to take that post.34 
Not even the pooling of the Jackson-Calhoun interests after 
the Pennsylvania "commitment" seems to have cooled the ardor 
of a number of the proponents of the Adams-Jackson combination. 
In several of the western states the Adams and Jackson forces 
operated almost in tandem, and in North Carolina the People's 
ticket, supposedly uncommitted, was a combination of Adams and 
Jackson men. As late as October Jacob Brown noted that as long 
as it was possible that Jackson would accept the vice presidency 
the Adams people felt the place should be reserved for him; that 
hope had now been abandoned and he urged support of Calhoun. 
But even at the end of November some Adams people considered 
it "highly important" that all states supporting Adams for the 
presidency should vote for Jackson for second choice. Jackson's 
age and geographical residence would give strength and influence 
to the Adams admini~tration.~5 After about April 1824 only a 
Crawford-Clay combination had remained possible for Crawford; 
Clay was the pivot between Crawford and Adams. 
Crawford's chances in New England were always regarded as 
slight, and his setbacks in Pennsylvania and New York had 
seriously jeopardized the chances of his election, but his friends 
worked valiantly in other areas. In New Jersey Mahlon Dickerson 
and others sought to elect Crawford, but they could not overcome 
Jackson's popularity. Although the New Jersey congressional 
delegation was said to prefer Crawford, they felt bound to reflect 
the will of the people, if that will were expressed decisively at 
the p0lls.~6 It  was so expressed: Jackson received the eight electoral 
votes, and the congressional delegation favored him 5-1. 
The key to Crawford's chances in Delaware was Louis McI,arle, 
who in 1823 yielded to entreaties of friends and refused election 
to the Senate. In January 1824 he had second thoughts about 
this sacrifice but decided in April to stay in the House. Delaware 
chose one Adams and two Crawford electors, and McLane as the 
34 Adams, Memoirs, 6:284-85 (April 9, 1824). If Jackson was not willing to accept 
the vice-presidential post, Adams would be personally satisfied if his friends sup- 
ported Nathaniel Macon. 
$5 j a c o l ~  Illown lo Oliver Wolcott, Oct. 16, 1824; Henry Dearborn to Wolcott, 
Nov. 27, 1824: 11. I'eavie and William Richmond to \Yolcott, Nov. 27, 1824, Wolcott. 
There are several other letters in the Wolcott Papers which express the same idea. 
$6 A. Dodd to C. K. Gardner, Oct. 23, 1824, Gardner. 
state's only representative controlled the state's vote in February 
1 825.37 
Samuel Smith was in the forefront of Crawford partisans in 
Maryland. Crawford and Adams had full slates of electors by 
the middle of July; Jackson was lacking only in the seventh 
district, but Clay had only two of a possible nine. The  newspapers 
of Baltimore and other areas were almost taken over by the contest, 
which Smith noted "engages all the attention of the politicians." 
Crawford's health had been injurious to his expectations, but 
Smith still believed he could be elected.38 
Virginia was the southern anchor of the Richmond-Albany 
axis, with Thomas Ritchie's and C. W. Gooch's Enquirer the 
chief propaganda agent and the Central Corresponding Committee 
-or Richmond Junto-the chief campaign managers and manipu- 
lators. But the Constitz~tional Whig ,  under John H. Pleasants, 
was established in January 1824 to oppose Crawford, indicating 
in its first issue that it preferred Adams "as a choice of evils." He 
united a "greater number of qualifications" and was the candidate 
most likely to harmonize the sectional feelings of the North and 
South. The  newspaper campaign was vigorous and the "man- 
aging" of the election-as well as the earlier caucus nomination- 
was severely criticized by many. Quite often the principles of 
Crawford's supporters, rather than Crawford himself, bore the 
brunt of the criticism.39 
North Carolina, considered by many as sure for Crawford, was 
heatedly contested. Though it was the native state of some 
veteran and ardent Crawford men, the revolt against the caucus 
system and Virginia domination, as well as active campaigning 
by the other groups, put the state in the Jackson column. The  
Jackson and Adams men combined to support a People's ticket 
37 Mcl.ane to James A. Bayard, 1)ec. 16, 22, 1823; Jan. 4, Feb. 1, 22, April 12, 1824: 
Mc1,ane to [Bayard], Jan. 14, 1824: McLane to Asbury Ilickins, Dec. 3, 1824, McLane. 
38 S I I I ~ L ~ I  to da~~gl l ter ,  June 6, 1824. Carter-Sinith. See also Uczllirr~ore Americulz J. 
Conritrercic~l 1)c~ily Advertiser, April 10, 16, June 15, July 3, 15, 29, Aug. 19, 1824. 
Smith corresponded frequently with Jonathan Russell in 1824 and early 1825; there 
are eighteen letters from him during this period in the Russell Papers. Cor- 
respor~dence between Crawford opponents in Maryland and Rufus King may be 
found in the published King material and in the Rufus King Papers. 
39 For some details of the Virginia events see John Tyler to James Barbour, Jan. 
5, 1824, Barbour: Charles Henry .lmbler, Thomas  Ritchie: A Study i n  Virginia 
Politics (Richmond, Va., 1913), 89-98; Richmond Enquirer; Baltimore American & 
Comnzercial Daily Advertiser; Constitt~tional Whig ,  Jan. 27, 1824: Niles' IVeekl? 
R e g i s t ~ r .  esp. Sept. 4. Oct. 16. 1824. 
of electors, which was officially not committed; this practice was 
considered by the Crawford men to be unfair. Gallatin was said 
to "clog" the Crawford machinery, and it was difficult to elec- 
tioneer against Jackson. The  general's service and character were 
of the kind people could appreciate, and "one cup of generous 
whiskey produces more literary ardor, than can be allayed by a 
month of reflection and reason." The opposition to Virginia 
domination was best exemplified in the Fisher resolutions and 
the attitudes of Fisher and Archibald Murphey. Fisher emphasized 
that Virginia had been followed so long that her politicians 
"fancy we do not part from her; tell her that North-Carolina 
will not vote for her candidate, and they will laugh you to scorn." 
And North Carolina had received practically no offices in the 
thirty-six years she had supported Virginia. No better could be 
expected from Crawford. Murphey felt so strongly on the matter 
of North Carolina subordination to Virginia that though he 
thought Crawford the best man among the candidates he opposed 
him and rejoiced in his defeat.40 
South Carolina was never in doubt, and Crawford backers were 
few. Among them was William Smith, who accused Calhoun of 
being a "master spirit" in the art of intrigue, of shifting from one 
candidate to another, and of trying to prevent the election of a 
President so that he, as Vice President elect, might assume that 
office.41 
The contest in South Carolina brought forth two of the better 
campaign pamphlets. "Southron" thought it only natural that 
zeal had been aroused by the Carolinian Calhoun, but since he 
had withdrawn from the race a "causeless spirit of revenge" 
should not "lead you to throw yourselves into the arms of those 
who are either unfit for your confidence, or whose interests are 
not common with yours; or what is still worse, whose interests 
are essentially at war with yours." Several pages are devoted to 
examining Jackson's qualifications, but most of the pamphlet is 
40 On North Carolina activities see Albert Ray Newsonle, The Presitlenlictl E/rclio?z 
of 1824 in Norlh Carolina (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1939); Shanks, Adangt~~fz ,  1: esp. 97, 
105, 1 1 1 ,  130, 137-38; William Henry Hoyt, ed., T h e  Papers of Archibald U .  
M ~ ~ i l ) h e y ,  2 vols. (Raleigh, N.C., 1914), 1:290, 293; 2:32; Hanlilton, "1.etters lo 
Yancey," 18, 46-49; Raleigh Star and North-Carolina Gazette; Raleigh Register and 
Nor//&-Carolina Gazette (May 21, 1824, for Fisher); Letters to Peter Force, esp. Sept. 
1824, I'eler Force Group, Emil Hurja Collec~ion (Tennessee Historical Society); 
John Owen to nartlett Yancey, July 21, 1824, Miscellaneous 2, NCDAH. 
41 Willialrl S~~l i t l l  LO Samuel Smith, Oct. 17, 1824, Van Uuren. 
devoted to Crawford. Praise for some of Crawford's characteristics 
is sparing and Southron notes his disagreement with some of: 
Crawford's positions. He reviewed the Georgian's public career 
and reached the conclusion that if the people wanted economy, 
curtailment of useless establishments, strict subordination of the 
triilitary to the civil power, a scrupulous regard for the Con- 
stitution, freedom from burdensome taxes in time of pe'ice, 
rapid ex~inction of the national debt, and salvation from the 
effects of the proteclion of domestic industry by the new school 
of  politicians, their votes should go to Crawford. The  final appeal 
was sectional: if the "southern fleople wish restrictions upon State 
sovereignty, and other measures, whose end shall be the abolition 
o j  sla-uery, by emancipation among zu, then, of course, Mr. Adams 
should be c refer red."^" 
"South-Carolinian" denied the people of the state had been 
unduly and unfairly excited and prejudiced against Crawford. 
The  excitement against Crawford, he maintained, arose from 
the circumstance that a man against whom there were so many 
arid weighty objections should persevere against the wishes of 
the people. Fifteen objections were presented. None was new; 
many had no basis in fact; but they were effectively couched in 
such terms as "negative, hidden or doubtful,  weak, illegal and 
z~nconstitutional" (Crawford's course as secretary of treasury) and 
a "Radical, creeping policy" which he would pursue as chief 
executive. The writer thought it would be a master stroke in 
the game Crawford was playing to get the "irresistibly increasing 
popularity" of Jackson out of his way so he would have the "easier 
task of prostrating Adams by an unfounded jealousy upon the 
Missouri question." Southron's statement that Crawford was 
"amiable, honest, and intelligent" was conceived to apply to his 
private life. "If it be so, let him enjoy the full benefit of such a 
rep~itat ion."~~ South Carolina was overwhelmingly for Jacltson, 
while Georgia threw her full force behind Crawford for President 
and Van Buren for Vice President. 
The  newspaper campaign continued through 1824 in the same 
42 '1'0 / / ,e  Prol)le of South-Caroli7ici. A71 Address on the subject of lhe clp)~roncl~iizg 
I'retitE~7r/irrl Eleclion, in ro/iirh the claims of William H .  Crawford are im@urlicilly 
or7rvn\c(,d ([Columbia,  S.C.?], 1824). 
43  Sotrte Ol~lectioi~s to M I .  Crautford as a Candidate for Lhe Preridrnlictl Clrc~ir, ruitlz 
(1 few renrarks on the charges preferled against South Carolina as hein< "i7z e r ro~ ,  
and uncertain in her Politics" [Columbia, S.C. (?), 18241, esp. 3, 11, 23, 38. 
vigorous vein of the year before; its unfairness, one-sidedness, and 
intensity drew the disapproval of many. Ruggles objected to the 
indiscriminate praise and eulogy by the friends of the candidates 
and the indiscriminate censure and reproach by opponents. He 
thought this nlorally and politically wrong and a practice no man 
c o ~ ~ l d  justify to his own conscience. He asked: "Is the thief who 
steals his neighbor's goods, to be ignominiously punished, and 
the murderer of reputation to escape unhurt?" And a non- 
Cra\vford man wrote that if one took the "calumnies of the 
most abandoned newspapers for the moral standard of this 
nation," it would be "supposed, that our Presidents, Secretaries, 
Senators, and Representatives, are all traitors and pirates, and the 
government ol' this people, had been committed to the hands of 
pul~lic ro l~bers . "~~ 
A much used and much criticized new device of the campaign 
might be termed the abbreviated public opinion poll. This prac- 
tice began before the caucus and was first applied to the members 
of Congress by a "sort of inquisitorial committee" of the friends 
of each candidate who were appointed to go around and count 
the members opposed to Crawford. The purpose was to make 
a publication to Crawford's di~advantage.~~ As soon as the caucus 
nomination was made, great play and emphasis were placed on 
the small number who had engaged in this meeting; such counting 
continued until Adams was chosen. Throughout the spring, sum- 
mer, and early fall counts were taken at public sales, militia 
musters, meetings to consider the tariff and internal improve- 
ments, grand juries, on steamboats, and apparently at any ltind 
of actual or fancied meeting. They nearly always showed that 
Jackson was in the lead-often overwhelmingly-though occa- 
sionally Clay or Adams was the favorite. There were also private 
polls.40 Whatever the accuracy of the polls might have been, the 
frequent and repeated use of them seems to have been designed 
to show that Crawford was the candidate of the minority and that 
he did not have a broad-based support. I t  is true that Crawford 
44 Ruggles to Harnmond, Jan. 5, 1824, Harnrnond, OSL Federal Gazette & Unlti- 
more Daily Advertiser, June 7, 1824. These are given only as examples; literally 
do7ens of similar sentiments were expressed. 
45 Rtrggles lo Hammond, March 10, 1824, Hammond, OSL. 
46For examples see Niles' Weekly Register 26 (May 22, June 5, 1824):194, 221; 
Fetlrrol Cazelte & Z3ollif1lore Dnily Advertiser, Feb. 16, March 30, 1824; Alissic~il)pi 
Repi~blictln and Lilerary Afe~senger,  March 26, 1824: llnily National /ournnl, Oct. 
1 1 ,  1824; D. Reinhardt to editor of National Journal, Aug. 21, 1824, Force Group. 
did not enjoy great popularity (he thought it wrong to court 
popularity) in most areas of the country, but the effect of this 
tactic on that already thin support can be easily conjectured. 
That personal popularity of the candidates was an important 
factor in the election is unquestionable, and most writers have 
discussed the election of 1824 in terms of personalities. Obviously 
there were other factors-even issues on which the candidates 
held slightly different opinions-but the most recent study on 
issues raises a number of questi0ns.~7 Should sectionalisnz as such 
be classified as an issue, or was it a manifestation of dissatisfaction 
with continued control of the executive branch by one state or 
area? Or a "normal" voter support for the candidate of his own 
area or region? If issues were of great import, can one reconcile 
the nearly identical views of Jackson and Crawford on the tariff 
and internal improvements with the great difference in their 
popular votes? Or the nearly identical popular votes of Clay and 
Crawford? After admitting that the importance of issues in the 
accepted sense varied G o ~ n  state to state-and even within states- 
is it not possible that in the first contest approximating the "typi- 
cal" American political election the major "issue" was the "people" 
versus the "managers"? It  seems doubtful that the posture of the 
candidates on the tariff, internal improvements, or the bank had 
any material effect on the outcome of the election. 
Crawford and his supporters were often referred to as the 
Radicals, a term applied so variously that it really had no meaning. 
In general, many of those advocating Crawford's election were 
perhaps more conservative than the supporters of the other candi- 
dates, and James Buchanan said they favored a strict construction 
of the Constitution and were not willing to give the central 
government any powers but those manifestly contained in the 
Constitution. But, as should be perfectly obvious, such a state- 
ment could not be reconciled with Crawford's stand on the bank, 
to say nothing of his direct statements on several of the other 
so-called issues. At times the term was used synonymously with 
Federal, to designate an opponent of "every salutary measure of 
government," or simply to indicate the group opposed to Calhoun 
and favorable to Crawford. At other times the Radicals were 
47 Paul C. Nagel, "The Election of 1824: A Reconsideration llased or) Newspaper 
Opinion," Journal of Southern History 26 (Aug. 1960):315-29. See also Curtis 
Wiswell Garrison, "The National Election of 1824" (Ph.D. diss., Johns Hopkins 
University, 1924), which concentrates on New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. 
said to advance the same doctrine the Federalists advanced in 
the late 1790s: the people, their own worst enemies, are not to 
be trusted wit11 the exercise of political power. Radical came to 
have so little meaning that some strongly anti-Crawford papers 
by late summer of 1824 had replaced it with ultra. They main- 
tained that the extremes of both parties had joined to support 
Crawford, and that this party was tainted with unpopular prin- 
ciples and must finally be found in conflict with the people's 
rights.48 These papers might well have been more nearly correct 
than those who persisted in using the term Radical. 
Some Crawford supporters, in describing the desirable ar tri- 
butes of Crawford, used the radical designation LO heighten the 
similarities between Jefferson and Crawford and between their 
principles. Jefferson and Madison did favor Crawford's election, 
but the Crawfordites were never able to get either man to declare 
his position. Nor did the Richmond Junto offend the dignity 
of the two former Presidents by putting them on the Crawford 
electoral t i~ket .~g 
The Crawford group would have been pleased to have the 
open support of Jefferson and Madison, but they did not bridle 
when it was not forthcoming. The  attitude toward Monroe, how- 
- 
ever, was quite different. Crawford partisans seemed to feel 
Mor~roe had a special debt to repay: Crawford had refused to 
stand against him in the 1816 caucus-and his action was empha- 
sized in the Address following the 1824 caucus. By the time of 
Monroe's second adminis~ration three of his cabinet members 
were obviously seeking to succeed him, and any logical and 
48 I % I I C ~ ; I I I ~ ~ I  t o  l'llomas Elder, Fell. 27, 1824, Gratz; Cllarleston Cily Gazette a~ztl 
Conrntercictl Daily Adverli.ser, April 24, 1824: Daily National Jolcrnal, Aug. 10, 13, 
Sept., Oct. 19, 1824: Albany Microscof)e. T h e  first issue of the 1)rtily Nntionnl 
Jozlrp~nl, Aug. 9, 1824, notified the subscribers to the Wasl~ington R e f ~ l ~ b l i c ( ~ ? ~  that 
that paper had Iwen "disposed of" to Peter Force, editor of the Jozlrnal. 
4:) Crawford's illness sel.iotrsly curtailed his correspondence, but Illere were solne 
exchar~ges with the two former Presidents. Crawford sent Hax seeds to JelFerson 
and recommentled Henry Jackson for a position at  the IJniversity of Virginia. He 
sent Madison a volume dealing with French diplo~nacy and wished a copy of his 
nore refnsing t l ~ e  War Department, the only written evidence Ile knew of that would 
refute the charge lie had sought lo avoid responsibility during the war and had 
soliciied rile appointlnenl as minister to France. Madison reassured Crawford on 
these points, and Jefferson delayed acknowledging receipt of the seeds in the hope 
Illat 11e rnigltt have added congratulations which "would have been very cordially 
offered." Crawford's defeat brought deep disappointment to Jefferson and "much 
darnped" the confidence lie had placed in the discretion of his fellow citizens. 
Crnwfortl to Madison, April 8, 1824 (copy), l'hillips: Madison to Crawford, Oct. 1, 
1824, Gross: Crawford to Jelferson, Feb. 4, 1825, Jefferson, UVa; Jefl'erson to Craw- 
ford, April 20, 1824, Feb. 15, 1825, Jefl'erson, MDLC. 
rational analysis of the situation seems to indicate the correctness 
of Monroe's impartial or neutral position. Some of Crawford's 
partisans attacked the administration, compared it unfavorably 
with that of Jefferson, and periodically accused Monroe of hoping 
for the succession of one of the other candidates. Less than a 
month after the caucus nomination the Washington Gazette leveled 
a violent attack on Monroe in connection with the money voted 
in 1817 and 1818 for furnishing the White House; Crawford 
withdrew the federal patronage from the paper. No rationaliza- 
tion of the action remains; doubtless simple propriety would 
have been sufficient reason. Patronage or no patronage, the 
Gazette continued to attack Monroe, claiming by mid-April that 
the entire influence of the executive was "evidently bent" on 
elevating Jackson to the presidency and "further concealment" 
by the paper would be treachery to the nation. A volunteer 
contributor to another paper said Monroe had thrown all his 
influence against Crawford-but in favor of Adam~.~O 
On several occasions Monroe did admit his deep obligations to 
Crawford, and several times he indicated his belief that Crawford 
did not countenance the activities of his friends. Again, he some- 
times thought Crawford did not sufficiently discountenance them, 
and more than a year after the election Monroe said he "could 
not be insensible" to these attacks and Crawford did not separate 
himself from his friends by "any public act, so as to shew that 
he did not approve their attacks." Monroe insisted that he had 
been impartial. Crawford seemed to understand Monroe's neu- 
trality and, so far as has been discovered, only once (and that in 
1880) did he "complain" of Monroe's lack of support.51 One is 
forced to conclude that a strong sense of fairness and neutrality 
did attend Monroe's actions. Had Monroe thrown his support 
to one of the candidates about the time of his reelection in 1820, 
50 Washington Gazette, April 6, 15, 1824: Adams, Memoirs, 6:285, 287-88 (April 9, 
10, 1824): John Moore to Jonathan Elliott, June 1, 1824; A Maryland Planter [Daniel 
Jennifer?] to Elliott, [n.d.], Force Group. T h e  volunteer and solicited articles were, 
of course, common to the papers of all candidates. 
51 Scc al)ove passim, Adams, Afenroirs, 6:229 30 (Jan. 8, 1824); Monroe to Tenclr 
Ringgold, May 8, 1826, Hamilton, Alonroe Writings, 7:81-82; Crawford Lo Dear Sir, 
Feb. 4, 1830, Crawford, Duke. T h e  letter to Ringgold contains by far the strongest 
and most condemnalory of Monroe's statements on this matler. Only Willianl Wirt 
among the long-time cabinet members was not actively involved in the campaign. 
For speculation as to what might happen to his position and his characterization 
of the candidates see Wirt to Dabney Carr, Aug. 27, 1824, William LYirt I'apers 
(VSL). 
that candidate might easily have succeeded to the presidency. 
On the other hand, Monroe's designation of a favorite after 1822 
probably would have brought no change in the election results. 
Crawford was often accused by liis opporients of "management"; 
liis supporters countered with queries on the purposes of the 
large parties given by others and on management of the cabal 
against Crawford. And they pointed out that Crawford had 
written no electioneering letters (as had Calhoun) to advance 
himself, nor had lie published pamphlets (as had Adams) to 
court the people. This was true, but it might have been better 
if Crawford had written some of the newspaper material that 
his supporters presented to the people." Of course, no presidential 
candidate campaigned in the present-day sense of that word. 
There was much talk about patronage, especially "Treasury 
Pap,"53 and its use in building a political campaign. Perhaps 
the most widely reproduced "pap" item was the presidenlial 
caricature, "Caucus Curs in full Yell, or a War Whoop to saddle 
on the People a Pappoose President," first printed in the Baltimore 
Patriot. In  the background is the President's house, to the right 
of which stands uncle Sam's treasury pap house wit11 its amalga- 
mated tool department. Jackson, with sword, is looking at the 
curs, which are growling and barking at him. Over the door is 
"pappoose meat by W.H.C." 1V.H.C. has a bowl labeled dollars; 
by his side is a beautiful female with a papoose, lashed upon 
a board in aboriginal style, in her lap. He  is offering her the 
contents of the bowl, saying "There's a bowl full of solid pappoose 
meat, That's a good girl; better marry our wild Indians than 
foreigners, good or bad." H e  feeds her; she cries; it is noted 
that papoose is better than rum. T h e  Richmond Enquirer is 
a pointer and has scented Old Hickory for his master to shoot 
at. Much comment f0llowed.5~ I t  was an effective presentation 
of several charges against Crawford. 
52 See, for example, Washington Gazette, Jan. 20, 27, 1824: Dickins to Russell, 
Sepl. 8, 26, 28, 1824; Krlssell to T)ickir~s, Sept. 18, 1824, Ilussell: [James I%arbo~~r?] ,  
Foilr Letters addressed to  the  People of the [Jnited States By a Felloro-Citizen 
(Raleigh, N.C., [1823]): Butler, Sltetches. T h e  Four Letters may be forlud at  I111ke 
IJniversity. They originally appeared in the Riclrrnond Enquirer and apparently 
werc in answer to Wvthe. Pendleton. Roanoke. and some other writers. 
, . 
53 See, for example, Washington Gazette, Jan. 17, 1824; Savunnah I Z e ~ ~ i ~ l ~ l i c ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  
Dec. 3, 1824. 
54 Tuscumbian,  Dec. 27, 1824. Dreams, lotteries, court cases, and presidential 
voyages were among 1l1e journalistic devices used to support or oppose candidates. 
See C u f ~ l d e n  (S.C.) Soulllern Cllronicle, Oct. 24, 1824; A4illedgeuille Georgia Journal, 
This item was one of many subjecting Crawford to sarcasm 
and abuse for his remarks about Indians and foreigners made 
eight years before. There was no real "defense" for his remarks, 
but his supporters did point out that Patrick Henry and Thomas 
Jefferson had previously made a similar recommendation con- 
cerning intermarriage of whites and Indians. "But this is not 
all. We have known men to be the noisy and unrelenting caltxm- 
niators of Mr. Crawford, on account of his suggestion, in regard 
to the Indians, who could, with calm indifference, and with an 
undisturbed conscience, behold, on their own plantations, certain 
mongrel beings, who bore in their countenance the lineaments 
and their veins the blood of their masters, writhing under the 
scourge of an unfeeling task master."55 Every candidate was 
subjected to ill-deserved abuse. 
Crawford partisans saw anti-Crawford possibilities in every 
event-even the visit by Lafayette, who they feared might be used 
to the advantage of one and the disadvantage of others. G. W. 
Erving, rather bitter toward Monroe who, he said, had unwit- 
tingly demoralized the Republican party, attempted to delay 
the departure of Lafayette, who understood Erving's apprehensions 
and thought if they had been expressed earlier he would have 
postponed his sailing. But he would do everything to stay neutral, 
to assuage the asperity of parties, and to show the necessity of 
union. He pointed out that he was equally the friend of Crawford 
and Adams and had a high respect for Jackson though he did 
not know him.56 Lafayette's visit was a triumphant one, and 
only the most irrational partisan could interpret it as harmful 
or helpful to any one of the presidential aspirants. At the 
reception for the French patriot in Washington Monroe was 
flanked on his right by the secretaries of state and treasury and 
on his left by the secretaries of war and navy.57 
April 6, 1824; National Republican and Ohio Political Register, Feb. 27, 1824; Nash- 
ville Wltig, Feb. 23, 1824. 
55 National Zntelligencer, Aug. 31, 1824, citing Georgia Journal. 
56 Erving to Crawford, April 20, June 26, 1824, Crawford, MDLC. Erving in many 
respects seems to have been much like Jonathan Russell: he was a gossip, a carper. 
a nit-picker, and very verbose. 
57 Richmond Enquirer, Oct. 16, 1824, citing National Zntelligencer. Later several 
stories of Crawford's "bad" behavior a t  the reception for Lafayette were bruited 
about. These are seriatim rather than simultaneous and appear to be rooted in 
gossip and rumor rather than fact. T h e  following February 7 Lafayette, the 
President and his family, Crawford and family, Adams and family, and Clay were 
among the audience at  the Cooper benefit. Daily National Journal, Feb. 9, 1825. 
When the election was over, it was soon clear that no candidate 
had received a majority, but it was not certain whether Clay or 
Crawford would go into the House with Jackson and Adams. It  
was a month before the electoral college voted, and the Crawford 
supporters continued to press their case for electors to switch 
their votes and for union with Clay. Partisans of the other candi- 
dates also sought additional votes for their favorites. But Clay, 
in late October, had privately indicated that he could not accept 
the proposals to take the vice presidency. He thought candidates 
should neither seek nor agree to compromises and should avoid 
either giving or receiving promises. He hoped he would not have 
to decide what course he would take if he did not get into the 
House. He did wonder how they could "get over" the minority 
caucus nomination of Crawford, the state of his health, and the 
principles of administration he might adopt because of "his posi- 
tion and Southern support." There were, he said, strong if not 
decisive objections to each of the other candidates, but Clay did 
not enumerate them. He wanted his friends to act together, 
especially in Ohio and Kentucky, and he "would make great 
sacrifice to that object."58 
A month later the vice presidency still did not appeal to Clay, 
who did not know what had happened in New York but thought 
cooperation between his and Crawford's friends might have given 
the votes of that state to the one or the other or divided them 
between the two. He believed he would join Adams and Jackson 
before the House but wondered what Crawford's friends would 
do in that circumstance. Without Crawford's support Clay could 
scarcely expect to be elected, but he saw "much probability of 
success" with it. He wanted to know what Virginia would do and 
obviously was encouraging the casting of the Virginia electoral 
votes for himself.SD 
Clay made no public statement about his lack of interest in 
the second position, and Crawford partisans continued to advocate 
that Crawford electors cast ballots for Clay as Vice President. 
58 Clay to Hammond, Oct. 2.5, 1824, Clay, 1.illy. Harnlnor~rl later r~oted Clay had 
stated "objections to Crawford" and this indicated to Hammond that Clay preferred 
Adams. He was going to write an article for the National Intelligencer in which 
he would include this letter to vindicate Clay from the accusation of uniting with 
Adarns in a bargain. Clay requested Hammond to leave out the words "from his 
position and Southern support." Hammond to J. C. Wright, April 2, 1825, Ham- 
mond, OHS; Clay to Hammond, April 25, 1825, Clay, Lilly. 
59 Clay to Francis Brooke, Nov. 26, 1824, Clay, UKy. 
At the same time they maneuvered to try to keep Crawlord's 
votes from being drained away-and to try to drain away some 
votes from the other candidates. As an alternative, they sought 
vice-presidential votes for their favorite in the hope that the 
choice of the Vice President might be made by the Senate.60 
Van Buren was apprehensive about what would happen to the 
"few electors that we have been able to save" from the wreck. 
Latest reports from the West indicated that if the electors "do as 
they ought," Crawford would come respectably into the I-Iouse, 
where his chances were as good as those of any of his opponents. 
As second choice in the East, Crawford would get the vote of 
some of the western states in the House. Van Buren seems to 
have had a different standard for what the eastern and western 
electors "ought" to do, for he said that the casting of New York's 
seven Clay votes and four Crawford votes for Crawford tvould 
make some reparation for the injury done by the legislature in 
choosing the electors. He thought his poor opinion would not 
have much weight with the electors, but authorized showing his 
letter to "our friends" in the electoral college, that is, the eleven 
Republicans who were supported on "our" ticket.61 In the first 
part of December some of the Crawford people were encouraged by 
the confidence of Westerners Ruggles, Thomas, and Noble and 
seemed to believe that if "Clay behaves well, we may triumph."62 
The  final electoral college vote was not known until near the 
end of the year, and shifts, though not as great as Van Buren 
suggested, in the New York vote did put Crawford in the House 
and exclude Clay. For some unknown reason two of the Clay 
electors did not appear for the voting; the substitutes, chosen by 
the other electors, voted for Adams. One of the original Adams 
electors voted for Crawford, and one Clay elector voted for 
Jackson. The  New York vote was: Adams 26, Crawford 5, Clay 4, 
and Jackson 1, or changes of + 1, + 1, - 3, and + 1, re~pectively.~~ 
60 See, for example, Washington Gazette, Nov. 24, 1824: Asbury Dickins to Bartlett 
Yancey, Nov. 21, 26, 1824, Yancey. T h e  first Dickins letter was confidential, the 
second in "strictest confidence." 
61 Van Ruren to John Lansing, Nov. 28, 1824, Lansing Miscellaneous MSS (NYH). 
(;a 5ee, for example, Rlc1,ane Lo L)ea~ Kitty, Ikc. 6, 1821, Rl~Lane 'l'hotnas \Y 
Cob11 to Yancey, Dec. 8, 1824, Yancey; James A. Hamilton to Van Buren, Dec. 12, 
1824, Van Buren. 
c;:l l'~ol,al)ly no one will ever know exactly what happened, but there have been 
acveral speculations and accounts. Roger Skinner, writing to Van Uriren on Decem- 
ber 1 (Van Buren), said John Taylor (who had been appointed to one of the 
vacancies) was active, as was Ambrose Spencer, in trying to secure six votes for 
Had the original New York vote held, Clay and Crawford would 
have had forty votes each, and only Jackson and Adams would 
have been before the House. 
Was a two-man contest before the House deliberately pre- 
vented, or was the three-way contest an accident of politics? If 
Crawford were no longer in the contest and had a greater number 
of congressional supporters than any other candidate (as was 
generally conceded), what would have been his power or influence 
as President-maker? With the certain election of Calhoun as Vice 
President and thus a Crawford-Clay combination out of the realm 
of possibility, Clay's influence might well have been subordinate 
to or at least nullified by Crawford's. But if Crawford is also 
before the House and "his" states adhere to him. Clay would 
have the "swing" power. With only Jackson and Adams before 
the House the result probably would have been the same, for 
Crawford later said he would have favored Adarns in such a 
situation. T h e  reason for the shift in the votes of the Clay and 
Adams electors in New York is unknown and apparently unknow- 
able. Was it a calculated shift, designed to diminish the influence 
of the Crawford wing of the party? 
In  the final electoral count, Jackson had all the votes of New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, North and South Carolina, Alabama, Mis- 
sissippi, Tennessee, and Indiana, 7 from Maryland, 3 from IAou- 
isiana, 2 from Illinois, and 1 from New York for a total of 99. 
Of Adams' 84 votes, 51 came from the New England states, 26 
from New Yorlz, 3 from Maryland, 2 from Louisiana, 1 from 
Delaware, and 1 from Illinois. Crawford's 41 votes represented 
the full votes of Virginia and Georgia, 5 from New York, 2 from 
Delaware, and 1 from Maryland, while Clay's 37 were the full 
votes of Kentucky, Ohio, and Missouri, and 4 from New York. 
Jackson's votes represented a t  least a majority of the vote in 
eleven states; Adams had a majority in seven; and Crawford 
and Clay had majorities in three each. T h e  popular vote seems to 
have been about as follows: Jackson 152,000, Adams 103,000, 
and Crawford and Clay 47,000 each.64 
Crawford. Hammond and others, according to Skinner, said the Adamsites had 
violated a pledge to give Clay eight votes in consideration of Clay's friends' sup- 
port of the successful ticket. Jackson's friends had attended the meeting of the 
elcclors and sorlght to efCect a d i~is ion of the votes between Jackson and Adains. 
See also Hammond, Political Parties, 2:187-88; Remini, Van Burrn, 82; Van Buren, 
A u ~ o ~ J ~ o s Y u ~ ) / ? ~ ,  appropriate places. 
64 Calhoun was elected Vice President with 182 votes. 
Crawford still had a chance, though a slim one, in the House. 
In  late December Jackson's prospects lessened because Illinois 
was understood to be for Adams. Clay was still "neutral," and a 
Crawford partisan believed the Kentuckian's friends would act 
with the Crawfordites if they "can have good reason to count 
upon success." With their aid, there were strong hopes for 
Crawford's election, but the contest would be "obstinate and 
protracted." McLane's calculation soon changed: if Clay should 
decidedly go to Crawford, the Georgian would be elected; the 
chances were that he would go to Adams.'j6 
Friends of Crawford and Clay were reported to have approached 
Adams with "more or less distinct" overtures. The  Virginia 
delegation gave assurances that, after voting two or three times 
for Crawford, they would vote for Adams rather than for Jackson. 
Clay friends said they would perhaps vote for Adams in the first 
instance and thus secure his election on the first ballot, but 
nothing definite had been promised by the end of 1824.60 Albert 
H. Tracy, member of the House from New York and an Adams 
man, thought by year's end that Adams' election was certain. 
The  intriguing portion of his letter is the remark, "I have con- 
fidential reasons for believing it to be more certain than I have 
expre~sed."~~ 
In early January Clay and Kentucky still held back, the Craw- 
ford forces had no "second man," and some thought New York, 
"true to her character," would abandon Crawford in the House. 
In any event, the one-vote states were still crucial. Louis McLane 
controlled Delaware, Daniel P. Cook the vote of Illinois, and 
John Scott the vote of Missouri. McLane was avidly pro-Crawford, 
and there seemed to be no question about Cook's voting for 
Adams. Scott, formerly for Crawford, was wavering and saying 
that the friends of Crawford could not expect him to sacrifice 
himself to no purpose. Thomas Hart Benton, reported to be 
"warmly" in the Crawford cause, thought he could hold Scott's 
support. In  the states with more than one representative in 
the House, Henry H.  Gurley was the swing vote in Louisiana 
and George E. Mitchell in Maryland. Samuel Eddy of Rhode 
Island was expected to vote for Crawford and thus neutralize 
65 Mc1,ane to Jarnes A .  Dayard, Dec. 27, 1824, Jan. 9, 1825, M~Latte. 
66 I'lumer, Jr., Lo I'lumer, Sr., Dec. 24, 1824, Blowrl, Adirrouri Co1i~~1701rairer,  123-24. 
67 Tracy to Thurlow Weed, Dec. 30, 1824, Weed. 
that state. But it was thought certain that if Clay's friends went 
against Crawford, the contest would be between Adams and 
Jackson, for Crawford would have only Delaware, Virginia, North 
Carolina, and G e ~ r g i a . ~ ~  
Though the tone of the letters of the Crawford men long 
before the middle of January was far from sanguine, they never 
completely despaired until the vote was cast. Their hope was 
to prevent the election of Adams on the first ballot; they believed 
they could then turn the tide to Crawford. Their thin veneer 
of confidence was badly scratched by the announcement on Jan- 
uary 24 of the Clay-Adams coalition. McLane said it "required 
no such formality to make it certain"; Adams would now get 
twelve and perhaps thirteen states on the first ballot. He feared 
Adams' election could not be prevented, but Cratvford's friends 
would stand firm and "leave the responsibility of this infamous 
bargain where it ought to rest." The  Jackson men, he said, were 
outraged; the indignation of the Crawford men was "not less, 
though much more composed." Clay "boasts openly" that he will 
elect Adams on the first ballot; "What a scoundrel he is!"6" 
Crawford said the coalition was "astonishing every person here 
except myself" and that the justification of the coalition was the 
state of his health. He thought, then, that Jefferson might be sur- 
prised by his statement that his general health was good, "but my 
handwriting is nearly destroyed as you will perceive by this letter." 
The Georgian had "long known the principal juggler" and had 
been "well convinced that he would [act] according to any calcu- 
lation of interest that he might make." He had expected a 
"different calculation," but there could be no doubt that the die 
had been cast.70 
The  week before the election there were many statements on 
68 Lowrie to Gallatin, Jan. 3, 1825, Gallatin; Willie P. Mangum to Thomas Ruffin, 
Dee. 15, 1824: Mangum to Duncan Cameron, Jan. lo, lS25, Shanks, Alnngnrn, 1:160, 
173-74; Saunders to Yancey, Dec. 19, 1824; Jan. 11, 1825, Clark; Mangum to Yancey, 
Dec. 25, 1824, Hamilton, "Letters lo Yancey," 51; John Forsyth to Henry hfeigs, Jan. 
8, 1825, John Forsyth Papers (Princeton). 
69 Saunders Lo Yancey, Jan. 18, 1825, Clark; McLane to [James A. Rayard], Ian. 21, 
1825, McI.ane. One does not have to ponder long what McLane's reaction woultl 
have been if Clay had decided to support Crawford. Adams had been rnee~ing 
with numerous people, said that Samuel Ingham had been trying to persuade Cook to 
vote for Jackson, and decided that "intriguing for votes is excessive, and the ~nc:uns 
adopted to obtain them desperate." Adams, Memoirs, 6:476-84 (Jan. 221, 25, 26, 
30, 1825). See also Washington Gazette, Jan. 21, 27, Feb. 10, 1825. 
70 Crawford to Jefferson, Jan. 31, 1825, Jefferson, MDLC. 
the certainty of success of a particular candidate and many others 
that the outcome of the voting in the House was in doubt. Hopes 
for Crawford's election were buoyed by the belief that in the 
private feeling of the members of Congress Crawford had more 
good will and was better esteemed than either of the other gentle- 
men, by the "assurance" that the New York vote would at first 
11e divided and later go to Crawford, by the possibility of getting 
Scott's vote, and by McLane's "masterly appeal" in the House 
which was said to have rescued Crawford from the disadvantage 
of the low state of his health. McLane, however, would not be 
surprised if Adams were elected on February 9; if he were not 
successful on that day, then his election was doubtful.71 
On a snowy Wednesday, February 9, only one (Robert S. Gar- 
nett of Virginia) of the 213 House members was absent. New 
York was the big question mark and not even the members of 
the delegation knew which way it would go. McLane, writing 
from the chamber, told of an incident that occurred at the open- 
ing of the session. Stephen Van Rensselaer, troubled for some 
time about the necessity of having to make a decision, had come 
to him in tears, desired McLane's commiseration, and confessed 
himself "dreadfully frightened." The  New York vote depended 
on him; if he voted for Adams, the New Englander could be 
elected on the first ballot. McLane told Van Rensselaer, who he 
said had heen firm for Crawford the night before, that no one 
had a right to expect him to support Adams. Van Rensselaer 
did vote for Adams, and later that day McLane informed Bayard 
that "Mitchell gave him [Adams] Maryland and I groan to say 
old Genl. Van Rensselaer N. Y ~ r k ! " ~ ~  
Crawford partisans did not expect the decision on the first 
ballot; they were again disappointed in New York. The fourteen 
held, but two went for Jackson; had Van Rensselaer cast his vote 
for either Jacltson or Crawford, as some expected, the state would 
71 John McI.ean to Henry Eddy, Feb. 3, 9, 1825 (typescript), Eddy; R4cI.ane to 
[)ear ICitiy, Feb. 8, 1825, McLane; Saunders to Yancey, Feb. 8, 1825, Clark. 'Tliis 
john McLean of Illinois sl~ould not be confused with John McLean of Ohio who 
was posttnaster general at this time. For McLane's speech of February 7 see 
Regi.rter of ZIeb(~tes, 18th Cong., 2d sess., 498-508. 
72 Mcl.ane lo Dear Kitty, Feb. 9, 11, 1825; McLane to lhyard, Feb. 9, 1825, 
Mcl.ane. McI,ane Lold Kitty he had "really loved" Van Rensselaer, but on the night 
of 1;el)ruary 10 "J wiped him from my heart . . . on a sleepless pillow." See also 
Stephen Van Rensselaer Lo Solomon Van Rensselaer, Jan. 22, 1825, Bonney, Legacy, 
1:415; Adams, A.lernoirs, 6:493 (Feb. 3, 1825). 
have been divided. But, of course, Van Rensselaer's was not the 
single "de~isive" vote. Eddy of Rhode Island hesitated for a long 
time and then gave that state to Adams by a 2-0 vote; Mitchell's 
vote gave Maryland to Adams; Gurley cast his vote for Adams and 
gave him I , o ~ i s i a n a . ~ W n e  Crawford supporter attributed the 
New York vote to Rufus King who was said to have persuaded 
Van Rerlsselaer the night before to go over to Adams. Another 
thought that if Adams was eventually to be elected, he was not 
sorry thal the balloting had "terminated at once."74 Some 01 the 
New Yorlters believed Clinton and his friends had deceived 
Jackson, and the Jackson people were bitter toward Clinton. 
Further, it was charged that an agreement between Clirlton 
and Adarns involved Clinton's being made minister to Engl;ind.7L 
It  is impossible to say what determined the outcome, but the 
decision was made by a very small number of people. TWO one- 
vote states, Illinois and Missouri, went to Adams; one three-vote 
state, Louisiana, went to him, 2-1; two other states, New York 
and Maryland, went to him by one-vote majorities. From the 
New England states he lost only one vote in Massachusetts; he 
carried Kentucky 8-4 (Jackson) and Ohio 10-4 (2 Jackson, 
2 Crawford). H e  secured single votes from New Jersey, Penn- 
sylvania, Virginia, and North Carolina for a total of 87 votes and 
13 states. Jackson's 7 states were New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South 
Carolina, Alabama, Tennessee, Indiana, and Mississippi (a one- 
vote state). His total of 71 votes included 1 From Massactlusetts, 
2 from New York, 3 from Maryland, 1 from Virginia, 2 from 
North Carolina, 1 from Louisiana, 4 from Kentucky, and 2 from 
73 Porsytli to hfeigs, Feb. 9, 1825, Forsyth: Lowrie to Gallatin, Feb. 28, 1825, 
G:~llatin: I'lumer, Jr., to Plumer, Sr., Feb. 13, 1825, Brown, A,lissoz~r.i Coiiif)r.oi~iises, 
137-38. It was said Mitchell would have voted for Jackson liad lie not been afraid 
of his c:onstitnents who were for Adams. 
74 \Yillianr <:olernatl to 'I'imolliy I'ickering, Feb. 13, 1825, 'I'irnothy I'icltering 
1'apet.s (MIJS); Forsyil~ to Meigs, Feb. 9, 1825. 
76 I.. Cl;irk to Roger Skinner, Feb. 28, 1825, Van Buren. Clinton cleclinetl the 
appointment, and it was given to Rufus King. Many intriguing comments may 
I)e four~d in the period itnmediately before and after the House v0t.e. One sucl~ 
was rnatlc Ijy a Clay supporter: noting that "we" were friends of internal improve- 
nlcrtts ant1 anxious lo learn the views of the different candidates, lie said, "Many 
of us were frientlly to Crawford X- we desired to secure ltim from sucrilice altl~ouglt 
we ditl no1 infend to lnake him President." J .  C. Wright to Charles Hamn~ontl, Jan. 
22, 1825, Ilammond, OHS. Nathaniel ~ a c o n  apparently was no1 surprised at the 
oulcome. A 1not11Ii before the voting he  wrote that Crawford "might I verily 
1)elieve l~ave  been elected eight years past president, but whether he ever will he 
now is very uncertain." Macon to Tait, Jan. 9, 1825 (copy), Nathaniel Macon 
Papers (Duke). 
Ohio. Crawford's 4 states were Delaware (a one-vote state), 
Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia. In  addition he secured 
14 votes in New York, 1 in Maryland, and 2 in Ohio for a total 
of 54. Besides the stales he carried in the electoral college he 
took North Carolina from Jackson. In addition to North Csr- 
olina, Jackson lost Maryland, Louisiana, and Illinois to Adams. 
Clay delivered Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky to Adams. In 
the electoral college the state count had been Adams 7, Jackson 
11, and Crawford 3; in the House it was 13, 7, and 4, respectively. 
Crawford, said not to have been anxious or impatient but 
always "mild, cheerful and affectionate" before the voting, re- 
ceived the news about three o'clock from Asbury Dickins, who 
arrived just before Thomas W. Cobb. Crawford showed no 
"emotion of any kind," and his first remarks were: "Is it possible! 
Well, I really believed from what I heard last night that Jackson 
would have been elected."76 The  Crawford house was crowded 
from eleven in the morning until eleven at night, but after tea 
Crawford played some whist, and Mrs. Sniith believed that he 
forgot all about the election. The  evening was cheerful and gay, 
and the whole family displayed so "much good humor and 
pleasantness" that Mrs. Smith was almost tempted to think the 
outcome was the one they preferred.77 Perhaps it was. 
When Adams' request that Crawford remain as secretary of 
treasury arrived the following day, Crawford declined the offer 
in a friendly note, overruling the suggestions of some that he 
send a "rude" answer. Among those present at the time was 
Louis McLane, who considered the offer an "insult." Too dis- 
tnrbed by Van Rensselaer's vote to go to Crawford's on Wednes- 
day, on Thursday he found the Georgian playing whist with his 
children and Mrs. Smith. He observed that no one could have 
conjectured that Crawford had lost the election; only Mrs. 
Cra~vford "exhibited marks of mortification" and spoke of Van 
Rensselaer in "terms of contempt and indignation which aston- 
ished me." Mrs. Smith, however, indicated no such feelings on 
76 Hunt, First Forty Years, 173-74. Crawford had said the night before that he 
would be Adams and Mrs. Samuel H. Smith could be Jackson in their "presidential" 
chess game, "for of the two I would wish him [Adams] to succeed." Each game they 
called one ballot, and Adams won three of the five "hardly contested" games. Ibid., 
175. Mrs. Smith, who was at  the Crawford home most of the week of the election, 
said Crawford was "excessively fond of chess." 
77 Ibid., 177, 179. 
Mrs. Crawford's part, said that her only wish was to return to 
Georgia as quickly as possible (this was necessary to her husband's 
health), and reported little condemnation of Van Rensselaer but 
numerous comments (including Crawford's) expressing pity for 
him and attributing his action to "weakness" alone. As on some 
other occasions in his career, Crawford showed less perturbation 
than his close friends and supporters. Though he did not seem 
unhappy about the results of the election, he was buoyed in 
spirit by a three-hour visit from Lafayette the following day.78 
The longest presidential campaign in United States political 
history was finally over; Virginia domination was at last over- 
thrown; the bases for the reestablishment of the two-party system 
were laid; Adams had his prize; Clay had his reward; Crawford 
had his memories and perhaps some regrets that he had not run 
in 1816-but he never expressed any. He showed no bitterness 
toward Clay, Adams, or Jacltson, and apparently he had no 
regrets. In 1830 he wrote that he did not consider his defeat 
unfortunate, for "I then verily believed, and I do now believe, 
that had I been elected, my remains would now be reposing in 
the national burial ground, near the eastern branch of the 
P o t ~ m a c . " ~ ~  
78 McLane to Dear Kitty, Feb. 11, 1825; Hunt, First Forty Years, 177-78, 181-96. 
jackson visited on February 11, and Robert Owen was among the many visitors on 
February 12. Crawford resigned his secretaryship on March 3, 1825. Crawford to 
Monroe, Monroe Microfilm, Series 2. 
79 Crawford to Calhoun, Oct. 2, 1830, Shipp, Crawford, 241. 
13 
The Last Georgia Years 
MOST HISTORIANS have either said nothing about Crawford after 
the choice of Adams as President or have contented themselves 
with the statement that he returned to Georgia to die. One recent 
scholar of the period, writing of Van Buren's visit to Crawford 
in early 1827, states that "at the bedside of the dying Crawford it 
had been agreed that, in return for Crawford's influence, Van 
Buren would accomplish the ruin of John Caldwell Calhoun."l 
Crawford by 1827 was quite well restored to health; he lived to 
witness, and to participate in, the ruin of Calhoun; he retained 
a hard core of influential followers in the party; and he remained 
active in Georgia educational, political, and judicial circles until 
his sudden death in 1834. 
There seems little doubt, however, that Crawford was not a 
well person in 1825 and for some time thereafter. He was bitter 
toward no one except Calhoun, whom he thought most responsible 
for keeping him from the presidency, but he was reluctant to 
discuss what had happened in the election-a reluctance he never 
seems to have lost. In February, he agreed with John O'Connor 
that the "untoward events" in New York were "unfathomable 
upon any other ground than imbecility in the principal actors," 
but those events were now history, and further discussion of 
them was not required. He described his health as good, though 
he said he was still feeble, and he indicated that he considered 
his retirement temporary by saying that he would probably return 
to the Senate as soon as his strength was re~overed.~ 
Crawford, his family, Senator Thomas W. Cobb of Georgia, 
and Lewis Williams of North Carolina left Washington about 
the middle of March in the Crawford carriage. He refused several 
invitations to public dinners along the way, noting that he had 
declined dining in public since his first indisposition, for the 
regimen prescribed by his physicians made it inconvenient to 
eat at any other than a private table. His itinerary took him 
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through Fredericksburg and Charlottesville, Virginia, Milton and 
Salisbury, North Carolina, and Pendleton, South Carolina-seem- 
ingly the most direct and certainly the most passable route at 
that time of year. Not as an exile but as a hero he returned to 
Georgia. People gathered at the borders of Oglethorpe County 
to welcome him, and a few miles from Lexington they formed 
a procession to lead him into town, where he was entertained 
at the home of his friend Judge John M ~ o r e . ~  
He then proceeded the three miles to Woodlawn, his pleasing, 
comfortable, and unostentatious home to which in happier circum- 
stances he had wished to return ten years earlier. There he piddled 
about his orchards, puttered at some agricultural experiments, 
and busied himself with other chores for the remainder of the 
spring and early summer. The  latter part of July he went to 
Madison Springs-presumably to take the waters-where he stayed 
until going to Athens for the University of Georgia commence- 
ment in early August. In the fall he attended several public 
dinners in his honor, and the winter of 1825-1826 he spent "on 
the sea ~ o a s t . " ~  
Apparently during 1825 and most of 1826 Crawford was phys- 
ically unable to supervise carefully the activities of his plantation, 
but he did continue to carry out some agricultural experiments. 
He regretted he could not do more along this line when he later 
wrote of his experiments with sugar cane and fertilizers and of 
his up-coming test of "Indian or corn-field" peas as a possible 
substitute for red clover and "plaister" of Paris, notably successful 
in the northern  state^.^ During those two years Crawford said he 
wrote with such difficulty and so illegibly that he had an almost 
"invincible aversion" to writing. His script, which bore not a 
"single trait of resemblance" to his earlier hand, and his imperfect 
articulation were by 1828 the only remaining "visible" effects of 
1 George Dangerfield, T h e  Awakening of American Nationality, 1815-1829 (New 
York, 1965). 278. 
2 Crawford to O'Connor, Feb. 24 or 26, 1825, Crawford, Yale. 
3 Nnlionul Inlellige?lcer, March 19, 29, 31, 1825, copying in first two instances fron~ 
Lhe Virginia Herald and the Raleigh Obsen~er; Shipp, Crawford, 196: Cobb, Leisure 
Labors, 233. Cobb says Crawford's friends were distressed by Crawford's difficulty 
of speech, his unsure walk, and his debilitated condition. 
4 (:rawfort1 lo Margaret [Mrs. Sarnuel H.] Smith, July 20, 1825, J. Henley S~t~i t l t ;  
<:rawford to Satnuel H. Smith, Nov. 21, 1826, Autograpll File, Houghton; Sl~ipp, 
Crc~ujlord, 199-201. 
5 Crawford Lo John  D. Legark, April 4, 1829 (copy), Phillips. Legark, editor of Ltle 
Soztlhern Agriculturist, had inquired about Crawford's experiments. 
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his affliction. Though he was nearsighted, his vision was slowly 
improving, and he had enjoyed uninterrupted good health after 
early 1827. He was not, however, as active and as strong as he 
had been before his first afflicti~n.~ Crawford's writing was 
actually reasonably good by 1828, but he had a tendency to omit 
words and apparently did not give the same attention to his 
composition as formerly. There is no indication that he ever 
overcame the articulation difficulty. 
Crawford quickly resumed his active participation in the affairs 
of the state college, in which he had long been keenly interested. 
He and his wife attended the senior examinations on June 20, 
1825, and on the following day dined with President Moses Waddel 
at Judge Augustin S. clay ton'^.^ In August he took part in the 
commencement exercises and attended the meetings of the board 
of trustees, of which he had been a member since 1812. 
After the trustees' meetings of July and September 1812, 
Crawford's mission to France had prevented his attendance until 
July 1816,8 when the board accepted the resignation of William 
Greene, professor of mathematics and astronomy, and of President 
John Brown. Crawford, Peter Early, and David B. Mitchell were 
the committee to find a new president.Vheir choice, Robert 
Finley of New Jersey, died before he had served a full year. 
Crawford, though not present at the board meeting, was again 
appointed to the search committee. After Nathan Berman, presi- 
6 Crawfol.d to Samuel H. Smith, May 30, 1828, J. Henley Smith. See also Crawford 
to Col. George Dotnford, Jan.  24, 1829, Baldwin Family Collection (Huntington); 
1,aEayette to James Barbour, Lafayette Letters (UVa). In the letter to Smith Craw- 
Cord wrote about his children: John had been admitted to the bar; Macon was in 
college at  Athens; William was at  the academy in Lexington: Robert, Susan, and 
I%ibb were in the plantation school, about a half mile froin the mansiori house, 
taught by the seventy-year old Virginian who had been Caroline's first teacher. He 
was an excellent instructor; be knew Latin, but William had to go to Lexington to 
study Greek. 
7 Moses Waddel Diary (MDLC). Crawford and George M. Troup "supped" with 
Waddel on August 1 and on November 15 Waddel dined with "Crawford Xcc." 
8 Manuscript minutes of the meetings of the board of trustees are in the University 
of Georgia library; a microfilm copy is in the Georgia Department of Archives and 
History. Volume 1 covers the years 1794-1817; Volume 2, 1818-1834. For the history 
of the early years of the University of Georgia see E. Merton Coulter, College Life in 
t h e  Old  S o u t h  (New York, 1928). 
9C;reene and Iirown apparently were unable to explain satisfactorily their 
reasons (called for by resolutions introduced by Crawford) for not obeying and 
enforcing the rules of the college. In response to Greene's request for a statement 
concerning his merits, the trustees resolved that "it is the opinion of the board that 
Mr. Professor Greene is a man of Science and Literature, and a zealous instructor 
of youth." 
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dent pro tem, and Ebenezer Porter declined appointment as 
president, the board in March 1819 chose Moses Waddel.lo 
Disciplinary regulations of the college pleased neither students 
nor faculty; problems were perennial and approached crisis pro- 
portions in 1820. Crawford, as a supporter of Pestalozzian schools, 
advocated considerable freedom for the pupil in the early years 
of schooling, but he apparently believed that disruptive influences 
should not be tolerated at the college. In 1821 he advised Waddel 
to seize the "earliest moment" to inflict punishment on or to 
purge from the college the "restless spirits which necessarily gain 
admittance." T o  make possible this rapid action a number of 
trustees sufficient to form a board should live close enough to 
be convened in one day. If Crawford's resignation would facilitate 
forming such a board, Waddel was at liberty to tender it when 
he thought proper.ll Waddel never exercised the option. Prob- 
lems of student conduct seem to have been less critical during 
the remainder of the 1820s. 
Crawford, grappling with the question of continuing in the 
cabinet in the summer of 1822, doubtless felt warm paternal 
satisfaction in the successful examination of two of his sons on 
August 3 and 5 and their admission to the college on the latter 
date.12 And he must have enjoyed other activities connected with 
this commencement. At the graduation ceremonies Governor 
John Clark, Crawford's one-time duelling opponent, almost "burst 
with rage" because he had to walk on the left side of Waddel, 
while Crawford, at the president's request, was on the right. 
Clark's hostility lo the college was public knowledge, and he 
had received several "buckets"-slanderous anonymous letters- 
which he suspected had come from the students. He laid the 
letters beEore the board of trustees with the request that the 
"delinquents" be ferreted out and punished. Crawford called for 
the reading of the letters; he "enjoyed their satire greatly, and 
l o  See Minntes of Dec. 23, 1816: Dec. 10, 1817; Nov. 8, 10, 1818; March 1, 1819. 
Crawford conferred with Finley in Washington. Coulter, College Life, 31. Joel 
Abhot and Thomas W. Cobb served with Crawford on the second coninlittee. In  
June 1817 the hoard requested that Crawford ask Henry Jackson, who had gone 
to France with Crawford as secretary of legation and had remained in the post under 
Gallatin, to resume his duties at the college. Jackson did so in 1818, but he resigned 
in  1820 I~ecause h e  was dissatisfied with the policing duties required of the faculty. 
He was rehired in 1822 (with no policing dnties), again resigned in early 1825, and 
was once more added to the faculty on August 3, 1825. 
11 Crawford to 'ltTatidel, Jan .  27, 1821, Gratz. 
12 Waddel Diary. Crawford "lodged" and "sat up late" with Waddel on August 5. 
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continued for a long time after to repeat the expressions which 
were the most irritating to Clark."13 
Crawford did not again meet with the board until 1825, but 
on the evening of August 3, 1824, the college had conferred on 
him an honorary LL.D. At the July 1826 session Crawford was 
put on the laws and discipline committee, and the following 
summer he became a member of the committee on college build- 
ings, library, and apparatus. He continued to attend somewhat 
more than half of the meetings and was presiding on August 4, 
1829, when the board accepted the resignation of Waddel with 
regrets and warm appreciation for his services. That same day 
Crawford's second son, (Nathaniel) Macon, delivered the vale- 
dictory and received the A.B. degree.14 
Within the next year Crawford presented to the school the 
forty-five-volume Dictionnire des Sciences, for which the board 
voted its thanks on August 3, 1830.15 In the absence of the presi- 
dent the next day, senior trustee Crawford presided, and the 
board approved his motion that the students' petition for a well 
on campus was reasonable. Crawford attended only one more 
meeting-in November 1830. On the tenth of that month, in 
conformity with Crawford's wishes, the board accepted his resig- 
nation. Crawford's decision to resign may have been prompted 
by the course of events in the legislature of 1880; the Baptists 
and the Clark party joined forces and increased the board from 
17 to 28. All additional members were Clark men. The  school 
thus became the "victim of political exploitation and religious 
bigotry-a precedent which was to plague the institution more 
than once thereafter."16 For almost two decades Crawford had 
taken an active and significant part in the affairs of the college, 
and he seemed always to have the interest of the school at heart. 
The  commencement period was often an occasion for intense 
political activity: agreement upon gubernatorial and other candi- 
dates, the pronouncement of political principles, the mending of 
13 Gilmer, Sketches, 203-4. 
1 4  Macon CrawFord later became president of Georgelown College in ICenlucky 
and of Mercer College in Georgia. 
15 Crawfortl 11ad also given the college a cutting (presented to hirn by the French 
government) from the weeping willow tree at  Napoleon's grave on St. Helena. This 
cutting grew into a large tree in the college's famous botanical garden, and in 
1928 il  still stood "weeping over the departed glories of the garden." Coulter, 
College Life, 55. 
16 Ibid., 205. 
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fences and renewal of personal contacts, and sometimes laying 
the bases of animosities that brought no good to the school.17 
Crawford, no doubt, was as busy as anyone else in the political 
sphere, but his reference to the 1828 actions is the only one that 
has been discovered. He wrote the editors of the Milledgeville 
and Augusta papers that a congressional ticket would be agreed 
upon at that time, and requested that the editor urge the attend- 
ance of "our political friends" and suggest that those who had 
been or would be selected as candidates send their acceptance 
to the postmaster at Athens.ls 
Crawford by then was a judge and was on the verge of aban- 
doning the ambition to return to the United States Senate. His 
close political friends and supporters loolted forward to his 
reentry into politics, and Thomas W. Cobb had said he would 
resign his Senate seat at any moment Crawford and his friends 
thought fit. As late as October 1, 1827, Crawford confidently 
expected to be in the Senate that fall: Cobb was even anxious 
to create the vacancy, but the bar of the northern circuit had 
been opposed to Crawford's leaving the bench, especially since 
George Gilmer-the only other person they were willing to have 
as judge-had, without ltnowledge of Crawford's intention to quit 
the judgeship, consented to run for and been elected to Congress. 
It  was understood, said Crawford, that Gilmer would be his 
successor; Gilmer's congressional seat could be filled without 
inconvenience at the general election the next 0ctober.l" 
By the time of the next general election Crawford had given 
up the idea of going back to the Senate. Writing from Sparta, 
amid the "bustle and confusion" of court, he noted that the low 
price of cotton made his salary of $2,100 "quite convenient" and 
more valuable to him than $6,000 would be in the capital city. 
He had, therefore, decided not to return to the Senate where the 
17 Ibid., 187. 
1s Crawford to John Stevens, June 6, 1828, Read. Crawford asked Stevens, collector 
of cnsloms at  Savannah, to keep as many as he wished of the twenty olive and twenty 
fig plants sent lo Crawford by the American consul at Leghorn. T h e  remainder 
should be forwarded as soon as possible to Musgrove and Wetmore at  Augusta. Two 
years earlier G. W. Erving had written that the consul at  Marseilles had sent wed 
to Crawford and the vine cuttings "(say ZOO)," were to be sent from Bordeaux a t  the 
fir% opportunity. Erving to Crawford, Jan. 28, 1826, Crawford, Duke. 
19 Nnlhaniel M a ~ o n  lo Crawford, Dec. 16, 1825, Crawford, hfD1.C; I.ewis \Villi.rtns 
to Bartlett Yancey, April 14, 1825, Hamilton, "Letters to Bartlett Yancey," 52-53, 
Crawford to Van Buren, Aug. 15, Dec. 21, 1827, Van Buren. See also Crawford to 
Yancey, l kc .  [Jan.] 1828, Yancey. 
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"defect in my articulation would prevent my holding the same 
rank as when I was a member of that body."20 
Though Crawford's physical abilities were low in 1825 and 
1826, his political influence was still a factor of considerable 
magnitude. With party realignment taking place after the 1824 
election and Calhoun casting his lot with the Jacksonians in 
1826, it was important to know where the Crawford wing of the 
party would stand. Van Buren's visit to Crawford in April 1827 
probably had the double purpose of determining whether his 
host could again become a contender for the presidency, and-if 
he could not or would not-to whom he would throw his support. 
At the time of the visit, Crawford's presidential ambitions were 
near the vanishing point, and the coalition of his and Jackson's 
followers seemed acceptable. Later, taking note of rumors and 
speculations that he would be a candidate in 1828 if Adams' 
friends were convinced that their favorite could not be reelected, 
Crawford said Adams would actually have to be defeated before 
his friends would come to this conviction; therefore, there was 
a "moral impossibility that any contest can arise between Jackson 
and myself."21 
Whatever might have been Crawford's desire for office, he 
seemed determined to do everything possible to prevent Calhoun 
from becoming the heir of Jackson. In the spring of 1827 he 
wrote Hugh Lawson White, senator from Tennessee, that only 
the apprehension that Jackson's election would bring Calhoun 
"into power" prevented the North and South from uniting behind 
him in 1828. He said Calhoun had only recently become a 
supporter of Jackson: he had favored Adams until Clay declared 
for the New Englander. Further, Crawford referred to letters 
he had received which noted that the term "military chieftain" 
was much bandied about at the Calhoun caucus in Columbia, 
South Carolina. Crawford thought Jackson should know these 
things. White sent a copy of the letter to Jackson, who wrote 
to another that it "adds proof that Calhoun was as much my 
enemy as Clay until him and Adams fell out. Can this be."22 
20 Crawford to Samuel [H.] Smith, Oct. 21 (postmark), 1828, Crawford, Duke. 
Cobb had resigned from the Senate earlier in 1828. 
21 Crawford to Ifan Iluren, Aug. 15, 1827, Van Buren. 
22 Crawford to White, May 27, 1827 (copy); White to Jackson, June 19, 1827, John 
Spencer Uassett, ed., Corresfionrtence of Andrew lackson, 7 vols. (Washington, D.C., 
1926-1935), 3:365; Jackson to John Coffee, July 1, 1827, Coffee Family I'apers 
(MDLC). 
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Crawford also wrote Van Buren that David Williams had ex- 
pressed regret that Van Buren seemed disposed to leave Calhoun 
in the vice presidency; Williams, he said, thought Calhoun "ought 
to be punished for the mischief he has done." Crawford deemed 
it "extremely desirable" that a candidate for the vice presidency 
be started against Calhoun during the present session of Congress. 
Jackson's frail health made it important that the Vice President 
be a man worthy of the highest trust. He suggested Nathaniel 
Macon.23 
Ambition did not die easily, and Crawford's vanity, amour 
propre, or political ego was temporarily twitted in late 1827 by 
his nomination for the vice presidency by the lower house of the 
Georgia assembly. Crawford was privy to the action, for earlier 
at Milledgeville his friends had prevailed upon him not to inter- 
pose any obstacle if his name was put forward. Thomas W. Cobb, 
in answer to a query, had told Lewis Williams of North Carolina 
that Crawford would accept the nomination but indicated that 
he would not run as a partisan of either Jackson or ad am^.^^ 
Crawford, though he said that his own feelings ~vould not have 
led him to seek the vice presidency, did make at least one attempt 
to promote his candidacy after the nomination by the Georgia 
house. Since his name had been put up, he wrote Yancey, he 
"should not like to fail," and he believed a nomination by North 
Carolina would have more weight than one by Georgia or Vir- 
ginia, which supported him in 1824. If North Carolina should 
take any action he wished Virginia to be informed, and the 
notice might be accompanied by "such suggestions as your judg- 
ment shall di~tate."~5 But the failure of the Georgia senate to 
support the action of the lower house had doubtless precluded 
any possibility of success. And Van Buren did not adopt Craw- 
ford's suggestion of nominating Macon; the fear of division of 
the Jackson forces and consequent encouragement of the adversary 
induced many reluctantly to support Calhoun, though Van Buren 
23 Crawford to Van Buren, Dec. 21, 1827, Van Buren. See also Crawford to john 
Taylor, March 1, 1831, Crawford Letterbook. 
24 Crawford to Bartlett Yancey, Dec. [Jan.] 2, 1828, Yancey; Lewis [Villiams to 
Yancey, Dec. 11, 1827, Hamilton, "Letters to Bartlett Yancey," 66-68. 
25 Crawford to Yancey, Dec. [Jan.] 2, 1828. Crawford said h e  wrote at  the sug- 
gestion of Lewis Williams; it would be too late for Williams to write after receiving 
Crawford's reply. Crawford was referring to the fact that if North Carolina's action 
was to be effective it should be known in Virginia by January 8, the day the 
Virginians would meet. 
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thought the "approbation of Georgia is hardly to be e x p e ~ t e d . " ~ ~  
By 1828 Crawford's more influential followers seemed to have 
decided that their interests would be best served by allying them- 
selves with the Jackson forces. But Clay's political future was 
quite uncertain at the moment, Clay and Crawford remained 
friends, and many Crawford partisans as well as others who were 
backing Jackson were confused and perplexed by reports of a 
Crawford letter to Clay in early February 1828. In that letter 
Crawford expressed the hope that Clay knew him too well to 
"suppose that I have countenanced the charge of corruption which 
has been reiterated against you. The  truth is, I approved your 
vote for Mr. Adams, when it was given; and should have voted 
as you did, between Jackson and Adams. But candor compels 
me to say, that I disapproved of you accepting office from him." 
He thought Clay had thus "indisputably connected" his fortune 
with Adams', that he must fall with him, and that only the course 
of the Adams administration could have driven Georgia to the 
Jackson banner. He singled out Adams' recommendation for 
building "light-houses to the sky" (observatories) for especial 
derogation and said the "whole of his first message to Congress 
is replete with doctrines which I hold to be uncon~titutional."~~ 
Clay did know Crawford too well to suppose he had counte- 
nanced the charge and the frank admission that he would have 
voted as Clay did "accords with the estimate I have always made 
of your intelligence, your independence, and your patriotism." 
Clay was neither surprised nor dissatisfied with Crawford's opinion 
that he had erred in taking a place in the Adams administration. 
He had not been inclined to accept, but he was under pressure 
from his friends-as well as from Louis McLane and John Forsyth, 
close friends of Crawford-to take the post. He had not foreseen 
the unpopularity of the administration, but popularity had not 
26Van Bnren to Crawford, Feb. 15, 1828, Crawford, MDLC. Some interpreted 
the feeble efforts to nominate Crawford for the vice presidency as a serious attempt 
to produce dissension in the Calhoun ranks in Georgia, Virginia, North Carolina, 
and New York and saw a link with Clay's alleged plans to promote Governor Tames 
Pleasants of Virginia for the vice presidency and DeWitt Clinton for the presidency. 
Others, aided greatly by rumor, saw a carefully developed plan to run Crawford 
for the presidency, throw the election into the House, and by managetnenl reelect 
Adams. See, for example, DuK Green to [Pressley Edwards or William T. Barry], 
Dec. 1, 1827 Green to Ninian Edwards, Dec. 18, 1827, Duff Green Letter Book, 
1827-1830: Littleton W. Tazewell to George W. Crump, Dec. 22, 1827, Littleton W. 
Tazewell Papers (UVa). 
27 Crawford to Clay, Feb. 4,  1828, Colton, Works, 4:191-92. 
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been the deciding factor in his public conduct. Rather, he had 
asked was the measure right? Will i t  conduce to general happiness 
and the elevation of the national character? H e  thought perhaps 
it was Adams' metaphor rather than the observatory which had 
provoked Crawford's censure, for nearly every President had 
made such a recommendation. He  then turned 
wit11 pleasure to the recollection of our amicable relations. What- 
ever you may have thought, or may have been sought to be 
infused into your mind, my friendly feelings toward you have 
never ceased; and, although our correspondence has been inter- 
rupted four or five years, I have always entertained a lively 
solicitude for your welfare, and availed myself of every oppor- 
tunity to inquire particularly about your health and situation. 
I have heard with unaffected pleasure of the improvement of your 
health. That it may be perfectly re-established, and that you may 
be long spared for the benefit of your family, and the good of 
your country, is the sincere wish of your faithful and obedient 
servant.28 
Four days later Clay briefly related to Francis Brooke the 
contents of Crawford's "curious" and "very friendly" letter, which 
he had answered in the most friendly terms. Soon several of 
Clay's friends had seen Crawford's letter, which Clay thought 
"does Mr. C. as much credit as it does me." Clay understood it 
was spoken of generally in Washington, but he would regret the 
subject getting into the ne~spapers.~"ost people knew only 
the rumored contents of the letter and were troubled by its 
possible effect on the presidential election. Crawford's long-time 
friend, Nathaniel Macon, was greatly perturbed. H e  thought 
sickness must have weakened Crawford's strong mind and that 
Crawford's adversaries in Georgia would use the letter against 
him and his friends. Cobb, Gilmer, and some other friends of 
Crawford were concerned that the letter might so change their 
party in the state as to put it in the minority. Macon, who was 
28 Clay to Crawford, Feb. 18, 1828, ibid., 192-95. A copy is in the Clay I'apers at 
the University of Kentucky. 
z! ]  C:l:ty lo llr.ooke, I'eI,. 22, 27. 1828, Clay, IJKy. On .April 29 Clay sent I3rooke 
copies of Crawford's letter and his reply ant1 perrni~ted Brooke some discretion in 
s l ~ o w i ~ ~ g  Illern to others. Colton, W o ~ k s ,  4:201. Brooke, writing Clay on February 
25, 1828 (Clay, I.illy), was "much gratified" with Crawford's remarks about the 
charge of bargain and corruption and asked whether Crawford would have any 
objeclion to having this known. 
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not sure what was in the letter, had heard that Crawford had 
written other letters that some of his warm supporters thought im- 
prudent. Before the end of the month talk about the letter had 
died away. The  full contents apparently had begun to circulate, 
and Macon thought Crawford's remark that he did not approve the 
Adams administration and would not support Adams for reelec- 
tion probably accounted for the termination of the discussion and 
~pecula t ion .~~ 
But a month later the Richmond Enquirer took up the matter, 
commenting on accounts of other papers and letters on which 
those journals reportedly based their stories. The  Enquirer con- 
cluded that Crawford did not write a letter saying he never "gave 
any credit" to the charges against Clay; such a letter would not 
"correspond with the declaration he had heretofore made." The  
statement by the Raleigh Register that Crawford not only ac- 
quitted Clay but said he would have voted as Clay did was called 
a "fal-tal"; the sentiments of Crawford were too well known for 
such a clumsy, not to say dishonest, trick to be "played of f  suc- 
~es s fu l ly .~~  Certainly the Enquirer publicized its fallibility and 
just as certainly the incident showed that frankness and honesty 
could easily be considered politically imprudent. 
As on several previous occasions, the person most affected was 
among the least agitated. Crawford explained the situation in 
early April. He had wanted to obtain, through Joel Poinsett in 
Mexico, some of the best Mexican cotton seed and thought the 
most certain way of conveying the request was through the secre- 
tary of state. This he did; and since "Clay and myself had always 
been on friendly terms," he thought his covering letter would 
have an "unfriendly appearance" if it took no notice of the 
" c in pleasant situation" in which Clay had been and was then 
placed. Crawford gave an accurate wmmary of his letter, using 
many of the phrases he had in the original. In keeping with his 
habit, he had no copy, but he had requested a friend to demand 
its publication in order to stop the misinterpretat i~n.~~ Nothing 
more on the letter was noted. 
3OMacon to W. N. Edwards, Feb. 22, 23, 27, 1828, Nathaniel Macon Papers 
(NCDAH). 
31 Richmond Enquirer, hlarch 28, 1828. In this particular instance i t  is impos- 
sible at: Limes to tell whether the remarks are from the Raleigh Register, the Wash-  
ingtoit News, or the Washington Telegraph. 
32 Crawford to Charles Jared Ingersoll, April 4, 1828, Ingersoll. He probably 
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Just at the time the Crawford-to-Clay letter reached the rumor 
stage, the death of DeWitt Clinton (February 11, 1828) raised 
among Calhoun supporters the specter of Van Buren being 
persuaded by the Federalists to become the vice-presidential 
candidate and through the union of the Clintonians and the 
Crawfordites bring the defeat of Calhoun. I t  was thought certain 
that Van 13uren would be pressed by a section of the Crawford 
interest, and this group would rejoice in his elevation as a 
means of personal advancement for themselves. But i t  was not 
believed that Van Buren would become the dupe of such a plan- 
the exa~nples of Burr and George Clinton would be sufficient to 
guide him on the right path.33 
Crawford's enthusiasm for his own vice-presidential candidacy 
was very short-lived, but until the end of 1828 he continued his 
efforts to elect someone other than Calhoun. In late October 
he wrote a number of almost identical letters in an effort to pull 
votes from the South Carolinian. Georgia, he said, could not 
"consistently with her feelings and character" vote for either 
Calhoun or Richard Rush, and to relieve the state from the 
embarrassment of voting for either he deemed it his duty to 
advocate the choice of Macon. Both the declared candidates had 
already been more than amply rewarded for any services they 
may have rendered or probably rvould ever render, but Macon, 
in the public service since 1791, had received no mark of the 
national confidence or any compensation other than the pay of a 
member of Congress. Crawford approved the idea of not dis- 
tracting the attention of the nation from the presidential contest 
by discussing the vice presidency, but this should not prevent an 
effort in favor of a man who for nearly forty years had been a 
c.onspicuous member of the ~ouncils of the nation. Macon's 
advanced age probably meant this was his last chance.34 
tnade t l ~ e  request for publication to Thonlas W. Cobb, who replietl that he  had 
not p~rblished the letter. Cobb hat1 been "in troul>le about it"; but since CrawEord 
did not manifest  he same degree of interest, Cobl) had concluded that "I need not 
make myself uneasy, especially as it was on your account and not my account that 1 
fell any tror~ble." Cobb to Crawford, April 1 I ,  1828, Golding. 
Russell Jarvis to A. Ware, Feb. 22, 1828; Duff Green to Dear Sir, Feb. 23, 1828, 
1)ulF Green Letter Book. Jarvis was Green's partner on t l ~ e  'I'elegra$h. 
:JsCrawfo~.d Lo Jesse 13. 'I'horr~as, Ocl. 25 (~>osltnal.k). 1828, ' l ' l ~on l ;~~ .  tie asked 
'Thornas to advance hlacon's claims I~efore l l ~ e  Illinois electors and let l~ in l  know 
as soon as possible of the prol)al>le electoral results in Illinois. I t  is inlel.esling to 
note that in late 1827 Crawford suprxxted Macon on grounds of his good health 
and Lhe feebleness of Jackson. Macon lived unlil 1837. 
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In other letters he asked that Macon's name be brought before 
- 
the New York electors in a "most impressive manner" and ex- 
pressed the hope that letters written to distinguished individuals 
in all states except New Hampsliire, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, and Connecticut would bring success. Crawford 
did not think Jackson would take a defeated Calhoun into the 
cabinet, but said he would I~irnself "cause representation to be 
made to Ja~kson" thal would prevent it. He supposed the election 
of the President must be determined by party, but he saw no 
reason why the Vice President could not I)e cliosen by "sober 
reason," without reference to party.36 
Party prevailed over sober reason, and Crawford's efforts went 
for nought. The  Georgia electors gave nine votes to Jackson, 
seven votes for the vice presidency to Senator William Smith of 
South Carolina, and two votes to Calhoun. Crawford voted for 
Jackson more "as a choice of evils, than as a matter of abstract 
preference," opposing the election of Adams rather than advo- 
cating the election of Jackson. He blamed no man for his choice 
between these two, felt it wise to soothe the disappointment of 
any state or section, and ascribed the rejection ot Adams to his 
political opinions and actions rather than to any feeling of dis- 
respect for New England.36 
Following the election of 1828 some of the key appointments 
went to warm partisans of Crawford who had become Jackson 
and Van Buren supporters. This did not please the Calhoun 
followers, including Duff Green, who was much dissatisfied with 
- 
and freely remonstrated against Samuel Ingham's choice of Asbury 
Dickins as his chief clerk. Four of the five foreign ministers 
were said to have been Crawford men and the fifth was originally 
a friend of Clay.37 Among this group was Louis McLane, neo- 
35 Crawford to Van Ilnren, Oct. 21, 1828, Van I%uren; C~.awfortl L o  1);ivitl I):~ggett, 
Nov. 15, 1828, Crawford, Yale. Similar letters went to Samuel Smith of Maryland 
and Felix Grundy of Tennessee; the latter replied that Ite consitlered t.lle 'I'ennessee 
electors pledged to Calhoun. Grundy suggested to Jackson that a future split of the 
party was in evidence, but he thought it woultl I)e the Crawfortl faction that prob- 
ably would break with the administration because oE a dislike for Calhoun. Craw- 
Eord to Smith, Oct. 21 (postmark), 1828, Crawford, Duke: Joseph I-Ioward Parks, 
Felix G r z ~ n d y ,  Champion of Deitzocracy (Ilniversity, La., 1940), 175. 
36 Crawford to Jesse B. Thomas, Jan. 9, 1828 [1829], '1'11oloas. 
37 Virgil Maxcy to Calhoun, April 9, May 7, July 4, 1829, 2 vols. American 
Historical Association, Annual Report ,  1899 (Washington, D.C., 1900), 2:795-807, 
810-14. Maxcy said that Ingham cut the discussion short by plainly intimating that 
he would not be interfered with in appointments in his own department. 
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Jacksonite who had given the Delaware vote to Crawford in early 
1825." When Crawford informed Secretary of State Van Buren 
of his pleasure with McLane's appointment as minister to Eng- 
land, he also gave him some advice and counsel on instructing his 
ministers to England and France and expressed his unhappiness 
that Stephen Olin had not been made secretary of legation. He 
presumed the appointment had been made before his letter of 
recommendation arrived, but Georgia would think it strange that 
the present administration refused what the last had granted. 
Maybe Olin could be given a position without removing another 
person; but if it is necessary to replace someone, that "should not 
be hard if the newspapers give us a true account of the ~abinet ."~" 
Intermittently the coals of Crawford's smoldering ambition 
seem to have been fanned by thoughts of Calhoun's fortunes-or 
wishes for his misfortune. In early 1830 Crawford felt Jackson's 
decision on a second-term candidacy would make no difference to 
Calhoun's career; the South Carolinian never had any prospect 
of votes except in South Carolina and Pennsylvania, but he might 
take North Carolina if pitted against Van Buren. On the other 
hand, Van Buren might be a powerful competitor for the 
Pennsylvania vote. He speculated on the states that Clay and 
Van Buren might carry and decided that in addition to the votes 
the latter could command "I could certainly obtain" the votes 
of North Carolina, and probably those of Tennessee and Alabama. 
Again, it was probable he would lose some votes north of the 
Potomac. However, Crawford would deeply regret being placed 
in competition with Van Buren-the House of Representatives 
would probably have to choose the President. If Crawford's name 
were brought forward, it ought to be at the instance of Van Buren 
and his friends. Crawford thought it within the "pale of possi- 
bility" that it would be better to postpone Van Buren's claim for 
38 In speculating and then commenting on the cabinet appointments McL.ane 
called John Branch (the new secretary of navy) an "old woman," and he said the 
new secretary of war, John H. Eaton, "has just married his mistress-& the mistress 
of 11-doz. others.!!" McLane to [?I, Feb. 12, 13, 1829, James Bayard Papers (Univer- 
sity of Delaware). 
39 Clawfold lo Van Buren, May 12, 1829, Van Buren. Later Crawford recoln 
mended six persons to Van Buren as negotiators with the Cherokee (he llimself 
wanted no appointment that would make it necessary to move his family) and 
repealed-as he had several times carlier-his belief that the ministers of the IJnited 
States received such low salaries that they could not, without injury to their pe~sonal 
fortur~es, stay abroad as long as the public interest required. Crawford to Van 
Buren, July 11, Sept. 9. 1829, ibid. 
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another term; if Clay and Calhoun should be vanquished a 
second time, they will be "hors du combat in all future time, 
and will not be able to offer any obstacles to VB's elevation." 
But Crawford said he had no personal ambition to gratify; his 
only ambition-if it could be called such-was to educate his five 
sons so as to render them useful citizens to the Republic. This he 
was able to do. When that goal was achieved and his daughters 
were "advantageously settled in Society," he would have accom- 
plished his work in this world and "shall be ready to depart hence 
X: be no more seen amongst men." A postscript said that Van 
13uren's friends may "possibly apprehend the same course of con- 
duct from me that I experienced from Mr Monroe, but I think 
my character ought to be sufficient guaranty against such an 
event."40 
Occasionally there was mention in the press and private cor- 
respondence of a possible Crawford-Clay coalition; to some such 
a union probably seemed reasonable because of Crawford's lack 
of enthusiasm for Jackson and his continued friendship with 
Clay. Crawford explored this possibility with Clay in March 1830 
and appears to have done a good job of ending a friendship of 
twenly years. He perceived from the papers that Clay, Calhoun, 
and Van Buren would be the next presidential candidates-if 
Jacltson were not a candidate. If so, Van Buren would be elected. 
Crawford believed Clay would not get a vote in New England: 
his and Adams' "manners habits, sentiments and principles" were 
so different that it was not probable the two could be supported 
by the same men. The  Kentuckian's popularity in the Atlantic 
states south of the Potomac had been destroyed by his union with 
Adams, and Crawford's standing in Georgia had been injured b y  
his defense of Clay against the charge of corrupt bargaining. 
If Clay wished to become President, Crawford thought his "most 
likely way of success" was to avoid the next presidential contest. 
Some of Crawford's friends wished to place his name in nomina- 
tion; if this were done and Clay, not a candidate, supported Craw- 
ford, the Georgian presumed there would be no doubt of his 
receiving the votes of the western and southwestern states, which 
with Virginia and some other states would secure his election. 
Clay would then be brought into the cabinet and "could hardly 
40 Crawford to Dear Sir, Feb. 4, 1830, Crawford, Duke. This letter, well written 
and with an excellent signature, was in reply to "your first letter from Washington." 
Crawford presumably was referring to Monroe's neutrality in the election of 1824. 
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fail to succeed when I retired." Crawford thought it possible his 
friends would make the same proposal to Van Buren, but "I 
should rather it should take place with you." Really, however, 
it was of little concern to Crawford: 
Do not suppose that 1 feel any solicitude upon the subject of this 
letter. I feel none; but supposing from what I have seen in the 
public papers that you lee1 some, it occurred to me that the most 
certain mode of gratilying that feeling was to adopt the course 
which 1 have suggested. If you should be of a different opinion, 
let the matter rest where it is, 8c there no harm will have been done. 
If Clay concurred in the proposal, Crawford would be happy to 
hear from him.41 
Clay thought this "singular" letter indicated "some want of 
self-possession." He did not answer because he could not do 
so in terms "consistent with the friendship which I once bore to 
Mr. C r a ~ f o r d . " ~ ~  Nor did he think the letter should be pub- 
lished. Crawford was not-and was not likely to be-formidable; 
and his "friends, though few of them are mine, are generally 
respectable. Their feelings would be affected. He has been high 
in public confidence. Ought that to be shown as having been 
misplaced, especially as he may not be in his right mind?" Clay 
remained firm against publication: "It could only be justified by 
some public good, and I see none that it would ac~ompl ish ."~~ 
There is a little evidence that just at the time of this "singular" 
letter some friends of Crawford had announced his candidacy for 
the vice presidency (not the presidency), that an effort would 
be made in his behalf in Massachusetts, and that some supporters 
were boosting him in Georgia. Crawford took much the same 
approach he had two years before by noting that once a person's 
name had been announced for a public office that person could 
not feel "perfectly indifferent."44 
Slightly more than a month after Cratvford's letter to Clay 
41 Crawford to Clay, March 31, 1830, Clay, MDLC. 
42 Clay to Francis Brooke, May 23, 1830, Clay, UKy; Colton, Works, 4:271-72. See 
also Clay to J.  S. Johnston, April 30, 1830, ibid., 264-65. 
43 Francis Brooke to Clay, June 6, 1830, Clay, Lilly; Clay to Brooke, June 16, 1830, 
Clay, UKy: Clay to Brooke, April 24, 1830 [1831], Colton, Works, 4:263. Reference 
to the Crawford letter of March of the preceding year and contents of the Clay- 
Brooke letters indicate improper dating of this last letter. Contents, actual and sup- 
posed, of the Crawford letter circulated at  least until the fall of 1831. See George 
W. Erving to Crawford, Sept. 7, 1831, Crawford, Dukc. 
44 Crawford lo Edwa1.d Harden, March 21, 1830, Edward Harden I'apers (1)uke). 
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the final episode in the Jackson-Calhoun split was triggered by 
revelatiorls concerning events following Jackson's Florida invasion; 
the possil>ility of Calhoun's succeeding Jackson was eliminated; 
Crawford's "solicitude" about the first and second offices disap- 
peared before the election of 1832 took place. Jackson might 
have known the true situation in 1818 had he been willing to 
listen,45 but his previous brushes with Crawford as secretary of 
war had preconditioned him for one conclusion only. By mid- 
1827 Calhoun's duplicity had been strongly intimated to Jackson, 
and Inore direct evidence was available in the letter from John 
Forsyth to James A. Hamilton in early 1828. Fear of endangering 
the election of Jackson seems to have dictated withholding this 
information until a more propitious time. 
The  sanctity of cabinet deliberations served many as sufficient 
moral cover for keeping the truth hidden, but both Calhoun and 
Crawford at the time of-or shortly after-the discussions had 
intimated the prevailing public belief was incorrect. Crawford 
believed that the cabinet deliberations belonged to history, but 
he thought it unnecessary to make public his feelings that Cal- 
houn, Adams, and Wirt were hypocritical in their remarks about 
the confidential nature of cabinet  deliberation^.^^ 
The  story has been told many times before and will not be 
repeated here. The  point of no return for Calhoun was reached 
on May 12, 1830, when Forsyth placed in Jackson's hands a copy 
of Crawford's letter of April 30 to Forsyth. For nearly a year 
everyone seemed to be corresponding and conferring with every- 
one else, John Quincy Adams was reading and rereading for 
his benefit and for others the entries in his diary, Crawford was 
making "deep and deadly" thrusts at Calhoun (indicating among 
other things that ever since Calhoun had established the Republi- 
can to slander and vilify Crawford's reputation Crawford had 
considered him a "degraded, a disgraced man"), Calhoun was 
publishing his version of the incident, and contemporaries were 
keenly aware that Calhoun was fighting for his political life.47 
46 See Jackson lo John Overton, May 13, 1830, Andrew Jackson Papers (Ten- 
nessee Iiistorical Society): ,John Williams to Van Buren, March 22, 1831, Van Buren. 
415 I t  sl~ould be noted that Wirt seemed thoroughly sincere in this Inatler, I)ut 
nearly identical accounts-at several different times-in Adams' Memoirs and Niles' 
IVeeltlji Register might lead one to wonder where Niles got his information. 
47 Relevant materials and accounts may be found in Niles' Weekly Register. 40 
(March 5,  12, 19, 1831):ll-24, 37-45, and at the appropriate places in Bassett, 
Correspondence of Andrew Jackson; Hamilton, Monroe Writings; Richard K. Crallb, 
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Most general accounts of the period have relied heavily on John 
Quincy Adams' account of events, and biographers of the prin- 
cipals have defended their subjects-with Crawford being ac- 
corded a full share of denunciation and condemnation for his 
perfidy and intrigue, his unrelenting hatred of Calhoun, and his 
unpatriotic disclosure of cabinet "secrets." Partial disclosure of 
the cabinet discussions had been made years before. That Craw- 
ford heartily and steadfastly disliked Calhoun-and sought to 
destroy him politically-cannot be denied. The charge of intrigue 
is probably not a very serious one in the political world; doubtless 
all the principals were guilty. Perfidy is not provable against 
Calhoun or Crawford, but certainly Calhoun lived for a decade 
under the lie that he had been the defender and Crawford the 
persecutor of Jackson. There seems little question-and there was 
none in Crawford's mind-but that Calhoun was schemingly in- 
volved in the "A.B." affair and that he had been an important 
factor in Crawford's not gaining the presidency in 1824. Craw- 
ford's actions prior to 1828 certainly indicated he did not want 
Calhoun as Vice President in that year, and surely he did not 
want him to become President. 
But in many respects Calhoun had only himself to blame for his 
fate. When he cast his lot with the Jacksonians in 1826-before 
the Crawford wing of the party had done so-he or some of his 
intimates might have explained his position to Jackson or to 
some of Jackson's intimates. Such explanation might have been 
acceptable at any time before the end of 1828. However, Calhoun 
and his partisans apparently thought Crawford reduced to a 
cipher in the party and preferred not to take the risk. Even so, 
Crawford did not go directly to Jackson; and though the whole 
thing might have been a carefully conceived conspiracy to ruin 
Calhoun, the early actors were numerous and Crawford did not 
play a major role until the late scenes of the drama. The  exigen- 
cies of politics probably determined the actions of the principals; 
ed., T h e  Works of John C. Calhoun, 6 vols. (New York, 1857-1864); Wiltse, Calhoun; 
Duckett, Forsyth; Adams, Memoirs. Among materials not generally used in discus- 
sing this episode are Crawford to Asbury Dickins, March 1, June 17, 24, 1831, 
Washl)urn; Forsyth to Crawford, Jan. 26, 1831, Golding. These do not materially 
alter the picture, but the Dickins letters show that Crawford made a se~ious effort 
to g c ~  his facts straight. The Forsyth letter indicates that Jackson was "entirely 
satisfied" with Crawford's account, regretted that he had been so long deluded, 
and i~nputed "no hostility for an opinion honestly entertained and frankly and 
constantly expressed." 
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if blame is to be attached, it should be spread among a half dozen 
or so. It  is highly unlikely that Crawford expected personal 
political gain from the episode, but he doubtless derived a certain 
satisfaction in seeing Calhoun finally get his "punishment," which 
Crawford thought should have been administered some time be- 
fore.48 
Shortly after a copy of Crawford's letter to Forsyth had been 
given to Jackson, Crawford became keenly interested in assem- 
bling a convention to amend the Constitution of the United 
States. He was disturbed by what he considered unconstitutional 
actions of the national government and by the spirit of discontent 
among the people. He was not surprised that in more than forty 
years much "contrariety of opinion" had arisen about the con- 
struction of the Constitution and that the central government 
had sometimes exercised doubtful powers. But dissatisfaction 
had increased to such an alarming extent and the disposition to 
exercise doubtful if not unconstitutional powers had become so 
pronounced that Crawford feared civil war if something were 
not done to conciliate the dissidents. He was not at all sure a 
convention would provide an answer, but he felt it would "go 
farther" than any other measure to allay discontent. 
His objection to the system of internal improvements contem- 
plated by Congress was greater than to the tariff system, which 
he had always thought would "cure itself" before the country 
was ruined. Then, too, ultimately the tariff would proba1)ly do 
more harm to those it was intended to benefit than to those it was 
designed to "fleece." He believed that in a convention the "west- 
ern people" would not abandon their support of internal improve- 
ments, but it was probable they would agree to a limitation of 
the power of the central government in that area. At present 
there was no limitation: all usurped powers are unlimited. It  
had occurred to Crawford that a "remedy" for the tariff con- 
troversy might be found in a requirement that all laws imposing 
duties or taxes be passed by majorities in both houses and then 
by a majority of the states, voting by states.4g 
48Though Crawford had corresponded with Van Buren about electing someone 
other than Calhoun as Vice President in 1828, there is no evidence of direct col- 
lusion betwren Crawford and Van Buren in the Jackson-Calhoun matter. 
49Crawford to Van Buren, May 31, 1830, Van Buren. The preceding winter 
Crawford had written Cambreleng C. Churchill suggesting the New York legislature 
ask for a nalional convention. 
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Crawford wrote several letters seeking support for calling a 
convention. Replies were cordial, but no correspondent agreed 
to assist acr.ively in accomplishing Crawford's purpose. One con- 
curred that a convention might tend to compose differences, but 
his state (Virginia) was so absorbed with organization of the 
government under the new constitution and so internally agi~ated 
and divided that he thought her incapable of any vigorous action 
on national affairs. Another emphasized that varied interests of 
the country would always foster differences of opinion and be- 
lieved a convention might "encourage insubordination" rather 
than allay discontent.50 
At the beginning of 1831 Crawford reopened the subject with 
Van Buren, who had requested an opinion on the best means of 
carrying Jackson's views on internal improvements into effect. 
Van Buren was correct in supposing that the presidential veto 
of the Maysville Road bill would give "unpleasure," but Crawford 
said the best and only means of regulating internal improvements 
was the calling of a convention to revise the Constitution. Craw- 
ford understood Jackson's message to deny to Congress the right 
to make local internal improvements, but if money is distribut:ed 
to the states they will use it for that purpose. He  emphasized that 
the Westerners were a great distance from ports, did not have the 
money to build the roads and canals, and insisted that necessary 
improvements be made at the expense of the entire nation. He 
thought, however, they would be satisfied with the distribution 
proposed 1)y the President. Crawford was, and if he were a mem- 
ber of [.he proposed convention he would sponsor an amendment 
to nla ke the procedure constitutional. Distribution of funds 
wor~ld then no longer depend on the whirn or  caprice of Congress 
and, since the United States could raise money more inexpensively 
than the states, this method would be financially advantageous to 
the states. A resolution from the New York legislature requiring 
the calling of a convention would have great weight with the 
other states.51 
Federal involvement in internal improverrlents was far less tl1a11 
Crawford seemed to expect, and by the summer of 1832 the tariff 
50 Benjamin Watkins Leigh to Crawford, Jan. 15, 1831: [John Williams] to Craw- 
fo~,tl, J~rr~c 29, 18%), <:~.awfortl, 1)like. I..eigh said that 1)efore receiving C:l.awfortl's 
l e ~ ~ c r  on I l~e  convet~tion proposal he had seen his letter on the same s~ll)jcct to 
I<ar~lc l~  Y;inccy. Willian~s was replyitla to Crawford's letter of June 5. 
51 Crawlord lo \'at1 1lul.el1, Jail. 3, 1831, \'ail Buren. 
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was the major cause of his irritation. After a discussion of the 
amalgamation of parties following the War of 1812, the lati- 
tudinarian construction of the Constitution held by Clay and 
Calhoun, and Calhoun's turn to the opposite extreme oC nullifica- 
tion, Crawford said the southern states had made up their minds 
that they would no longer be "filched and robbed" by the tariff. 
He disagreed with McDuffie's contention that the southern states 
paid all the duties, and he rejected the doctrine of nullification as 
"self-evidently absurd." The  tariff, however, was unjust and 
oppressive; it must be abandoned or the union would be dissolved. 
He had fought against the nullification forces and for the calling 
of a national convention to consider this and other problems. If 
the tariff states refused to join, then the antitariff states could 
hold the convention, frame a constitution, and terminate the 
oppression. If the tariff states did unite in a convention that 
failed to resolve the differences, they could then peaceably form 
a constitution for themselves. These developments he did not 
wish to see; they were a "choice of evils of great magnitude." 
The South, Crawford maintained, was being fleeced by the 
tariff; when this can no longer be done, the tariff will fall as a 
matter of course. He did not insist on total repeal, but he wanted 
a partial repeal and some assurance that the whole of the "brig- 
andage shall ultimately and at a certain time entirely cease." He 
pictured some of the extremists of the tariff states as saying that 
dissolution of the union would be better than meeting some of 
the demands of the antitariff states, and the South as saying the 
same thing of the tariff states. Crawford hoped these extreme 
views would produce reflection and moderation in the delibera- 
tion upon the tariff and warned that the issue must be compro- 
mised at the current session or the opportunity of reviewing it 
would never arise-the question would "pass irretrievably into 
other hands never again to be discussed in the capital."52 The  
issue was not compromised, and two months later Crawford was 
sorely troubled. He had hoped his earlier communication would 
have helped to promote a solution, but the time for reviewing 
the tariff had now passed. The  expectations of the South had not 
52 Crawford to Mahlon Dickerson, July 8 (recd.), 1832, Dickerson. T h e  first four 
pages of this nine-page letter are missing. T h e  first part of the fifth page deals 
with Calhoun's ideas of consolidation in government. Dickerson of New Jersey, a 
strong Crawford supporter in 1824, was a long-time influential member of the 
Senate. 
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been realized; she would right her own wrongs and put an end 
to the "robbery and pillage which had been inflicted . . . under 
color of law." He concluded, "I shall not advocate secession 
myself, but it will be popular in this state."53 
For some time Georgians had been deeply agitated about the 
tariff. In August 1828 Crawford was chairman of a group of 
more than one thousand which met in the college chapel at 
Athens, passed a protest against the tariff, and recommended 
that the state set to work to manufacture what it needed. The  
extent lo which Crawford carried out plans for doing the manu- 
facturing for his own "family" is not known. He was quick to 
make a start, however, for the next month he asked the help of 
a Philadelphia friend in finding a power loom "to go by hand"; 
spinning machines he could obtain in Georgia on short notice. 
He thought the tariff unconstitutional, but in the final analysis 
it might be productive of good: he probably would not have 
reached his decision concerning home manufacture but for the 
import duties.E4 
In 1832-again following commencement exercises at Athens- 
there was a call for the "friends of . . . Jackson, and those opposed 
to the Protective System, and opposed to a redress . . . by Ntillifi- 
cation" to meet at the new chapel. This group, of which Crawford 
was leader, suspecting that the nullifiers would counter by calling 
a meeting at the same time and place, arrived before the appointed 
hour. Crawford was presiding when the group led by John M. 
Berrien and Augustin S. Clayton arrived in such numbers that 
they took complete control of the meeting, condemned the tariff, 
and called for the election of delegates to a convention at Milledge- 
ville on November 12. One hundred and thirty-one delegates 
from sixty of the eighty counties of the state assembled on the 
designated day. John Forsyth, after some parliamentary maneu- 
vering designed to show the hand of South Carolina in the move- 
ment in Georgia, led fifty delegates from the hall of the house o f  
representatives. The  actions of the rump convention were incon- 
~ e q u e n t i a l . ~ ~  
53 Crawford to Dickerson, Sept. 6, 1832, ibid. 
54 E. Merton Coulier, "'l'l~e N~lllification Movement in Georgia," Georgia Hi.$- 
lnrical Qztnrterly 5 (March 1921): 8; Crawford to Charles Jared Ingersoll, Sept. 11, 
1828, Tngersoll. Crawford on occasion used "family" to refer to his slaves as well 
as to his wife and children. 
55 Couller, "Tl~e Nullilicalion Movement in Georgia," 14, 24-25. 
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Between the Athens and Milledgeville meetings Crawf'ord had 
been asked to dine with a group on September 22 and to "lay 
before the people" his views on measures that should be taken 
in the present crisis, particularly in relation to a southern con- 
vention. Judicial duties prevented his attendance, and he used 
a letter as the best available means to communicate his ideas. 
He favored calling a national convention to revise the Constitu- 
tion; the antitariff states should pass resolutions requiring Con- 
gress, by terms of the Constitution, to call the convention. It  
was by no means certain, he said, that a convention would reject 
the changes sought by the South, for the behavior of men in 
convention would probably be different from the behavior of 
those same men in Congress. In Cong-ress the only question was 
what power had been granted, and the answer was so often 
"abusively determined" that it is "in fact no inquiry at all." In 
convention the question would be what powers shall be granted. 
After the powers of the central government had been determined, 
the advantages of union and disunion could be deliberated. If 
it were discovered that the number and population of the states 
disposed to secede was not sufficient for self-protection, he deemed 
it unwise to separate. It  would be better to submit to the evils 
of the tariff and even a system of internal improvements than 
to form a connection with a foreign state. 
Crawford opposed a southern convention until a general con- 
vention had been tried and failed. And he opposed "any uncon- 
stitutional, or extra constitutional measure, until every measure 
of redress promised by the constitution, shall have been fruitlessly 
exhausted. Let us keep ourselves in the right; and put our 
opponents in the wrong." He made his position very clear in his 
closing remarks: 
Any measure of resistance, whether riullification or secession, is 
so fraught with awful consequences, too much caution and delib- 
eration cannot be exercised. . . . We know not to what consequence 
the measures now in embryo may lead. . . . I reject nullification 
as a peaceable, constitutional measure, for I verily believe that 
n o  man i n  his senses ever believed i t  t o  be  so. I reject it as a 
revolutionary measure, because every constitutional measure of 
redress has not been tried, and because it will, in all human 
probability, be ineffectual, and will injure none but those who 
resort to it. Under this belief, I shall be sorry to see South 
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Carolina, or any other southern state resort to it. I should prefer 
a southern convention to nullification.56 
Crawford's letter may well have had some influence on the Forsyth 
followers at Milledgeville, but nothing deterred South Carolina 
from passing her nullification ordinance on November 24, 1832. 
Crawford followed the deepening nullification controversy 
with much interest and great concern. By early January 1833 he 
had heard of only one "nullifier in this country" who found the 
bill for modification of the tariff unacceptable. The  more reason- 
able people would accept an even more gradual reduction of 
rates than provided by the measure. If they could be sure that 
the principle of protection was to be abandoned, they would not 
"stickle" about a few years difference in its final terminal date. 
Crawford's only fear was that the measure would not be passed 
at the current session, and he reiterated his belief that nullification 
was a "self evident absurdity" when pictured as peaceable and 
constitutional. That the states must be the judges in the last 
resort, the "ultima ratio regum," he had always admitted, and if 
the South Carolina leaders had presented this view to the people 
he would have thought better of them. But they, like "all other 
hypocrites concealed its true character until they had deluded 
the people into the doctrine."57 
Commenting two weeks later on Calhoun's apparent fear of 
consolidation of power in the central government, Crawford cor- 
rectly pointed out that both as a member of Congress and as a 
department head Calhoun had been an ardent advocate of such 
consolidation. Now, in an "arbitrary" and "around" definition, 
Senator Calhoun was equating consolidation with government 
56 Crawford to the Committee at  Alford's Cross-Roads, Sept. 13, 1832, Niles' 
Weekly  Register 43 (Nov. 17, 1832): 185. T h e  original of this letter has not been 
located. In early 1831 Crawford, disappointed that the South Carolina legislature 
had adjourned without requesting a national convention, contrasted the violent 
method of change in European cou~itries with the peaceable and consti tuliol~~l 
changes which could be rnade in the United States. No state which resorretl Lo 
 evolutionary measures without exhausting all constitutional methods of obtai~ling 
redress would "stand justified in the sight of Heaven," he said. "That nullification 
,9: seceding from the union are revolutionary measures cannot I think at1111it of 
talional doubt. The  strongest objection I have to the Carolina doctrine is t l ~ a t  
its authors have deceitfully and hypocritically represented both measures to be 
conslilutional and peaceable. They must have known better, and the~efore atled 
dishonestly." Crawford to John Taylor, March 1, 1831, Crawford Letterbook. I'aylor 
had been governor of South Carolina, 1826-1828. 
57 Crawford to Richard Henry Wilde, Jan. 16, 1833, Crawford, MDLC. 
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by majority. Crawford was pleased that the nullifiers had post- 
poned the operation of their ordinance until the adjournment 
of Congress, but he was disappointed in Jackson's message and 
thought the movement of troops to Charleston and Augusta 
" i m p r ~ d e n t . " ~ ~  This is the last known comment by Crawford 
on the tariff and nullification. 
The  above pages indicate that someone other than Calhoun 
had changed his views: Crawford certainly had not held the tariff 
and internal improvements unconstitutional when he was a 
department head. On another great issue of the Jackson period 
his views had not changed. He seems to have been little con- 
cerned with the controversy over the Second Bank of the United 
States and observed-in answer to a request-that his opinion 
was recorded in the two speeches he made in the Senate in 181 1. 
Since then he had had no occasion to review the question and had 
not altered his views. No man, he believed, could preside over 
the treasury one year without being "deeply impressed with the 
expediency of the bank in conducting the finances of the union," 
nor did he believe the framers of the Constitution ever could 
have intended to prohibit the passage of a law proper to carry a 
power into effect because it might be carried imperfectly into 
effect by another law. His construction of the grant of power to 
pass "all laws which may be necessary to carry the enumerated 
powers into effect" included the power to pass all laws which are 
"necessary and proper to carry the enumerated powers into effect 
in the most perfect manner, and not in an incomplete and 
imperfect manner." If necessary, Crawford said his recorded 
speeches might be republished; he was persuaded he could not 
improve upon his earlier ideas, even if he had the means of 
investigating the subject.59 
Jackson's veto of the bank recharter bill very probably did not 
meet with Crawford's approval, but Crawford's assertions con- 
cerning the powers of the secretary of the treasury over the bank 
and most particularly over the deposits were cited to justify 
Jackson's "pet bank" policy.60 There is absolutely no evidence 
68Crawford to Wilde, Jan. 29, 1833, Norcross. Crawford's references to Calhoun 
by name were much more frequent after the beginning of 1830 than they had been 
in the preceding five years. 
69 Crawford to Ingersoll, Dec. 5, 1831, ibid. 
60 Jackso11 LO Van B~rren, Sept. 8, 1833, Van Buren; Francis N. Thorpe, T h e  States- 
~,~ansl l i l )  of Andrew lackson as told in his Writings and Speeches (New York, 1909), 
265-66. 
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for the statement of some writers, as well as implications of editors 
and politicians for several years after Crawford's death, that Craw- 
ford had changed his ideas about the constitutional right of Con- 
gress to charter a bank. 
Crawford never secured a national convention, but he did serve 
in a state convention called to consider changing the basis of 
representation for the state assembly. In the early 1800s the James 
Jackson-Crawford (and later the Crawford-Troup) party, though 
Republican, was composed of more well-to-do and aristocratic 
elements than the opposition or Clark party. Political lines were 
often drawn more on men than on principles, and in a number 
of instances both the Georgia parties were in opposition to the 
dominant national party.61 There was a growing cleavage over 
the matter of representation in the state legislature; and though 
not exactly an east-west division, it was basically a clash between 
the older and the newer settled areas. The  constitution of 1798 
provided for one to four representatives for each county, depend- 
ing upon the population calculated on the federal ratio. The  
rapid increase in the number of counties resulted in a large and 
expensive legislature and an increasing dissatisfaction with the 
equal representation in the senate. A call for a convention to 
consider changes was defeated in 1821, but such a body did 
assemble in Milledgeville from May 6 to 15, 1833. Crawford, a 
delegate from Oglethorpe County, was defeated for the presidency 
of the gathering by James M. Wayne, candidate of the Clark 
faction, 151 to 88. He was one of twenty-seven, three from each 
judicial district, appointed by the president to present a plan 
for the consideration of the convention. 
In the call for the convention the legislature had stipulated 
that all delegates must have lived seven years in the state and 
must take an oath "not to change, or attempt to change or alter 
any other section, clause or article of the constitution other than 
those touching the representation of the General Assembly." 
Many delegates thought the legislature had exceeded its authority 
by imposing these restrictions. On May 6 Crawford asserted that 
the law and the prescribed oath "reversed the order and nature 
61 T h e  Clark faction drew more lteavily from frontier and small fartner groups 
and from migrants from the Carolinas; the Crawford-Troup faction had many 
adherents of Virginia background and from the longer settled areas. Niles' W e e k l y  
Regis ter  41 (Oct. 22, 1831):150, said, "We know not what they differ about-but 
they do vio lent ly  diKer." 
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of things": the creature had presumed to dictate to the creator. 
If there was any one recognized principle in the United States, 
it was that the people were sovereign. The legislative action he 
considered a "gross and palpable usurpation," and he disagreed 
with the delegate from Muscogee that the citizens had adopted 
the law of the legislature as a letter of instructions to the delegates; 
he thought that not one in a thousand had done so. The  oath 
opponents lost, 102 to 132, and the delegates not meeting the 
residence requirements were not seated.62 
The  committee report of May 8 provided for a senate of thirty- 
six members and a house of 144 members, preserving the federal 
ratio. By May 13 the plan had been rejected, and a senate of 
forty-five-one from each two counties regardless of population- 
and a house of 144 based on white population was voted. Every 
county would have one representative; those fifteen counties with 
the greatest population would have two additional, and the next 
most populous twenty-five would have one additional. Each new 
county would increase the size of the house by 
Crawford spoke on several occasions, and at times his remarks 
were quite barbed. On May 8 he "cut down" a delegate who was 
not speaking to the point at issue by saying the "time of the 
committee has been spent without profit or advantage." The  
following day he thought the time of the convention would be 
"greatly economized" if the advice of President John Witherspoon 
to the Princeton graduates was followed. Whether they entered 
politics or any other field that involved discussion, Witherspoon 
counseled: "First, never rise to speak until you have something 
to  say. Second, be sure to   it down as soon as you  have suit1 it." 
If this advice had been followed, the convention wo~ild not have 
been told that Negroes created taxation (a "discovery" ol' the 
gentleman from Muscogee); they never had done such in any 
age in any part of the world, but they were the subject of taxation. 
Nor, said Crawford, was there a single point of analogy bettveen 
the federal ratio and the rotten boroughs. Rotten boroughs did 
prevent a fair expression of public will; sparsely settled counties 
62 Atltei~s Southern Bannrr, May 1 1 ,  1838; Afilledgraille Georgia lozttnc~l, 111nc 
13, 1833. A brief accollnt of the convention is in Albert Berxy Saye, A Conbtittllional 
Tlictory of (;eorgin, 1732-1945 (Athens, Ga., 1948), 170-73. 
63 Athens Southern Banner, May 25, June 8, 1833. The white population of the 
senate districts ranged from 1,371 to 17,851 and the "federal" population from 1,730 
to 20,584. Ibid., June 8, 1833. 
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produce the same evil. Members of the assembly from such 
counties represent territory and not people; the rotten boroughs 
represented only some lordly aristocrat. Such boroughs may have 
I~rought much good intellect into Parliament, but in Georgia 
residents of the counties themselves must be sent to the legislature. 
Four days later Crawford said he did not consider the federal 
ratio a debatable question and presumed that the convention of 
1798 so viewed the matter. The ownership of slaves did not give 
a man votes-it mattered not whether he held five or five hundred 
-but the federal ratio gave to the whites of counties where slaves 
were owned the right of representation. He contended that every 
free white had a larger portion of power in the sixty-two small 
counties than did the whites of the twenty-seven larger counties, 
if federal ratios were used. He had never said nor feared that 
Congress would interfere with the three-fifths ratio, and he never 
expected Congress, except by inadvertence, to pass a palpably 
unco~lstitutional act. But-he asked the members to cast their 
eyes over the "interminable prairies"; their imagination was dull 
if they could not foresee the time when three fourths of the 
states would be nonslave, and then the three-fifths ratio and the 
right of property in slaves might be disputed. Long before this 
time the question of abandoning the federal ratio might be pre- 
sented, and he would "blush to contend" for the right of repre- 
sentation in Congress which the state had discarded as unjust in 
state representation.'j4 
The following day he returned to the matter to repel the 
charge that he had deserted principle. Yes, he had said earlier 
that as a general abstract principle free population was the correct 
base of representation. But this was liable to exceptions, and 
where a part of a community had property not generally diffused- 
especially if that property was taxed-the right of that property 
should be secured in the constitution. Slaves he considered that 
type of property, and the right of representation secured to the 
southern states for this very population increased the obligation 
of the convention to adhere to the federal numbers for state 
representation. He did not consider this a desertion of principle 
as the delegate from Richmond had charged. No man of "common 
sense" would make the charge, but he (King) in the committee of 
64 Georgia .Journal, June 13, 1833. 
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twenty-seven had asserted the right of a minority to govern a 
majority-and endeavored to prove this right. At this point 
Crawford was called to order and declared out of order for 
referring to something done in a different branch of the govern- 
ment. Crawford wished to know who "will assert that a com- 
mittee appointed by a deliberative body is a different branch 
from the appointing body." He admitted being out of order but 
said the rule had no application to the case. Other gentlemen 
had amused the convention with "what they have heard, not in 
this house, but out of doors, in the woods, and possibly no where. 
No gentleman has indulged more largely in this way than the 
gentleman from the county of Wood. I beg his pardon, the 
gentleman from McIntosh, Mr. Wood."65 
Crawford and his supporters lost 123 to 126 on May 13 in 
their effort to substitute federal numbers for free whites as the 
basis of representation in the lower house. A move to reconsider, 
followed by debate which lasted all the next morning, was lost 
114 to 130. Names were not given but Crawford's convention 
statements would indicate he was ~ ~ i t h  the minority on May 15 
when the delegates voted 152 to 80 to submit the amendment to 
the e l e ~ t o r a t e . ~ ~  Some of the papers opposed to the amendment 
noted-as Crawford had on May 9-that the proposed representa- 
tion gave influence to counties, not individuals, and insisted that 
population or population and taxation were the only true bases 
of representation in harmony with republican  institution^.^^ The  
proposed amendment was rejected by a majority of approximately 
five thousand votes; in Oglethorpe, Craw ford's county, the vote 
was 620 to 145 against adoption.68 
Crawford apparently continued to work for reform of the 
legislature, and on the same day it carried the news of his death 
the Southern Banner printed the presentment of the Madison 
County grand jury, September term, 1834. It  said, in part, that 
"On the subject of the call of a Convention as given in charge 
by his Honor, Judge Crawford, we have taken the liberty to 
differ from the views submitted by his Honor on that important 
subject." They justified their action by the recentness of the 
other convention and their contention that the plan rejected was 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid., May 16, 23, 1833. 
67 See, for example, Athens Southern Banner, June 1 ,  8, 1833. 
68 Saye, Constitutional History, 172-73; Athens Southern Banner, Oct. 19, 1833. 
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open to as few objections as any likely to be proposed by another 
corivention at that time. Before going again into convention, a 
majority of the citizens of the state should "feel the necessity" 
of reducing the size of the legislature, no matter what the judges 
of the superior courts might r e ~ o m m e n d . ~ T h e  n xt convention 
was held in 1839. 
The  tariff, nullification, and reapportionment issues had cut 
across the old party lines, which had never been clearly drawn. 
George M. Troup, co-leader with Crawford of the James Jackson 
party, former governor (1823-1827) who had been vigorous in 
his opposition to the central government, and supporter of nullifi- 
cation, refused the nomination for governor in 1833. Joel Craw- 
ford became the "unanimous" nominee to oppose Wilson Lump- 
kin in his bid for a second term. The  Clark newspapers seemed 
to believe that the Troup party was extinct, but "responsible 
members" of that group asserted that parties then in the state 
were esserltially the same as had existed for years. Crawford 
thought this a correct evaluation but indicated that the Milledge- 
ville constitutional convention-where the Clark party first made 
an effort to assume the character of the Union administration 
party-showed that there were "wolves in sheep's clothing in our 
ranks." The Clark party, he said, had always abused power and 
the convention was a good example of such abuse. When the 
"Ethiopian changes his skin and the leopard his spots," it might 
be possible for the Clark party to change its political and moral 
character. Admittedly nullification had affected both parties, 
but that influence was passing and Crawford thought the most 
violent nullifiers in Georgia "probably never indulged a desire 
of making a permanent schism" in republican ranks. Joel Craw- 
ford, however, was no nullifier and might be a rallying point for 
the republicans. Crawford was hopeful that in a few more years 
things would settle down to a "proper basis," for the "college is 
doing much for the cause of civilization, and correct principle 
in politics, morals and religion. Let the people be enlightened, 
and we shall have a good Republican Government firmly estab- 
lished among us."70 
69 Athens Southern Banner, Sept. 20, 1834. Sincere thanks were extended to Craw- 
ford for the impartial manner in which he presided. 
7oTroup to Crawford and ot l~ers,  May 1 1 ,  1833; Goltling: Crawford to I'tlitor 
De La hfotta of the Savannah Republican, June 3, 1833, in Athens Southern Banner, 
June 22, 1833. Crawford believed that his party had the "ascendancy in intelligence 
and respectability." Lumpkin was reelected. 
332 LAST GEORGIA YEARS 
One week after printing this letter the editor of the Southern 
Bunller regretted the college reference because he anticipated the 
"handle that would be made of it by enemies of the college"-the 
Macon Telegraph had said that the college would be used as a 
party engine. On June 20 the editor of the Federal Union, 
obviously pro-Clark, apologized for publishing this "absurd letter": 
he realized Crawford's opinion had long ceased to be respected, 
but the position which he had taken against the nullifiers had 
made his course the object of some curiosity. Crawford's defeat 
for the presidency of the recent convention was attributed to the 
suspicion that his professed attachment to the union was only 
hatred for Calhoun in disguise, and the convention members 
knew that his "want of courteous and affable manners, the exces- 
sive irritability of his temper, and the unrestrained violence of 
his malevolent passions" would render him incompetent and 
offensive as the presiding officer. The  paper was not surprised 
at what it called Crawford's attachment to the nullifiers and said 
it would have been greatly surprised if he had not made the 
Union party the object of his "vindictive abuse."71 
A "friend of learning" regretted Cratuford's remark and the 
political implication but pointed out that Crawford knew the 
situation at the college, was familiar with its management, and 
could not have intended to convey the idea attributed to him 
unless he wished by slander to arouse the prejudice of the com- 
munity against the school. However one might feel about Craw- 
ford, this writer "would sooner suppose that all he intended was 
that the institution was doing much for the cause of knowledge 
and religion in general."72 Even though the commencement 
periods had been occasions for politicking, when one considers 
Crawford's long connection with the board of the college, his 
deep respect for and devoted efforts in behalf of learning, his 
failure to inject politics into the school activities while on the 
board and his children's connections with the school, it seems 
reasonable to assume that "friend of learning" was close to the 
truth. It  was one of several instances in his career when Crawford 
had either not spelled out his idea sufficiently or had so placed it 
in his text that it could be interpreted to his disadvantage. 
71 Copy in Phillips Papers. The paper said Wayne received nearly all the Union 
party vote, while Crawford received all but one of the nullification votes. 
72 Athens Southern Banner, Aug. 3, 1833. 
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As has been noted, Crawford had become a judge in June 1827. 
Governor Troup had appointed him judge of the superior court, 
northern circuit. At that time the circuit contained Franklin, 
Hart, Elbert, Madison, and Oglethorpe counties; by 1834 the 
first two counties had been removed but five others had been 
added, and court met twice a year in each of the county seats.73 
The  superior courts were the highest in Georgia until 1845. The 
constitution of 1798 did not specify the method of choosing 
judges; in practice they were elected by a joint meeting of the 
two liouses of the legislature, with the governor filling vacancies 
that occurred when the legislature was not in session. Crawford 
was elected without opposition in 1828, but on November 11, 
1831, he defeated Nathan C. Sayre by only seven votes, 110 to 
103.74 
Crawford's opinions as judge give evidence that he used the 
English, American, and Georgia law books that were available 
to him and that he frequently was more concerned with justice 
than with the letter of the law. He reputedly rernarlted that 
s ~ ~ i r ~ m u s  j z ~  is sometimes summa injuria, and " I  must so construe 
the rule as to do the parties substantial justice." And in an Ogle- 
thorpe County land case of 1829 he said that when substantial 
justice had been done between two parties a new trial would not 
be granted-although the verdict might be against the evidence. 
Crawford's "clear and conscientious sense of right, an extra- 
ordinary recollection of what he had known in early life, kept 
him in the straight course,"76 and he seems to have been a humane 
and rather good judge. 
Crawford was, however, more excitable in temper than he had 
been before his illness, and he was especially impatient with what 
73 Crawford's warrant of appointment, June 1, 1827, with an attached oath that 
he had not engaged in a duel since January 1, 1819, and that he would faithfully 
execute the duties of his office, is in a display case in the Georgia Department of 
Archives and History. T h e  oath is dated June 20, 1827. T h e  court vacancy resulted 
from the death of John M. Dooly. 
74 The  Federal Union, Dec. 8, 1831, charged that every possible means, including 
denunciation and proscription, werr used by Crawford's friends to secure his 
eleclion. Votes for two other judgeships were close: Charles Daugherty won the 
Webtern District (112-93) on the third ballot and William W. Holt the Middle 
District (108-104) on the fourth ballot. Apparently Crawford won on the first ballot. 
75 SIJC~I  supe~ior court minutes as are available ale on microfilm in the Georgia 
Ilepaltrnent of Archives and History. See Ogletho~pe County Superior Court 
Minutes, Opinion on Lewis Brown and Thomas Wooten, administrators of Felix G. 
Hap, deceased, versus David M. Burns, Harden; Shipp, Crawford, 201; Gilmer, 
Sttetches, 128. 
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he called a "silly speech." He is said to have told a lawyer who 
repeated his argument that he went " 'round and 'round like a 
blind horse in a gin." A practical and blunt judge, Crawford 
touched on the "right chord . . . was as tender as a woman," and 
he was often moved to tears by the eloquence of the future 
Georgia chief justice, Joseph Henry L ~ m p k i n . ~ ~  
The  case that perhaps best shows Crawford's humanity as a 
judge is Reuben Jones v.  Heirs and Distributees of James A. 
Bradley, decided at the October 1830 term of the Oglethorpe 
County Superior Court. Bradley's will directed that if any of his 
slaves wished to go to the African colony they should be per- 
mitted to do so and their experises to the port of embarkation 
should be paid. In opposition to carrying out the provisions of 
the will the Georgia act of 1818 prohibiting emancipation was 
read. This act declared null and void every will or other instru- 
ment intended to give freedom to slaves. Crawford ruled that 
the 1818 act was designed to prevent the emancipation of "people 
of color" whose presence would be injurious to the slave popula- 
tion, but this will did not contemplate that such freed persons 
would remain within the state and was not calculated to "produce 
the mischief intended to be guarded against. . . ." The will, 
therefore, did not come within the "reason of the law." The  
fact that there was no fund from which to pay the expenses of 
getting the freedmen to the port ought not to be considered an 
insurmountable obstacle; it was probable the Colonization Society 
would pay the costs if necessary. 
The judge was of the opinion that neither the "letter nor 
intention of the several statutes of the state, are in oppositioil to 
the provisions of the will. . . . Neither the laws nor the settled 
policy of the State impose any obstacle to its execution in relation 
to the slaves." He presumed the executor was as competent to 
determine the desires of the slaves as the court was to direct him. 
If placed in the situation of the executor, the court would convene 
the legatees of the estate and some of the most respected neighbors, 
proceed to interrogate the slaves as to their desires, and make a 
memorandum of their several answers. If any wished to go to 
Africa, they should immediately be disposed of according to the 
provisions of the will. If there was no fund to defray their expenses 
76 Garnett Andrews, Ren~iniscences of an Old Georgia Laroyer (A~lat~ta ,  Ga., 1870). 
59. Other anecdotes of the bench period may be found in Shipp, Crawford, 202-3. 
LAST GEORGIA YEARS 335 
to the port of embarkation, those desiring to emigrate might be 
hired out until the requisite sum was obtained.77 
For many years as a senator and cabinet member Crawford had 
been concerned with and about extinguishing the Indian title 
to lands within Georgia's borders. The  long delays and perhaps 
his illness increased his impatience and intensified his dissatisfac- 
tion with inaction. Just before he left Washington the Treaty 
of Indian Springs-negotiated on behalf of the Indians by a hand- 
ful of chieftains-had "taken" from the Creek all their lands 
in Georgia in return for an equal amount of land in the \Vest 
and $400,000. One of the negotiating chieftains was William 
Mclntosh, cousin of Governor Troup, and for his major respo~isi- 
bility for the treaty the Upper Creek decreed his death-and 
carried it out. Georgia, incensed over seeing two states (Alabama 
and Mississippi) carved out of her cession already in the uriion 
and the Indians still on her lands, was on the verge of armed 
conflict with the central government. Monroe's agents were in- 
vestigating the matter at the end of his term, and the problem 
fell to Adams. Adams disallowed the treaty on grounds of fraud 
and forbade Troup to begin survey of the land. Troup proceeded 
-with preparations for the survey and for war. The  negotiation 
of the new treaty of Washington involved the time-honored use 
of bribery and chicanery, but the negotiating chieftains were 
more representative of the Upper and the Lower Creek than had 
been the case earlier. Still dissatisfied because not all the Creek 
lands had been ceded, Troup openly defied the secretary of war. 
Hurriedly, still another treaty was negotiated in November 1827; 
by this instrument the Creek quit title to the last of their lands 
in Georgia.T8 
Crawford was not pleased with Adams' action on the Treaty 
of Indian Springs or with the vote of some of his friends on the 
renegotiated agreement. He expressed surprise that Samuel Smith 
of Maryland had voted for it and pointed out that the old treaty 
vested in Georgia fee simple title to the lands-and Georgia in- 
tended to carry the old treaty into effect. While it was expected 
77 G .  M. Dudley, Reports  of Decisions Mnde  by 1he Titdges of Lhe Superior Courts  
of L a u ~  und Chancery of Lhe Slate of Georgia (New York, 1837), 170-71. 
78 The  Treaty of Indian Springs and other documents dealing with the Georgia 
matter nlay be found in ASPIA, 2, passim. T h e  treaties of Indian Springs and 
Washington dealt with all the lands-except for a small strip along the Chat- 
tahoochee River-west of a line from Marietta to Albany. 
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that Adams with "accustomed perverseness" would interpose his 
authority, such action would cause civil war "in which I expect 
to have a part." He told Smith that to gratify a "few Indian 
savages who had no claim on your benevolence, you have probably 
subjected the nation to the horrors of a civil war for I assure you 
we will not give up the land without a ~ t r u g g l e . " ~ ~  
Fortunately, the war did not come and the last major difficulty 
with the Indians in Georgia arose over the Cherokee lands in 
the northern part of the state. Many of the Cherokee did not 
wish to leave Georgia; treaties had permitted them to receive 
individual allotments of land; Sequoyah had invented his alpha- 
bet by 1825; and the Cherokee Phoenix was being published at 
New Echota, the capital of the Cherokee "nation." A constitution 
was adopted in 1826, but the Cherokee soon found that Georgia 
law had been made applicable to them and they were forbidden 
to continue with their government. The  discovery of gold in the 
region in July 1829 made the issue more acute and brought the 
requirement that all whites in the Cherokee country must secure, 
from Georgia authorities, a permit by March 1, 1831, if they 
wished to continue residence there. This led to the Worcester 
v .  Georgia case, with Georgia refusing once again to be bothered 
by the opinion of the Supreme Court.80 I t  was 1838 before the 
Cherokee began their "trail of tears" to the West. 
Crawford had no role in the final removal of the Indians from 
Georgia, but he was involved with the famous Tassels incident. 
In  September 1830 Tassels (George or Corn) was indicted in 
Hall County for the murder of another Cherokee. The  indict- 
ment was founded on the 1829 statute extending Georgia law 
over the Cherokee and giving to the superior courts of certain 
counties jurisdiction over offenses committed in the Cherokee 
country. A plea as to jurisdiction was filed and Judge Augustin 
S. Clayton reserved the question to the convention of superior 
court judges, which met annually and functioned as an ad hoc 
supreme court. The  judges were unanimous in their decision, 
and Crawford, chairman of the convention for the seven years 
he was a judge, wrote the opinion.81 
79 Crawford to Samuel Smith, Nov. 21, 1826, Autograph File, Houghton. 
80 Geo~gia officials had refused to receive or record the tlecision in the Cherokee 
nation case. There are many accounts of these events, but a good summary is in 
E. Merton Coulter, Georgia: A Short History (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1947), 218-37. 
81 An amendment to the Georgia consLitution in 1835 provided for the establish- 
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Crawford was convinced that the "very grave question" would 
not have arisen but for the political, party, and fanatical feeling 
excited during the last session of Congress. The  deputation of 
Cherokee attending discussions in Washington learned that the 
decision of Congress would be unfavorable to them and eagerly 
seized upon the suggestion that their case be taken before the 
Supreme Court. Relations with the Indians, he pointed out, had 
undergone many changes since the English arrived in the new 
world, but whatever rights the English possessed over the Indians 
were now vested in the state of Georgia. The correctness of this 
had been ably elucidated in Johnson u. McIntosh (8 Wheaton 
543). He quoted at considerable length from this 1823 decision; 
part of the quotation stated that these "grants have been con- 
sidered by all, to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the 
Indian right of occupancy." Another part emphasized that the 
Indians were considered merely as occupants to be protected and 
were deemed incapable of transferring absolute title to others. 
The Indians were not then considered sovereign powers, and, 
further, the Constitution gives Congress the power to "regulate 
commerce with . . . the Indian tribes." When this power is 
exercised, said Crawford, Congress directs how the citizens of the 
United States shall behave; it does not have this authority in 
regulating relations with foreign countries. Why? Because the 
Indians are members of communities that are not sovereign 
states. And though there have been many wars against the Indians, 
there is not a single declaration of war against them. "They must 
have been judged improper objects of a declaration of war, only 
because they were held not to be sovereign states."s2 
Even by the decision of the Supreme Court, every acre of land 
in the occupancy of this "sovereign, independent Cherokee Na- 
tion" is vested in fee in the state of Georgia. Are the Indian 
tribes within the limits of the United States legal objects of the 
treaty-making power? They are not legal objects for war; can 
any other evidence be required? It  seems self-evident that if not 
tnent of a supreme court, but the court did not begin to function until 1845. 
Crawford and Thomas P. Carnes, an earlier judge of the northern circuit were two 
"leading spirits" in the movement to establish a supreme court. William J. Northen, 
ed., Alen of Mark i n  Georgia, 4 vols. (Atlanta, Ga., 1906-1908), 1:36. See also Saye, 
Co~tst i t t~t ional  History, 177-86; Ruth Blair, comp., Georgia OFcial Register (Atlanta, 
Ga., 1931). The opinion is in Dudley, Reports, 229-38. 
82 Dudley, Reports, 233. 
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an object of declaration of war, they cannot be an object of treaty- 
making. Even if they were such at one time, the rights, position, 
and other factors had been unalterably fixed before the treaty- 
making power had been given to C ~ n g r e s s . ~ ~  I t  seemed strange 
that objection should be made to Georgia's exercising its juris- 
diction over the Cherokee territory, for if a government is "seized 
in fee of a territory, and yet have no jurisdiction over that ter- 
ritory, [it] is an anomaly in the science of jurisprudence." T o  
contend that a state may exercise jurisdiction over a territory 
but not over its inhabitants is to present a "more strange anomaly 
than that of a government having no jurisdiction over territory 
of which it is seized in fee."84 T h e  contentions of the counsel 
for the Cherokee that by the articles of treaty and cession between 
the United States and Georgia the United States had been given 
by Georgia the right to hold treaties with the Cherokee and that 
Georgia was bound to abstain from all efforts to extinguish the 
- 
Indian right to lands within her own limits were conceived to 
- 
be erroneous. He  emphasized here that even when the United 
States made war against the Seminole residing outside the limits 
of the United States, there was no declaration of war.85 
T h e  matter was concluded as follows: 
This convention deems it a waste of time to pursue this examina- 
tion. It has satisfied itself, and it is hoped the community, that 
independent of the provisions of the State constitution claiming 
jurisdiction over its chartered limits, that the State of Georgia 
had the right in the year 1829 to extend its laws over the territory 
inhabited by the Cherokee Indians, and over the Indians them- 
selves; that said act of 1829, is neither unconstitutional, nor 
inconsistent with the rights of the Cherokee Indians. The plea 
to the jurisdiction of the court submitted to this convention is 
therefore overruled.86 
One cannot help but notice the similarity of Crawford's argu- 
ments and conclusions concerning the status of the Indians and 
those of John Marshall in his opinion on Cherokee Nation v.  
Georgia only a few months later.87 
83 Ibid., 234-35. 
84  Tbid., 236. 
85 Ibid., 237-38. 
86 Tl)id., 238. Tassels was hanged. 
87 See 5 Peters 1 (1831). Of course, in Worcester u. Georgia (1832), when a mis- 
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During Crawford's seven years on the bench many young 
lawyers were admitted to practice. Perhaps the two most famous 
licensed by Crawford were Robert A. Toombs and Alexander 
H. Stephens. Toombs was admitted to the bar on March 18, 
1830, in the Superior Court of Elbert County, and Crawford 
was said to have given him "favor from the first."ss Stephens 
seems to have been the last person whose license to practice was 
signed by Crawford. On  July 22, 1834, he was examined in 
Crawfordville by Joseph H.  I,umpltin, William C. Dawson, and 
Daniel Chandler, the solicitor general for the northern circuit 
whom Stephens considered the most eloquent and promising of 
the rising young men of the state. Stephens was a bit disturbed 
ahout how he would perform but took some consolation from a 
remark of his lawyer-friend, Swepton C. Jeffries, that Crawford 
was not too exacting; after an examination to which he had paid 
little attention, the judge ordered, "Swear him, Mr. Clerk; if 
he ltnows nothing he will do nothing." Stephens would have 
been satisfied for Crawford to follow the same course with him, 
but the judge paid attention all the time. T h e  young lawyer 
seems to have done well; the examiners favored passing him; and 
when it was over, Crawford said, "Talie an order for admission, 
Mr. Solicitor, and have the oath administered. I, too, am perfectly 
sa t i~ f ied . "~~  Crawford was to hold only one court after the 
admission of Stephens to the bar-the one in Madison County. 
All indications are that Crawford was in good health on Sep- 
tember 1, 1834, when he wrote Andrew Jackson concerning the 
vacancy on the Supreme Court caused by the death of William 
Johnson of South Carolina, an associate justice since 1806. He  
thought it might be difficult for Jackson to fill the vacancy to his 
sionary wlio was definitely a citizen of the United States was involved, the Court 
accepled jurisdicrion of the case and said the Georgia law of 1829 was void. See 6 
Peters 515. The  decision was, however, of no effect; Georgia officials even forbade 
its being ollicially recorded. 
8s l'le;~sa~i~ A .  Slovall, Iiohert Toonrbs . . . (New York, 1892), 13; IJlrich I%. 
Pl~illips, T h e  I.ife of Robert Toot/tbs (New York, 1913), 15-16. 
x!t Myrla  1.oc:ltett Avary, ed., lic,rollc,c/io~zs of Alexn~trler H .  Stephells . . . (New 
York, 1910), 363-65. Stephens and William H. Crawford, Jr., were classmates and, 
ll~olrgh no l~onors were given, those two and ,James Johnson were chosen to give 
the commencement orations. Crawford drew "Valedictory," but Stephens said his 
class slantling was higher than that of the orher two, who he thollght "stood eq~lal, 
two nlarks only below me." Ibid., 230-31. Stephens said he stood with the Troup- 
Crawlord group in 1833, repudiating nullification but standing on the doctrine of 
stale rights. Ibid., 232. 
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satisfaction, for in South Carolina the most prominent legal 
personages belonged to the "nullifying party which cherishes the 
most deadly hostility to the federal administration." He had 
heard good things of the former state attorney general, James L. 
Petigru, but he had held only that office and membership in the 
state legislature. The district judge, Lee, stood well with the 
late David Williams, but Crawford did not know to what party 
in South Carolina he had attached himself. In Georgia, John M. 
Berrien's abilities were thought sufficient for the station, but he 
too was against the administration. The character of the district 
judge "forbids the idea of his promotion." 
For seven years, said Crawford, he had been judge in a circuit 
where the bar in character, intelligence, and respectability was 
equal to any in the state. His official conduct had given this group 
complete satisfaction although he had been twenty years absent 
from the legal profession when the judgeship was conferred 
withoul his or any other's solicitation. Parties in the state were 
so fluctuating that he might not be reelected next November 
if the party "to which I am opposed should have a majority in 
the next legislature." Such a view of the situation made appoint- 
ment to the federal bench desirable to him at that time, and 
should Jackson, "upon a full survey, of the materials out of which 
you have to make the selection feel disposed to select me, the 
appointment will be thankfully received and the duties of the 
ofice discharged to the best of my understanding and with strict 
fidelity and impartiality."R0 
Perhaps the last letter Crawford wrote also concerned the 
Supreme Court position. On Saturday, September 13, he com- 
municated to Mahlon Dickerson a number of the ideas and 
evaluations contained in his letter to Jackson. He indicated, how- 
ever, that nullification had made considerable progress in Geor- 
gia-so much so that he had been "upon the brink of denuncia- 
tion" for more than twelve months. When one considered the 
length of his service in the federal government, the offices he had 
held, and his role in public affairs, it seemed to Crawford that 
appointment to the Supreme Court "furnishes the proper & 
appropriate retreat for the decline of life; such a retreat as is 
QoCrawford to Jackson, Sept. 1, 1834, Jackson, RID1,C. I'etigru had been state 
attorney general from 1822 to 1830. He was, and remained, an outstanding and 
eloquent spokesman against nullification and secession. 
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suitable to my past life & public services." He would provide 
testimonials if required. He understood that Levi Woodbury, 
secretary of the treasury, was in favor of his appointment, and 
he knew he need not request Dickerson to use his friendly influ- 
ence. Dickerson was at liberty to show the letter to such of his 
colleagues as he thought proper, and Crawford asked him to give 
an "intimation of the probable result" as soon as practicable- 
the election for circuit judge took place in early N ~ v e r n b e r . ~ ~  
Crawford had spent Friday, September 12, with his daughter 
Caroline, her family, and the newest grandchild, and on the fol- 
lowing day had gone to the home of Valentine Meriwether, about 
fourteen miles from Lexington. He did not feel well; a phy- 
sician prescribed for him and relieved the symptoms. He retired 
early but was stricken during the night. While sitting in a chair 
the next day he became unconscious and never recovered. He 
died in the early morning of Monday, September 15-the day he 
was to begin court in Elbert County. Cause of death was described 
as an "affection of the heart."QVrawford was buried the next 
day in the family plot at Woodlawn; the only other grave at the 
time was that of the Dudley boy who had died about fifteen 
months before. 
A number of the newspapers had heavy black lines at the top or 
bottom-or used other methods to denote mourning-when they 
carried the notice of Crawford's death. The  National Intelligencer, 
which had perhaps the longest story, noted that Crawford's Senate 
speeches were "remarkable for their strength, and his votes for 
their honesty and independence." But his "unconcealed disdain 
of every thing like pretense, subterfuge, or the ordinary arts and 
tricks of mere party-men" probably earned him "more respect 
and general regard" than any of his other qualities. He was 
1)old and fearless in his course, he shunned no responsibility, he 
compromised no principle. "If, indeed, he had a fault as a poli- 
tician, it was rather in contemning too haughtily the customs 
and seemings which form a part of the usages of those who mingle 
91 Crawford to Dickerson, Sept. 13, 1834, Dickerson. This letter of three pages 
was well written and the signature is allnost identical to that of the 1816-1818 period. 
On the back of the letter Dickerson noted the circumstances of Crawford's death 
and ir~dicated this was probably the last letter he  wrote. Ja~nes  M. Wayne of 
Georgia was appointed to the Supreme Court in 1835. 
9zAthens Southern Banner, Sept. 20, 1834; Shipp, Crawford, 213; Niles' Weekly 
Register 47 (Sept. 27, 1834):51; National Intelligencer, Sept. 27, 1834. 
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much in public affairs; preferring downright truth, in all its 
simplicity, and all its nakedness too, to the circumlocution and 
periphaze of older and more practised statesmen." In his domestic 
and private relations he enjoyed no less the love of his family and 
affection of his friends, than in his public life he "possessed their 
unbounded respect and ~onfidence."~~ 
The  Intelligencer had caught several of Crawford's character- 
istics and attributes; others it understandably did not mention 
under the circumstances. He was a man with fine native ability, 
though he seemed to think his talents "modest" and considered 
himself unqualified to handle the secretaryship of war during 
wartime. He honestly exercised the talents he had, was devoted 
to his duties, and had a great capacity for work. 
He was open-minded; carefully examined available information 
and points of view; subordinated personal, sectional, and party 
interest to the national interest; stressed that public good should 
be the decisive factor, especially when decision rested with one 
person; was calm and dispassionate in speech and discussion; and 
though he defended his position with ability and sometimes with 
pertinacity, he never (according to Adams) "pressed" too far. 
Perhaps this was in keeping with his belief that any proposition 
carried to the extreme was open to suspicion. His opinions and 
ideas were sincere and honest, and he assumed that those who 
differed with him spoke from the same bases. He thought rapidly 
crment. and was generally viewed as a man of good jud, 
Crawford thought he had no "claim" to any office, and his 
ethical standards were high. Competence, honesty, and perform- 
ance of duty were prerequisites to appointment to and retention 
in office, where one should exercise the same economy as in his 
private affairs. Crawford was imaginative, efficient, and practical 
in his administration of the war and treasury departments, con- 
stantly seeking a stricter accountability of public officials, exer- 
cising close supervision of subordinates, and searching for better 
methods of conducting the public business. His contributions 
in the areas of inspection and accountability were indeed sig- 
nificant. 
He was never a dilettante-in the arts of any other area-and 
had a deepseated distaste for hypocrisy and pretense. Justice was 
93 National Intelligencer, Sept. 27, 1834. See also Athens Southern Banner, Sept. 
20, 1834; Richmond Enquirer, Sept. 30, 1834. 
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more important to him than legal technicality, and verbosity 
troubled him. Perhaps at times he assumed too much under- 
standing on the part of others. As a result, his ideas were some- 
times too sparingly stated and caused him political difficulties. 
Crawford had the ability to work with those with whom he 
disagreed, except with Calhoun after 1822. From that date he 
considered the South Carolinian unprincipled, and it might be 
noted that Adams terminated "confidential" relations with Cal- 
houn at about the same time. But it seems doubtful whether 
Crawford hated Calhoun as he seemed to hate John Clark. Craw- 
ford seemed to see in these two men an opportunism-rather than 
honesty and sincerity of conviction-which he did not see in most 
of his other associates and political opponents. 
The strict tripartite division of constitutional powers, Crawford 
believed, should be observed. The  judiciary should exercise 
restraint, the executive and legislative branches should not en- 
croach one upon the other, and in administering laws legislative 
intent should be considered. Power should not be usurped, But 
the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution should be 
interpreted to allow legislation that was necessary and proper to 
carry out the function of government in the most perfect manner. 
He was an unqualified supporter of the American form of gov- 
ernment; his nationalism was ardent. His importation of seeds, 
plants, books, and other items was a manifestation of a desire to 
improve the position of the United States, and his long treasury 
circular to consuls in 1819, a large portion of which dealt with 
collecting and importing plants and seeds, has been described 
as among the first practical national measures for the promotion 
of American agriculture.B4 
Crawford could, at times (especially after his illness of 1823) 
94Treasury Circular, March 20, 1819; Henry Barrett Learned, T h e  President's 
Cnbinrt (New Haven, Conn., 1912), 309, citing Elkanah Watson, Hictory of the Rise, 
Progres~, and Existing Conditions . . . (Albany, N.Y., 1820), 205-6. T h e  treasury cir- 
cular, concerned primarily with uniform execution of the act of April 20, 1818, also 
dealt with the importation of inventions. Crawford encouraged Mason I.ocke 
Weems to translate and publish Le Sage's Historical Atlas, which he thought 
the "most successful effort of the age to facilitate new acquisitions of historical. 
genealogical, chronologial, and geographical information." He sometimes sought 
to give pnhlicity to the writings of his friends or was suggested as a person who 
"might feel an Interest and a pleasure in furthering the efforts of some intellectr~al." 
Crawford to Weems, July 18, 1824, Chamberlain; Crawford to Benjamin de Constant, 
April 26, 1824, Crawford Letterbook; Joseph C. Cabell to William Wirt, June 17, 
1821, William Lowndes Papers (UNC). 
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be abrasive in personal contact, but ordinarily he seemed to be 
otherwise. Described by some as "commanding in conversation," 
he seemed to enjoy the give and take of personal interchange, 
had a sense of humor that was rather uncommon for the period, 
much enjoyed telling anecdotes, told them well, and was a "capital 
laugher." Apparently, he liked substance in his conversations and 
was not much given to idle chit-chat. 
Little information on his family life remains, but what is avail- 
able indicates a warm, loving, and compassionate husband and 
father who wished his children to develop into independent 
individuals strongly committed to democratic processes in all 
walks of life. He might be described as a permissive parent. 
Independent but not a loner, firm but not rigid, modest but 
not unambitious, decisive but not dogmatic, principled but not 
doctrinaire, careful but sometimes not sufficiently cautious, for- 
giving but not always forgiven, Crawford truly was a free spirit 
who philosophically accepted what came. He refused a contest 
for the presidency with his close friend Monroe in 1816; eight 
years later the prize was beyond his reach. His enviable record 
of eighteen years of national service ended in 1825; after 1827 
he added seven more years of service to his adopted state. 
The  Oglethorpe County will books bear no evidence that Craw- 
ford died testate. John, the oldest son, became administrator of 
the estate, and George M. Dudley, Crawford's son-in-law, was 
attorney for the administrator. The  inferior court of the county, 
composed of the first five justices of the peace appointed for the 
county, designated freeholders B. Pope, Joseph I. Moore, and 
James I,. Thomas to divide the slaves, horses, and mules equally 
among Mrs. Crawford and six of the children.g5 
The  three appointees determined that the slave property sub- 
ject to distribution was valued at $16,175, or a little more than 
$2,310 for each heir. The  slaves were put into seven <groupings 
as nearly equal in value as possible, "due respect being had to 
keeping families together." Mules and horses were added so that 
five lots were valued at $2,450 each, one at $2,445, and one at 
$2,470. As best can be determined there were forty slaves (eight 
of whom were children), six mules, and seven horses. The rernain- 
95 These six children were (Nathaniel) Macon, William H., Jr., Robert, I'.liza 
Ann, Susan, and (W.W.) Bibb. Crawford had settled a competence upon his oldest 
child, Caroline, a t  the time of her marriage to Dudley. I t  is presumed that John 
had also received a portion of the family goods. 
LAST GEORGIA YEARS 345 
ing personal property could not be divided witliout destroying 
its value, so it was considered expedient to have it sold. The 
proceeds of that sale and from the sale of t l ~ e  land were to be 
equally divided among the seven heirs at a later date. The  
court gave approval on May 2, 1836, for sale of the land.gG 
Though Crawford was for marly years the first citizen of 
Georgia and among the first citizens of the nation, little has 
been done to collect Crawfordiana or to honor his memory. 
On the centennial of his death citizens of Madison, Georgia, sub- 
scribed $106.75 of which $100 was given to Mr. and Mrs. C. H. 
Crawford for a gold watch that had belonged to Cra~vford. Three 
years earlier the state historian had written to William Dudley, 
descendant of Caroline Crawford, asking about the "uniform" 
Cratvford had worn at the French court and about other items 
that might be in their possession. The ~vatch and the cloak are on 
display in the Georgia Department of Archives and Hist0ry.~7 
Although the parks, squares, circles, and public buildings of 
Georgia towns and cities are replete with plaques, statues, busts, 
and monuments, Crawford seems to have been completely for- 
gotten until the 1950s. In 1955 the Georgia assembly approved 
the establishment of the Hall of Fame for Illustrio~xs Georgians 
in the rotunda of the state capitol at Atlanta. The first six chosen 
for inclusion were Alexander H.  Stephens, the three Georgia 
signers of the Declaration, and the two signers of the Constitution. 
Crawford was seventh. Four years later, in elaborate ceremonies. 
Crawford's was one of the first four busts to be presented and 
unveiled. A plaster bust was placed in the Washington-Wilkes 
Historical Museum at Washington, G e ~ r g i a . ~ ~  
The horizontal marble slab that covers Crawford's grave gives 
96 Annual Returns for 1836 . . . State of Georgia, Oglethorpe County, , l ;rn~~ary 
term, 1836; Minutes of the Court of Ordinary, May term, 1836, from copies in the 
Phillips papers. T h e  only other information foontl on the administration of the 
estate shows that the "amt. left on hand" on September 15, 1834, was $553.37v2, that 
eight bags of cotton were sold on November 6, 1834, for $339.78, and seven bags for 
$471.97 on November 28. Crawford Letterbook. 
97 The  ~~urchase  of the watch seems to have bee11 prompted in part by a desire to 
help the C. H. Crawfords; he had been bedridden for four years, and his wife had 
suffered a degree of invalidism. Crawford Folder, GDAH. The  50-cent fractional 
currency, series of 1875, issued under the acts of March 3, 1863 and June 30, 1864, 
bore the likeness of Crawford. A piece of this currency and three photos made 
from the J. W. Jarvis painting of Crawford are in the Keith Read Collection. 
98 The  other busts were of William Few, Abraham Raldwin, and Crawford TY. 
Long. All were the work of Bryant Parker. See Jan. 7, 1959 Program of the Hall 
of Fame for Illustrious Georgians (Atlanta, Ga., 1959). 
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a brief outline of his career and says he was "alike independent, 
energetic, fearless and able." It  is broken into two almost equal 
pieces; the burial plot is ill kept-if at all; the iron fence is all 
but fallen down; and it is nearly impossible to reach the graveyard, 
which is just west of Crawford, Georgia, about four hundred 
yards north of U.S. Highway 78. One is hard put to imagine 
that a short distance away the mansion house stood; broad acre- 
ages were fertile and green; agricultural experiments with plants 
and seeds from many parts of the world were being conducted; 
joyous family gatherings took place on the lawn with the big, 
jovial, fun-loving father in the middle of the intellectual as well 
as the physical activity. The  house has long since burned down 
and the historical marker (just off the highway) indicating that 
Crawford lived not far from its location is devoted primarily to 
his duelling activities. May he become better known for more 
important things. 
Note on Sources 
MORE THAN a century ago fire destroyed a large collection of 
Crawford letters and papers assembled by his daughter and son- 
in-law. However, there still exist hundreds of letters to and from 
Crawford in several small Crawford collections and in the papers 
of his contemporaries and political associates. These are scattered 
from Maine to California in more than two hundred collections 
found in almost a hundred depositories. In addition, the vast 
congressional and executive department materials make possible 
a thorough study of his ministership, his administration of the 
war and treasury departments, and his role as a senator and cabinet 
member. Most of Crawford's contemporaries who achieved na- 
tional stature have been the subject of one or more scholarly 
biographies, but only recently did a really satisfactory biography 
of his closest political associate, James Monroe, appear. Many of 
the studies of the period give little space to Crawford, and one 
soon reaches the point of diminishing returns when examining 
the l~iographies, general histories, and monographic materials of 
[-.he first quarter of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, hundreds 
of books and articles have been studied for information on, or 
pertinent to, Crawford, but only a few that significantly touch on 
his career or are considered essential to an understanding of the 
topics discussed will be treated in this note. A comparable stan- 
dard of selectivity is applied to manuscripts, memoirs, diaries, 
edited worlts, and newspapers. 
Manuscripts 
The two largest collections of Crawford materials are in the 
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, and in the Duke Uni- 
versity Library. The  first includes, among other things, his Letter- 
book (which contains the Journal he kept during the first part 
of his ministership to France), letters to Crawford, and photostats 
348 NOTE O N  SOURCES 
of letters to Crawford. The materials at Duke are varied in nature 
and include jottings, calculations, a number of personal letters, 
and items dealing with his judgeship. Papers at Yale University 
deal primarily with problems of enforcing the revenue laws; 
those at the IVilliam Clements Library, the New-York Historical 
Society, and the Chicago Historical Society are wide-ranging in 
subject and period. Those at Rice University are chiefly cor- 
respondence with John O'Connor. Many other depositories have 
Crawford items, limited in some instances to a single accession. 
The  papers in the possession of Crawford's great-great-grand- 
daughters, Miss Fanny Golding of Columbus, Mississippi, and 
Mrs. E. E. (Patty) Gross of Hattiesburg, Mississippi, are especially 
rewarding: they seem to be in the category of cherished items, 
they have not heretofore been available to researchers, and they 
!)ridge a number of gaps in other Crawfordiana. 
The  James Monroe Papers in the Library of Congress, the New 
York Public Library, and the University of Virginia L,ibrary are 
barely second in importance to the Crawford papers, for they con- 
tain not only letters to and from Crawford and Monroe but items 
which Cratvford had received and transmitted to Monroe in con- 
nection with various matters. The  Albert Gallatin Papers, ill 
the New-York Nistorical Society, and the Martin Van Uureri 
Papers, in the Library of Congress, are indispensable. The  Gal- 
latin Papers touch upon just about every major event and facet 
o f  Crawford's national career up to 1825. The Van B~~re r l  Papers 
are basic to an understanding of the presidential elections of 
1816 and 1824. 
Papers of Langdon Cheves, the South Carolina EIistorical So- 
ciety, and of William Jones, Historical Society of Pennsylvaliia, 
are necessary to proper treatment of the relationships between 
the Treasury Department and the Second Bank of the United 
States and of the efforts to alleviate and solve the bank and cur- 
rency pro1)lems. The Charles Tait Papers in the Alabama Depart- 
ment of Archives and History are perhaps more intimate in nature 
than any other collection and reveaI much of Georgia, Alabama, 
and national politics. The  large collection of Henry Clay papers 
in the University of Kentucky Library and the smaller one in the 
I,illy Library, Indiana University, illuminate the personal and 
political relationships of Clay and Crawford between 1814 and 
1830. 
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For Georgia matters the holdings of the Georgia Department 
of Archives and History-which include the manuscript journal 
of the House of Representatives, the Oglethorpe County tax and 
other records, the Superior Court records, the governors' files, 
and the individual name folders-and those of the University of 
Georgia Library-minutes of the meetings of the university 
trustees, the Henry Jackson Papers, and the Telemon Cuyler 
and Keith Read collections-are of paramount importance. 'The 
papers of William Lowndes and of Bartlett Yancey at the Uni- 
versity of North Carolina and of Walter Clark at the North 
Carolina Department of Archives and History were the most fruit- 
ful for North Carolina; the Edward Harden, Nathaniel Macon, 
and David Campbell papers at Duke University deal with North 
Carolina and less confined matters. The  Joseph Bryan Papers at 
the Virginia State Library were especially rewarding for the early 
part of Crawford's national career, and the Correspondence of 
John Randolph and James M. Garnett at the same depository 
ind  the Randolph Letter Book at the University of Virginia 
have a wider chronological range. 
Materials in the Joseph Nicholson, Asbury Dickins, and J. 
Henley Smith papers, and the Moses Waddel Diary in the Library 
of Congress; the Charles Jared Ingersoll Papers and the Simon 
Gratz, C. W. Conarroe, and Frank M. Etting collections in the 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania; the John Bailey, Rufus King, 
John O'Connor, and John W. Taylor papers in the New-York 
Historical Society; the James Barbour, Samuel Gouverneur, and 
Azariah C. Flagg papers in the New York Public Library; the 
Charles K. Gardner Papers in the New York State Library; the 
Jacob Brown Papers and the Alexander Calvin Washburn and 
Otis Norcross collections in the Massachusetts Historical Society; 
the Charles Hammond and the Charles E. Rice papers in the 
Ohio Historical Society; and the Thomas Worthington and 
Charles Hammond papers in the Ohio State Library provided 
much information on the states and on the national scene. The  
papers of Louis McLane (University of Delaware), Mahlon Dick- 
erson (New Jersey Historical Society), and Jesse B. Thomas 
(Illinois State Historical Library) were especially useful on Dela- 
ware politics and the election of 1824, appointments, and Illinois 
politics, respectively. Papers of Ninian Edwards and Daniel P. 
Cook in the Chicago Historical Society are vital to fleshing out 
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some parts of the "A.B." affair, and the Jonathan Russell Papers at 
Brown University provided many useful items, especially for the 
years 1818 to 1825. The  worth of the autograph files, notably the 
one at Houghton Library of Harvard University, and of the name 
and miscellaneous collections of many depositories can readily be 
determined from the documentation. 
Material from the records of the State, War, and 'Treasury 
departments, in the National Archives, form the corpus of the 
treatment of Crawford's ministership to France and his administra- 
tion of the War and Treasury departments. The  Diplomatic Des- 
patches (France, Vols. 14- 16) contain not only the correspondence 
between the secretary of state and the minister but also many of 
the letters between Crawford and members of the French govern- 
ment. There are many routine materials in the War Department 
records, but the Military Books are central to policy and to the 
relations between the department and Congress. The  quantity 
of the Treasury Department records is staggering; many are 
routine and not germane to this study. Most necessary to the 
functions chosen for discussion were Series E, Letters and Reports 
to Congress; Letters Received, Second Comptroller's Office; Letters 
Received from the Secretary of Treasury, First Comptroller; 
Treasury Circulars; Excise Letters; Revenue Letters; General Land 
Office, Miscellaneous Letters; and Series IV (General Land Ofice 
and Secretary of Treasury). 
Government PIL blications 
For Crawford's senatorial career the Annals of Congress are the 
most important single item. The  Senate Documents and House 
Documents, containing communications from and to the secretary 
and Congress, from the President, annual reports of the secretary, 
reports of committees, and a variety of other information are 
indispensable to the study of the activities of the War and Treasury 
departments. Equal importance-though the yield is smaller- 
must be attached to the Finance, Foreign Affairs, Indian Affairs, 
Miscellaneous, Military Affairs, and Public Land volumes of the 
American State Papers. The Senate Execzltive Jol~rnals are neces- 
sary to a detailed analysis of the appointments controversy of 
1822, and trustworthy information on appropriations can be 
secured only from the Statutes. 
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Edited Works 
'The story of cabinet discussions would sometimes be nonexistent 
and often meaningless without careful attention to appropriate 
volumes of Charles Francis Adams, ed., Memoirs of John Quincy 
Adams . . . , 12 vols. (Philadelphia, 1874-1877). Adams was 
rarely wrong on his facts, but his views, opinions, and evaluations 
of associates are too frequently strongly biased and jaundiced. 
The  value of Henry Adams, ed., T h e  Writings of Albert Gallatin, 
3 vols. (Philadelphia, 1879), is diminished by the omission of 
large portions of letters. The  total effect of a number of letters, 
most of which are easily accessible in the Gallatin Papers in the 
New-York Historical Society, is vastly different from that conveyed 
by the published version. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed., T h e  
Writings of James Monroe, 7 vols. (New York, 1898-1903); Charles 
R. King, ed., T h e  Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, 6 vols. 
(New York, 1894-1900); and the three volumes of James F. Hop- 
kins, ed., Mary W. M. Hargreaves, assoc. ed., T h e  Papers of Henry 
Clay (Lexington, Ky., 1959- ), contributed valuable information 
on many topics, while Catharina Visscher (Van Rensselaer) 
Bonney, comp., A Legacy of Historical Gleanings . . . , 2 vols. 
(Albany, N.Y., 1875), contains a number of letters no longer avail- 
able elsewhere, and Everett S. Brown, ed., T h e  Missouri Compro- 
mises and Presidential Politics, 1820-1825 (St. Louis, Mo., 1926), 
is important for ideas, opinions, and positions of several national 
figures during the half decade covered. Gaillard Hunt, ed., T h e  
First Forty Years of Washington Society . . . (New York, 1906), 
discloses important information on Crawford's family and social 
life, as well as political maneuverings and social activities in the 
national capital. E. B. Washburn, ed., T h e  Edwards Papers . . . 
(Chicago, 1884); Richard K. Crall6, ed., T h e  Works of John C. 
Calhoun, 6 vols. (New York, 1857-1864); and J. G. deRoulhac 
Hamilton, ed., "Letters to Bartlett Yancey," James Sprunt His- 
torical Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2, also have limited significance. 
Newspapers 
Niles' Weekly Register occupies a unique position for any stu- 
dent of the second, third, fourth, and fifth decades of the nine- 
teenth century: it is far more than a newspaper since it contains 
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not only news but copyings from papers throughout the country, 
many documents, reports, letters, and other materials that are no 
longer available elsewhere. At least one newspaper in each state 
-usually more than two-was run for the lengthy 1824 campaign; 
more comprehensive coverage was given to the Washington, D.C., 
and Georgia papers for all of Crawford's career. Among the most 
useful were: National Intelligencer, National Jozlrnal, Washing- 
ton Gazette, Washington Republican, Washington, D.C.; Augusta 
Chronicle and Georgia Advertiser, Milledgeville Georgia Journal, 
Savannah Republican, Athens Southern Banner, Athens Journal, 
Athens Gazette, Georgia; Raleigh Observer, Raleigh Star, North 
Carolina; Richmond Enquirer, Virginia; Baltimore Patriot, Feder- 
al Gazette & Baltimore Daily Advertiser, Baltimore American 6. 
Commercial Daily Advertiser, Maryland; Philadelphia Democratic 
Press, Pennsylvania; Albany Argus, Albany Microscope, New York; 
Boston Patriot, Boston Columbian Centinel, Tazrnton Free Press, 
Massachusetts; Portsmouth Journal, New Hampshire Patriot, New 
Hampshire; Mobile Commercial Advertiser, Montgomery Repub- 
lican, Alabama; Nashville Whig, Tennessee; and Illinois Intel- 
ligencer. 
Others 
Most biographies, monographs, and other secondary materials 
make little contribution to the understanding of Crawford's ca- 
reer. A few of these accounts do deal extensively with the Geor- 
gian, with his contemporaries, or with problems, issues, and events 
that are central to a proper perspective and evaluation of Craw- 
ford's activities. J. E. D. Shipp, Giant Days, or the Life and Times 
of William H.  Cruwford (Americus, Ga., 1909); [George M. Dud- 
ley], "Williani H. Crawford," James Herring and James Barton 
Longacre, T h e  National Portrait Gallery of Distinguished Ameri- 
cans (Philadelphia, 1840), vol. 4; Joseph H. Cobb, Leisure Lahors; 
or, Miscellanies Historical, Literary, and Political (New York, 
1858); George R. Gilmer, Sketches of Some of the First Setllers of 
Upper Georgia, of the Cherokees, and the Author (New York, 
1855; rev. ed., Americus, Ga., 1926); Ulrich B. Phillips, Georgia 
and State Rights (Washington, D.C., 1902); and Alvin 1,aroy 
Duckett, John Forsyth, Political Tactician (Athens, Ga., 1962), 
contribute most to the Georgia phase of his career. Nenry Adams, 
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History of the United S/a/es of America, 9 vols. (New York, 1909- 
191 1); Henry Adams, T h e  Life of Albert Gallalin (Ptiiladelphia, 
1850); Irving Brant, James Madison, 6 vols. (Indianapolis, Ind., 
1941-1961); Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, 3 vols. (New 
York, 1944-195 1); Samuel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams 
and llze Foundalion~ of American Foreign P o k y  (New York, 
1949); and Harry A~nmon, James Monroe: T h e  Q?~e.ll for Nl~lional 
Identity (New York, 1971), provide a more general and national 
setting. Ralph C. H.  Catterall, T h e  Second Bunk of /he  United 
Slates (Chicago, I!)OS), and Bray Hammond, Banks und Banking 
in America from the Revolzltion to the Civil War (New York, 
1957), are fundamental to comprehension of the bank and currency 
issues. T h e  same is true of Leonard D. White, T h e  leflersoninns: 
A StzitIy in Admini~trative History, 1501-1829 (New York, 1951), 
in the area of administrative practices and trends. DeAlva Stan- 
wood Alexander, A Political History of New Yorh, 3 vols. (New 
York, 1906-1909); Jabez D. Hammond, T h e  History of Political 
Parties in ihe State of New York, 2 vols. (Cooperstown, N.Y., 
1847); and Robert V. Remini, Martin Van Buren and the Making 
of the Democratic Party (New York, 1959), throw much light on 
political events in New York, especially during the 1816 and 1824 
elections. 
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310, 318, 323 
Fort Charlotte, 10 
Fortress Monroe, 82 
Fox Indians, 85 
France, 4, 29, 31-33, 35, 50, 78; Crawford 
as minister to, 53-77; spoliations on 
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See also National Intelligencer 
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Bonaparte, Napoleon 
i\'ashwille Gazette, 238 
iVashwille Whig,  239 
national debt, 147-48, 151-53, 159, 161. 
See also sinking fund 
i\'ational Intelligencer, 216,220, 221, 228, 
240, 243, 250, 277-78; prints Crawford's 
obituary, 341-42 
National Road, 168-70, 169n 
Nelson, Hugh, 243 
Neptune, 74, 78, 79 
Neuville, Baron Hyde de, 182-83, 193-94 
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O'Connor, John, 234, 302 
Oglethorpe County, Ga., 5, 14, 303 
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Stephens, Alexander H., 339, 339n, 345 
stock conversion plan, 162-63 
Supreme Court, vacancies on, 206-07, 
339-41 
Swift, Joseph G., 81-82, 83 
Tait, Charles, 10, 11, lln-12n, 13, 19, 220, 
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Watkins, Robert, 8n, 9 
Wayne, James M., 327 
Webster, Daniel, 127, 246 
Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 192 
TVeed, Thurlow, 279 
'IVellington, Duke of, 71 
TtTest Florida, annexation of, 43-47 
West Point, 83 
Wheaton, Henry, 233-34, 262, 280n 
\trhite, Hugh Lawson, 251, 308 
Wilkes County, Ga., 6, 40 
rvilkinson, James, 50, 50n 
IYillianis, David R., 174-75, 309, 340 
Williams, John, 236 
'tVilliams, Lewis, 302, 309 
364 INDEX 
Wilmington, Del., 74 Woodlawn, 13-15, 52, 79, 303 
Wilmington, N.C., 108 Worthington, Thomas, 205-06 
IVilson, James J., 220 Wright, Silas, 232 
Wilson, Thomas, 220 
Wirt, William, 121, 138, 172, 175, 176, Yancey, Bartlett, 220, 309 
179, 188, 189-91, 198, 248, 290n, 318, Yates, Joseph C., 272-73 
318n Yazoo land sales, 5, 6, 8n, 44 
Witherspoon, John, 328 Young, Samuel, 272-73 
Woodbury, Levi, 341 
